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ASTRACT 
 
Jean Paul Sartre proposed that: 
 
Historical situations vary…What does not vary is the necessity for him to exist in the world, to be at 
work there, to be there in the midst of other people, and to be mortal there. The limits are neither 
subjective nor objective, or rather, they have an objective and a subjective side. Objective because 
they are to be found everywhere and are recognizable everywhere; subjective because they are lived
1
 
and are nothing if man does not live them, that is, freely determine his existence with reference to 
them (Sartre 1987: 38, 39). 
 
The Existential philosophy as outlined by Sartre, Levinas, and Kierkegaard cares about 
the lived experiences of individuals. Such a view is in contradistinction to other 
philosophical views which have a tendency to reduce human experience, or to lose the 
individual in abstraction.  
 
This thesis has a central concern for the ethical care of patients in the National Health 
Service. In order to explore the concrete experiences of patients it is necessary to 
consider the care providers. To that end, the individual health professional then 
becomes the focus of study. 
 
To assist in this approach a double narrative runs through the thesis, which comprises 
exploring ethical decision making in the NHS, and also on the legal concept of clinical 
negligence. These two concepts are intertwined in that legal hearings and rulings have a 
                                                 
1
 Emphasis in the original. 
. 
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normative influence upon health care practice, and also influence public expectations. 
The explicit purpose of this approach was to ensure that the theory was explored and 
developed; grounded upon everyday clinical NHS practice, which includes legal and 
political influences. 
 
 
The first four chapters of the thesis constructs the three main areas of analysis; 
Philosophical, legal, and political. With this framework established, the critical analysis 
of five legal cases of clinical negligence (Chapters Five and Six), establishes 
convergences in the work of Sartre, Levinas, and Kierkegaard in relation to the subject, 
freedom and the ethical.  
 
The Kierkegaardian concept of kinesis
2
 is applied to explore the transition from 
possibility to actuality in ethical action. During this process a range of dynamics are 
identified in creating the concept as best described by Levinas as totalisation
3
 . 
 
Where previously the argument was located at the individual (subject) and 
organisational (system) level, in Chapter Seven it moves outwards to consider how the 
authentic individual can create a civil society. 
 
Given the recalcitrant barriers identified in the analysis, Chapter Eight considers 
existentialism as a theory of community and as contributing to epistemology. Together 
                                                 
2
 ‘Movement’. 
3
 Totalization involves the reduction of any form of difference to sameness for the purpose of enhancing 
the power of rationalization (Hutchens 2004:15). 
. 
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these theories are proposed as addressing the real needs of individuals, by promoting 
their freedom, and achieving unity in diversity. 
 
The recommendations in Chapter Nine are based upon the interplay of two main 
dialectics uncovered in the body of the thesis concerning ethics and epistemology. 
Deontology, Utilitarianism, and Virtue ethics were found to all contribute towards 
professional conduct. However, they were found to be insufficient because they reduce 
patients and health professionals’ existence to the same as everyone else. Further, 
Virtue ethics reverses the way in which ethical behaviour is evaluated in comparison to 
the other two main normative theories. That is, behaviour is evaluated against the virtue 
being foundational, as opposed to the act performed. However, there is no discussion 
on how the individual health professional would decide which approach to use. All 
three approaches then lack a crucial factor which is the existential dimension. 
Existential ethics is then presented as a possible approach to facilitate the development 
(kinesis) of health professionals to the ethical sphere of care. Existential ethics 
emphasises the pre-theoretical aspect in caring for patients. That is, it appreciates the 
individual and their difference, prior to any conceptualization which has the potential to 
reduce individual difference to sameness. From this perspective recommendations are 
outlined for facilitating individuals to develop the ethical aspect of care, for health care 
pedagogy, and for leadership within the NHS.  
. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION & BACKGROUND 
Background to the study. 
This doctoral thesis developed from an undergraduate research study which explored 
the ethical behaviour of health professionals working in an intensive care unit. The 
study found 72% of the patients had an endotracheal tube cuff pressure
4
 above the 
recommended safe pressure (MacLaren 1996). An education programme reduced the 
percentage of high endotracheal tube cuff pressures down to 44% of all patients. When 
staff were interviewed about the persisting high cuff pressures, they could provide high 
detail on the pathophysiology resultant on these pressures, but indicated that more 
visible aspects of care were of priority in comparison to the less visible cuff pressure 
(MacLaren 1996). The question then arose regarding the motivation for ethical 
behaviour. While the evidence base for this issue is now well established, the problem 
still persists, suggesting that this problem is more than solely an educational one 
(Sengupta et al. 2004, Shibasaki et al. 2012, Sole et al. 2011, Sultan et al. 2011).  
 
 
High quality clinical care is delivered by an interprofessional health care team 
(Pethybridge 2004, Reeves et al. 2009, Kvarnström & Cedersund 2006). A 
collaborative team-based model of health care delivery has become increasingly valued 
over the traditional hierarchical model of medical dominance (Grumbach & 
Bodenheimer 2004, Wagner 2000, Leape et al.2009). As the literature review will later 
                                                 
4
 An endotracheal tube is passed into the trachea when a patient requires mechanical ventilation. In order 
for the tube to be air tight, a small balloon at the end of the tube (cuff) is inflated to achieve this airtight 
seal. The pressure should be maintained in the range of 20-30 cm H20 (Sengupta 2004). 
. 
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demonstrate- that while an epistemology of deductive reasoning and reductionist logic 
is still used by doctors in decision making-it tends to omit the other dimensions of 
personhood such as psychological, social, relational, and spiritual. This finding is 
significant given that the biopsychosocial model of care has been espoused by health 
professionals for more than three decades (Engel 1977, Engel 1980, Smith 2002). And 
yet, in 2010 key research studies are finding that medical staff focus upon the patients 
functioning and remove the existential meanings from the assessment (Agledahl et al. 
2010). Such reductionism to the biomedical module ‘…involved a moral as well as a 
practical simplification (Agledahl et.al. 2010; 107)’. Importantly, the authors highlight 
that this is an ‘…integral part of clinical practice and not an individual flaw (Agledahl 
et. al. 2010; 107)’. One vital aspect of this process was termed ‘Existential filtering’ 
‘…which took the focus away from the patients’ private feelings and what the suffering 
meant to the particular patient (Agledahl 2010; 111)’ 
 
The moral domain of health care. 
Health care has a moral domain precisely because medicine, nursing, and the allied 
health professions aim to relieve patients’ suffering and to improve their health 
(Pellegrino 2001, Cronqvist et al. 2004, Kulju et al. 2013). The political influence of 
this moral aspect has been recognised since the inception of the National Health 
Service (NHS) in 1948. The then Secretary of State for health-Aneurin Bevan-stated 
“We now have the moral leadership of the world (Anon 1948)”. This was in reference 
to the founding principles of the NHS. These pronounced that health care in the NHS 
would be; universal, equitable, comprehensive, high quality, free at the point of 
delivery, and centrally funded (National Health Service Bill 1946). Since its launch, the 
. 
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history of the NHS has been one of reforms (Butler 2010, Klein 2010). Two landmark 
reforms moved the NHS philosophy to one of consumerism. The first was brought in 
by the Chief Executive of Sainsbury’s which instigated general management into the 
NHS with the aim of making health services more business-like (Harrison 1990). The 
second, more radical reform was to introduce a quasi-market into health care (Greener 
2002, Timmins 1995). The conservative Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher considered 
the NHS had become a ‘…bottomless financial pit… (Thatcher 1993; 608)’. While the 
internal market could contribute fiscally, little consideration was given in moving 
towards a market economy. That is, little thought was given to how splitting health 
authorities from hospitals, and making hospital trusts compete on the market for 
customers, would affect patient care, particularly on the moral domain.    
 
The moral domain of teaching. 
Similar reforms, influenced by a market economy, have changed the philosophy of 
higher education (Barnett 2011, Naidoo and Jamieson 2005). The dominant economic 
philosophy within higher education has become neoliberalism (Olssen & Peters 2005). 
It has introduced a new mode of governmentality with the commodification of teaching 
and research (Olssen & Peters 2005). Neoliberalism as the dominant economic 
discourse has placed universities on the open market, and as such has contributed 
towards the globalisation of higher education (Barnett 2000). Under such a managerial 
system teaching as a commodity is measured with performative criteria and valued in 
measurable outputs (Barnett 2000). Higher education has become part of the 
knowledge economy and the role of universities has become crucial to governments 
around the world.   
. 
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Alasdair MacIntyre provides a helpful analysis of the university within this knowledge 
economy as an input-output machine (MacIntyre 2004, MacIntyre & Dunne 2002). 
According to MacIntyre the students, as raw material, are the input, and output is 
measured by exam results, number of graduates, and research publications (MacIntyre 
& Dunne 2002). However, the market economy sets up a dynamic within the university 
system due to the focus on outputs as the basis for competition. The market economy 
also sets up a dynamic due to industry
5
  stipulating the required graduate competencies 
for the undergraduate curricula (Pellegrino 1999). The combining of these two 
pressures can influence teachers and students. 
 
Schapper and Mayson (2005) propose that with the curricula prescribed and an 
outcome driven approach to teaching, academics become cast in the role of process 
labourer. With the emphasis on standardisation there is a risk of losing the internal 
goods
6
 of the practice of teaching. Barnett supports this view by arguing that the 
bureaucratic system requires staff to ‘…subjugate their academic personae with the 
corporate persona… (Barnett 2011; 51)’. Barnett goes on to identify how the 
bureaucratic university affects the existential dimension of the lecturer; ‘…it limits 
academic identity, it corrals academic life into an undue uniformity, it allows no escape 
(Barnett 2011:56)’. The difficulty identified in MacIntyre’s analysis is that those who 
lack the relevant experience of the practice ‘are incompetent thereby as judges of 
internal goods (MacIntyre 2004: 189)’. A potential problem then arises where the 
                                                 
5
 NHS in this case. 
6
 Alisdair MacIntyre distinguished between internal goods and external goods to a practice in After 
Virtue (MacIntyre 2004). Internal goods are defined as those goods which can only be had by 
engagement in the particular practice. 
. 
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managerial system lacks insight to the goods of a practice such as teaching health 
professionals. Such a view would be supported by Hyland who argued that competence 
strategies ‘underpinned as they are by technicist and managerial assumptions cannot 
accommodate the ethical and epistemological bases of professional practice (Hyland 
1997:492)’. This is a significant point as Kreber identifies that it is ‘only by exercising 
the virtues of justice, courage, and truthfulness that we can both sustain the standards of 
excellence that have historically developed within a practice and gain access to the 
internal goods of a practice (Kreber 2013; 85)’. When an individual has to subjugate 
their virtues, for the sake of prioritising the external good of a practice, questions then 
arise about authentic being within an organisation. This is one of the main existential 
themes which will be discussed in this thesis. 
 
Introduction to Existentialism. 
Given the subjugation of the existential dimension in both health care and in teaching, 
existentialism is being used as the main philosophical framework in this thesis to 
analyse how such a down-playing would affect the quality of care provided to patients. 
 
Existentialism came to fruition following the Second World War. It became identified 
with a cultural movement that flourished in Europe in the 1940s and 1950s. Mróz 
(2009) explains that there are at least three basic connotations to existentialism; as a 
certain life style with a new way of interpreting the post-war reality, as an influence 
upon the art-world
7
, and in its strict sense as a philosophy. While the first of these 
                                                 
7
 Some of the literary approaches, such as the use of the novel, and literary techniques such as the use of 
pseudonyms will be discussed later in relation to teaching ethics. 
. 
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connotations is a passé event now, existentialism has continued influence upon the 
other two areas, i.e. in the art-world and in philosophy. As a philosophy it has further 
influenced theology and psychology.  
 
While the nineteenth century Danish philosopher, Søren Kierkegaard (1813-1855), and 
German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900), came to be seen as precursors of 
the movement, there were earlier origins to this theoretical outlook (Please see 
Appendix 5. p.436). Flynn proposes that existentialism, with its focus on the proper 
way of behaving - as opposed to an abstract set of theoretical truths- can be traced back 
to Socrates (469-399 BC)  (Flynn 2006;1). 
 
Existential philosophy selects a distinctive cluster of philosophical problems. In its 
acute phase this could be seen in the focus of trying to make sense of the reality of the 
war years, and then the postwar ‘…all-pervasive feeling of historical and personal 
crisis, of abandonment, this acute consciousness of the lack of moral or ethical 
orientation… (Mróz 2009; 127). It is this concern with human existence that delineates 
the area of philosophical inquiry for existentialism. From this perspective of the 
subjective, existing individual, existentialism claims that a new grammar is required, 
not found in previous philosophy, in order to understand the existing individual. 
 
Existential philosophy was specifically selected as the main philosophy in this thesis 
because of its focus upon the existing individual. With its main themes of developing 
an individual self, having a concern for the moral domain of life, developing an 
. 
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authentic self, and being free to act, it was considered an appropriate overarching 
dimension to appraise clinical practice within the NHS. 
 
Søren Kierkegaard (1813-1855), Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-1980), and Emmanuel Levinas 
(1905-1995) were chosen because they each brought a unique perspective to the 
discussion on the ethical domain of health care. Although it is well recognised that they 
have opposing views on many of the main themes concerning the existing individual, 
this only proved to enrich the dialogue by having a creative dynamic from which to 
consider the different arguments. Some would even challenge that Levinas is not 
usually classed as an existentialist. The essential contribution from each of these 
provocative thinkers will now be discussed in turn, commencing with Kierkegaard. 
 
Kierkegaard. 
Søren Kierkegaard was a prolific writer both in theology and in philosophy. Two of the 
main critiques in his work are against the Danish church in his home town of 
Copenhagen, and the other was against his perennial adversary Hegel. In attempting to 
highlight the crowd mentality of the Danish church Kierkegaard developed the concept 
of ‘Christendom’ in contrast to an individual faith which would be Christianity 
(Hannay & Marino 1998). One of his main themes remains constant from this period; 
that of movement. The example he gave was that where ‘Christendom’ was being, 
where in comparison one became a Christian (Carlisle 2005). In addition to providing a 
negative critique on Hegel’s all-encompassing philosophical system, Kierkegaard 
opposed the lack of movement in Hegel’s philosophy; ‘It is indeed curious to make 
movement the basis in a sphere in which movement is inconceivable or to have 
. 
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movement explain logic, whereas logic cannot explain movement (Kierkegaard 1992a; 
99 & 100)’. The existentialist8 perspective then that Kierkegaard brings to this thesis is 
movement through his emphasis on becoming over being. ‘…ethics, which does not 
have the medium of being but of becoming (Kierkegaard 1992a; 421)’. This central 
theme will now be developed in discussing Kierkegaard’s stages of existence. 
 
The Stages of Existence. 
For Kierkegaard, to exist means to take up a stance in relation to one’s life and world. 
He argues in his work for a theory that begins with the individual’s experience of 
existence rather from abstract philosophical systems such as Hegel’s which arguably 
are unable to capture the existing individual. The ‘stages’ or ‘spheres9’ of existence are 
three main types of subjectivity; aesthetic, ethical and religious. As different types of 
subjectivity, they ‘…refer to ‘how’ one lives, rather than ‘what one believes or does 
(Carlisle 2006; 75)’.  
 
The purpose of distinguishing these spheres was to assist Kierkegaard’s readers to 
reflect and to see the truth about their own individual existence. Carlisle explains that 
the stages are there to instruct sophisticated, educated readers who believe they already 
know what it means to be ethical (Carlisle 2006). The overarching schema of the 
                                                 
8
 Kierkegaard has a unique literary style to address the existing individual. Some of the features are that 
he speaks to the reader on a personal level. Due to the use of pseudonyms the reader is uncertain to 
Kierkegaard’s own views. This literary technique is developed further in works such as Either/Or 
(Kierkegaard 1992b) where the reader is left to puzzle over the contrasting points of view expressed by 
the different opinions in the book. The final example would be where Kierkegaard wrote Fear and 
Trembling (Kierkegaard 1985) and Repetition (Kierkegaard 2009) under different pseudonyms and then 
they were published on the same day. Yet some suggest they should be read as companion pieces 
(Carlisle 2006 12).  
9
 Kierkegaard switched from ‘stages’ to ‘spheres’ in his discussions of the aesthetic, ethical and religious 
forms of life (Carlisle 2006:86). 
. 
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existential framework shows a movement towards ‘interiority’ or inwardness. As the 
stages are outlined below some of the central existential themes will be identified; 
freedom, authenticity, and the necessity to choose one’s life. Kierkegaard summarizes 
this where he states;  
 
‘Ethics focuses upon the individual, and ethically understood it is every individual’s 
task to become a whole human being, just as it is the presupposition of ethics that 
everyone is born in the state of being able to become that (1992a;346)’. 
 
This proposition will first be considered in the first of the descriptions of subjectivity, 
in the aesthetic stage.  
 
The Aesthetic. 
Given that for Kierkegaard, to exist means to take up a stance in relation to one’s life 
and world, it will be seen that the aesthete has a very weak sense of self. It can be seen 
from the table (Appendix 1.p.424) that the aesthete is characterized as being immersed 
in the world of immediacy and pleasure. Since Kierkegaard defines freedom as a 
person’s power to become something, to have direction in their life, and to have the 
capacity to act, the aesthete lacks freedom. In relation to the health professional, the 
aesthete’s only value is pleasure, so they are self-interested, and have not yet developed 
a self to care for others. As such they are uninterested in the ethical domain of health 
care practice for the ethical lacks excitement
10 ; ‘Beneath the sky of the aesthetic 
everything is light, pleasant and fleeting: when ethics come along everything becomes 
                                                 
10
 It will be proposed later that this stage is similar to Sartre’s concept of bad faith. 
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hard, angular, an unending ennui
11
 (Kierkegaard 1992b; 305)’. From this it can be 
established that the aesthete fails to recognize the ethical because they have not yet 
chosen this type of subjectivity. 
 
The Ethical. 
While Kierkegaard provides a negative critique of the aesthete, the overarching schema 
of the framework shows that the previous stage (aesthetic) is not completely abandoned, 
but rather is transformed in the ethical. Kierkegaard also points out that the stages are 
qualitatively different so it takes a ‘leap’ to make the transition between stages. In the 
movement from the aesthetic to the ethical, this is facilitated by irony which by self-
undermining the individual helps them to see the aesthetic type of subjectivity 
untenable. 
 
Crucially in the ethical stage the individual chooses good and evil/or excludes them. 
There is a change here in comparison to the aesthete in the area of decision making, in 
that the ethical stage the individual becomes seriously engaged with decision making. 
This includes the ethical individual taking responsibility for developing their self, and 
in turn they have a sincere concern for others. 
 
Kierkegaard poses a significant problem in his work Fear and Trembling where he 
considers the Old Testament biblical story of Abraham being called to sacrifice his son 
Isaac (Kierkegaard 1985). Significantly, Kierkegaard defines the ethical as the 
universal; 
                                                 
11
 A feeling of listlessness and dissatisfaction arising from a lack of occupation or excitement. 
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The ethical as such is the universal, and as the universal it applies to everyone, which can be put 
from another point of view by saying that it applies at every moment (Kierkegaard 1985; 83). 
 
When the ethical is defined as the universal, as duty and obligation (Kant), and is 
concerned with acting for the sake of the community as a whole (Utilitarianism), the 
question arises if the ethical can ever be suspended? Kierkegaard replies that the ethical 
can be suspended for something else which lies outside of the ethical sphere. This 
would be the single individual as they stand in relationship to the Absolute. 
Kierkegaard calls this movement a ‘teleological 12  suspension of the ethical’ 
(Kierkegaard 1985; 83-95). While Kierkegaard explored this concept in theological 
terms, this theory of the teleological suspension of the ethical will be considered within 
the thesis in relation to whistle blowing, and justice for patients when the ethical 
system is called into question. It will be argued that while world religions do influence 
health care ethical debates, there is also the potential to see Kierkegaard’s argument 
from a wider perspective, where the relation with the Absolute can potentially be faith 
in the health care system and its founding principles. Consideration of this view will be 
outlined in the religious stage below. 
 
The Religious. 
In many respects the ‘Religious’ term is a misnomer, and Kierkegaard spent most of his 
life highlighting its antonym, which would be personal, individual faith. This was 
Kierkegaard’s position even when he was dying in hospital. At this time he refused a 
                                                 
12
 Teleological comes from the Greek word telos which means ‘having reached its end, finished, 
complete (Liddell 1992; 797)’. It is commonly translated as end, purpose or goal.  
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visit from his brother who was a theologian and pastor. When his friend asked if he 
would like to receive the Eucharist, Kierkegaard confirmed that he would, but from a 
layperson because he considered pastors as civil servants of the Crown (Kirmmse 1998; 
15). This is a continuation of Kierkegaard’s distinction between religiosity 
(Christendom) and true faith (Christianity). 
 
The role of world religions is discussed in the thesis in relation to decision making, and 
the hermeneutical challenge of interpreting ancient texts in a postmodern society. In the 
religious stage Kierkegaard offers a unique perspective on what the individual turns to 
in concrete situations when several rules/duties/obligations may all apply at once, when 
we are forced to ‘choose outside any rule and from inside ourselves (Barrett 1990;168)’. 
This view anticipates Levinas’ concept of totalisation; where the chief movement of 
modernity is a drift toward mass society, which means the death of the individual as 
life becomes ever more collectivized and externalized. Where Kierkegaard applied his 
critique to the possibility of region becoming institutionalized, it is applied in the thesis 
to the individual health professional within the NHS system. 
 
Carlisle helpfully explains that although it seems clear that there is a progression from 
the aesthetic to the ethical to the religious ‘…I might move between all three within a 
single day (Carlisle 2006:87)’. These three stages of existence will be discussed in the 
corpus of the thesis in analyzing the cases of clinical negligence. First, they will be 
reviewed in conjunction with Sartre’s ontology. 
 
 
. 
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Sartre. 
Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-1980) was not only a French philosopher, but his œuvre is a 
unique phenomenon as he has also been a major playwright, novelist, political theorist, 
and literary critic (Baldwin 1995). One of the major achievements in his philosophy 
concerns freedom to exist as an individual.  
 
Prior to Sartre’s work on existential freedom there had been a long standing debate 
between determinists-who believe that everything that happens is fully determined by 
what has gone before it-and the proponents of free will ( Kane 2005). An extreme 
example of determinism within the world of physics was proposed by Laplace. He 
stated that;  
 
if a powerful intellect understood Newton’s laws, and had a description of the current position and 
momentum of each particle in the universe, and the requisite mathematical ability, that powerful 
intellect could predict and retrodict every event in the history of the universe (Weatherford 1995; 
195).  
 
This thesis of determinism within physics was termed the ‘clockwork universe’ and it 
dominated the world of physics for two hundred years (Weatherford 1995). The greater 
concern for the current discussion is whether individual humans are subject to the same 
sort of determinism. The determinists would argue that we are the products of our 
upbringing and social conditioning, with genetic make-up and psychology influencing 
us. 
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In this way free will is seen as an illusion with everything that people do is causally or 
logically necessitated. Sartre, by contrast attempts to show that free will is an intrinsic 
and necessary feature of the human condition (Cox 2006). Without this existential 
freedom health professionals would not be responsible beings capable of choice. Nor 
would there be any requirement to think or to make decisions as there would be no real 
possibilities or alternatives. The structure of Sartre’s existential freedom will now be 
set out below. 
 
Freedom 
Where Kierkegaard criticized Hegel for the lack of movement and the all-
encompassing nature of his philosophical system, Sartre finds Hegel lacking on his 
theory of being (ontology). One of the key areas where Sartre disagrees with Hegel is 
where he thought that there is neither being nor non-being, only becoming. This is 
crucial to Sartre’s work, and he makes it clear that this difference is what gives the 
individual freedom to be. Rather that the  abstract ‘clockwork universe’ Sartre’s chief 
concern was with the truth of the lived experiences of people as they struggle with the 
obstacles of other people who are for and against them, and to have free will in a world 
where economic, social, political and cultural structures serve to impede rather than 
support individual flourishing. In contrast to Kierkegaard, Sartre was an atheist and as 
such rejected any theological structure that would suggest any predetermined values in 
the world. In so doing Sartre emphasized freedom to make decisions as the source of 
value lies in individual’s choices. The locus of the moral problem thereby changes to 
being a human problem which confronts us individually as personal responsibility. 
Similarly to Kierkegaard, Sartre insisted that individuals are responsible for what they 
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make of themselves-regardless of the situations they find themselves in
13
. This 
relationship between being and non-being (nothing) is central to his entire philosophy, 
and serves as a consistent thread in exploring his complex system. The overarching 
existential schema will now be described. 
 
Sartre’s theory of freedom is set out in three modes of consciousness. They are named 
being-in-itself, being-for-itself, and being-for-others. The focus of the discussion will 
be on the in-itself  and  for-itself.  
 
Being in-itself  is unreflective. It is what the individual is before they begin to think 
about what they are. The true role within the structure of being for in-itself  is best 
uncovered in comparison to the for-itself. 
 
Being  for-itself  is that mode of consciousness which think’s about the in-itself. As 
such it is that mode of consciousness which considers its being. By being able to reflect 
upon the in-itself, the for-itself  has a constitutive role in that it can imagine how the in-
itself could develop in the future. For Sartre the existing individual is the relationship 
between the in-itself  being (the thing I am), and the thinking about of the thing I am 
(for-itself); consciousness of being. Since –according to Sartre - we are not predefined 
in any way, individuals are free to develop their being and to define their existence. 
Such acknowledged freedom causes anguish, and one main way to resolve this anguish 
is to live in bad faith where the  for-itself  attempts to not choose itself. 
                                                 
13
 Sartre was a prisoner of war and yet even towards the latter years of his life he maintained that ‘in the 
end one is always responsible for what is made of one’. 
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Sartre’s overarching existential schema is applicable to this thesis as it provides 
structure in exploring if health professionals have freedom to exist as individuals. It 
provides an existential grammar to consider if health professionals struggle with the 
existing-in-situation with the potential for bad faith. Sartre identifies two types of bad 
faith. One where the individual tries to escape the anguish related to the freedom to 
define their existence. The other is where the individual discounts their antecedent 
condition-which includes facticity-as if they were pure possibility, living in the future, 
uncumbered by any past. Both forms of bad faith are unrealistic about the human 
condition by insisting it is either transcendence or facticity, when in fact it is both. 
Those who choose the challenge to live this truth about their condition are said by 
Sartre to be ‘authentic’. The authentic person is an individual, not just part of the crowd, 
or as will be seen in Levinasian terms totalised. 
 
Levinas. 
The Lithuanian-French philosopher Emmanuel Levinas (1906-1995) proposed the need 
for thinking beyond ontology. In Totality and Infinity (2008) Levinas provides a 
critique of western philosophical thought and practice, which he considered to be a 
striving for totalization. This is one of the key concepts in Levinas’ work which means 
the universe is reduced to an origin and unity due to panoramic overviews and 
dialectical syntheses (Peperzak 1996). Writing against such Western totalitarianism 
Levinas maintains that the human and divine Other cannot be reduced to a totality of 
which they would only be elements. 
 
. 
 
31 
Levinas was a pupil of Husserl and Heidegger and was therefore influenced by their 
work on phenomenology. Indeed, Levinas’s work is deeply indebted to the Husserlian 
theory of intentionality, with the most significant aspect being his contestation of the 
ethical implications of its epistemolgical account of intersubjectivity. Levinas 
considered Husserl’s intentionality as privileging a representational model of 
consciousness. In other words, every objectifying act is necessarily either a 
representation or founded on a representation; 
 
Yet already with the first exposition of intentionality as a philosophical thesis there appeared the 
privilege of representation. The thesis that every intentionality is either a representation or founded 
on a representation dominates the Logische Untersuchungen
14
 and returns as an obsession in all of 
Husserl’s work (Levinas 2008;122).  
 
At the heart of Levinas’ philosophy is a reversal of Husserl’s theory of intentionality. 
By enacting this reversal Levinas inaugurates a new style of phenomenology, and 
places a new emphasis on ethics by pronouncing ‘Ethics as First Philosophy (Levinas 
2009a)’. Since this distinctive account of the ethical is so crucial to this thesis, 
intentionality will first be explained, and then Levinas’ reversal of Husserl’s 
intentionality will be discussed in relation to his face-to-face encounter with the Other. 
Firstly, intentionality will be briefly explained. 
 
 
 
                                                 
14
 Edmund Husserl. Logical Investigations. Published in 1900-01. 
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Intentionality. 
Intentionality has been central to discussion within philosophy in the context of 
ontological and metaphysical questions about the fundamental nature of mental states 
such as perceiving, knowing, and experiencing (Jacob 2010). The philosopher and 
psychologist Franz Brentano revived the term from medieval philosophy in 1874 when 
he defined it as ‘the direction of the mind on an object (Crane 1995; 412)’. The word 
intentionality comes from the Latin intentio, from the verb intendere, which means 
‘directed towards some goal or thing (Jacob 2010)’. Intentionality then is a 
characteristic feature of our mental states which are evident in what we commonly call 
being ‘conscious’ or ‘aware’. Examples would be when we-as conscious beings- are 
conscious of physical objects or other people. In this way each such mental experience 
is a representation of something other than itself and so gives a sense of something.  
 
Husserl’s interest in intentionality was inspired by his teacher Brentano. Although 
Husserl placed great emphasis on the lived experience (Erlebnis) he continued to 
maintain that practical acts are necessarily founded on cognitive presentations. 
According to Levinas this elevation of the theoretical mode of intentionality leads to an 
intellectualism. Peperzak claims that in this sense Levinas characterizes Husserl’s 
philosophy as an ‘objectifying’ or ‘representationist’ mode of thought (Peperzak 1997). 
 
 
Levinas’ reversal of intentionality-the face-to-face. 
Cohen helpfully emphasizes that the face-to-face encounter between the self and the 
other person, is not a concept, rather it is a concrete reality, which actually occurs with 
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all the particularity of the Other (Cohen 2007). Konopka perceptively identifies, that 
Levinas’ reversal of intentionality ‘…was never meant to render intentional analysis 
null and void, but to search for a prior relation of transcendence
15
 not proper to acts of 
objectification (Konopka 2009;150)’. Levinas uncovers this relation prior to concepts 
and prior to Husserl’s intentionality. This feature is seen in his conversation regarding 
face with Philippe Nemo, where Levinas explains; ‘The relation with face can surely be 
dominated by perception, but what is specifically the face is what cannot be reduced to 
that (Levinas 2007; 85 & 86)’. 
 
Levinas identifies the potential limiting dynamic of intentional analysis-applying 
concepts to the other person-where I want to control the other person for my purposes 
or ends. The power of such an epistemology can be seen where Levinas pronounces; 
 
But in knowledge there also appears the notion of an intellectual activity or of a reasoning will-a 
way of doing something which consists precisely of thinking through knowing, of seizing something 
and making it one’s own, or reducing to presence and representing the difference of being, an 
activity which appropriates and grasps the otherness of the own (Levinas 2009b: 76). 
 
The face-to-face encounter resists this grasp, classification, and domination. However, 
Levinas details the vulnerability of the other in terms of being ‘weak’, ‘poor’, ‘the 
widow and the orphan’, ‘whereas I am the rich or the powerful (Levinas 2009b:48)’. As 
a result, Levinas locates the non symmetrical nature of the relationship at this juncture, 
and in other terms names it a break in the horizons of everyday experience; 
                                                 
15
 Emphasis added. 
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The expression the face introduces into the world does not defy the feebleness of my powers, but my 
ability for power
16
. The face, still a thing among things, breaks through the form that nevertheless 
delimits it. This means concretely: the face speaks to me and thereby invites me to a relation 
incommensurate with a power exercised, be it enjoyment or knowledge (Levinas 2008:198). 
 
With this fundamental encounter with the Other established, Levinas then develops, 
repeats, and refines the formulation in order to open our eyes to this hidden aspect of 
everyday life (Morgan 2011). Some of the significant aspects which will be developed 
in the body of the thesis are from his essay ‘Is Ontology Fundamental? (Levinas 2006)’. 
In contrast to the more usual asymmetrical relationship within healthcare - where the 
nurse or doctor have dominance over the patient due to their superior knowledge and 
skills of the health condition- Levinas states the relation occurs in the vocative
17
 
(Levinas 2006). This call from the Other is prior to epistemology, ontology, and even 
philosophy
18
. Due to this call being a command it cannot be ignored. Rather, Levinas 
develops the hold this call has over me, and states it will hold me hostage.  
 
                                                 
16
 “Mon pouvoir de pouvoir.” This footnote is in the original text. 
17
 Latin. vocativus from vocare which means ‘to call’. Vocative is a case of nouns, pronouns and 
adjectives in Lain and other languages, used in addressing or invoking a person (Soanes & Stevenson 
2003; 1973). 
18
 Levinas strictly maintains his arguments within philosophy. However, some of his ideas are perhaps 
easier to see within theology. An example would be where Levinas seems to present paradoxes such as 
the Other being ‘weak’, ‘poor’, an ‘orphan’, and yet at the same time having height, infinity, being able 
to ‘command’, and that there is a trace of the absolute Other in the Other (person) (Levinas 2008:251). 
This is best seen within Judeo-Christian theology of the Incarnation where God took on human flesh in 
the form of the second person in the trinity; Jesus Christ (Berkhof 1981; 333). The detail of Levinas’ 
paradox is clear in the New Testament-Matthew 25. Jesus is judging nations based on how they have 
helped the hungry, thirsty, naked, and sick. When the question is posed of when any individual could 
have ever welcomed Jesus as a stranger, naked, sick or in prison, the answer is given; ‘Truly, I say to you, 
as you did it to one of the least of these my brethren, you did it to me’. In this way, due to the trace of 
God in each individual person, they can be poor and hungry, but they also have the trace of the infinite in 
them (height). 
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This reversal of intentionality and the focus upon the relation with the Other allows 
Levinas to develop a new phenomenology (Crowell 2012). This new view can be seen 
where Levinas proposes; 
 
…Already of itself ethics is an “optics19”. It is not limited to preparing for the theoretical exercise of 
thought, which would monopolize transcendence. The traditional opposition between theory and 
practice will disappear before the metaphysical transcendence by which a relation with the 
absolutely other, or truth, is established, and of which ethics is the royal road (Levinas 2008:29). 
 
The foundation of this relationship towards the other is ethics; 
 
‘We name this calling into question of my spontaneity by the presence of the Other ethics. The 
strangeness of the Other, his irreducibility to the I, to my thoughts and my possessions, is precisely 
accomplished as a calling into question of my spontaneity, as ethics (Levinas 2008: 43)’. 
 
The calling into question of my spontaneity occurs in the call of the human face. This 
ethical perspective from Levinas is explored in relation to legal responsibility during 
the analyses of the legal cases of clinical negligence. 
 
Levinas and Sartre. Differing perspectives on the human encounter. 
The face as outlined above is distinctly different from Sartre’s The Look. By 
considering the two ways of encountering the Other, it can be seen that Levinas’ 
phenomenology has developed from Sartre’s work, particularly on Being-for-the others. 
                                                 
19
 From the Greek optikos from optos ‘seen’ (Soanes & Stevenson 2003:1236). Allows us to see.  
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Consideration will now be given to these encounters, commencing with Sartre’s being 
for-the other. 
 
Being-for-the-Others. 
Sartre’s being for-the Others will be discussed in the thesis as this mode of being can 
limit the health professionals’ identity. It occurs when the individual experiences 
themselves as seen by the Other, or when they can imagine themselves from the point 
of view of the Other. Sartre develops this phenomenon of encounter through a series of 
vignettes in Being and Nothingness (Sartre 2000). 
 
The first vignette that Sartre introduces involves seeing a man in an empty park. Where 
previously the individual was alone in the park they could view the park from their own 
view (Solipsism). However, the awareness of the man’s presence in the park affects the 
individuals situation, in that there is a disintegration of the of the world from my own 
point of view; 
 
Thus suddenly an object has appeared which has stolen the world from me. Everything is in place; 
everything still exists for me; but everything is traversed by an invisible flight and fixed in the 
direction of a new object. The appearance of the Other in the world corresponds therefore to a fixed 
sliding of the whole universe, to a decentralization of the world which undermines the centralization 
which I am simultaneously effecting (Sartre 2000: 255). 
 
Sartre portrays this situation of the reorientation of the world towards this man as ‘a 
kind of drain hole…’ where my world ‘is perpetually flowing off through this hole 
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(Sartre 2000; 256)’. The relevant fact is that the Other is a threat to my centralization 
and can cause a radical reorientation of my being.   
 
In the second vignette Sartre portrays a voyeur at a keyhole. While on his own and 
involved in his actions the individual is in a solipsistic consciousness (Being-in-itself). 
The look changes the mode of being; 
 
But all of a sudden I hear footsteps in the hall. Someone is looking at me! What does this mean? It 
means that I am suddenly affected in my being and that essential modifications appear in my 
structure… (Sartre 2000; 260). 
 
The look from the Other
20
effects a change in the situation, in that the individual 
becomes an object for the Other’s subjectivity. Consequently, the Other becomes a 
threat to the individual’s freedom due to this objectification. This is because when the 
individual experiences himself as seen by the Other he immediately ceases to be a 
transcendent subject (Linsenbard 2010). Sartre argues that conflict is necessary in this 
situation as the individual attempts to reclaim their self as seen as their project in the 
world. While it was previously identified above that there were two types of bad faith 
relating to the individual, bad faith can also involve attempts at objectifying the Other 
in an attempt to degrade the Other’s assessment of me (Linsenbard 2010;63). This 
mode of being will be discussed in the thesis in relation to the existential freedom of 
health professionals. 
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 Sartre explains that it does not have to be a physical look from two eyes, ‘But the look will be given 
just as well on occasion when there is rustling of branches, or the sound of a footstep followed by silence, 
or the slight opening of a shutter, or a slight movement of a curtain (Sartre 2000;257)’. 
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Crucially for phenomenology, Sartre discovers that the ‘…experiencing the Other as 
subject cannot begin with our experience of some particular thing in the world. It must 
begin with how I experience myself as an object
21
(Crowell 2012; 11). Sartre’s account 
of the Other’s subjectivity clears ‘the way for Levinas to reverse the terms of the 
traditional priority of ontology over ethics (Crowell 2012; 11). 
 
The focus of the study. 
In his book, After Virtue, Alasdair MacIntyre provides the scenario where the world of 
natural science suffers a catastrophe, where a Know-Nothing political movement 
destroys much of the systematic research process underpinning knowledge, to the 
extent that only fragments remain. Significantly, people continued to use the technical 
language of science: 
 
The hypothesis which I wish to advance is that in the actual world which we inhabit the language of 
morality is in the same state of grave disorder as the language of natural science in the imaginary 
world which I described. What we possess, if this view is true, are the fragments of a conceptual 
scheme, parts which now lack those contexts from which their significance derived. We possess 
indeed simulacra of morality, we continue to use many of the key expressions. But we have - very 
largely, if not entirely – lost our comprehension, both theoretical and practical, of morality 
(MacIntyre 2004:2).  
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 Emphasis in the original. 
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Most importantly MacIntyre goes on to emphasise ‘What would appear to be rival and 
competing premises for which no further argument could be given would abound 
(MacIntyre 2004: 1 & 2)’.  
 
The aim of this research was to explore MacIntyre’s hypothesis within health care. That 
is to evaluate the extent to which there are fragments of differing moral frameworks 
within health care theory and practice. 
 
The research was undertaken using existential philosophy as the main evaluative 
framework. 
 
Main Hypothesis. 
The main hypothesis of this thesis holds that health professionals are not existentially 
free when they care for patients within the NHS. In other words, they lack existential 
autonomy to provide the highest quality of care.  
 
Main proposition. 
This thesis proposes to put forward an existential ethics developed from the philosophy 
of Kierkegaard, Sartre, and Levinas as an alternative way of caring for patients within 
the NHS. 
 
This thesis is set out in the following chapters; 
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Outline of Chapters 
Chapter One. Introduction & Background 
Chapter Two. Research Method 
There are two main methods used in this thesis. The overall theoretical method is 
outlined first in section 2.1., and the specific method used to analyse the legal 
transcripts is provided in section 2.2; 
 
2.1. Theoretical Analysis 
In this section the main method used in the theoretical analysis is explained. 
Specifically, the method is one of what could be termed, ethical-existence 
phenomenology. The main philosophers considered in the body of the thesis are 
introduced. 
 
2.2. Legal Analysis 
An outline is provided in order to contextualise clinical negligence within the law of 
Tort. This section explains the specific method of the Black-letter approach used in 
Case law. It then concludes by detailing and justifying the selection of the ten legal 
transcripts on clinical negligence for analysis. 
 
Chapter Three. ‘Evidence in Ethical Decision Making.  
This chapter takes up Levinas’ proposal that ethics is first philosophy. It explores the 
dominance of empirical ‘evidence’ in comparison to other ways of knowing. 
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Chapter Four. Literature Review and Philosophical Analysis of Ethical Decision 
Making. 
 
With the overall method set out in chapter two, this chapter reviews the research 
literature on ethical decision making within the National Health Service, from a 
multiprofessional perspective. Chapter Four then develops to provide a concept 
analysis of the various terms used to denote decision making. Here, it is made explicit 
that there is no generally agreed definition at the intra-professional level, that key 
variables such as the time available, and how well structured the problem is, influence 
the approach taken at the inter-professional level. From these research findings, a 
conceptual framework is formed upon the work of Hamm (1988). The purpose of this 
conceptual framework is to provide a focus from which to discuss how decisional 
theory articulates with the three classical moral theories of deontology, 
consequentialism, and virtue ethics.  
 
Whistle blowing  
Through the theory already reviewed on decision making, this section aims to consider 
why some professionals know of dangers to patients but keep silent, others raise 
concerns and are ignored, while yet others raise concerns regardless of the hostility or 
prolonged nature of the whistle blowing. This aim is fulfilled by firstly considering the 
etymology of the term, and a concept analysis performed on various permutations on 
the definition of whistle blowing. Some high profile whistle blowers found in the 
public press are then critically reviewed. Such cases as, Graham Pink, Beverly Allitt, 
the Personality Disorder Unit at Ashworth Special Hospital, Rodney Ledward, the 
. 
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consultant anaesthetist; Dr Stephen Bolsin at Bristol Royal Infirmary, Alder Hay, and 
Dr Harold Shipman. In conjunction with the research, these paradigm cases reveal 
seven common major themes within the concept of whistle blowing. These themes are 
then considered in turn with a theoretical framework proposed by Van Es and Smit 
(2003) which allows exploration at the three different moral domains of public, 
organisational, and personal ethics. The chapter concludes with a summary of the key 
findings. This includes where Rennie and Crosby found that the number of medical 
students prepared to whistle blow declined in the later year groups of the course 
(Rennie and Crosby 2002). Significantly the literature also demonstrates how there is 
under reporting of error due to the fear of reprisals. It also identifies the slow insidious 
process of change into poor clinical practice. 
 
With the theoretical bases from legal theory, ethical decision making, and whistle 
blowing now established, chapters four and five are conjoined to provide a theoretical 
analysis of ten cases of clinical negligence occurring within the National Health 
Service. 
 
Chapter Five. Free to be condemned? 
This chapter moves the discussion of ethics from the clinical area into the legal system. 
The discussion is set up to consider the extent to which morality is allowed to pervade 
the legal process. In order to do this an outline is provided of the three predominant 
approaches within jurisprudence which include; Legal positivism, Natural law, and law 
as interpretation. In order to consider the challenges of interpreting legal and religious 
texts, the development of hermeneutics is explored from the political perspective of the 
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German political theorist Carl Schmitt (1985), and philosophical perspective of 
Frederich Schleiermacher (1998), and Martin Heidegger (1999). With this groundwork 
in place, the analysis then commences on the first of the legal transcripts on clinical 
negligence. The clinical practice and legal process is evaluated against the ethical 
framework set out in the work of Kierkegaard, Levinas, and Sartre, with the key 
concept of kinesis being particularly evaluated, that is, the extent to which individuals 
move from non-being, to a being that is responsible for the other
22
. 
With this analytical framework in place, the chapter identifies a number of potential 
weaknesses within the legal system. It is argued that the judges are dependant upon the 
role of Expert Witness due to the rapidly developing technology within the NHS, but 
such a system is vulnerable as it is almost beyond judicial endeavour to understand this 
expert evidence. Judicial reasoning is further scrutinised by considering Kant’s 
transcendental metaphysics in relation to determinant and reflective judgement (Kant 
1987), before the chapter concludes with considering the influence of the quasi-market 
on the delivery of health care. 
 
Chapter Six. Either/or; The Authentic Individual 
Chapter Six continues with the analytical framework established in the previous 
chapter, and now moves on to consider a further seven legal cases of clinical 
negligence. This chapter argues for an authentic way of being for professional health 
care staff. The argument provides evidence of where clinical guidelines are not 
followed, and NHS regulators and NICE are bypassed. Where the Evidence Based 
                                                 
22
 The concept of kinesis in the work of Kierkegaard, Levinas, and Sartre is being proposed in this thesis. 
It is a concept which is not immediately associated with these thinkers. 
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Practice is a major philosophy, this is a significant undermining of the prevailing 
philosophy within the NHS. 
Kierkegaard and Sartre’s ontology and ethics is analysed in more detail, against the 
background of the legal cases reviewed. One of the main discussions regards the 
placing of financial ends as the focus of decision making. This is considered in relation 
to the case of Ann Marie Rogers and the funding of Herceptin. The concept is traced 
out further in the work of Polanyi (1999) where it was found that some of the cases 
were decided on the basis of the financial impact rather than notions of justice for the 
patient. Such cases were found to contain Polycentricity. 
 
The argument concludes by emphasising the importance of the individual having a self 
to be responsible for the other, and of having a self that is developed for emotional 
involvement with vulnerable patients. 
 
Chapter Seven. Contemporary Ethical Issues: A Survey of Aporiai                        
Chapter Seven takes some of the key legal issues identified in the previous two 
chapters during the analysis of the court transcripts, and focuses upon them from the 
political aspect. The main concern in this chapter is the relationship between the citizen 
and the state. The chapter is structured by providing an overview of the concept of 
sovereignty, before identifying five aporia. That is where five areas which should 
support ethical action, end with fossilisation of the individual in the system. The 
argument moves from a traditional view of sovereignty within a defined territory, to the 
supranational level of European law. The chapter concludes with a sketch of 
Kierkegaard’s view of a civil society as a comparison to the situation analysed. 
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Chapter Eight. Existentialism at the Im/passé 
This chapter draws together some of the main problems identified in the previous 
chapters. The argument is structured by firstly providing a literature review and 
concept analysis on existentialism, before outlining the concept of historicity from 
Heidegger. This then allows for a contrasting discussion from Heidegger’s historical 
context through the notion of tradition, to the proposal of existentialism as a potential 
way to care for patients. The argument identifies the change of perspective contained 
within existentialism caused by being conscious of the infinite in relation to the finite. 
From this perspective, existentialism is then evaluated in its potential contribution 
towards jurisprudence, epistemology, and political theory. The chapter closes by 
returning to some of the cases of whistle blowing and links the discussion on 
totalisation to the importance of having a self in order to care for patients. 
 
Chapter Nine. Conclusion: Existential Ethics 
This concluding chapter critically reflects upon the dual narrative running through the 
thesis on ethical decision making and the influence of the legal system in serving 
justice in cases of clinical negligence. It rehearses on one final occasion, some of the 
weaknesses in consequentialism, principlism, and deontology as a way to inform and 
guide ethical care. Kantian deontic theory is appraised within the legal and health care 
systems as a codification of ethical behaviour, acting –in conjunction with the Evidence 
Based Practice paradigm – to provide norms which should be followed with 
unquestioning duty.  
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By placing emphasis on the pre-theoretical aspect of caring for patients, existentialism 
has uncovered some weaknesses in the current ethical convention. The normative and 
virtue approaches to ethics all contribute towards professional conduct, but a crucial 
aspect is lacking. This is the existential dimension. 
The current convention reduces the professional conduct of health professionals to the 
same as everyone else’s. This chapter identifies some of the theoretical underpinnings 
for this situation, and goes on to make recommendations for an authentic way of caring 
for patients. 
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CHAPTER TWO: RESEARCH METHOD 
 
Introduction  
The preceding chapter (Introduction & Background), set out the main hypothesis of this 
thesis, as one which will explore the extent to which health professionals are 
existentially free to make ethical decisions pertaining to patient care. It argued for 
existentialism as an approach which might fruitfully explore questions around the 
ethical aspect of healthcare. This argument was premised upon the objective and 
speculative approach to metaphysical philosophy failing to capture what it is to exist-as 
a patient, nurse, or doctor. The existentialism of Kierkegaard, Levinas and Sartre were 
then set up in contrast to this negative critique, in order to highlight ethical questions as 
being essentially first-person, and the real subject in ethics being the existing subject. 
 
With the historical development of existentialism established in the previous chapter, 
this chapter is concerned to explain the further development of existential 
phenomenology as a particularly suitable practice of phenomenology to address the 
main research aim. It will also discuss why this expanded version of existential 
phenomenology is a particularly suited research method to explore the ethical domain 
of the lived experience of patients and health professionals. 
 
The main problem in establishing a suitable method was due to the interdisciplinary 
nature of the study encompassing the fields of healthcare, law, and philosophy. Each of 
these disciplines has its own epistemological paradigm, with science for example 
considering how we do act, and normative ethics with how we should act (Loughlin 
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2011). Even within some of these disciples there are epistemological paradigms that are 
given unfounded predominance, for example, Evidence-based medicine (Henry et 
al.2007). Notwithstanding these challenges there is a call within the healthcare 
literature for research methods which are interdisciplinary in nature, and where 
philosophy has an ‘…indispensable contribution to make to the discussion of 
practice…’ and ‘…the problems of practice provide the proper context for real progress 
in philosophy (Loughlin et al 2011; 840)’. 
 
The following sections in this chapter will outline the rationale for the approach which 
became the final research method; 
 
 Overview of the research method, 
 Literature Review (1), 
 Literature Review (2), 
 Legal Analysis, 
 Philosophical Analysis, 
 
OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH METHOD.  
 
In order to address the main research aim concerning existential freedom, two literature 
reviews were carried out. This allowed for an empirically informed philosophical 
analysis. The first focuses upon published research in healthcare journals on the topic 
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of healthcare ethical decision making and whistle blowing. The second reviews original 
law court transcripts involving clinical negligence. 
 
The literature reviews were planned so that the findings of the healthcare literature 
would aid the philosophical analysis performed on the legal transcripts. The two levels 
of analysis performed on the legal transcripts are the legal analysis which was 
performed first, and then the philosophical analysis (existential phenomenology) which 
was performed separately, and following the legal analysis. This is summarised in 
figure 1, below. 
 
 
 
Literature Review (1)  
Healthcare literature on 'Ethics’ 
and ‘Whistle blowing'.  
   
  Literature Review (2) 
  Legal transcripts on 'clinical negligence'. 
    
    
  Legal Analysis 
  (Black-letter approach). 
    
    
  Philosophical Analysis 
 (Existential phenomenology) 
  
Figure 1. Overview of research method. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW (1).  
 
A literature review was carried out on the empirical research within healthcare journals 
on key concepts related to the freedom of health professionals being able to act. 
Research studies were located using the electronic databases of the Cumulative Index 
to Nursing and Allied Health Literature (CINAHL) and on MEDLINE. This reviewed 
key topics such as ‘ethical decision making’, ‘ethical sensitivity’, ‘moral distress’, and 
‘Whistle blowing’. These latter two concepts were important in reviewing what health 
professionals would do when they felt health care fell below an acceptable, safe bench-
mark. 
 
This literature review established the main philosophical underpinnings to healthcare 
ethics as deontology, teleology, and virtue ethics. The findings of the literature review 
were analysed by MacIntyre’s assertion that our vocabulary for morality is fragmentary 
where rival and competing premises are put together without any further discussion 
regarding the coherence of the theory. 
 
The findings of this literature review were then used in the philosophical analysis of the 
legal transcripts of clinical negligence. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW (2).  
Introduction 
The second literature review is based upon legal transcripts of court hearings on cases 
of alleged clinical negligence within the NHS. 
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Legal transcripts are produced from shorthand notes taken during the trial. However 
most courts now have a specialised machine with a phonetic key system, or digital 
recordings. These notes or recordings are then transcribed into longhand by employees 
of legal firms who are contracted for this purpose. The transcripts provide an exact and 
unedited record of every spoken word, with each speaker indicated (Knowles 2012). 
 
For research with a focus upon the existential freedom of individuals this is a very rich 
resource because the verbatim statements of nurses and doctors are provided in detail, 
concerning their lived experience. It was these legal transcripts which were the primary 
sources in this literature review. 
 
The following section will explain the process of legal research and the selection 
criteria for the cases chosen for critical analysis, before moving on to the method of 
legal and philosophical analysis. 
 
Legal Research and Case Law  
Legal research, in a similar fashion to any research, is the systematic process of 
identifying and retrieving information necessary to support legal decision making 
(Salter 2007). This study has used an iterative approach between primary and 
secondary legal authorities. The primary sources are composed of the verbatim texts of 
case law obtained principally through the electronic databases of ‘Westlaw’ and 
‘NexisLexis’. These are then cross referenced in books called Case Reports or 
Reporters. Secondary sources consist of legal opinion published in journals. 
. 
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Since the court system is hierarchical a ‘case’ starts in the ‘court of first instance’ and 
can progress through appellate courts. Each time a case goes to court the proceedings 
are recorded verbatim and then published in Reporters and electronic databases. In a 
similar fashion to a research paper each case is published in a specific framework 
which provides information in a standard format on the Citation, Parties involved, 
Court, Hearing dates, Summary, Legislation and previous cases referred to, and the 
Decision (Thomas 2006). In this way a case remains live until the time for granting a 
re-hearing has passed (Elias & Levinkind 2005).  
 
Within each case the Ratio decidendi (the reason for the decision) is explained in detail 
with numerous citations to previous decisions and other legal authority (Woodley 
2005). Via this process we can see how Dworkin challenges legal positivism and 
instead argues that a judge does not make law but instead interprets what is already part 
of the legal materials (Dworkin 1998). The authors of Autopoietic theory go further by 
proposing that the legal system is similar to the typical biological system which is self-
replicating, and where the initial properties of a member of one generation are 
controlled by properties of members of the preceding generation (Teubner 1993). 
Autopoietic theory was originally developed by Maturana and Varela (1991) to explore 
the individual organism and to explain the particular nature of living as opposed to 
non – living entities. Niklas Luhmann (1995) developed the theory to make autopoiesis 
the basis of his social theory. When this theory has been applied to the legal system it 
assists in understanding the independence and autonomy, - or the degree of closure - , 
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in the legal system
23
. Further, it helps to distinguish from collective and individualised 
regulation where the two may co-exist, but where they are analytically distinct and 
therefore raise significantly different notions of justice. 
 
This is a pertinent theory as jurists also change what was previously background text in 
previous citations (Obiter dictum) into a binding precedent in the form of Ratio 
decidendi. In this way the law is said to be operationally closed. Both approaches will 
be useful in analysing the legal transcripts for the degree to which law is autonomous 
or socially conditioned. 
 
 
Selection criteria for the Legal court transcripts.  
The legal research has been found by using the National Health Service Litigation 
Authority website (NHSLA) which is a Special Health Authority as part of the NHS 
and is responsible for handling negligence claims made against NHS bodies in England. 
NHSLA provides statistical reports on the breakdown of negligence claims made, 
which provides a framework for developing a representative sample for research on 
such claims.  NHSLA presents 5,697 claims of negligence being filed in 2005-2006, 
with £560.3 million being paid out on these claims. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
23
 Closure is defined as where all legal procedures always reproduce the system. 
. 
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Figure 1. Total number of reported CNST (Clinical Negligence Scheme for Trusts) claims 
by specialty at 31/03/06 (since the scheme began in April 1995, excluding “below 
excess” claims handled by trusts) 
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Figure 1 provides a breakdown of the clinical groupings of these claims of negligence. 
From this information five main groups were used to identify cases documented in 
legal court transcripts.  
 
The statistical data produced by the NHSLA was reviewed throughout the research 
period, and finally evaluated in 2011. It will be seen from the graph below (Figure 3) 
that the groupings selected for study have not changed. The most recent report 
concludes; 
 
In 2009/10, 6,652 claims of clinical negligence and 4,074 claims of non-clinical negligence against 
NHS bodies were received by the Authority, up from 6,088 claims of clinical negligence and 3,743 
claims of non-clinical negligence in 2008/09. £787 million was paid in connection with clinical 
negligence claims during 2009/10, up from £769 million in 2008/09(NHSLA 2011). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
. 
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Figure 2. Total number of reported CNST claims by specialty as at 31/03/10 (since the 
scheme began in April 1995, excluding "below excess" claims handled by trusts) 
 
 
 
 
 
While the cost in pure financial terms is significant-especially in the way the funding 
for damages will be diverted from funding the NHS-the impact upon public confidence 
is of equal importance. From the table below (Figure 3) it will be seen that some £550 
billion pounds was diverted from the NHS in the period 2007-2008. 
 
Figure 3. Funding for damages. (NHSLA) 
 
 
Year Damages awarded Defense legal Costs Claimant legal costs Total 
2005-2006 £412,245,050 £53,894,083 £91,252,864 £557,391,997 
2006-2007 £332,786,934 £49,808,394 £83,830,905 £466,426,233 
2007-2008 £384,841,737 £56,848,517 £108,921,201 £550,611,45 
 
 
In terms of human cost, approximately one in ten patients admitted to hospital suffered 
an unintended harm while being treated (Department of Health 2005). This figure has 
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remained consistent over the past ten years, while in other large industries fatal 
accidents and major injuries have been in decline since 2006 (The Health and Safety 
Executive 2010). This then raises the question of how the NHS can provide an 
appropriate level of care which can reduce the current volume of liability for failing to 
provide care at the appropriate level (Fenn et al.2004). 
 
The legal databases of LexisNexis and WestLaw UK were used to search for Full Text 
court case transcripts on cases of clinical negligence including the healthcare team. 
Both databases provide the ability to perform a legal search on United Kingdom, 
European Union, and United States of America legislation, Case law, and of legal 
journals. Due to cases potentially being reported in a number of forums, - for example, 
court transcripts, Command papers, Independent investigations, and in a law journal 
article, - a comprehensive view can be obtained of the case.  
 
The following tables (1-5) present the five groups selected for research; ‘Surgery’, 
‘Obstetrics & Gynaecology’,’Medicine’,’Psychiatry & Mental Health’, and  
‘Community Care’. One additional group (Group 6. ‘Other’) was developed to explore 
some of the wider issues within the legal cases. 
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Table 1. Group 1. 
 
 
Group 1.  Clinical Speciality; 'Surgery' 
  
  
CASE 1. 
 
Case reference. 
Chester v Afshar [2005] P.N.L.R. 14 UKHL 41 HL. 
Chester v Afshar [2005] P.I.Q.R. P12 [2004] UKHL 41 HL. 
 
Summary; 
A female patient (Miss Chester) underwent an elective lumbar spinal procedure which 
resulted in serious neurological damage. The consultant surgeon negligently failed 
to give the claimant adequate warning of the dangers inherent in the surgery. 
 
CASE 2 
 
Case reference. 
Rehman v University College London Hospitals NHS Trust. [2004] EWHC 1361. 
2004 WL 1174251. 
 
Summary; 
Nursing & Medical staff discharged Ms Rehman following surgery with an undiagnosed 
perforated bowel 
 
CASE 3 
 
Case reference. 
Goodson v H.M. Coroner for Bedfordshire and Luton Court of Appeal (Civil Division). 
[2005] WL 24933003. 
[2006} C.P. Rep 6. 
 
Summary; 
Mr Harry Coleman (83) died following an elective procedure to deal with gallstones. 
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Table 2. Group 2. 
 
 
 
Group 2.  Clinical Speciality; 'Obstetrics & Gynaecology' 
CASE 1. 
 
Case reference. 
Michelle Anne Brindley v Queens Medical Centre University Hospital NHS Trust. 
[2005] EWHC 2647 (QB). 
 
Summary; 
Michelle is Owen Bridleys' mother. Owen was born in 1999 with no kidney on the left 
side, a very small abnormal kidney on the right side, severe mental disability and  
deafness. 
Michelle claims the NHS Trust negligently failed to give her proper advice during the 
second trimester of her pregnancy. 
Involves the ultrasonographer, midwifery, consultant radiologists, and examines the 
decision making process. 
 
CASE 2 
 
Case reference. 
Ceri Ann Walters v North Glamorgan NHS Trust [2002] EWHC 321  
 
Summary; 
Infant son died as a result of negligent treatment at the Prince Charles Hospital,  
Merthyr Tydfil. Claim of negligent diagnosis and prognosis. 
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Table 3. Group 3. 
 
 
Group 3.  Clinical Speciality; 'Medicine' 
CASE 1 
 
Case reference. 
The Queen on the Application of Mohammed Farooq Khan v The Secretary of  State for 
Health [2003] EWCA Civ 1129 
The Queen on the Application of Mohammed Farooq Khan v The Secretary of State for 
Health [2003] EWCA Civ 1129 [JUNE 2003] 
The Queen on the Application of Mohammed Farooq Khan v The Secretary of State for 
Health [2003] EWCA Civ 1129 [October 2003] 
 
Summary; 
Naazish Khan was a three year old girl requiring haemodialysis to protect her from renal 
failure secondary to receiving chemotherapy. Naazish suffered a cardiac arrest and died 
suddenly from receiving a grossly excessive amount of potassium. These details were not 
disclosed on Naazish’s death certificate. Mr Farooq Khan wanted to request an investigation 
under European law into the death of his daughter. 
 
CASE 2 
 
Case reference. 
Gregg (FC) v Scott [2005] WL 62248. 
 
Summary; 
Doctor misdiagnoses a lump under a patients arm as being benign when it is in actual 
fact malignant. 
This case raised a question which has divided courts throughout the common law 
world. 
 
 
 
Table 4. Group 4. 
 
 
 
Group 4.  Clinical Speciality; 'Psychiatry & Mental Health' 
 
CASE 1 
Case reference. 
Fairlie v Perth & Kinross Healthcare NHS Trust. [2004] WL 2295492. [2004] S.L.T.1200 
 
Summary; 
Father seeking damages from the consultant psychiatrist after his daughter underwent 
Recovered Memory Therapy (RMT). The father averred that the consultant psychiatrist 
had failed in his duty to act with reasonable care to avoid foreseeable harm to him. 
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Table 5. Group 5. 
 
 
Group 5.  Clinical Speciality; 'Community Care' 
 
CASE 1 
Case reference. 
Denise Lynn Merelie v Newcastle Primary Care Trust  
Denise Lynn Merelie v Newcastle Primary Care Trust & Others. 
[2006] WL 1732530 (QBH) 
[2006] EWHC 1433. 
 
Summary; 
Denise Lynn Merelie was a dentist for principally school children and the elderly, but 
also for mentally ill or phobic patients. Four Dental nurses lodged a complaint the main 
allegation being that Denise was liable to outbursts of anger to staff and patients. 
Two other dentists supported the allegations. 
 
 
 
Table 6. Group 6. 
 
 
Group 6.  Clinical Speciality; 'Other' 
 
CASE 1 
Case reference. 
R. (on the application of Rogers) v Swindon NHS Primary Care Trust and another. 
[2006] WL 316105. QBD. 
R. (on the application of Rogers) v Swindon NHS Primary Care NHS Trust and another. 
[2006] 1 WLR 2649. COA. 
 
Summary; 
In June 2005, Ann Rogers tested positive for HER2 (type of breast cancer). Her  
consultant wrote to the Trust asking if it would pay for Herceptin, which was the new 
unlicensed treatment for cancer which was showing 'exciting results'. The Trust refused 
to pay for the treatment. 
This case is similar to Barbara Clark where she was given Herceptin' and the ruling 
bypassed NICE, which raises questions about the role of Evidence in these situations 
and of course Rationing. 
 
 
 
In total, ten legal ‘cases’ were analysed. This turned out to be a very rich research 
source, due to the high level of detail in the legal transcripts. Due to some of the cases 
going to a number of different court hearings, often there was more than one transcript 
. 
 
61 
to analyse. When the analysis was completed some of the cases had overlapping themes, 
where they supported the findings, but did not add anything new. For this reason, the 
ten original cases were collapsed down to the following five cases for in-depth 
discussion and philosophical analysis. 
 
 
 
 
Table 7. Final five cases selected for analysis. 
 
CASE 1. 
  
Case reference. 
Michelle Anne Brindley v Queens Medical Centre University Hospital NHS Trust. 
[2005] EWHC 2647 (QB). 
 
Summary; 
Michelle is Owen Bridley’s mother. Owen was born in 1999 with no kidney on the left 
side, a very small abnormal kidney on the right side, severe mental disability and  
deafness. 
Michelle claims the NHS Trust negligently failed to give her proper advice during the 
second trimester of her pregnancy. 
  
CASE 2. 
 
Case reference. 
R. (on the application of Rogers) v Swindon NHS Primary Care Trust and another. 
[2006] WL 316105. QBD. 
 
Summary; 
In June 2005, Ann Rogers tested positive for HER2 (type of breast cancer). Her  
consultant wrote to the Trust asking if it would pay for Herceptin, which was the new 
unlicensed treatment for cancer which was showing 'exciting results'. The Trust refused 
to pay for the treatment. 
 
CASE 3. 
 
Case reference. 
Denise Lynn Merelie v Newcastle Primary Care Trust  
[2006] WL 1732530 (QBH) 
 
Summary; 
Denise Lynn Merelie was a dentist for principally school children and the elderly, but 
also for mentally ill or phobic patients. Four Dental nurses lodged a complaint the main 
allegation being that Denise was liable to outbursts of anger to staff and patients. 
Two other dentists supported the allegations. 
 
. 
 
62 
Table 7. Final five cases selected for analysis. 
 
 
CASE 4. 
 
Case reference. 
Goodson v H.M. Coroner for Bedfordshire and Luton Court of Appeal (Civil Division). 
[2005] WL 24933003. 
[2006} C.P. Rep 6. 
 
Summary; 
Mr Harry Coleman (83) died following an elective procedure to deal with gallstones. 
 
 
CASE 5. 
 
Case reference. 
The Queen on the Application of Mohammed Farooq Khan v The Secretary of  State for Health 
[2003] EWCA Civ 1129 
 
Summary; 
Naazish Khan was a three year old girl requiring haemodialysis to protect her from renal failure 
secondary to receiving chemotherapy. Naazish suffered a cardiac arrest and died suddenly from 
receiving a grossly excessive amount of potassium. These details were not disclosed on 
Naazish’s death certificate. Mr Farooq Khan wanted to request an investigation under European 
law into the death of his daughter. 
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The chosen cases cut across English and Scottish law, and they also represent the full 
judiciary system from High Court, Court of Appeal, House of Lords, and the European 
courts. The main feature in all of the cases is one of negligence, and for this the four 
elements of; Duty, Breach, Damage and Remoteness must be established (Tingle and 
McHale 2001). All of the legal cases examined fall into Jones definition regarding Duty 
of care; 
 
In cases of medical negligence the existence of a duty owed to the patient is usually regarded as 
axiomatic, and attention normally focuses on whether there has been a breach of duty or whether the 
breach caused damage (Jones 2003:12).  
 
A number of the cases are interested in establishing if the medical and nursing staff 
also have a duty of care to the relatives, and to what extent this binds. Casen (2004) 
explains that when considering duty of care, it is the primary/secondary victim 
distinction which currently shapes the fate of claimants seeking damages for 
negligently inflicted mental trauma. The label of ‘secondary’ victim is generally 
reserved for those whose involvement with the incident is limited to witnessing or 
hearing of the imperilment of others. 
 
Research Plan  
The research approach is twofold. It involves a critical engagement with the literature 
and the utilisation of the empirical data, and secondly to develop a clear understanding 
of ethics in health care. This analysis will continue to be sensitive to the dynamic 
context of healthcare and will therefore continually review factors likely to influence 
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health systems in the future. An example of this would be the recommendation of Sir 
Derek Wanless (2002) who argued that the United Kingdom had fallen behind other 
countries in health outcomes, in part because the UK had spent less but also because it 
had not spent well. It concluded that the UK should devote a significantly larger share 
of its national income to health care over the following 20 years – reaching between 
10.6 and 11.1 per cent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by 2022/3, up from 7.7 per 
cent in 2002/3. It will therefore be important to monitor the emerging philosophy of 
health systems as the recent Comprehensive Spending Review (CSR) states that targets 
and incentive systems to improve productivity should focus on health as the ‘product’. 
The reimbursement system, Payment by Results (PbR), should play a part in 
encouraging a more automatic mechanism to encourage the NHS to seek out more 
productive ways of meeting patients’ health care needs (Appelby 2007). 
 
LEGAL ANALYSIS. 
Introduction and Background  
The empirical material of this study is composed of a literature review on a 
representative sample of Clinical negligence. Although different types of law will be 
discussed later, it is worth stating that while the law is divided into a number of 
specialist fields with each having its own language, procedures and substantive rules, 
the two principle categories of law are Civil and Criminal (Wall 2004). Within these 
two jurisdictions there is an overlap in that a criminal offence (for example assault) will 
often have an equivalent in the Civil jurisdiction (for example trespass). For the 
purposes of this study ‘Case law’ is being used, which comprises the corpus of 
decisions made by judges in either Civil or Criminal courts. This form of law has 
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evolved over time and is often referred to as ‘Common law’ or ‘Case law’. Such case-
based reasoning takes a principle-based approach and is termed ‘Casuistry’. Toulmin 
defended and brought about a revival in the use of Casuistry in his book published in 
1990; The Abuse of Casuistry: A History of Moral Reasoning (Toulmin & Jonsen 1990).  
 
Due to this legal research representing the United Kingdom and its four constituent 
countries, relevant differences in the legal systems of England, Northern Ireland, 
Scotland, and Wales will be emphasised. While there are many differences at the micro 
level the four countries are similar to all others in the world in that their three major 
legal systems consist of civil law, common law, and religious law. This point is 
relevant as it is an admixture of these three which influences legal decisions, and 
appeals across countries for example from Scotland, through England to the European 
courts. It may seem prima facie impossible to attain any coherence and thereby 
rendering any comparative analysis of legal case transcripts invalid, but fortunately, all 
law is based upon two major systems, or a blend of the two, namely, civil law and 
common law. The historical background to the development of both should not be 
overlooked as they have fundamentally differing philosophical underpinnings which 
are relevant today as one jurist (Ronald Dworkin) has had a great influence in causing a 
paradigm shift within jurisprudence. 
 
Civil law development comes from a history of autocratic government which has 
unlimited legislative and judicial power. It can be traced back to the Torah which 
contains the first five chapters of the Hebrew bible, and also to the ‘Corpus Juris 
Civilis’ from the Roman empire. The essence of this system is the way in which it is 
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autocratically developed, advertised to all citizens, the severe penalties imposed for 
breaching such laws, and the exceptionally strict conditions in which they were written 
out. The meticulous detail of the exactness in the unchanging manuscript can be seen 
today where scribes are unable to deviate from one dot ‘iota’ in writing out the Torah 
(Toulmin & Jonsen 1990). Such legal positivism will be crucial in any analysis of Case 
law in today’s post-modern context, especially in the light of Dworkin’s sophisticated 
philosophy of law as interpretation (Wacks 2006). 
 
In Common law practice, judges have the authority to decide what the law is when 
there is no clear guiding statutory law. The process is that they must first follow any 
statutory law, or to have good reason for not doing this. Judges also refer to any 
previous similar cases and precedent therein contained. At the heart of common law is 
the concept of standing by court decisions (Mays 2001). Such ‘Precedent’ is binding on 
all courts of a similar or lower level. This can also be part of the process for developing 
statutory law, in that when a number of similar Precedents are codified into statutory 
law. It is crucial here to trace this process back to individual judges being the authors or 
legislators. Traditionally it was accepted that judges filled in the gaps left by rules of 
law by using their discretion (Freeman 2001). Hart (1997) thought that there were times 
when no matter how much judges scrutinized previous cases their application became 
indeterminate. This point is made explicit where he explains: 
 
In every legal system a large and important field is left open for the exercise of discretion by courts 
and other officials in rendering initially vague standards determinate, in resolving the uncertainties 
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of statutes, or in developing and qualifying rules only broadly communicated by authorative 
precedents (Hart 1997: 136). 
 
This situation is in contrast to that of the civil law as posited. In examining the two 
systems of law a range of fruitful questions arise related to the analysis of the selected 
case transcripts. Questions around the objectivity of jurists (Epstein 2007), the role of 
morality in such judgements, and the gap in the legal system between what ‘is’ and 
‘ought’ to be. 
 
Legal Research and Case Law 
Legal research, in a similar fashion to any research, is the systematic process of 
identifying and retrieving information necessary to support legal decision making 
(Salter 2007). This study has used an iterative approach between primary and 
secondary legal authorities. The primary sources are composed of the verbatim texts of 
case law obtained principally through the electronic databases of ‘Westlaw’ and 
‘NexisLexis’. These are then cross referenced in books called Case Reports or 
Reporters. Secondary sources consist of legal opinion published in journals. 
 
Since the court system is hierarchical a ‘case’ starts in the ‘court of first instance’ and 
can progress through appellate courts. Each time a case goes to court the proceedings 
are recorded verbatim and then published in Reporters and electronic databases. In a 
similar fashion to a research paper each case is published in a specific framework 
which provides information in a standard format on the Citation, Parties involved, 
Court, Hearing dates, Summary, Legislation and previous cases referred to, and the 
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Decision (Thomas 2006). In this way a case remains live until the time for granting a 
re-hearing has passed (Elias & Levinkind 2005).  
 
Within each case the Ratio decidendi (the reason for the decision) is explained in detail 
with numerous citations to previous decisions and other legal authority (Woodley 
2005). Via this process we can see how Dworkin challenges legal positivism and 
instead argues that a judge does not make law but instead interprets what is already part 
of the legal materials (Dworkin 1998). The authors of Autopoietic theory go further by 
proposing that the legal system is similar to the typical biological system which is self-
replicating, and where the initial properties of a member of one generation are 
controlled by properties of members of the preceding generation (Teubner 1993). 
Autopoietic theory was originally developed by Maturana and Varela (1991) to explore 
the individual organism and to explain the particular nature of living as opposed to 
non – living entities. Niklas Luhmann (1995) developed the theory to make autopoiesis 
the basis of his social theory. When this theory has been applied to the legal system it 
assists in understanding the independence and autonomy, - or the degree of closure - , 
in the legal system
24
. Further, it helps to distinguish from collective and individualised 
regulation where the two may co-exist, but where they are analytically distinct and 
therefore raise significantly different notions of justice. 
 
This is a pertinent theory as jurists also change what was previously background text in 
previous citations (Obiter dictum) into a binding precedent in the form of Ratio 
decidendi. In this way the law is said to be operationally closed. Both approaches will 
                                                 
24
 Closure is defined as where all legal procedures always reproduce the system. 
. 
 
69 
be useful in analysing the legal transcripts for the degree to which law is autonomous 
or socially conditioned. 
 
Research Methodology 
While the overall research method of the thesis is one informed by critical analysis, 
some specific questions have to be addressed in analysing decisions in reported 
judgements. One of the most fundamental questions is regarding the most valid 
approach to interpreting the legal documents, and this aspect is crucial due to the divide 
within law as a discipline where there are pure ‘doctrinalists’ and those who take an 
interdisciplinary approach. Vick highlights this where he states; 
 
Legal researchers have to take into account the intellectual tension, and discernible friction between 
black letter academic lawyers using traditional modes of legal analysis and those who would classify 
themselves as Interdisciplinary scholars using ideas and techniques borrowed from other disciplines 
(Vick 2004 :163). 
 
The significance of this point is that it is the ‘doctrinalists’ who define what law is and 
what sits within this definition. At the professional and academic levels they control 
what is deemed as legal knowledge, even to the point of who can register as a 
practising lawyer, and what books on law can or cannot be published. Precisely due to 
this tension within the discipline of law, issues surrounding validity of methodology 
need to be discussed and made explicit to address the criticisms which can be 
anticipated from within this ‘academic tension’. Hutter and Lloyd-Bostock (1997) go as 
far to suggest there is no possibility of conducting legal research other than through the 
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application of a particular frame of reference which determines how the dissertation is 
created, formulated and pursued. Questions of validity also need to address the fact that 
legal facts are open to interpretation as outlined by Salter and Manson: 
 
In other words, the same points of law and fact that have been interpreted in a certain way by one 
side to a legal dispute are frequently susceptible to diametrically opposite interpretations of no lesser 
plausibility by lawyers representing the other party (Salter and Manson 2007: 41). 
 
Primary legal sources which include cases and statutes are not in themselves inherently 
black letter materials but it is this approach which is used at the exclusion of other 
approaches such as socio-legal in ‘Case law’. The legal analysis will therefore take a 
two stage approach. First the primary legal sources will be analysed using the black 
letter approach, then these findings can be subjected to a critical analysis. To 
commence with an interdisciplinary approach such as socio-legal would unnecessarily 
expose the study to criticisms of not understanding the process of law development, 
interpretation, and decision making. 
 
Black-letter Approach 
The black-letter approach provides an exact method for understanding law as a 
practised system and a recognised legal framework for interpreting Case law. Balkan 
describes the black-letter approach as ‘…through the lens of a specific interpretative 
framework’ (Balkan 1996: 956). This framework involves seeing each case as if it 
formed part of a system of rules which are internally connected and related to each 
other in distinct clusters and groups (Hofheinz 1997). Such rules are imbedded in other 
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‘Cases’ and in Statutes with the internal connections being identified through cross-
referencing specific rules, and through the identification of legal principles and axioms. 
A philosophically significant point is that within this approach the analysis must 
‘insulate’ the topic from supposedly ‘non-legal factors’ which would include policy, 
political, social and economic issues as though these were somehow ‘external’ to legal 
research (Hofheinz 1997). 
 
Whilst the criteria for selecting ‘Cases’ has been previously identified it is now 
necessary to outline how the many hearings within a case are prioritised. This is 
performed by paying particular attention to the most recent appeal judgements 
regarding the case in, for example, the Court of Appeal, House of Lords, and the 
European Court of Justice. Twining (1994) helpfully explains that disputed points of 
law largely dominate the lower level courts, and that points of law prioritised by the 
black-letter tradition are mainly found in superior courts. Within legal reasoning 
‘Cases’ are located at the base of a hierarchical pyramid with legal rules, legal 
principles and axioms being prioritised above this. 
 
Law of Negligence 
Case law covers both civil and criminal jurisdictions. The specific aspect of law which 
is being examined in the legal transcripts is Negligence. The law of negligence is 
expressed in Tort in common law systems and Delict in the civil law system (McLean 
& Mason 2003). Although there are seven different categories of Tort law, Negligence 
is the dominant tort.  
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‘Clinical negligence’ is any litigation involving negligence in the delivery of healthcare 
(Wall 2004). In tort law clinical negligence has the effect of imposing costs on 
interested parties. It has been suggested that court judgements in the tort law of 
negligence have the effect of promoting cost effectiveness in the provision of health 
care (Heasell 2004). Others have argued for economic theories which have sought to 
establish a broadly utilitarian theory for the attribution of liability (Merry 2002; 152). 
The aim of such claims is to address issues of unsatisfactory quality of care. This legal 
system is linked to the NHS governance framework which is answerable to claims of 
negligence and puts the Chief Executive as having overall accountability, and 
responsibility to influence clinicians, allocate resources with the underlying risk, rights 
and responsibilities. Such a system however may contribute to ‘defensive medicine’ 
where doctors carry out investigations that may not be necessary just to insure against 
every eventuality. Some develop this argument further in outlining the regulatory 
overload imposed upon the NHS, the consequent impaired capacity to manage 
effectively, and most poignantly; the development of a defensive compliance (Scrivens 
1995, Walshe 2003a, 2003b). 
 
Negligence in law is founded upon one of the most famous cases in British legal 
history; Donoghue v. Stevenson. ([1932] A.C. 532, 1932 S.C. (H.L.) 31, [1932] All ER 
Rep 1) (Wall 2004). This case will be discussed in more detail in a later chapter.  
 
Patient Expectations in litigation  
Litigants take their accusations of negligence to court with the expectation that some 
understanding may be gained of what happened, for some legal redress where the court 
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will adjudicate in the matter (in the same way as would any fair-minded individual 
independently of the legal context), and also to be compensated for any distress caused. 
From this position litigants view the legal system as imbued with moral values. In 
reviewing the ten selected cases of clinical negligence a number of philosophical 
questions are presented for analysis; 
 
1. What connections and overlaps are there between morality and the law? 
2. To what extent do judges exercise discretion when there is a ‘gap’ in the law? 
3. Is there an ‘internal morality’ in rule making? 
 
  
Morality and Law 
Contemporary clinical issues which are taken to court are explored via the black letter 
approach. In the cases reviewed this has resulted in an approach which excludes 
everything but a purely legal view of the case. This point can be seen in all of the cases 
but most poignantly in Goodson ([2004] EWHC 2931) where the coroner recorded a 
verdict of ‘death by misadventure’ and the daughter wanted to appeal against the 
coroners refusal for the inquest into the death to be carried out as an investigation for 
the purposes of article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights (The obligation 
to protect the right to life). From the clinical information it is clear to see that Mr 
Coleman had suffered a perforated duodenum when the consultant surgeon had carried 
out an Endoscopic Retrograde Cholangio-Pancreatography (ERCP) sphincterotomy and 
stone extraction. Mr Coleman’s’ clinical notes documents his deteriorating condition to 
a point where a decision is made to treat him conservatively (withhold treatment), with 
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a resultant cardiac arrest. Given the significance of the clinical details in adding weight 
to a legal argument this point is worthy of further analysis. In his judgement Richards 
stated; 
 
In relation to each basis it is submitted that the coroner, who is not medically qualified, was wrong to 
refuse to seek independent medical evidence in reliance solely upon his own uninformed view that 
there was no ground for considering that the medical personnel involved might have been negligent 
and that he trusted them to give an objective opinion on their area of expertise as to the adequacy of 
their own treatment which lead to Mr Colemans’ death (Goodson ([2004] EWHC 2931: Para. 29).  
 
It may be considered from what was stated that the clinical evidence then should be 
reviewed and a differing judgement made, but it was not reviewed, and the appeal was 
dismissed. 
 
Issues which are excluded at the beginning of a case are difficult to reintroduce at a 
later date. This legal principle was set out in Whitehouse v Jordan ([1981]1 WLR 246 
at 249F) where Lord Wilberforce said there are strict limitations on the power of an 
appeal court to reverse the decision of a judge on an issue of fact, and Lord Wilberforce 
went on to explain; 
 
The main reason why, in the absence of an error of law, the judgment of the trial judge calls for the 
utmost respect is that he has seen and heard the witnesses ....The strength of this consideration will 
vary from case to case according as conclusions have been reached as to credibility, or based on 
demeanor (Whitehouse v Jordan ([1981]1 WLR 246 at 249F: page 636). 
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There are a number of cases which have set this precedent including Maynard v West Midlands 
Regional Health Authority ([1984] 1 WLR 634) where in the House of Lords, Lord Scarman 
said ‘In English law the appeal process is a rehearing of fact and law. But the limitations upon 
an appellate Court’s ability to review findings of fact are severe and well-established’. 
 
The black-letter approach does not ignore or exclude moral issues; rather they are 
subordinated to law. In Fairlie v Perth and Kinross Healthcare NHS Trust ([2004] 
S.L.T. 1200) -where a father sought damages for negligence when a consultant 
psychiatrist treated his daughter with recovery memory therapy (RMT) and as part of 
this therapy she falsely alleged that her father had sexually abused her-the emotional 
issues are addressed but the legal process clarifies the case as one which should have 
been presented as a claim for ‘defamation’. Lord Kingarth explained: 
 
Had the claim been made as a claim for defamation, questions would have arisen in relation to the 
defense of qualified privilege and in relation to time bar. It would be wrong to allow the pursuer to 
advance a claim for defamation in the guise of a claim for damages based on negligent statements 
(Fairlie v Perth and Kinross Healthcare NHS Trust ([2004] S.L.T. 1200: Para. 13).  
 
The emotional and moral issues of the father being wrongly accused of sexually 
abusing his daughter were further clarified through defining to whom the duty of care 
was owed, i.e. the daughter was the patient. By following the legal process of 
examining similar cases, applying legal precedent, and using legal tests to define 
negligence (Hunter v Hanley 1953 S.L.T. 62, Bolam v Friern Hospital Management 
Committee [1957] 2 All ER 118, Maynard v West Midlands Regional Health Authority 
[1984] 1 WLR 634 and Bolitho v City and Hackney Health Authority [1998] AC 232) 
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it was agreed that the duty of the therapist is to the patient, the criticism of the 
consultants standard of care was identified as problematic where Lord Kingarth states  
 
Turning to the second (regarding standard of care) of the defenders’ broad criticisms of the pursuer’s 
pleadings, I am less impressed with these. It seems to me reasonably clear that on a consideration of 
the pleadings as a whole the pursuer is offering to prove that Dr Yelowlees fell below the standard of 
a reasonably competent professional (Fairlie v Perth and Kinross Healthcare NHS Trust ([2004] 
S.L.T. 1200: Para.33 ).  
 
This point was undecided because the case had been presented essentially as a claim for 
defamation in the guise of a claim for damages for losses caused by negligence. The 
moral issues within such a judgement can be seen in the judges’ final comments; 
 
In all these circumstances I am persuaded that the first and third broad heads of argument advanced 
by the defenders are sound and that the action falls to be dismissed, as a matter of law. I stress “as a 
matter of law” because it goes without saying that if, as the pursuer claims, Dr Yellowlees made the 
diagnosis which it is said he did, and it was one reached carelessly without proper investigation, the 
pursuer’s concern to seek redress is wholly understandable. I am nevertheless required to decide this 
case within the boundaries of the law as it has recently developed (Fairlie v Perth and Kinross 
Healthcare NHS Trust ([2004] S.L.T. 1200; Para. 38). 
 
Some may argue that morality enters the legal system through statute law rather than 
Case law.  
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PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS; Existential phenomenology/Hermeneutics.  
The foregoing section on ‘Legal Analysis’ has highlighted the reductive perspective 
imposed by the Black-letter approach to investigating alleged cases of clinical 
negligence. It was also established that non-legal factors are isolated in the legal 
analysis in two main ways: the first is through the hierarchical structure of the court 
system, so that really only the judge in the court of first hearing has the privilege to see 
the claimant and defendant face-to-face. The second mechanism for isolating non-legal 
factors is through the bracketing process of the Black-letter analysis. 
 
The purpose of detailing the legal analysis was to trace the clinical problem through the 
legal process, to its ultimate conclusion in law. The problem that was identified was 
that the ethical/moral dimension of the clinical problem is separated out during the 
legal interpretation of negligence. This is why it appears potentially valuable to set up a 
contrasting dialogue between the legal and a philosophical analysis of the same legal 
transcripts.  
 
This section on Philosophical analysis aims to outline the method used to explore the 
legal transcripts from a philosophical perspective. It will commence by outlining the 
development of phenomenology (Edmund Husserl), through hermeneutic 
phenomenology (Martin Heidegger and Hans-Georg Gadamer), to an Expanded 
existential phenomenology as found in the works of Levinas.  
 
Once the foundations are established for the expanded existential phenomenology, the 
latter part of this section will provide the detail on how this theory was applied to the 
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legal transcripts in the philosophical analysis. In order to achieve these aims this 
discussion will be divided into the following parts; 
 The development of phenomenology-Husserl, 
 The development of phenomenology-Heidegger, 
 The development of phenomenology-Levinas, 
 Detail of the philosophical analysis, 
 Conclusion. 
 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHENOMENOLOGY-HUSSERL. 
Phenomenology is a philosophical movement that has had its greatest development in 
Husserl (Solomon 2001). It is both a disciplinary field within philosophy, and also a 
movement in the history of philosophy. While Edmund Husserl is often cited as the 
founding father of phenomenology, the concept can be traced back to Aristotle, and the 
term was certainly used in the title of Hegel’s book; Phenomenology of Spirit, which 
was first published in 1807. Husserl synthesised what was previously the two different 
areas of research, in psychological theory (Franz Brentano, William James) and the 
theory of logic (Bernard Bolzano, Gerhart Husserl
25
 and Gottlob Frege) (Smith 2011). 
Husserl challenged the dominant views on the nature of truth at the time. For example 
he criticised psychological theory for trying to apply methods from the natural sciences 
to explore human issues (Laverty 2003). 
 
                                                 
25
 Son of Edmund Husserl. 
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The phenomenology of Husserl inaugurated a new approach within philosophy when 
he designated consciousness as the departure point for phenomenology (Giorgi 2005). 
For Husserl, the structure of consciousness was based upon Brentano’s work on 
intentionality which proposed that only mental states are intentional (Crane 1995). 
Husserl was interested in the epistemology of this problem, so his conceptual 
framework focused on conscious awareness as the foundation to building knowledge of 
reality. Phenomenology then for Husserl is the study of lived experience which he 
termed Erlebnis (van Manen 1997). This life-world is taken as what we experience pre-
reflectively, without applying concepts, and frequently includes what is taken for 
granted (Husserl 1999). In this way Husserl viewed consciousness as constituting the 
life-world of the individual, and also of the individual constituting the world. 
 
In reviewing nine key thinkers in phenomenology, Moran (2000) explains that the 
concept of the phenomenological reduction is a key epistemological strategy. 
According to Moran, the reduction was proposed by Husserl, then developed by 
Heidegger, reinvented by Merleau-Ponty, and then applied by Levinas, but with an 
ethical emphasis (Moran 2000). There appears to be an important distinction in the 
focus of each of these philosophers work with Husserl primarily upon epistemology, 
Heidegger on ontology, and more recently, with Levinas developing a phenomenology 
of sense within ethics. 
 
The use of phenomenological reduction or bracketing is crucial to this thesis as it will 
be proposed later as a feature within legal analysis where ‘non-legal factors’ are 
isolated from the analysis stage. When the legal process is considered as a research 
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method, the participants of the study are interviewed, this is digitally recorded and 
transcribed, but it is only when all of the facts of the case have been heard that non-
legal issues are bracketed. While Husserl proposed the phenomenological reduction-
suspending particular beliefs about the phenomena, and identifying presuppositions-in 
order to see things ‘as they are’, the bracketing in legal analysis is done specifically to 
see things as they are in law. While it removes a certain bias, it also provides a 
systematic-and planned- bias. 
 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHENOMENOLOGY-HEIDEGGER. . 
Heidegger differed from Husserl in how the lived experience is explored. Instead, he 
proposed that hermeneutics -as founded upon the ontological view-should be used as a 
research method in exploring the lived experience of individuals. It is significant for 
this thesis that Heidegger was influenced by Kierkegaard, and thereby was one of the 
first thinkers to combine existentialism with phenomenological methodology (Yagi 
ND). This then provides a conceptual framework which supports phenomenology, 
hermeneutic phenomenology and existentialism. Todres and Wheeler support the 
philosophical coherence of phenomenology, hermeneutics, and existentialism as a 
philosophical perspective for nursing research (Todres and Wheeler 2001). 
 
Heidegger focused on the situated meaning of a human in the world. He called this 
Dasein. He also viewed humans as being concerned about their fate in an alien world 
(Inwood 1997). Heidegger also emphasised the dynamic of an individual’s background, 
which includes what a culture hands down to a person. He termed this historicality. 
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This feature will be contrasted in the body of the thesis in relation to the existential 
theme of freedom. 
 
The movement within phenomenology from Husserl’s epistemology, through 
Heidegger’s ontology, to include Kierkegaard’s existentialism can be seen where Yagi 
proposes; 
 
Kierkegaard’s self and Heidegger’s Dasein therefore mark the reversal of the ontological priority in 
that it is not the foundation of our knowledge (validity of knowledge) to which we must look, but the 
manner in which we as unique individuals engage in and delve into an activity such as a quest for 
knowledge. Hence they incorporate in their pursuit of knowledge the preoccupation of understanding 
ourselves, our way of Being. In turning away from the strictly theoretical approach to philosophy, 
Kierkegaard and Heidegger converge in a number of defining moments which bring to light a 
radicalised conception of existence. (Yagi ND; 63) 
 
This ‘reversal of the ontological priority’ will be discussed in Chapter 4 in relation to 
virtue ethics, and hermeneutics will be discussed in chapter 5 in relation to the legal 
transcripts. However, in the philosophical analysis hermeneutics has an expanded 
interpretation to apply not only to texts, but also to people. Hermeneutics then becomes 
a method for interpreting people (patients in this case). 
 
So far in the historical development of phenomenology, intentionality has been 
foundational, even if the emphasis has changed from epistemological, to ontology; 
‘…the manner in which we as unique individuals engage26…(Yagi ND; 63)’. 
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 Emphasis added. 
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Hans-Georg Gadamer extended Heidegger’s work on hermeneutic phenomenology. He 
also seems to highlight this problem regarding intentionality-in the sense of 
understanding an individual (patient), when explains; 
 
Hermeneutics must start from the position that a person seeking to understand something has a 
bond
27
 to the subject matter that comes into language through the traditionary text and has, or 
acquires, a connection
28
 with the tradition from which it speaks (Gadamer 2004;295). 
 
When considering hermeneutic phenomenology in relation to understanding individuals, 
the aspect of theory which appears to be neglected is exactly how we engage, develop a 
bond, or acquire a connection with the other. The following section will propose 
Levinas’ expanded existential phenomenology as a foundation for the bond with the 
other.  
 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHENOMENOLOGY-LEVINAS.  
Levinas is not usually considered an existentialist as such (Please see Appendix 5. 
Genealogy of existentialism.). Strikingly, some of his writings such as On Escape (Levinas 
2003), Existence and Existents (Levinas 2008
a
), and Totality and Infinity (Levinas 
2008
b
) do contain lengthy discussions on existentialism.  
 
Levinas sets out his phenomenology in Totality and Infinity (Levinas 2008
b
) where he 
sets out the structure of relation with the other; ‘The way in which the other presents 
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 Emphasis added. 
28
 Emphasis added. 
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himself, exceeding the idea of the other in me, we here name face (Levinas 2008
b
; 
50)’.Where Husserl sought to limit sense, Levinas expands the horizons of 
phenomenology in the concept of face. In a similar fashion Levinas’s perspective 
overthrows Husserl’s historicity; 
 
The face of the Other at each moment destroys and overflows the plastic image it 
leaves me, the idea existing to my own measure and to the measure of its ideatum-
the adequate idea(Levinas 2008
b
;51). 
 
 
 
Writing in Entre Nous Levinas explains the principle trope in his later phenomenology 
as the unpresentable trace
29
: 
 
I have attempted a ‘phenomenology’ of sociality, taking as my point of departure the face of the 
other, proximity, by hearing-before all mimicry, in its facial straightforwardness, before all verbal 
expression, in its mortality, from the depths of that weakness-a voice that commands: an order 
addressed to me, not to remain indifferent to that death, not to let the other die alone; that is, an order 
to answer for the life of the other man, at the risk of becoming an accomplice to that death (Levinas 
2006a:146). 
 
This concept provides an ethics of ethics, or theory of ethics, which applies to the 
individual, society, and Levinas also works this out at the political level. For Levinas, 
this responsibility for the other precedes consent, every contract, and it precedes 
                                                 
29
 Trope is from the Greek tropos meaning ‘turn’ or ‘turn of speech’ (Mautner 1999; 573). It is ‘…a kind 
of figurative, non-literal, use of words which achieves its effect by deviating from the standard meaning 
of the words used (Mautner 1999;573)’ 
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ontology ‘…I am obliged without this obligation having begun in me, as though the 
order slipped into my consciousness like a thief, smuggled itself in…’(Levinas 
2008a;13). Such a position will be seen later to be in contrast to Kant, as this 
responsibility is prior to the thematizing of consciousness, and is not an obligation 
based upon the universalization of maxims. Similarly, Kierkegaard has a concern at the 
heart of his philosophy for an authentic way of existence which is free from the crowd, 
and free from being defined by their context. Kierkegaard explains; 
 
Now, all in all, there are two ways for an existing individual: either he can do everything to forget 
that he is an existing individual and thereby manage to become comic (the comic contradiction of 
wanting to be what one is not, for example, that a human being wants to be a bird is no more comic 
than the contradiction of not wanting to be what one is, as in casu [in this case] an existing 
individual, just as in the use of language it is comic when someone forgets his name, which signifies 
not so much forgetting his name as the singularity of his nature), because existence possesses the 
remarkable quality that an exiting person exists whether he wants to or not; or he can direct all his 
attention to his existing (Kierkegaard 1992a:120). 
 
The detail of this authentic existence is provided within the thesis where the aesthetic, 
ethical and religious stages are discussed as part of the theoretical analysis, along with 
Kierkegaard’s concepts of irony and repetition. 
 
 
One of the problems highlighted in this section regards intentionality. Drabinsky 
believes that ‘…the problem of intentionality as such is the problem of relation 
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(Drabinsky 2001; 17)’. Levinas and Kierkegaard however, provide the structure for this 
relation in the concept of face, and subjectivity is the relation. 
 
The philosophical analysis is based upon this expanded existential phenomenology. As 
such Drabinsky states; 
 
A phenomenology aimed at describing this pre-predicative life (with all qualification due regarding 
the term “description”) opens up the possibility of another practice of phenomenology. That is, the 
exploration of the relational structures of pre-predicative life explores the limits imposed by the 
idealist’s closed system of predelinated horizons (Drabinsky 2001; 20). 
 
It is then, this pre-predicative life that the analysis aims to uncover in the legal 
transcripts. Below the procedure for performing the analysis is explained. 
 
Detail of the philosophical analysis. 
Once the legal transcripts were downloaded as pdf. (Portable Document Format) files 
from the electronic law databases (Westlaw and NexisLexis); they were then printed 
out onto A4 paper. Following this they were then photocopied onto A3 size paper. Such 
a format allows the text from the transcripts to take up the right hand of the A3 page, 
and leaves the left hand of the page for taking notes and identifying existential themes 
in the transcripts of alleged clinical negligence. 
 
The main existential themes will be critically analysed within the body of the 
discursive chapters 4-8. However, the main discussion is based upon the following 
identified themes in the work of Kierkegaard, Sartre, and Levinas; 
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 Freedom, 
 Personal responsibility, 
 Authenticity/Anxiety/Passion-engagement, 
 Situatedness/Facticity, 
 The crowd/political dimension, 
 Subjectivity as truth. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has provided the rationale for performing two literature reviews. The first 
on published research within healthcare journals on ethics and whistleblowing. This 
was performed to establish the current thinking on these topics, and in order for the 
findings to inform the second literature review which was on the legal transcripts. The 
legal transcripts were subjected to two levels of analysis, first the legal and analysis, 
and then the philosophical analysis. 
 
Existential phenomenology was outlined as developing from Husserl, through 
Heidegger, and Levinas’s expanded existential phenomenology was presented as the 
favoured method to critically analyse the legal transcripts. 
 
The next chapter will commence with the first literature review on ethics and 
whistleblowing. 
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CHAPTER THREE: ‘EVIDENCE’ IN ETHICAL DECISION MAKING. 
 
 
But in knowledge there also appears the notion of an intellectual activity or of a reasoning will-a 
way of doing something which consists precisely of thinking through knowing, of seizing something 
and making it one’s own, or reducing to presence and representing the difference of being, an 
activity which appropriates and grasps the otherness of the own (Levinas 2009b: 76). 
 
Introduction 
The work of Levinas-as exemplified above- has thrown up a question about the role of 
‘evidence’ in providing ethical care to a patient. Within health care Evidence-Based 
Practice (EBP) is a powerful philosophy which holds that all care should be based upon 
evidence. To facilitate this process there are many structures in place to provide 
evidence. Unfortunately, EBP has been heavily criticized since its inception. 
 
The problem which emerges for the current study is that most research projects would 
carry out a literature review as foundational for the study. However, Levinas is 
suggesting that the ethical relation is prior to concepts and prior to Husserl’s 
intentionality. From this arises the challenge of constructing an argument using the 
dominant narrative-empirical research-on a topic which is anterior to epistemology. 
That is, for Levinas, the relation with the patient (Other) cannot be reduced to 
perception, where applying concepts to the other person can have a limiting dynamic. 
 
As a consequence of this challenge, this chapter aims to discuss the role of ‘evidence’ 
in ethical decision making, prior to commencing the literature reviews in the next 
chapter. 
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Evidence Based Medicine (EBM) was pioneered by the British epidemiologist, Archie 
Cochrane (UK Cochrane Centre 2013). Cochrane was a prisoner of war for four years 
where he had the role of senior medical officer for 20,000 prisoners of war (POW) 
(Cochrane 1999). This experience of caring for POW, who suffered from poor nutrition, 
typhoid, diphtheria, and tuberculosis, seems noteworthy as very few died in these 
squalid conditions despite the lack of medical resources (Cochrane 1999). In evaluating 
the role of evidence-especially Randomised Controlled Trials (RCTs)-it is poignant to 
highlight the care Cochrane provided to a Soviet prisoner. In his autobiography 
Cochrane explains that he was given a Soviet prisoner to care for who was suffering 
from a severe pleural rub (Cochrane & Blythe 2009; 82). Being unable to speak any 
Russian, and with no Morphine to relive the severe pain, Cochrane took the screaming 
prisoner in his arms. Cochrane reports that the prisoner stopped screaming almost at 
once, and died some hours later in his arms (Cochrane & Blythe 2009; 82).The 
significant point being, that it was not the pleurisy which was causing the pain, but 
loneliness (Cochrane & Blythe 2009; 82). 
 
This section is going to explore the development of EBM and the critical point of these 
differing types of ‘evidence’ as portrayed in Cochrane’s actions towards the prisoner. 
That is, it is proposed that a RCT could readily be found on a respiratory problem such 
as a pleural rub. In contrast, it would be challenging to find a RCT on existential 
loneliness as experienced by a Russian prisoner of war.  
 
 
. 
 
89 
Background and development of EBM/EBP. 
The philosophy of EBM developed out of concern that many patients/clients were 
receiving clinical interventions which were based upon convention, intuition, and that 
such an approach was ineffective (Sacket et al 1996). EBM was also part of Clinical 
Governance through which the NHS was continuously improving the quality of the 
services provided to patients while at the same time operating within fiscal constraints 
(Scally & Donaldson 1998). A relevant aspect of Clinical Governance is that it aims to 
enforce compliance with nationally devised evidence based policies (Onion 2000). It 
achieves this through clinical guidelines and national service frameworks (McSherry & 
Pearce 2011).To establish clear guidance on best practice, a National Institute of 
Clinical Excellence (NICE) was created to give new coherence and prominence to 
information about clinical and cost effectiveness (McSherry & Pearce 2011). Through 
this process the British government has endorsed EBM as being both clinically, and 
cost effective in that with limited resources money will be best spent on interventions 
with proven effectiveness and efficacy (Department of Health 2010). 
 
Cochrane’s work was developed through Canadian researchers working at McMaster 
University which was led by David Sackett and Gordon Guyatt (Sur & Dahm 2011). 
Sacket et al. (1996) define evidence based medicine as;  
 
…the conscientious, explicit, and judicious use of current best evidence in making decisions about 
the care of individual patients. The practice of evidence based medicine means integrating individual 
clinical expertise with the best available external clinical evidence from systematic research. By 
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individual clinical expertise we mean the proficiency and judgment that individual clinicians acquire 
through clinical experience and clinical practice (Sacket et al. 1996; 71). 
 
It is the judicious use of and integrating individual clinical expertise that will be the 
focus of argument in the following sections. 
 
Evidence-based practice (EBP) evolved from EBM and spread to other professions 
such as nursing, physiotherapy, psychology, education, and dentistry (Aveyard & Sharp 
2013). EBP is an interdisciplinary approach to clinical practice where health 
professionals base their care upon the same national guidelines such as those produced 
by NICE, the Cochrane database, or SIGN (Scottish Intercollegiate Guidelines 
Network) for the NHS in Scotland. 
 
Philosophical foundations of EBP. 
Evidence-based practice
30
 makes a number of epistemological assumptions. These 
conflicting and incoherent assumptions favor one particular form of ‘reliable’ evidence 
over other forms of evidence, and also harbor a misguided understanding of the knower. 
Each of these assumptions will be considered in turn, in relation to the potential 
harmful affect they have upon delivering a high standard of care to individual patients.   
 
Philosophy consists of five branches. These are Metaphysics (Study of existence), 
Epistemology (Study of knowledge), Ethics (Study of action), Politics (Study of force) 
and Aesthetics (Study of art). There is a hierarchical relationship between these 
                                                 
30
 Also sometimes referred to as Evidence-Based Healthcare Practice (EBHP). 
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branches. At the root is metaphysics, which is closely related to epistemology. Ethics is 
said to be dependent on epistemology because it is impossible to make choices without 
knowledge. Politics is a subset of ethics. Aesthetics is dependent upon metaphysics, 
epistemology, and ethics
31
.  
 
Epistemology-which is also called the theory of knowledge-, is the branch of 
philosophy concerned with enquiry into the nature, sources and validity of knowledge 
(Grayling 2003; 37). Since the primary question of epistemology considers what is 
knowledge, ‘…the standard preliminary definition states that knowledge is justified 
true belief 
32
(Grayling 2003; 37). Therefore, what we know is a subcategory of what we 
believe. 
 
Within contemporary analytical philosophy there are two schools of thought about 
justification; Evidentialism (Conee & Feldman 2004) and Reliabilism (Goldman 2011, 
2012). Evidentialism claims that evidence provides justification for beliefs (Conee & 
Feldman 2004). ‘Evidence’ means the contents of direct experiences mediated by 
perception, memory, intuition or introspection (Conee & Feldman 2004). Conee and 
Feldman explain that Evidentialism is a version of epistemic internalism, and that 
recent epistemology has included many attacks on internalism and has in turn seen the 
development of numerous externalist theories (Conee & Feldman 2004). Reliabilism is 
in contrast, a version of epistemic externalism. That is, for reliabilists, the source of 
                                                 
31
 The purpose of setting out this overview is to assist the later discussion which will explore different 
ways of knowing. Some of which will consider the relationship between ethics and epistemology. In later 
chapters consideration will be given to Levinas’ proposal that ethics is first philosophy.  
32
 Emphasis in the original. 
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justification for knowledge is external, because a belief is justified only if it has been 
formed as the result of a generally reliable process
33
 (Goldman 2012). Hutchison and 
Rogers incisively distinguish between evidentialism and reliabilism by stating,  
 
…reliabilists claim that  justification derives from sourcing beliefs through reliable methods; these 
might include perception or memory, but the key point is that it is the process
34
 from which the 
evidence derives, rather than the evidence itself, which justifies the belief (Hutchison & Rogers 
2012;986).     
 
Evidence Based Practice- with its process for performing Systematic reviews and 
Randomized Controlled Trials (RCTs)-then seems to be within the reliabilist school of 
justification
35
. In addition to these stipulated methods of research, one of the most 
crucial aspects of EBP is its emphasis upon the epistemic hierarchy for ‘evidence’ 
(Figure x). It can be seen from Figure x. that priority is given to RCTs, systematic 
reviews, and meta-analyses. All of these methods derive their recommendations on 
modal information from populations or subgroups (Hasnain-Wynia 2006; 2). As a 
research method, the gold standard approach-RCTs- standardizes, rather than 
individualizes, patient care (Hasnain-Wynia 2006; 1 Thompson 2002; 2). It can also be 
seen that the hierarchy of evidence places ‘expert opinion’ (internally mediated 
evidence-Evidentialism) at the bottom of the hierarchy. Significantly, this is an 
inversion of how the pyramid would have been prior to EBP, when the individual 
experience of health professionals would be the main source for informing decision 
                                                 
33
 Emphasis added. 
34
 Emphasis in the original. 
35
 Schwab argues that Reliabilism is an attractive epistemic perspective for medical practice (Schwab 
2008). 
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making (Bartolucci et al. 2010). Such a prioritizing of evidence has consequences for 
the individual patient as health professionals attempt to integrate the two epistemic 
approaches [reliabilism and evidentialism] to justifying belief. 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Hierarchy of Evidence Based Practice. Developed from Phillips et al. (2009), 
Evidence Based Nursing Practice (nd), and Sackett et al. (2000). 
 
EBP as a new paradigm? 
In 1992, a working group consisting of thirty clinical scientists and clinical teachers co-
authored an article where evidence-based medicine was described as a shift in medical 
paradigms (Guyatt et al.1992). The move was from the traditional paradigm of medical 
practice, to EBM which proposes that intuition, unsystematic clinical experience, and 
pathophysiological rationale are insufficient grounds for clinical decision making 
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(Guyatt & Busse 2006). Instead, EBM places emphasis upon the examination of 
evidence from clinical research (Guyatt & Busse 2006). 
 
At this stage in the discussion the work of Carper is helpful in providing a framework 
to highlight this ‘paradigm’ shift in sources of evidence (Carper 1978). In her typology 
of nursing epistemology, Carper proposed that there are ways of knowing which are not 
scientific, and perhaps not empirical (Porter 2010). Carper distinguished between 
‘empirics’ (scientific knowledge), on the one hand, and ‘aesthetic’ (art), ‘personal’ 
(required for authentic personal relationships), and ‘moral’ (Carper 1978) (Please see 
figure 6 below). 
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  SCIENTIFIC NON-SCIENTIFIC       
EBM
36
 Best   Clinical   Patient    
SACKETT Research   Expertise   Values   
ET AL. Evidence 
 
  
 
    
(2000).           
KUHN   
TACIT 
KNOWLEDGE……………………………………………………………………. 
(1962).             
POLANYI   
TACIT 
KNOWLEDGE……………………………………………………………………. 
(1962).             
CARPER Empirical Aesthetic Personal Moral     
(1978).             
BENNER Know what Know how Intuition       
(1984).             
MUNHALL         Unknowing   
(1993).             
WHITE           Socio-political 
(1995).             
FAWCETT   Aesthetic Personal Ethical     
ET AL.   theories theories theories     
(2001; 
118).             
RYCROFT-   Professional         
MALONE   craft knowledge         
ET AL.   & reasoning         
(2004).             
Figure 6. Sources of ‘evidence’. 
                                                 
36
 Cochrane’s classic text ‘Effectiveness and efficiency: random reflections on health services’ had a 
profound influence on the practice of medicine and on the evaluation of medical interventions. He was 
the first to set out clearly the vital importance of RCTs for assessing the effectiveness of treatments 
(Cochrane 1972, Claridge and Fabian (2005; 552)). 
. 
 
96 
 
Subsequent authors have added other ways of knowing, such as ‘intuition’ (Benner 
1984), ‘unknowing’ (Munhall 1993), ‘socio-political knowing’ (White 1995), and ‘craft 
knowledge’ (Rycroft-Malone et al. 2004). Similar frameworks to Carper’s can be found 
in physiotherapy in the ‘propositional’, ‘professional’, ‘craft’, and ‘personal 
knowledge’ as recommended by Higgs and Titchen (1995). For the current discussion, 
the distinction between empirical and tacit knowledge will be sufficient. 
 
EBP – Assumption; Empirical research as the only ‘evidence’. 
 Since its inception, EBP has been criticized for its narrow focus upon empirical 
evidence, while not considering the patients perspective, and for denigrating the role of 
clinical expertise (Cohen et al. 2004). In order to defend EBP, Sackett et al. responded 
that EBP 
 
…requires a bottom up approach that integrates the best external evidence with individual clinical 
expertise and patients’ choice, it cannot result in slavish cookbook approaches to individual patient 
care (Sackett et al. 1996: 72).  
 
As a result the debate has produced research on the topics of including patients in 
decision-making, patient-focused care, and in considering patient values. This section 
aims to highlight the role of tacit knowledge, and thereby the ineliminable and 
irreducible role of the individual health professional in integrating the tripartite division 
of; best research evidence with clinical expertise and patient values. 
 
. 
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EBP has attained the status of a law (Samanta et al 2006). As such, litigation is a 
powerful tool for influencing clinical practice as health professionals observe the 
consequences of following, or not following clinical guidelines. For example, solicitors 
and barristers use clinical guidelines in litigation, and increasingly so as part of trial 
strategy (Samanta et al. 2006) Such an approach is deeply problematic as when 
considering what should happen when there is no clinical guideline. Grol and 
Grimshaw have highlighted the gap between best practice based upon scientific 
evidence, and actual clinical care (Grol & Grimshaw 2003). They found that in the 
United States and the Netherlands at least 30-40% of patients do not receive care based 
upon current research evidence (Grol & Grimshaw 2003). In the United Kingdom there 
is evidence of widespread noncompliance with guidelines (Sheldon et al. 2004). This 
should not be surprising when consideration is given to the exponential growth of 
published research in relation to the time available for staff to read and implement this 
information. Estimates intimate that 27kg of guidelines, 3,000 new papers, 1,000 new 
indexed Medline articles, and 50 new randomized clinical trials (RCTs) are published 
each day (Coppus et al. 2007;2).  
 
EBP continues to be founded upon an incoherent philosophical assumption that 
prioritizes Reliabilism, and discounts Evidentialism
37
. When it was introduced in the 
mid 1990s EBP had an exclusive focus upon empirical evidence. This untenable 
position changed when it was challenged by health professionals (Tanenbaum 1994, 
Feinstein & Horwitz 1997). Reactively, the proponents of EBP began to call for the 
                                                 
37
 This argument has a substantial, supportive bibliography from Miles et al. (Miles et al. 2002, 2003, 
2004, and 2006), Norman (Norman 1999 and 2003), and in the literature on tacit knowledge, for example, 
(Henry 2006, Henry et al. 2007, Thornton 2006). 
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‘integration’ of some alternative kinds of knowledge, as well as emphasizing the need 
to include patient goals and values into clinical decision making (Sackett et al 1996). 
The philosophical problem which bedevils EBP is that because the authors have 
provided no sound philosophical argument for restricting the definition of ‘evidence’ in 
the beginning, there is now no rational for integrating the different kinds of ‘evidence’. 
An example of this can be found in an article from Haynes at McMaster University 
which provides a model with overlapping circles demonstrating the integration of 
research evidence, patients’ preferences, and clinical circumstances (Haynes et al 2002; 
1350). Where this article lacks detail, is in explaining how the different kinds of 
‘evidence’ integrate (Paley 2006). Tonelli argues that the few attempts to describe a 
method for integrating various kinds of medical knowledge and reasoning into clinical 
decision making have been unsatisfactory (Tonelli 2006; 249). The fundamental 
philosophical problem being that positivism - as expressed in the empirical hierarchy of 
EBP – separates questions about knowledge and value, whereas in clinical practice the 
two come together (Loughlin 1998, Loughlin 2002). By developing an unfounded 
epistemic hierarchy, EBP has driven a wedge between empirical evidence, and other 
forms of evidence derived by intuition, experiential learning, and expert opinion. By so 
doing, it has created artificial barriers between epistemology and ethics (Loughlin 
2006). The individual patient and the individual clinician have been squeezed out of the 
equation (research evidence, clinical expertise, and patient values) involved in clinical 
decision making. Within epistemology, the ‘evidence’ mediated by perception, memory, 
intuition or introspection (Evidentialism) has been down-graded by EBP, in favoring 
empirical ‘evidence’ (Reliabilism). This is a significant change within health care as 
health professionals such as nurses, doctors and physiotherapists use inductive 
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reasoning in order to identify the health problem with the individual patient or client. 
The remaining question regards how the two schools of thought about justification of 
belief are to be brought together for the benefit of the patient? In other words, how is 
Evidentialism (which is a version of epistemic internalism (Conee & Feldman 2004)), 
and Reliabilism (which is in contrast a version of epistemic externalism (Conee & 
Feldman 2004)) to become integrated? The challenge in rehabilitating epistemic 
internalism is that recent epistemology has included many attacks on internalism, and a 
consequence has seen the development of numerous externalist theories (Conee & 
Feldman 2004). 
 
Application to clinical practice. 
The position described above, where positivism-via EBP-separates knowledge and 
value, and develops barriers between epistemology and ethics must affect the way 
patients are cared for within the NHS. One way to evaluate this situation is to consider 
what provokes individuals to complain and pursue litigation about their experience of 
health care. The NHS Information Centre for England reports that the highest 
percentage of written complaints (44.8% or 43,644) concerns the medical profession 
(NHS Information Centre). Nursing, Midwifery and Health Visiting make up 22.1% 
(21,500) of all written complaints (NHS Information Centre). When the subject of the 
complaints are examined, ‘All aspects of clinical treatment’ makes up the highest 
percentage of written complaints (42.2% or 42,727) (NHS Information Centre). This 
was followed in turn by ‘Attitude of staff’ (12.2% or 12,331) (NHS Information 
Centre). The statistic which appears to be fundamental to the current argument is that 
54% of all complaints relate to direct patient interaction (patient values) with 
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healthcare professionals (clinical expertise
38
) (NHS Information Centre). These are the 
two kinds of ‘evidence’ EBP fails to integrate into clinical decision making. As a result 
The NHS Confederation report identifies that patient experience should examine all 
aspects of care delivery which includes the individual’s first point of contact (The NHS 
Confederation 2010). It goes on to establish that ‘improving the experiences of all 
patients starts by treating each of them individually to ensure they receive the right care, 
at the right time, in the right way for them (The NHS Confederation 2010)’. A project 
scoping carried out by NICE found that the ‘Lived Experience’ of the patient was a 
main theme (NICE 2012). ‘Lived Experience’ was described as; 
 
The recognition that individuals are living with their condition and experiencing it in a unique way, 
that family and broader life need to be taken into account, and that all of these aspects of lived 
experience can affect self-care. Taking into account individual physical needs and cognitive needs 
because of condition. Everyday experiences, hopes, expectations, future uncertainty, feelings of loss, 
feelings of being morally judged, feelings of blame. Some of these experiences originate ‘outside’ of 
the health care system but are brought with the patient into the health system; other experiences may 
be affected by attitudes and expectations of health professionals (NICE 2012; 48).   
 
Such recognition
39
 requires garnering the ‘evidence’ mediated by perception, memory, 
intuition or introspection (Evidentialism) which has been previously argued as being 
down-graded by EBP. The question which remains regards how the two schools of 
thought about justification of belief are to be brought together for the benefit of the 
patient? 
                                                 
38
 Emphasis added. 
39
 Emphasis added. 
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Proposition-Levinas.  
Tonelli (2006) provides a helpful argument that goes a long way in responding to this 
challenge. By proposing Casuistry, which is a term to describe case-based reasoning 
(Jonsen & Toumlin 1988), Tonelli highlights the importance of context. The problem 
which has been identified with Casuistry used in law, and in ethics, is in trying to find a 
similar ‘case’ which has a good fit with the case at hand (Jonsen 1986, Jonsen 1991). 
 
The philosophy of Levinas, in seeking the foundation of normativity, uncovers the 
ethical core and key values of health care. In contrast to EBP, Levinas argues that 
ethics is the total resistance of reducing the other person to concepts, and therefore 
comprehension (Nortvedt 2003a). Rather, the other person is always other
40
, and it is 
precisely this otherness that awakens the moral demand of responsibility (Nortvedt 
2003b). 
 
In meeting a patient for the first time, the health professional encounters the otherness 
of the suffering person. Here the consciousness of the doctor or nurse comes across the 
other, not as a concept, theme, or re-presentation, but as an infinite and irreducible 
other (Nortvedt & Nordhaug 2008; 159). This is what Levinas means when he proposes 
that ethics is first philosophy; that the intuition of ethical responsibility in the encounter 
with the other person cannot be reduced to comprehension (Please see figure 7 below) 
(Critchley & Bernasconi 2002). 
 
 
                                                 
40
 Levinas uses the term alterity. 
. 
 
102 
Ethics has priority over Ont/Epistem-ology Law 
Call of the other   
reduction via 
concepts 
Need to establish 
proximity 
Responsibility   Freedom ‘duty of care' 
Other   Same Same 
Infinity   Totality Totality 
Living-for-the 
Other   
Living-from-the 
Other 
Living-for-the- 
polity 
 
Figure 7. Levinas’ claim that Ethics is First Philosophy. (Adapted from Beals 2007:67). 
 
In order to pursue a claim of clinical negligence in law, the claimant would need to 
prove that there were relations giving rise to a duty of care. There is a three part test for 
the duty of care, one of which is to prove a ‘sufficient relationship of proximity’ 
between the alleged wrongdoer and the person who has suffered damage (Deakin et al 
2007; 129). Robertson proposes that at the doctrinal level in law, duties of care are 
imposed on the basis on interpersonal responsibility, which are driven by the pursuit of 
interpersonal justice (Robertson 2013; 33). The crucial point is that this is based upon 
‘proximity’ being defined as nearness in space or time. For Levinas, it is relational 
proximity which grounds our basic ethical motivations (Critchley & Bernaconi 2002).  
 
Nortvedt amplifies an important distinction between an ethics of proximity and other 
moral theories concerning moral reasons (Nortvedt 2008). He goes on to explain-
drawing upon the work of Nagel-objective or agent-neutral reasons must express values 
that are independent of the particular perspective of the agent (Nortvedt 2008, Nagel 
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1986). This seems to link well with the previous discussion concerning the role of tacit 
knowledge in EBP (Figure 6 above), but also, more importantly, with Kierkegaard’s 
stages of existence (Appendix 1.). That is, for Kierkegaard, the Ethical stage involves a 
serious engagement with the either/or of our selves
41
, and the either/or of good and evil, 
or excludes them. Williams supports this view with his argument that always thinking 
impartially about attachments, personal projects and relationships tends to undermine a 
person’s integrity, a person’s sense of self, and to further distance individuals from 
their humanity (Williams 1988). 
 
Proximity in the Levinasian sense is closeness understood as vulnerability, the 
exposedness of subjectivity to an incomprehensible, infinite otherness (Levinas 2008a). 
Levinas uses the metaphor of face. Importantly, this face is not a concept or a theme, 
but contains more than the human ego can subsume as a category of knowledge 
(Critchley & Bernasconi 2002). An ethics of proximity roots the conception of the 
humanity of humans in concrete human experiences, and the experiences that Levinas 
investigates philosophically are experiences of vulnerability and suffering (Levinas 
2008b).  
 
Conclusion 
This argument has not been against EBP per se. In fact, Paley provides clear reasoning 
on precisely why objective research evidence is required in health care in order to 
reduce bias and faulty reasoning (Paley 2006). Rather, the argument has attempted to 
foreground the ethical dimension of care, to identify the dynamic of seeing EBP as 
                                                 
41
 The authentic self, which includes having integrity. 
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iconoclastic, and then the potential detrimental consequences to patient care where 
other aspects of evidence are excluded from decision making. 
 
Further, this argument has attempted to explore the potential role for Levinas’ ethical 
metaphysics that founds an ethical sensibility that is irreducible to knowledge, and 
thereby a definition of caring about the individual patient. Such a view sees the person 
(face) as more than a bio-psycho-social being-from the outside- and rather, into the 
experiences of the patient (Lavoie et al.2006). 
 
Levinas’ reversal of intentionality in the encounter with face will be considered in 
reviewing the literature on ethical decision making, and whistleblowing in the next 
chapter. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: LITERATURE REVIEW AND PHILOSOPHICAL 
ANALYSIS OF ETHICAL DECISION MAKING 
 
 
Introduction. 
 
Health care is provided to patients by a team of health professionals. The structure of 
this team is usually defined by the patient’s health care needs. Regardless of this fact, 
in most care settings this will include a nurse, doctor, and a member of the Allied 
Health Professionals (AHPs). Crucial to this clinical encounter is the relationship 
between the health professional and the patient. For it is here that their respective lived 
worlds intersect. 
 
The concept of healthcare provides a framework from which to evaluate a good or 
poor standard of health care. Consequently, definitions of the good or poor doctor or 
nurse can also be derived from this framework. In this chapter the philosophy of 
Aristotle, Kant, MacIntyre, and Pellegrino are considered in arguing for the internal 
morality for the health professions. 
 
MacIntyre, distinguished between goods which are internal to and external to a practice. 
In his book After Virtue MacIntyre enunciates internal goods as those realised when 
trying to achieve the standard of excellence definitive of that practice (MacIntyre 2004). 
This thesis has viewed each of the health professions as a practice, with, for example, 
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excellence in caring as a good internal to nursing practice; excellence in healing a good 
internal to medical practice. MacIntyre defines external goods as those which do not 
contribute directly to the attainment of the aims characteristic of a practice. Within 
health care, making money would be an example of a good external to medical and 
nursing care. 
 
This framework then, - consisting of an internal morality of health professions - is used 
in this chapter to evaluate other views of morality found in the research literature. 
 
The overarching aim of this thesis is to explore the extent to which professionals caring 
for patients within the National Health Service are existentially free to make ethical 
decisions. The concept of existential freedom is that as proposed by Kierkegaard, Sartre 
and Levinas; where the individual health professional in recognising that they exist as 
an individual, develops a self, in order to take responsibility for others. From the 
patient’s perspective, it is to perceive the individual as existing, and all that is in their 
lived world. For example, Agledahl et al (2010), when investigating doctors’ moral 
practice found that when doctors’ were taking a patients’ medical history, they 
transformed the patients’ ‘diverse concerns into specific medical questions(Agledahl et 
al.2010;107)’. This overlooking of existential meanings and focusing on purely 
functional aspects of patients they called a process of ‘essentialising (Agledahl et al 
2010; 107)’. 
 
Existential freedom will also be discussed in relation to whistle blowing, or what is 
now more commonly called the ‘cause for concern’ policy. There has been a long 
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history of inquires (Shipman, Bristol, Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust) into 
the NHS in the United Kingdom which has brought about one of the most prolonged 
investigations into the behaviour of health professionals. In conjunction with this there 
are an increasing number of claims and complaints made against health professionals 
through claims of clinical negligence. While this will be explored further in the second 
literature review on clinical negligence, this chapter will argue that the treatment of 
NHS whistle blowers is totemic of the NHS environment of conformity, secrecy and 
suppression. 
 
This chapter will also explore the role of teaching in the moral development of health 
professionals. Specifically, the focus will be on how topics such as decision making, 
and ethics are taught. In many respects the definition of a good nurse, doctor, or 
physiotherapist are set out in the standards for education and training (NMC 2010, 
GMC 2009, HCPC 2012). This will be discussed in relation to an internal morality of 
health professions as proposed by MacIntyre, and Pellegrino. 
 
REVIEW 
 
Aim 
The reason for undertaking this review was to thoroughly examine the empirical 
evidence base to test the thesis proposition that health professionals are not existentially 
free to care for patients. Additionally, this evidence was consulted in order to establish 
the dominant moral theory/s which would then contribute to later discussion of decision 
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making in reviewing the cases of clinical negligence, and also in developing a potential 
existential theory of ethics. 
 
 
Review methodology 
This review actually consists of a series of literature reviews which will be detailed 
below. The method used was as outlined in the United Kingdom Centre for Reviews 
and Dissemination Guidelines on Systematic Reviews (Centre for Reviews and 
Dissemination (2009). This involved reading the articles, and then relevant data were 
isolated, compared, and related. 
 
Search strategy 
An extensive search was performed in the electronic databases of Medline, Cinahl Plus, 
Scopus and Assia for papers published between January 1990 and February 2013. The 
following keywords were used; ‘decision making’, ‘clinical decision making’, ‘clinical 
judgement’, ‘clinical reasoning’, ‘diagnostic reasoning’, ‘ethical reasoning’, ‘ethical 
decision making’, ‘moral reasoning’, ‘ethical practice’, ‘ethical action’, ‘ethical; 
behaviour’, ‘moral behaviour’, ‘moral judgement’, ‘ethical sensitivity’, ‘moral 
sensitivity’, ethical distress’, ‘moral distress’, ‘whistle blowing’, and ‘cause for 
concern’. 
 
Search outcome 
 
In exploring the concept of decision making in healthcare the researchers use a number 
of expressions. When the term ‘decision making’ is used there is an instantaneous 
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overlap into the psychology literature, in particular to the field of judgement and 
decision making (Baron 2000, Gilovich et al. 2002, March 1994, Payne et al. 1993, 
Tversky and Kahneman 1981). There is particular salience of thought with the 
healthcare literature around areas of influence such as culture (Markus and Kitayama 
1991, Weber et al. 2000), and emotion (Lerner and Keltner 2000, Sloman 1996). 
Within nursing and midwifery the most common term used is ‘clinical decision 
making’ (Buckingham and Adams 2000a, 200b Bucknall and Thomas 1997, Cioffi 
1997, Field 1987, Jenks 1993, Lauri et al 2001, Luker 1992, Rhodes 1985, Thomas et 
al.1991). Patricia Benner uses the term ‘clinical judgement’ (Benner and Tanner 1987, 
Benner 2000, Benner, Tanner and Chesla 2009). Others (Grobe et al.1991, Higgs and 
Jones 2000, Kuiper 2002, Mattingly and Fleming 1994, Pesut and Herman 1992, Pesut 
and Herman 1999) use ‘clinical reasoning’. Within medicine ‘diagnostic reasoning’ is 
common (Elstein et al.1978, Wigton et al. 1988, Offredy 1998, Offredy 2002). Some 
subjugate ethical with moral (Candy 1991, Chally 1992, Esterhuizen and Kooyman 
2001, Parker 1990). Hamers et al. states; ‘…it appears that there is no unequivocal 
definition of decision making and that there is no consensus regarding the terminology 
that should be used’ (Hamers et al. 1994; 54). This is no surprise when we trace the 
different threads back to different disciples exploring the same topic of how people 
behave when faced with more than one choice. Dowie has clarified between 
‘judgement’ and ‘decision making’ by defining judgement as ‘the assessment of 
alternatives’ and decisions as ‘choosing between alternatives’ (Dowie (1993: 8). 
However all of the terms describe similar cognitive activities that doctors and nurses 
perform in making choices about patient care (Tanner 1994, Facione and Facione 1996, 
Rashotte and Carnevale 2004, Benner et al 2009). 
. 
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The other major contributing group to healthcare is Physiotherapists. They make up 
30.4% of the Allied Health Professionals (AHP), with Occupational Therapists being 
the second largest group with 20.4% (Scottish Executive Health Department 2002). 
Physiotherapists ‘…to a high extent still work within the biomedical frame of 
reference’ (Gard and Thrane. 2003: 64). With physiotherapists and occupational 
therapists previous alliance with medicine it is perhaps understandable that the terms 
used by AHPs are similar to doctors; ‘ethical reasoning’, ‘clinical decision making’, 
and ‘clinical reasoning’ (Barnitt and Partridge 1997, Clawson 1994, Harding and 
Williams 1995, Higgs 1993, Higgs et al. 1999, Thornquist 1994). 
In order to critically appraise the literature on ethical decision making, this chapter is 
divided into the following sections; 
 
 Approaches to decision making 
 Theoretical Analysis of Moral Behaviour (Ethical Decision Making).  
 Meta ethical Fragments of philosophy. 
 MacIntyre, Managerial Ethics and Relativism 
 Telos/Ethical ends. 
 Deontology 
 Virtue Ethics 
 Teaching ethics and Ethics pedagogy 
 Discussion and Conclusion. 
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Approaches to decision making 
One of the most striking features in the literature is the way that doctors, nurses and 
Allied Health Professionals (AHPs) use different approaches to decision making. This 
feature will be brought out in reviewing the different philosophies, core curriculum, 
and management structures of the key professions making up the healthcare team. The 
main development here has been where nurses and AHPs (previously knows as 
Professions Allied to Medicine (PAMs)) have gained a degree of autonomy from the 
Medical Model where the doctor directed the nurses and PAMs, both clinically and in 
management. The central debate has been over an ethics of care (Gilligen 1982) or 
ethics of justice (Kohlberg 1981a, Kohlberg 1981b). From this polarised situation 
emerged differences in approach in educational preparation, particularly between 
nurses and physicians (Bates 1970, Twomey 1989, Baumann et al. 1998, May & 
Fleming 1997, Fry 1989, Grundstein-Amado 1992, Oberle and Hughes 2001). The 
potential problem of differing curricula is one of ‘…conceptual and practical 
isolationism of thinking about health care ethics’ (Hanson 2005; 168). 
 
There are two overarching, predominant theoretical perspectives on decision making 
within healthcare: the analytic and the intuitive (Rashotte & Carnevale 2004). Dowie 
and Elstein (1988) provide an overview of this research to describe the cognitive 
processes used by doctors, with the models also being used by nurses and AHPs. The 
models have been identified as; the Bayesian formula of probability (Eddy and Clayton 
1988, Fischhoff and Beyth-Marom 1988), the clinical continuum theory (Hamm 1988), 
decision analysis theory (Doubilet and McNeil 1988), the Brunswik lens model 
(Wigton et al. 1988), information processing theory (Elstein and Bordage 1988), and 
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reflection-in/on-action theory (Schön 1983). All of these theories remain relevant to 
healthcare and their current utility is perhaps best seen in the algorithms and decision 
trees used within NHS 24. 
 
Within the analytical perspective of decision making, Bayesian inference is a popular 
rational model. Thomas Bayes’ theorem claims that accurate decision making can rely 
on probability estimates based on the prior occurrence of two separate particular 
diagnoses with specific signs and symptoms (Swartz 1998). It is a mathematical model 
for revising predictions in light of relevant evidence (Encyclopaedia Britannica 2005). 
In Bayes model, decision making is represented in terms of hypotheses, each of which 
is characterised by a subjective probability, representing one’s confidence in its truth. 
Two features of Bayesian theory to highlight are that our beliefs come in degrees of 
certainty, and that these degrees of belief as probabilities are thought of as subjective 
probabilities. That is, it can be ‘perfectly rational for different people to attach different 
subjective probabilities to the same proposition’ (Papineau 2003: 291). The theorem 
dictates that upon discovering new evidence practitioners will adjust their degree of 
belief in the hypothesis (Rashottee and Carnevale 2004). In nursing, Bayes’ theorem 
was used in some of the first research investigating nurse decision making (Hammond 
1966). 
 
There is also increasing interest in the use of decision trees (Bonner 2001, Corcoran 
1986a, Elwyn et al. 2001, Hatcher 1995, Koenig et al. 1993, Schulberg et al. 1989, 
Zarin and Earls 1993). Decision trees can provide structure to assist decision making in 
clinical practice (Carnevelli and Thomas 1993). Decision trees are a problem solving, 
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rational approach to assist a decision where there are mutually exclusive courses of 
action. Each option is objectively, or subjectively assigned corresponding expected 
probability and utility estimates. For example, evidence in the form of research can be 
added in to provide objectivity. The best decision is then computed by multiplying the 
probability with the utility of each outcome (Dowding and Thompson 2002). Simply 
stated, numerical values are given at each fork in the decision tree to add or subtract 
weight to each consideration and thus to substantiate potential outcomes. The literature 
around the efficacy of decision trees has two main findings; 1. They can improve 
consistency between nurses, and improve decision accuracy (Shamian 1991, 
Letourneau and Jensen 1998, Warren et al.1999), 2. Greater clinical experience does 
not necessarily cause clinicians to converge on an optimal diagnostic strategy (Elstein 
et al. 1978, Ferrand et al. 1992, Offredy 1998, Offredy 2002, Tanner et al. 1987, 
Wigton et al. 1988). Decision trees may facilitate the communication process between 
clinicians (Shamian 1991), and clinicians and patients (Naik et al. 2005). One of the 
issues with such tools is the balance of power in shared decision making which affects 
the process of dialogue inter-professionally, intra-professionally, and with the patient. 
 
The dominant explanatory theory on nurse decision making until the 1980s was the 
hypothetico-deductive rational process based around theory from cognitive psychology 
(Thompson 1999). This theory which was first presented by Newell and Simon (1972) 
has been one of the most influential descriptive theories of decision making in 
medicine and nursing (Rashotte and Carnevale 2004). Elstein et al. (1978) found that 
medical decision making is a sequential cognitive activity where early problem 
identification and hypothesis generation guide subsequent data collection and 
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hypothesis evaluation. Similarly there have been a number of studies which have 
concluded that nurses make judgements about patient care using the hypothetico-
deductive model (Carnevali 1984, Corcoran 1986a, 1986b, 1986c, Einhorn and Hogarth 
1981, Hamers et al. 1994, Putzier et al. 1985, Tanner et al.1987, White et al.1992, 
Radwin 1990). An important aspect of this theory is that the human decision system 
can be separated into two components. One is the short-term memory that contains the 
stimuli information required to unlock factual and experimental knowledge stored in 
the long-term memory which makes up the second component (Hamers et al. 1994). 
This has recently been developed with the research on the role of emotion in decision 
making (Lerner and Keltner 2000). 
 
The information processing model is then described as having a number of stages. 
Elstein et al. (1978) proposed a four stage model, based on a five year research project 
using medical students and qualified doctors. Carnevali (1984) describes a seven-stage 
process used by nurses. Radwin (1990) and Hamers et al. (1994) describe a four-stage 
model which contains the basic framework of Elstein et al (1978); The first stage is 
called ‘cue acquisition’, and involves the clinician taking part in a patient encounter 
and gathering preliminary clinical information about the patient. In the second stage the 
clinician develops a number of tentative hypotheses, based upon the gathered data and 
short term memory based cues. In the third stage the clinician interprets the cues 
gathered during the first stage and classifies them as either confirming, refuting, or not 
contributing to the initial hypotheses developed. This classification is then used in the 
final evaluatory stage where the clinician weighs up the pros and cons of each decision 
alternative, and chooses the one favoured, based on the quality of the evidence. 
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This linear process does not take cognisance of the role of emotions in decision making. 
Psychologists have found that positive emotions increase creative problem solving and 
facilitate the integration of information (Isen 1993). Estrada et al. (1994) found that 
doctors in whom positive affect has been induced integrate information more 
efficiently than do controls, show less anchoring on earlier diagnoses, and display more 
creativity in their thinking. Positive feelings can promote variety seeking (Kahn and 
Isen 1993), overestimation of the likelihood of favourable events, and the 
underestimation of the likelihood of unfavourable events (Nygren et al. 1996, Wright 
and Bower 1992). Conversely, negative affect (feelings) can produce a narrowing of 
attention and a failure to search for new alternatives, and people in negative moods 
make faster and less discriminate use of information that can increase choice accuracy 
in easier tasks and decease it in harder tasks (Luce et al. 1997). Similarly, Mano (1992, 
1994) found that people in unpleasant moods employ simpler decision strategies and 
form more polarised judgements. This dynamic of the decision maker is neglected in 
the hypothetico-deductive rational process, and yet it is bound to affect the decision 
making process. Lewinsohn and Mano (1993) found that people in pleasant moods 
deliberate longer, use more information, and re-examine more information than others. 
All of this research contributes to a richer understanding of decision making in the 
clinical context which involves the constraints of time, and the influence of feelings. 
Holzemer (1986), Offredy (1998, 2002) and Elstein and Schwartz (2000) found that it 
was precisely when practioners were confronted with uncertain or complex problems 
that this approach was commonly applied to their decision making. 
 
. 
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Albert et al. (1988) considered medical decision making as more of a cyclical model 
which is dynamic and iterative. Similarly, Patel et al. (1999), and Knoebel (1986) 
thought that medical decision making in real-time clinical situations is a combination of 
both forward and backward reasoning. 
 
The analytical linear approach has also been challenged for not being able to predict the 
ways in which expert practitioners make decisions in ambiguous situations (Benner 
1983, 2000, Benner and Tanner 1987, Corcoran 1986c, Tanner et.al 1987, Patel et al. 
1999). The main proponent of intuitive decision making has been Benner (2000) within 
nursing, and Schön (1983) within the medical field. 
 
Intuition was initially identified by Carper in the nursing literature (Carper 1978). 
Carper’s (1978) work was developed upon the earlier works of Dewey (1958) and 
Polanyi (1962). Carper (1978) identified the fundamental importance of intuition in 
Ways of Knowing in Nursing, and this remains a seminal work. However the role of 
intuition in nursing practice continues to be debated (Darbyshire 1994, Effken 2001, 
English 1993, Gobet and Chassy 2008, Johnson 1994, King and Appleton 1997, Paley 
1996).  
 
There are many different definitions of Intuition. Effken (2001) provides a useful table 
with twenty two definitions of intuition. Some of the main features are; ‘knowledge of 
a fact or truth, as a whole’; ‘immediate possession of knowledge’; and ‘knowledge 
independent of the linear reasoning process (Effken 2001: 248)’. Dreyfus and Dreyfus 
outlined six key aspects of intuitive judgement as ‘pattern recognition, similarity 
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recognition, commonsense understanding, skilled know-how, sense of salience and 
deliberative rationality’ (Dreyfus and Dreyfus 1986:50). This is very similar to the 
study carried out by Pyles and Stern who found what they termed a ‘nursing gestalt’ 
which was a matrix in which the nurses linked together knowledge, past experiences, 
patient cues and gut feelings (Pyles and Stern 1983). The nurses explained their gut 
feelings as recognition of the patients ‘falling out of the pattern’ which was the 
discrepancy between what the nurse’s saw and what they expected to see in the patient. 
Theses subtle cues then provided the nurses with a feeling trigger about changes in the 
patients’ condition. It is interesting here to see the link with the first step in the 
Information processing model ‘cue acquisition’ and the role of emotions as outlined in 
the psychology literature. 
 
Benner and Tanner first defined intuition as ‘understanding without rationale’ (Benner 
and Tanner, 1987: 23)’. More recently (Benner et al. 2009), they now emphasise that 
knowing the patient or client, and being involved with his/her care are also key 
elements which strengthen the nurses’ intuition. Within the context of ethical decision 
making Pyles and Stern (1983) highlighted the difficulty which nurses can experience 
in communicating these intuitive feelings to medical staff, especially when the nurses 
wanted doctors to take action based on their clinical judgement. 
 
Embedded in the research on intuition is the debate about nursing as a science or art. 
With Banners’ intuitive-humanist research approach and the more traditional 
systematic-positivist research approach being seen as two opposing approaches. 
Intuition is more often included in the art than the science of nursing (Gordon 1986, 
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Hampton 1994, Johnson 1994, Johnson 1996a 1996b, Pyles and Stern 1983, Rew 1988, 
Rew and Barrow 1987). Some have argued for the two approaches as different ways of 
knowing (Berragan 1998), and others as two poles of the clinical decision making 
continuum (Thompson 1999).  
 
The Cognitive Continuum Theory is a descriptive theory that shows how judgement 
situations or tasks relate to cognition. Hamm (1988) states that cognition is neither 
purely intuitive nor purely analytical, rather it is commonly located at some point in 
between. The model contains two continua; cognition, and judgement task structure. 
The cognitive continuum ranges from intuition to analysis, and the judgement task 
structure ranges from ill-structured, to well-structured (Hammond 1980, 1981, 
Hammond et al. 1983) (Please see Figure 4. below). According to the theory, the more 
structured a task is, the more analytically induced will be the decision-making mode. 
Equally, with an ill-structured task decision making is suggested to be intuition induced. 
 
Because the cognitive continuum theory is based upon Social Judgement Theory it is 
sensitive to such variables as power, social structure, and individual knowledge (Hamm 
1988). This is where it departs from the rationality of the information processing model. 
Thomson (1999) gives the example of an individuals’ position in the structures and 
hierarchies in a work environment affecting how much credibility they are perceived to 
have. The example given is that practitioners may reject intuitive solutions from 
‘junior’ colleagues where analytical reasoning cannot be demonstrated (Thompson 
1999:1227). 
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When Benner’s (1984) Novice to Expert framework is superimposed onto Hamm’s’ 
Cognitive Continuum, Intuition as experienced by the expert would be placed at mode 
6 ‘intuitive judgement’. The Novice, who find themselves ‘governed by context free 
rules as guides to action’ would be at the other pole of analysis. This combined 
framework is then useful for seeing the debates on nursing as an art or science. 
Intuition is ‘know how’ knowledge often related to the ‘art’ of nursing, medicine, and 
physiotherapy; ‘know that’ knowledge is grounded in theory and empirical research 
and often classified as responsible for the ‘science’ of nursing (Thompson 1999: 1225). 
Foundational to this stance is that intuition is not congruent with rationalism and 
empiricism, ‘the two epistemological positions that generally form the crux of medical 
discourse in Western epistemological philosophy’ (Rashotte and Carnevale 2004: 164). 
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Figure 8.  Adapted from Hamm (1988: 87). 
 
 
 
 
 
Theoretical Analysis of Moral Behaviour (Ethical Decision Making) 
Within moral philosophy there are three classic moral theories. These are known as 
deontology, consequentialism, and virtue ethics. They are further classified as 
Expert 
Novice 
. 
 
121 
deontology being described as non-teleological, with consequentialism and virtue 
ethics as both being teleological. Reiman (1990) explains that teleological moral 
theories normally take the production of good consequences as the decisive feature of 
morally approved behaviour. 
 
The healthcare literature on ethical decision making is predominantly based upon 
deontology, and to a lesser extent consequentialism, especially that of utilitarianism. 
Virtue ethics is not referred to in the research on ethical decision making. The main 
moral theory providing the framework for professional regulation and standards of 
conduct is deontology. This is the same for doctors, nurses, midwives, and the Allied 
Health Professionals (GMC 1995, GMC 2002, GMC 2006, NMC 2008, HPC 2008, 
GMC 2009a). However, when the health professional is presented with an ethical 
dilemma no indication is given as to which moral theory should take precedence, nor to 
which principle is cardinal within the chosen theory. This is even the case in the 
guidance to doctors on medical ethics (BMA 2012). 
 
Meta-ethical Fragments of Philosophy 
Kant and Aristotle had different views of what the good is. Aristotle starts the 
Nicomachean Ethics with the phrase;  
 
Every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and pursuit is thought to aim at some good: 
and for this reason, the good has rightly been declared to be that at which all things aim (Aristotle 
1998: 1). 
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Theories on moral behaviour in general, and ethical decision making (normative) in 
particular, assert themselves without any preamble regarding their meta-ethical 
foundations and origins. The literature within healthcare ethics is a good example of 
this where fragments of Kantian, Aristotelian, and Bentham’s philosophy are all used 
simultaneously without consideration at the meta-ethical level. Yet there are many 
aspects of these respective philosophies which are incompatible. Alasdair MacIntyre 
(2004) makes this point eloquently in the opening chapter of his book After Virtue 
where he paints the world of natural science suffering a catastrophe where a Know-
Nothing political movement destroys much of the systematic research process 
underpinning knowledge, to the extent that only fragments remain. Significantly, 
people continued to use the technical language of science; 
 
…but many of the beliefs presupposed by the use of these expressions would have been lost and 
there would appear to be an element of arbitrariness and even the choice in their application which 
would appear very surprising to us (MacIntyre 2004: 1). 
 
Most importantly MacIntyre goes on to emphasise ‘What would appear to be rival and 
competing premises for which no further argument could be given would abound’ 
(MacIntyre 2004: 1,2).  
 
Further, the subtleties within each individual philosophy are treated as an amorphous 
mass so that Kant stands for Deontology and duty, without further consideration of the 
several formulations of the categorical imperative, or indeed mention of the 
hypothetical imperative (Schwartz 2010). This point will be explored further in the next 
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section in relation to whistleblowing where instrumental reasoning may be a factor 
where staff keep silent in order to avoid confrontation.  
 
Yet there is a distinction between two levels of moral thinking within Plato and 
Aristotle. Plato distinguishes between ‘knowledge’ and ‘right opinion’. Aristotle 
distinguishes between ‘virtues of character and of intellect’. Hare confirms this view in 
explaining; 
 
But it may be doubted whether its immense importance has yet been realized…it is hardly an 
exaggeration to say that more confusion is caused, both in theoretical ethics and in practical moral 
issues, by the neglect of this distinction than by any other factor (Hare 1981: 25).  
 
MacIntyre, Managerial Ethics and Relativism 
Moral behaviour does not occur in a vacuum. Rather, it is socially situated in historical 
time. As will be seen later, this is a feature in Kierkegaard’s definition in the stages 
which move from the aesthetic which is completely immersed in the social situation, 
through the ethical, to the religious which is able to transcend the current context by 
way of the infinite. With Kierkegaard there is a movement inwards, to that single 
individual, and also to the infinite. 
 
In the Greek language there are two concepts of time; Kronos which is clock time, and 
is said to be more quantitative, and Kairos which has a more qualitative nature, and is 
described variously as the ‘opportune moment’, or ‘situational context’ (Kinneary and 
Eskin 2000). Kairos gives Kronos a transcending value, and links human agency to 
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cosmic order (Zhu 2006). This historical situational context influences moral behaviour 
in the same way that we would consider the influence of the fluid a cell was bathed in 
when trying to understand its functioning. Moral behaviour is immersed in a bath of 
terms of reference, from time-past, but is a part of present-time (part of the whole).  
 
This dynamic interrelationship with unstoppable, unrepeatable, time calls for a constant 
wakefulness to critically appraise what is happening on this meta-ethical horizon, 
before it becomes unquestioning practice. Tillich states ‘Kairoi are those cries in 
history which create an opportunity for, or demand an existential decision by the 
human subject’ (Tillich 1936). Here in the concept of Kairos, we can hear little motifs 
of what Aristotle called ‘equity’ in law which was defined as ‘justice that goes beyond 
the written law’ (Kinneavy and Eskin 2000), what Heidegger termed moment in his 
earlier writings, and which is developed into a full-blown theme which will be 
discussed in the chapter on Existentialism (Chapter 8).  
 
Sacks (2005) agrees with MacIntyre (2004) that it is the most visual protest, the 
angriest voice, and the extreme slogan who win. Emotivism has become the language 
of morals. What we have lost is a common language and logic accessible to all so that 
we can reason together. John Rawls called this ‘public reason’ (Rawls 1993, 1999). In 
each of the Universalist cultures there was a greater degree of moral consensus 
compared to the post modern situation of global capitalism. Postmodern knowledge 
according to Lyotard ‘refines our sensitivity to differences and reinforces our ability to 
tolerate the incommensurable. Its principle is not the expert’s homology, but the 
inventor’s paralogy’ Lyotard (1984: xxv). It is the incommensurability of some ethical 
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decisions which lead to claims of healthcare negligence. Within the healthcare system 
there appears to be differing ends to the goods of practice. This change was pushed into 
the light with the introduction of competitive tendering, the introduction of NHS Trusts 
and the forces of the free market allowed to impact upon healthcare management. The 
key issue at heart was that the success of patient care was measured with a Utilitarian 
approach, with league tables promoting the most financially efficient hospitals and 
naming and shaming those who had not been able to function within their allocated 
budget. The main telos had become financial with the expectation that patients could be 
reduced to an inanimate commodity as measured in all other factories of the market. A 
practical example of this would be where some larger Trusts would perform poorly 
(financially) precisely because they provided complex interventions where the clinical 
risk was high, and patients were referred from out-with the Trusts geographical area 
because of their expertise, as in for example, Cardiac surgery. This is a feature of 
global capitalism the influence of which can also be seen within education. On 
discussing the concept of ‘productivity’ within education MacIntyre explains; 
It is a highly abstract conception of the school as an input-output machine whose activities are to be 
understood as transforming measurable input into measurable output (MacIntyre, 2004: 3).  
 
As within education, the ends within healthcare have similarly changed. The challenge 
in both areas is the unpredictability of the commodity; in healthcare the patient, in 
education the student. What happens when the patient fails to comply with the standard 
Patient Pathway? Is the chief end of a student to pass exams? Perhaps unlike other 
businesses, in health care and in teaching the individual professional uses the 
‘therapeutic self’ as the machinery through which to effect change. There is a push to 
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reduce patients and students into compartments in order to be financially efficient. 
MacIntyre (1999) terms this phenomenon ‘Social Compartmentalisation’ where each 
particular area of life is delimited, with its own norms and prescribed roles. These 
cultural parodies are reinforced with professional codes which encourage staff to do 
one’s duty just because it is one’s duty and not for the sake of any further end. 
 
Telos/Ethical Ends 
In the moral domain of healthcare practice it is important to consider what end we are 
aiming for, and to consider what the good is. Depending upon who you ask the 
responses could feasibly range from a good outcome for an individual patient, through 
to national prosperity by way of reducing illness. In evaluating the literature on moral 
behaviour (ethical decision making, Whistle blowing, legal cases of healthcare 
negligence) it seems a misconception to believe that the micro level aims of individual 
patient care would be subsumed in the macro level political aims, that the two levels 
are integrated. Manpower planning calculates the number of qualified nurses per 
patient within a certain level of dependency. The detrimental effect of staff shortages 
on patient care and staff morale has been well documented (Bowman 1995). Aristotle 
would ask what is the function of Nursing, Medicine, and the Allied Health 
Professionals? What is the function of the health service? In answering this, we would 
need to consider where Aristotle (1998) usefully distinguishes between the internal 
goods of a practice which he termed praxis, and those which have its end external to 
the practice as poiesis. This approach is going to be used in considering - in turn - 
Deontology, Virtue Ethics, Utilitarianism, and some of the philosophical issues 
presented in the healthcare literature. 
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Deontology 
Kant is almost surgical in his incisive analysis on morality, in the way that he goes 
straight to the issue of ‘Freedom’. He has already established that a ‘goodwill’ is the 
most important thing when he states ‘It is impossible to conceive anything at all in the 
world, or even out of it, which can be taken as good without qualification, except a 
goodwill
42’ (Kant 1997a: 59). But what if that ‘goodwill’ is not free? 
 
The healthcare literature, the NMC, the GMC, and the HPC, all presuppose that human 
agents have free will. It then follows from this premise that staff have a Categorical 
Imperative to care for patients, indeed, a ‘duty of care’ which is legally binding. The 
curriculum for all healthcare professionals endorses this position. When things go 
wrong these are the very ‘duties’ which are used to evaluate behaviour and actions. 
 
It is difficult for the above situation to capture the hierarchical structure of the National 
Health Service and the dynamics within the healthcare team caring for the patient. 
Implicit in the literature is an assumption that all members of the Health care team are 
equal. In reality the NHS is composed of a hierarchical structure as outlined in the 
organisational figure below.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
42
 Italics in the original. 
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Table 8. NHS Trust Organisational Structure. 
 
 
What is not evident from the chart is the medical dominance over the other professions 
which is perpetuated by the view that scientific evidence takes precedence. For 
example at the top of the research methodology pyramid is Randomised Controlled 
Trials. Another feature which is clear in the literature, and is reiterated in the 
management structure above, is the way in which the professions learn separately about 
ethics, approach ethical problem solving differently, and the linear management 
structure. These differences are demonstrated well in the case where a Consultant 
geriatrician asked a Sister of a Day hospital, to give a patient Haloperidol (sedative) 
dissolved in a cup of tea. A disciplinary hearing exonerated the Consultant, and the 
Sister was suspended and given a final written warning (Kellet 1996). This whole case 
questions the authority of the multidisciplinary team and the equity of team members. 
Yet central to Kantian ethics, as espoused in our professional codes and standards, is 
equity; ‘Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person 
or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as 
an end (Kant 1997a: 32)’.  
Chairman of the Trust 
Medical Director Director of Nursing & Patient Services 
Nurses & Midwives Allied Health 
Professionals 
Doctors 
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While the whole team should be working towards the same strategy through annual 
personal objectives, this is frequently not sensitive enough to changes, so personal 
objectives soon become misaligned with the executive or political strategy. A practical 
example of this would be where NHS Trusts ‘go into the red’ and have to try and save 
millions of pounds. 
 
Figure 9 below demonstrates some of the tensions which can arise when personal 
objectives are not aligned to the executive strategy. It becomes significant again to 
reiterate Aristotle’s question of what is the function of the Health Service.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 9. The telos of caring 
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The literature review on Whistle blowing and the theoretical analysis of the legal 
transcripts on healthcare negligence, provide themes of evidence where healthcare 
professionals are not free, autonomous agents. It seems from the research that we 
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believe we are free and using the Categorical Imperative, but the evidence seems to 
demonstrating we are in fact using the Hypothetical Imperative, which conditionally 
requires an action for the sake of some other end or purpose. With the Hypothetical 
Imperative the heteronomous will is subjugated to rules of action that have been 
legislated externally to it. This is not said to be critical of organisations, because they 
too are subject to this. 
 
This point can be teased out by looking at what Kant calls ‘Kingdom of ends’;  
 
A rational being must always regard himself as making laws in a kingdom of ends which is possible 
through freedom of the will - whether it be as member or as head. The position of the latter he can 
maintain, not in virtue of the maxim of his will alone, but only if he is a completely independent 
being, without needs and with an unlimited power adequate to his will (Kant 1997a: 95, 96).  
 
The challenge for a rational professional within the NHS is the extent of their freedom 
of will, and adequate resources (‘without needs and with an unlimited power adequate 
to his will’ (Kant 1997a: 96). At a superficial level it may seem as if individuals (and 
organisations) are being used as means-to-an-end, with the Hypothetical and 
Categorical Imperatives being a polarised debate. The cardinal question is to what 
extend do we perceive our freedom, and the philosophical manoeuvre to be able to 
conceive of ourselves in the noumenal realm as free, and in the phenomenal realm as 
subject to causal influences. Drummond (2007) in explaining the ancient Greek concept 
of epimeleia heautou (Care of the self), and system efficiency states; 
 
. 
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 … it is important that these two ends, care of the self and system efficiency, are not treated as being 
mutually exclusive, but to embrace the epimelia heautou is to keep the relation between these ends 
in a state, not of absolute opposition, but certainly that of an enigmatic ambivalence of a perhaps 
longed-for harmony, on the one hand, and a permanent provocation, on the other (Drummond 2007: 
264).  
 
As previously stated this was the Internal and External goods of a practice for Aristotle. 
Within the Categorical Imperative there is an often overlooked aspect which 
emphasises the unique value of rational life in the way that it also directs backwards 
towards the individual; ‘For rational beings all stand under the law that each of them 
should treat himself and all others, never merely as a means, but always at the same 
time as an end in himself (Kant 1997a: 95). 
 
Virtue Ethics 
The discussion thus far has considered decision making in the National Health Service, 
and the fragmentary nature of the underpinning philosophy is beginning to emerge. 
One significant point supported by Hare has been the distinction of two levels of moral 
thinking within Plato and Aristotle regarding knowledge and character. This point is 
now going to be considered further in exploring the moral paradigm of Virtue ethics. 
 
It is perhaps of epistemic importance to note at the outset, the way in which virtue 
ethics is frequently presented as a contrast to act-based, and belief-based theories, such 
as deontology and consequentialism
43
. The sub-text being one on incompatabilism. The 
                                                 
43
 Examples would be Baron et al (1997), Oakley (2001) and van Hooft (2006). 
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extent of this suggestion is underlined by the landmark paper presented by Elizabeth 
Anscombe in 1958 which proposed, 
 
It would be a great improvment
44
 if, instead of "morally wrong," one always named a genus such as 
"untruthful," "unchaste," "unjust." We should no longer ask whether doing something was "wrong," 
passing directly from some description of an action to this notion; we should ask whether, e.g., it 
was unjust; and the answer would sometimes be clear at once (Anscombe 1958:7,8). 
 
Anscombe forced this debate by calling for the rejection of deontological and 
consequentialist theories, and as can be seen in the proposal above, wanted to shift the 
focus of moral evaluation away from actions on to agents
45
.  
 
The potential influence Virtue ethics can have upon developing a moral community, 
epistemology and ethics will now be considered. 
 
Virtue Ethics-structure. 
The roots of Virtue ethics can be traced back to Aristotle and Plato (Hursthouse 2010). 
In The Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle proposes: 
 
Virtue, then, is a state of character concerned with choice, lying in a mean, i.e. the mean relative to 
us, this being determined by a rational principle, and by that principle by which the man of practical 
wisdom would determine it (Aristotle 1998: 39). 
                                                 
44
 Misspelling in the original. 
45
 In passing it is worth noting that Anscombe (1958), Macintyre (2004), and Taylor (2007) all share the 
analysis of reified moral theory as being substitutes for discredited faith-based axioms. This issue will be 
considered in more detail in conjunction with secularisation, and the influence this has upon the moral 
imagination in Chapter Seven. 
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This précis will now be explored by applying the theory to clinical practice within the 
National Health Service, with particular reference to the current theme under discussion 
in this chapter of decision making. First the structure of Aristotle’s thought will be set 
out. 
 
The linking of virtue (arête) and character places a functional definition upon human 
being. This is seen where virtue (arête) in the Greek sense is used to describe 
excellence in quality. Aristotle applied this not just to human being, but also to 
inanimate objects. The example which is often used –and links well with Sartre46- is 
that of a knife which should cut well. So anything good performs its function well and 
demonstrates virtue (arête). Thereby the good nurse, doctor, or physiotherapist would 
perform their function well. The aim of this virtue is the highest good (eudaimonia) 
which is usually translated as happiness or flourishing (Hursthouse 2010).  
 
Significantly for health care pedagogy, Aristotle distinguished between moral and 
intellectual virtues (Slote 1995). The moral virtues included qualities of character such 
as courage, temperance, patience, truthfulness and care. Aristotle considered these 
being acquired by habituation.  
 
The intellectual virtues were divided into art or technical skill (techne), scientific 
knowledge (episteme), practical wisdom (phronesis), intelligence (nous), and wisdom 
                                                 
46
 Sartre used the example of a penknife to illustrate how it had an essence, where individuals exist first, 
then develop an essence. 
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(sophia). Aristotle thought that the intellectual virtues were best gained by instruction 
(Aristotle 1998). Here then are suggested two developmental methods: habituation, and 
instruction. 
 
At this juncture it may be profitable to set up a dialogue between Aristotle and Kant in 
order to clarify the two perspectives, for Virtue was also an aspect in Kants’ moral 
theory, and indeed in consequentialism. Elizabeth Anscombe’s paper seems to have set 
off a reaction principally between virtue ethics and the two other normative approaches 
to ethics. Instead of taking the traditional approach of contrasting virtue ethics with 
deontology and consequentialist theories, it may be helpful to consider any common 
ground
47. Kant’s main criticism of virtue ethics can be found where he stated, 
 
 
Plato found the chief instances of his ideas in the field of the practical, that is, in what rests upon 
freedom, which in its turn rests upon modes of knowledge that are a peculiar product of reason. 
Whoever would derive the concepts of virtue from experience and make (as many have actually 
done) what at best can only serve as an example in an imperfect kind of exposition, into a pattern 
from which to derive knowledge, would make of virtue something which changes according to time 
and circumstance, an ambiguous monstrosity not admitting of the formation of any rule (Kant 2007: 
311). 
 
Each of these criticisms is now going to be taken in turn to critically evaluate virtue 
ethics. 
                                                 
47
 Kant made the distinction between determinant judgement where a rule was applied to particulars. 
Whereas, in reflective judgement, the individual was presented with the particular and had to find the 
rule. 
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The Field of the Practical. 
Given that both virtue ethics and the other two main normative ethical theories are 
concerned with virtues it is necessary to clarify what distinguishes between these 
theories regarding the concept of virtue. In deontology and consequentialism, the act is 
more fundamental than the virtues and vices. Therefore, act-based theories define the 
moral virtues and vices in terms of the right and wrong acts performed by the health 
professional. These acts are based upon moral principles and rules which are universal 
in form (van Hooft 2006:20). Similarly, belief-based epistemologies such as 
evidentialist accounts of justification (Evidence Based Practice), take evidence to be 
more fundamental that the epistemic virtues and vices (Battaly 2010: 2). 
 
Greco and Turri (2011) provide a key explanation in distinguishing between virtue 
ethics and the other two main normative theories. Greco and Turri (2011) assert that 
virtue ethicists and virtue epistemologists would reverse the analysis, so that right and 
wrong acts are defined in terms of the moral virtues and vices (actor-based)-rather than 
the other way around. Therefore, virtue epistemologists take the epistemic virtues and 
vices (agent-evaluation) to be more fundamental than any type of belief-evaluation 
(Crisp 2010). The two approaches are then defined as virtue ethics, and virtue theory. 
The crucial aspect is not just the mere presence of a virtue in an ethical theory, but 
rather the role they play within that theory (Mcaleer 2007). Virtue ethics however, does 
not exclude deontic judgements nor ethical principles; rather they would be derivative 
from the virtues with a primary emphasis on the assessment of agents and their motives 
and character, as opposed to acts and choices (Slote 1992:89). 
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As a consequence of the reversal of the analysis, it is the virtues (arête) which have 
primacy in virtue ethics. Both the moral and intellectual virtues are required for 
flourishing (eudaimonia) as a health professional. Perhaps the primacy of arête is best 
seen in Aristotle’s two books on ethics: The Nicomachean Ethics (Aristotle 1998) and 
the Eudemian Ethics (Aristotle 2011). Barnes traces the word Ethics as having its root 
in the Greek word ĕthika which actually means ‘matters to do with character’, and 
Barnes goes on to emphasise this point by suggesting ‘…and a better title would be On 
Matters of Character
48’ (Barnes 2000:123,124). Knowing of the great scientific work 
carried out in Aristotle’s oeuvre, raises a question about how this reversal of the 
analysis would apply to any epistemology. Brown (2003) addresses this question by 
clarifying, 
 
But while Aristotle firmly believes in universals – as we saw, he believed knowledge must be of 
what is universal – he rejected the idea that they could exist uninstantiated49 and thus independently 
of their particular instances (Brown 2003: 608). 
 
This places health professionals in a bridging position between universals and the 
particular. While there are concepts such as ‘patient’ and ‘vulnerable individual’, it is 
for the doctor or nurse to recognise this (instantiate) in the particular patient, as an 
actual example. Aristotle identifies this tension when he discusses the Universal: 
 
                                                 
48
 Italics in the original. 
49
 Emphasis added. Instantiate from the Latin instantia ‘be present’. Regarding a universal or abstract 
concept-represented by an actual example.  
. 
 
137 
If it be suggested that the universal is the substance of a thing, we answer: (a) The substance of a 
thing is that which is peculiar to it, but the universal is common to many. It must be the substance of 
all or of none. But it cannot be the substance of all; and if it be the substance of one, this one will 
be
50
 the others, for things whose substance or essence is one are one. (b) It is that which is not 
predicated of a subject that is substance, but the universal is
 51
 predicated of a subject (Aristotle 1997: 
208 (1038
b
)) 
 
According to Aristotle, the virtue epistemology in such a situation (the nurse presented 
by the particular patient and having to apply universal concepts) would allow the health 
professional to act from their stable and reliable character (arête) (Crisp 2010). Such an 
account of knowledge would certainly provide a rich definition which could include the 
use of emotion as part of perception, and there is room for creativity and also open-
mindedness towards the individual patient. However, there appears to be a potential 
problem here in that the individual nurse or doctor would first have to decide to choose 
to develop
52
 a moral character. Aristotle does discuss the topic of Conditions of the 
various kinds of becoming in chapters seven to nine in his Metaphysics (Aristotle 1997). 
Some of the key aspects will now be identified below, with a fuller discussion on 
Aristotle’s’ concept of actualization (kinesis53) being held in Chapter Six.   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
50
 italics in the original 
51
 italics in the original 
52
 emphasis added. 
53
 ‘Crucially, kinesis is an inner power that grounds the individuality of existing things’ (Carlisle 2005: 
23). 
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Making an example in an imperfect kind of exposition, into a pattern. 
Virtue ethics is predicated upon virtue being primary, and thereby foundational. As 
such there then falls out a requirement to teach virtue which includes facilitating moral 
development, practical wisdom, and excellence of character, so that the health 
professional can make sound ethical judgements in clinical practice. 
 
Aristotle proposes that the way a health professional should learn virtue is by 
performing virtuous acts: 
 
For the things we have to learn before we can do them, we learn by doing them, e.g. men become 
builders by building and lyre-players by playing the lyre; so too we become just by doing just acts,| 
temperate by doing temperate acts, brave by doing brave acts (Aristotle 1998:28,28 (1103
a
33)) 
 
While the relevance to clinical practice is perhaps immediate (we learn to become a 
nurse by nursing), of equal relevance is the practice of being a student. For example, by 
being a diligent student. With Aristotle there is always this movement from potential to 
actualization. The moral and intellectual virtues are intertwined as outlined above from 
Greco and Turri (2011), so that right and wrong acts are defined in terms of the moral 
virtues and vices. Perhaps unlike trades such a building, the health professions involve 
learning in theory (academia) and also in clinical practice. Most analyses of virtue 
theory in health care focus upon the clinical practice aspect (moral virtue) and 
habituation, and the instruction of the intellectual virtues as being more suited to the 
university (Psychiatric nursing-McKie et al. (2000), Nursing- Scott (1997), (2000), 
(2003), Medicine-Pellegrino & Thomasma (1993), Jansen (2000), Occupational 
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139 
Therapy – Brockett (1996)). If54 however, teaching involves instruction in moral virtue, 
teaching-as a practice-becomes a moral practice. This is a crucial point, as previously 
(pre-modernism, pre-Enlightenment, pre-Rationalism) such a discussion was not 
required, where now it is an issue to be considered, with far-reaching implications for 
the quality of patient care. Zagzebski (2010) reviews several different moral theories 
and establishes that they all have one thing in common, which is, they make one 
concept foundational. For example, in Utilitarianism the foundational concept is ‘What 
everyone desires’, in Kantian deontology it is ‘Reason’, and in Aristotelian virtue 
theory it is ‘Human Nature’ (Zagzebski 2010:46). Significantly, Zagzebski identifies 
that all of these foundational concepts is something outside ethics. At the foundation of 
ethics then is a question regarding the value of morality, especially when it has to be 
justified in terms other than ethics e.g. reason, human nature, or economics: 
 
The attraction to foundationalism, I believe, is due to the fact that in the modern era a moral theory is 
not only expected to justify our individual moral practices, it is assumed that the entire practice of 
morality itself is in need of justification
55
, and it is assumed further that a secure foundation is the 
best way to justify the practice of morality (Zagzebski 2010:47). 
 
Such a crucial question then identifies some challenges for the moral practice of health 
care. Particularly regarding the telos
56
 of health care, and the role of morality in this 
system. In reviewing the past twenty years of the NHS market, Brerenton and 
Vasoodaven concluded: 
                                                 
54
 If, because teaching could become based upon a pure economic model. 
55
 emphasis added. 
56
 Aristotle proposes: ‘But a certain difference is found among ends; some are activities, others are 
products apart from the activities that produce them…the end of the medical art is health…that of 
economics wealth (Aristotle 1998:1 (1094
a
19)). 
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That said, the market reforms of the past 20 years have had unmistakable effects on the culture of the 
NHS. In particular, the introduction of competition has developed a system-wide awareness of costs, 
efficiency and accountability. 
 
However, the reforms have not been proven to bring about the beneficial outcomes that classical 
economic theory predicts of markets, including provider responsiveness to patients and purchasers; 
large-scale cost reduction; and innovation in service provision. Many researchers have attributed this 
to the failure to create a true, functioning market (e.g. due to political interference, weak purchasers, 
and barriers to exit and entry), as well as a lack of a stable policy environment to inspire staff 
commitment and enthusiasm
57
 (Brerenton & Vasoodaven 2010:10). 
 
Since virtue ethics is predicated upon virtue being primary, and thereby foundational, 
this requires to be clarified among other potentially competing moral theories such as 
Utilitarianism embedded within NHS Trust strategies. For example, the past twenty 
years economic analysis appears to have been successful in fiscal terms (increasing 
awareness of costs and efficiency), but not so successful in terms of improving the 
quality of care provided to patients. Such clarification is necessary as moral virtue is 
gained through the process of habituation by witnessing exemplars in a moral 
community. For Aristotle moral and intellectual virtues are intertwined through 
practical wisdom (phronesis) (Kerr 2011: 645.646). When the virtues are placed as 
foundational -as in virtue epistemology- not only is the ethical analysis reversed, so is 
the epistemological analysis. That is, when the doctor or nurse encounters a patient 
(other), it is pre-conceptual, it is the unspeakable, the undiscursive, and not subject to 
                                                 
57
 Emphasis added. 
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explanation
58
. This is the opposite of the more familiar epistemology, where concepts 
are applied to the other, in order to define the other
59
. In caring for vulnerable patients 
this appears to be a valuable point in Aristotle, for on occasions patients must be cared 
for prior to any specific nursing problem being identified, or prior to any medical 
diagnosis being considered. Zagzebski (2010) clarifies this epistemic argument by 
using the example of gold, where people knew of its value and use for millennia prior 
to knowing the nature and atomic structure of gold. In this way, virtue epistemology 
contributes to health care research by precisely valuing the unspeakable aspects of 
patient care. This poses a challenge to health care professionals as the unspeakable is 
prior to rationalism, ethical rules and principles, and crucially prior therefore to 
economic analysis 
 
In contrast, virtue ethics, (which includes virtue epistemology) captures this rich aspect 
of health care through the development of character. It is the intellectual agents and 
communities that are the primary source of epistemic value and ‘the traits constitutive 
of their cognitive character’ (Greco & Turri 2011). Hudson states: 
 
The unity of character is extremely labyrinthine. It couples systematically a person’s values, choices, 
desires, strength or weakness of will, emotions, feelings, perceptions, interests, expectations and 
sensibilities (Hudson 19896:) 
 
The development of character then becomes a powerful process, via habituation and 
teaching. Before outlining some specific aspects of facilitating development of the 
                                                 
58
 Kant. Determinant judgement where a rule was applied to particulars.  
59
 Kant. Reflective judgement, where the individual was presented with the particular and had to find the 
rule. 
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virtues, it is worth highlighting once again, that the teachers and exemplars must first 
have chosen the ethical life
60
. Otherwise, both processes (habituation and teaching) can 
potentially facilitate the vices
61
. This point is identified by Aristotle where he proposes; 
 
 
And the corresponding statement is true of builders and all the rest; men will be bad builders as a 
result of building well or badly. For if this were not so, there would have been no need of a 
teacher… 
 
…by doing the acts that we do in our transactions with other men we become just or unjust, and by 
doing the acts that we do in the presence of danger, and by being habituated to feel fear or 
confidence, we become brave or cowardly (Aristotle 1998: 29 (1103
a
33)). 
 
From this it is clear to see that Aristotle identifies the need for a teacher, and also the 
role of a guide in the habituation process. There are two main opposing views on 
Aristotle’s theory of habituation (Kerr 2011). The debate centres on the role the 
intellect plays in informing us of the ends to pursue (Moss 2011). Principally, the 
‘intellectualists’ think that Aristotle gives the task of informing us of the ends to pursue, 
not to character (virtue) but to the intellect (Moss 2011). Moss clearly argues that 
Aristotle intends moral virtue (character) to inform us of the ends to pursue (Moss 
2011). This is important to health care, and the education of health professionals, as the 
development of character is not informed by the intellect. Rather, character involves 
                                                 
60
 The ethical and the political (economic) aspects of health care are not exclusory concepts. Aristotle 
purports that ‘For even if the end is the same for a single man and for a state, that of the state seems at all 
events something greater and more complete whether to attain or to preserve; though it is worth while to 
attain the end for one man, it is finer and more godlike to attain it for a nation or for city-states 
(Aristotle1998:2 (1094
a
19)).   
61
 This will be discussed on a number of occasions later in the thesis under the concept of totalisation. 
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something that precedes rational cognition, which is non-rational cognition. Both Moss 
(2011) and Kerr (2011) identify the conceptual confusion on the conflation of equating 
the non-rational with the non-cognitive. Having reviewed the alternative (intellectualist) 
views Moss concludes: 
 
 
In sum, then, the burden of proof is squarely on the Intellectualists: on a straightforward, textually 
and philosophically defensible reading of both ethical works, virtue is solely a non-rational state 
(Moss 2011:214). 
 
 
With the development of character then based upon non-rational cognition, this places 
a significant role on perception, imagination, and the emotions. Sherman argues that 
virtuous action is preceded by discriminating perception which includes reactive 
emotions, along with desires and beliefs about the situation (Sherman 1999:247). 
 
Some of the principles in teaching moral virtue- as non-rational cognition can now be 
outlined. Aristotle has emphasised the need to perform acts in order to develop virtue 
by habituation. There is then a requirement to provide multiple and various 
opportunities for students and health professionals in order to have exposure to such 
situations. Because these experiences are not subject to explanation the student/health 
professional will need an exemplar. It might be difficult –even in a quasi-market 
environment of the NHS-to explain why caring or compassion are important. Aristotle 
goes against the tide of Evidence Based Practice by suggesting, 
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Nor must we demand the cause in all matters alike;| it is enough in some cases that the fact be well 
established, as in the case of first principles; the fact is a primary thing and first principle. Now of 
first principles we see some by induction, some by perception, some by a certain habituation, and 
others in other ways (Aristotle 1998; 14 (1098
a
15)). 
 
For Aristotle, it is not always necessary to know the reason why something like caring 
matters, it is sufficient that something has been shown to matter
62
. In teaching moral 
virtue Aristotle suggests it is pointless to engage in argumentation. Rather that it 
becomes evident through experience. Health care students and professionals then 
experience and witness this in their myriad encounters within the health care 
community, which includes university life. The focus then is on how one interacts with 
students, patients, and relatives; rather than what one knows or what explanation is 
given. Caring, compassion and kindness are evidently virtues as seen through direct 
perception, as experience. 
 
Virtue Ethics and Decision Making. 
The criticism made of virtue ethics is that it does not detail how one should act, or how 
you would decide taking a virtue ethics approach. However, this could be seen as a tu 
quoque
63
 argument as in deontology there is the potential for two rules to collide, or 
two ethical principles. 
 
                                                 
62
 Kierkegaard says that subjective truth is a matter of how-how one lives-whereas objective truth is a 
matter of what one know or believes. Kierkegaard also claims that the essence of the human subject is 
not reason, but passion. This will be discussed in a later chapter. 
63
 Latin ‘You too’. The appeal to hypocrisy. Logical fallacy. 
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In decision making virtue ethics provides rich information which is overlooked in both 
deontology and consequentialism. Vulnerable patients are sometimes unable to put into 
words how they feel due to physical or mental ill health. The development of character 
provides an ethical sensitivity to the other that involves motivation and passion. It is a 
settled disposition which is consistent over time and is orientated outwards toward the 
patient. 
 
The next section will consider how ethics is taught within the health professions. 
 
 
Teaching Ethics and Ethics Pedagogy 
Background 
There has been a lengthy debate in the literature on how best to assist students and 
health care professionals to provide the best care to patients, by doing the good or right 
thing. Hattab (2004) provides a useful overview of how ethics has developed in 
medicine from the Hammurabi Code of 2000 BC which defined the duties and rights of 
Babylonian surgeons, through to the Hippocratic Oath of 400 BC which emphasised 
the classical principles of: ‘fidelity to the patient’, ‘beneficence’, ‘non-maleficence’, 
‘truth telling’, and ‘confidentiality’. Purtilio (2000) and Swisher (2002) have given a 
similar overview of ethical practice within Physical Therapy (Physiotherapy). These 
two historical analyses combined with the Nursing and midwifery literature shows the 
various branches (‘Nursing’ ‘Physiotherapy’ ethics) of professional ethics emerging 
from biomedical ethics. This is not surprising due to the Medical model being 
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predominant at this time. Purtilio demonstrates the effect of this philosophy in a 
statement from a draft professional code of 1935  
 
Diagnosing, stating the prognosis of a case and prescribing treatment shall be entirely the 
responsibility of the physician. Any assumption of this responsibility by one of our members shall be 
considered unethical (Purtilio.2000: 114).  
 
The progress in bio-medical sciences and technology has transformed health systems, 
healthcare organisations, and presents a continual flow of ethical dilemmas, and a 
movement away from the simple doctor-patient relationship, to one which incorporates 
the health care team and the patient’s family. At key times in history the health care 
curriculum has been advised to adapt the teaching of ethics, due to inquiries such as 
Shipman (Smith 2004) and Ledward (Ritchie 2000). Examples influencing the medical 
curriculum are the Pond Report (Institute of Medical Ethics 1987), Tomorrows Doctors 
(GMC 1993, 2009b), and the UK Consensus Statement (The Institute of Medical Ethics 
1998). There have been similar recommendations for Nursing (UKCC 2001), Social 
Work, and Allied Health Professions (The Chartered Society of Physiotherapy 2002, 
2011).  
 
One major influence upon the teaching of ethics has been with the move away from the 
Medical model where there has been an increase in clinical autonomy for nurses and 
AHPs. However the lines of accountability are not clear due to all of the health care 
reforms. A practical example of this would be where the Consultant surgeon advises 
the nurses and physiotherapists about the care the patient should receive; however, they 
. 
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are not managed by the surgeon. This has become more complex recently where the 
medical staff have lost some of their power in that they are more accountable to the 
NHS Trust managers and Chief Executive. This very point was beautifully 
demonstrated by the series of documentaries developed with the Open University when 
the experienced businessman, Sir Gerry Robinson (2007) tried to implement change at 
Rotherham NHS Foundation Trust. After discussing changes with the Consultants, 
nurses and managers he stated; ‘I had absolutely no idea what I was taking on. I knew it 
was going to be tough but it was one of the most difficult challenges I have ever 
attempted Robinson (2007)’. The historical development of the health care team is 
important in analysing the current ethics situation, and in considering the future. As 
previously stated, the doctor was in charge of the patient, with nursing and the other 
members of the health care team subjugated to the doctors’ control. With increased 
autonomy nurses, midwives and AHPs faced more clinical dilemmas. In the past, 
nurses and AHPs were expected to be obedient without question and did not participate 
in ethical decision making. The exception here is Clinical Psychology which has been 
more aligned to medicine, and has remained more dominated by scientific concepts 
(Solbrekke and Jensen 2006). 
 
Rationale for Ethics Content in Teaching 
From the above changes the content of ethics teaching has been prescribed both within 
universities, and in Continuing Professional Development (CPD) within health care. 
These changes are also part of the implied social contract professionals have with the 
society they work in. Part of this contract has always been that society grants monopoly 
status to professions as the professionals will put client’s interests above their own. 
. 
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This altruism has always underpinned this fiduciary relationship, with ethical practice 
being of prime importance (Hilton & Slotnick 2005). Through the process of 
maintaining the public’s confidence an ever increasing list of ethics topics is developed 
for inclusion in the health care curricula and CPD, examples of which can be found in 
Miles et al (1989), in the UK Consensus Statement (The Institute of Medical Ethics 
1998), Goldie (2000) and Goldie et al. (2002). Swisher provides a comparative diagram 
of the periods of ethics in medicine and Physiotherapy with medicine going through the 
three stages of: ‘Proto ethical’ (1960-1972), ‘Philosophical Bioethics’ (1972-1985), and 
‘Global Bioethics’ (1985- present) (Swisher 2002). Physiotherapy has gone through the 
stages of ‘Ethical Self identity’ (1935), ‘Patient Focused Identity’ (1950s), and the 
future is ‘Societal Identity’. Both Physiotherapy and medicine recognise that the broad 
problems presenting in the future will require many disciplines and ‘nested’ in what 
society requires. However, the current ethics content and delivery does not appear to be 
effective in nursing, medicine, social work, and the Allied Health Professions (AHPs). 
Nurses and midwives experience three recurring themes within the range of problems 
in the literature; 1) Nurses are concerned about ethical problems but take no action, or 
are overruled by medical staff, or cannot overcome the perceived barriers and suffer 
moral distress (Penticuff & Walden 2000, Sleutel 2000, Fry et al 2002,Grady et al.2008, 
Lützén et al.2003, Redman & Fry 2000, Schluter 2008); 2) Newly graduated nurses do 
not assert themselves when they experience moral conflict, instead they look for ways 
to cope with their own moral distress, which involves compromise and not 
implementing the right care (Kelly 1998, Dodd et al. 2004); 3) Nurses who do take 
ethical action can find themselves isolated and ostracised by other staff, and try to find 
. 
 
149 
ways to promote their own moral survival (Spence 1998, Sundin-Huard & Fahy 1999, 
Woods 1999, Wurzbach 1999, Rodney & Varcoe 2001, Gaudine & Beaton 2002). 
 
In a similar fashion the medical curriculum has been evaluated and found wanting. One 
of the key critics was Hafferty and Franks (1994), and although their findings were 
more than a decade ago, they are still influential today. They had two key points. The 
first was that while it is possible to teach information about ethics, this in no way can 
decisively influence a student’s personality or ensure ethical conduct. Their second line 
of argument has been very influential, this is where they considered that most of the 
critical determinants of a doctor’s identity operate not in the formal curriculum but in a 
more subtle less officially recognized ‘hidden curriculum’ (Hafferty & Franks 1994, 
Lempp & Seale 2004). There are a number of recent studies which would support 
Hafferty & Franks 1994 work. Rennie & Crosby (2002), when exploring medical 
student’s inclinations to whistle-blowing, found that the number of students willing to 
report misconduct declined over the five years of the medical curriculum. Goldie et al. 
(2004) found that while the first year of the medical curriculum had a positive impact 
on student’s potential behavior on facing ethical dilemmas, the remainder of the 
curriculum had a detrimental effect. The concept of the ‘hidden curriculum’ and the 
process of moral enculturation have been the focus of a number of research studies 
which have evaluated the deterioration in students’ ethical abilities as they ‘progress’ 
through the medical curricula (Self & Baldwin 1998, Patenaude et al. 2003, Lemonidou 
et al. 2004, Solbrekke and Jensen 2006). 
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Specific Content Being Taught 
Due to the traditional roles of the health care team being an aid to the doctor, the ethics 
syllabus for the others in the team was one on the science of conduct, based upon duties 
and obligations to the doctor. The literature is organized into philosophical or 
normative ethics which considers what ‘ought’ to be done on a rational basis, and 
social scientific or descriptive ethics which describes human ethical behavior. Within 
the philosophical branch, metaethics includes Deontology, Utilitarianism, Care, Virtue, 
and principle approaches to ethics. The specific content being taught to health care 
professionals has been principalism, deontology and consequentialism. Parsons et al 
(2001) found the dominant approaches in nursing education in the United Kingdom 
was one of deontology and consequentialism.  
 
Teaching Methodology 
There has been much debate about the benefits of interprofessional learning (Glen 1999, 
DOH 2007, Kennedy 2001, McPherson et al. 2001, Kennard 2002, Wakefield at al 
2003, Tunstall-Pedoe 2003, Glen and Reeves 2004, Hanson 2005, Reeves at al 2006). 
A number of systematic reviews investigating Interprofessional Education (IPE) have 
found very little reliable evidence. Zwarenstein et al. (2001) found no studies on IPE 
which met their inclusion criteria. Other reviews found weaknesses in the research 
(Barr 2000, Reeves 2001). When Ross and Southgate (2000) carried out a survey of 
medical and nursing schools in 1996, they found only three examples of shared 
learning. It is also important to consider what the purpose of interprofessional learning 
was. In the government documents the aim of this education is to develop a more 
flexible, responsive, collaborative workforce, where the rigid differentiation between 
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professions is reduced, and thereby increasing the opportunities for role substitution. 
Glen and Reeves (2003) highlight some of the conceptual confusion in these documents, 
in that they use the term ‘multiprofessional’ which is defined by CAIPE (Barr et al. 
2000) as ‘an educational activity where learning is shared passively’ for example when 
doctors and nurses share the same lecture. In contrast ‘Interprofessional education’ uses 
interactive approaches between professionals to encourage collaboration. The 
challenges in any Interprofessional education (Interprofessional because only this will 
achieve the desired outcomes), but especially interprofessional ethics education is 
achieving the balance where the individual has their own professional identity before 
this becomes blended in to another professional group. Parsell and Blight (1998) stated 
that one of the key aspects of successful interprofessional education is that students 
must be secure in their own identities as professionals, and Brown et al (2000) details 
the problems for effective collaboration when boundaries are not clear. This seems to 
be a key consideration when analyzing the research from the different professions of 
nursing, clinical psychology (Solbrekke & Jensen 2006), social work (Clark 2006), 
medicine (Goldie 2000, Hattab 2004, Hilton & Slotnick 2005), and the Allied health 
professions (Purtilo 2000, Swisher 2002, Edwards et al 2005). If only the enculturation 
process is examined as an example, there are huge variations between the professions, 
with nursing students having clinical placements immediately, medical students (on the 
whole) not having a placement until the fourth year, and the other professions having 
various blocks of time on placement. At this point it is worth considering what is the 
aim of the curriculum for each professional group, as perhaps this is pertinent in 
establishing the moral ends of the professions. If a reductionist approach is taken, and 
an Integrated Care Pathway (ICP) used as a model, then on paper we see the patient is 
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admitted by the nurse, operated on by the surgeon, received back to the nurse, with the 
physiotherapist having key interventions, and social workers and clinical psychologists 
only being called in if deemed necessary. On this patient pathway, it can been seen that 
‘And all the men and women merely players, They have their exits and their entrances’ 
(Shakespeare 1979:501). Each has a different clinical and moral end, and this situation 
is extended to patients collectively within managed care, within the strategic ends of 
the health care system. The various curriculi are designed to provide each professional 
with the clinical competence to function in these distinctive acts. This is supported in 
the studies carried out by Mann et al. (2005) investigating perceptions of roles amongst 
doctors and six other professions revealed statistically significant differences between 
the groups on two main factors ‘Teamwork and interprofessional skills’ and 
‘Communication and interpersonal skills’. Similarly, Tunstall-Pedoes’ study (2003) 
emphasizes the preconceived attitudes professionals groups have of each other. Some 
have argued that there is a different moral framework underlying the different 
professional roles, so that medical staff take an ‘ethics of justice’, nurses an ‘ethics of 
care’ (Baumann et al 1998). 
 
It is also worth highlighting the dichotomous way in which the healthcare professions 
curriculum is delivered with a deontic approach to teaching ethics, and the socialisation 
process being used for a much wider range of clinical skills. Here we have almost 
reversed Aristotles’ approach in that moral virtue was acquired through exercising the 
virtue, ‘…while moral virtue comes about as a result of habit…’ (Aristotle 1998: 28).  
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Discussion and Conclusion 
Kant and Aristotle had different views of what the good is. Aristotle starts the 
Nicomachean Ethics with the phrase, 
 
Every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and pursuit is thought to aim at some good: 
and for this reason, the good has rightly been declared to be that at which all things aim (Aristotle 
1998: 1). 
 
Crucially, Aristotle locates this good within individuals as part of their psychological 
make up. This can be seen where he states ‘Virtue, then, is a state of character 
concerned with choice…’ (Aristotle 1998: 39). This approach is supported in the 
literature because it recognises the dynamic of the decision maker, in psychology 
(Baron 2000), the influence of culture (Weber & Hsee 2000) emotion (Lerner 2000, 
Slowman 1996, Learner and Keltner 2000) mood (Estrada et al 1994), and the 
relational aspect of working in a team (Gilligen 1982).  
 
Unlike Aristotle, Kant proposes that the moral worth of our action does not reside ‘…in 
the purpose to be attained by it, but in the maxim in accordance with which it is 
decided upon (Kant 1997a: 65)’. Kant focuses on the question of what ground humans 
can resort to in establishing action guiding rules that are valid for all (Heubel and 
Biller-Andorno 2005). As a non-teleological theory, the deontological approach is 
based upon maxims, rules and principles. The principles approach remains very 
popular in the healthcare core texts on ethics, in for example (Gillon 1986, Edwards 
2009, Beauchamp and Childress 2008) This is despite sustained critiques from Clouser 
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and Gert (1990), Clouser (1995) and Davis (1995). These same rules can be identified 
threaded through the various professional regulatory bodies such as the General 
Medical Council, Nursing and Midwifery Council, and The Health Professions Council 
(GMC 1995, GMC 2002, GMC 2006, NMC 2008, HPC 2008). One of the major flaws 
within deontology is that it fails to explain how to settle conflicts between moral 
principles and obligations (Davis 1991, Hurst-house 1999). A simple example of this 
would be where the nurse has a duty of care to the patient; 
 
 (1.4 You have a duty of care to your patients and clients, who are entitled to receive safe and 
competent care.), to be their advocate, and to work co-operatively within a team (4.2) You are 
expected to work co-operatively within teams and to respect the skills, expertise and contributions of 
your colleagues. You must treat them fairly and without discrimination) (NMC 2008).  
 
This suggests the question, Is their primary duty to the patient or to the team? The 
Teleological approaches of consequentialism and utilitarianism to ethics is largely 
missing from the ethical decision making literature. Yet this is an approach used on a 
daily basis by health care professionals. If we take the example of rationing of health 
care Nurses, doctors and Allied Health Professionals always have to consider the best 
outcome achievable with the available resources. From the literature on rationing 
(Clarke 2001, Wells 1995, Botes 2000, Coast 2001, Syrett 2007, Moreira 2011, 
Mikochik 2011) we can see that a teleological approach is used at the micro level of 
trying to do the best for the greatest number of patients in your care, up to the macro or 
strategic level of management where the greatest good is being achieved for a given 
population on a set budget. 
. 
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The next section (Whistleblowing) will review some of this theory on ethical decision 
making as applied to the specific scenarios individuals found themselves in where they 
felt they had to blow the whistle. 
 
WHISTLEBLOWING 
 
The previous review of the literature explored what staff ought to do based upon 
normative ethics, the next section will explore the literature on how staff act when 
confronted with a poor standard of care. This discussion will evaluate the existential 
theme of freedom. That is, the free will to act. 
 
Etymology 
The first identified use of the term ‘Whistle-blower’ was on the twenty third of March 
1970 in the New York Times (Pearsall and Hanks 2003). Interestingly, one of the 
definitions of ‘Whistle’ is of a person who speaks on behalf of another as ‘an 
instrument’ or ‘mouth-piece’. This definition can be traced back to Wycliffes’ 
translation of the Bible from the Latin Vulgate in 1380. It is from the Latin root for 
‘called to speak on behalf of another’ (advoc tus) that we get our term ‘Advocate’. It is 
therefore perhaps not surprising that the literature on Patient advocacy is also relevant 
here (Chafey et al. 1998, Watt 1997). There is more than one theory on whistle blowing. 
Hunt (1995) gives the genesis to referees drawing attention to a foul in a game, while 
others say it is derived from British police constables blowing the whistle to warn the 
public of danger and to alert other officers in the area. According to King (1997) and 
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Miethe & Rothschild (1994) the most commonly used academic definition of whistle 
blowing is “the disclosure by organization members (former or current) of illegal, 
immoral or illegitimate practices under the control of their employers, to persons or 
organizations that may be able to effect action (Near & Miceli 1985, Miceli & Near 
2002). Judd (1999) states that Whistleblowing is comparable to the shrill sounding 
noise of a whistle piercing the background noise and disrupting the false harmony or 
imposed silence of the status quo. De Marias’ definition alludes to the philosophy of 
Aristotle and Schopenhauer when he explains; 
 
…a concerned citizen, totally or predominantly motivated by notions of public interest, who initiates 
of her or his own free will, an open disclosure about significant wrongdoing directly perceived in a 
particular occupational role, to a person or agency capable of investigating the complaint and 
facilitating the correction of wrongdoing (De Maria 1995). 
 
Specifically, it alludes to the tensions within citizenship, and freedom of will. Some 
authors (Weiss 1994, Ray 2006, Hunt 1995,Wilmot 2000) also distinguish between 
‘internal’ where the whistleblower talks to people higher up in the organization, or 
‘external’ where it is reported to the media, or public interest groups. Rothschild & 
Miethe (1999) found that nearly all whistle-blowers first report perceived wrongdoing 
to parties within their organizations. 
 
Whistleblowers are a useful group of people to study when exploring moral behavior. 
Their actions take place in complex organizations, in situations of ambiguity and lack 
of moral clarity. Their displayed actions take place in the real milieu and are well 
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documented in inquiry reports and legal transcripts. From this the organisational ethics, 
reference to professional codes of conduct, and personal values can be explored.  
 
Search Strategy 
A search for the literature on Whistleblowing was carried out on the following 
electronic databases; International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS) (1951-
2007), MEDLINE (1996-2007), Cumulative Index to Nursing & Allied Health 
Literature (CINAHL) ( 1982-2007), and the British Nursing Index (BNI) (1985-
2007).Both CINAHL and MEDLINE yielded fourteen articles of research in English, 
there were no articles on Whistleblowing to be found via the BNI, and seven research 
articles within the IBSS. There are a number of literature reviews which cover the 
earlier material (Bowman 1983, Miethe & Rothschild 1994), and a more recent one in 
the journal ‘Annual Reviews in Control’ (Hersh 2002) on the ethical issues and 
conflicts of loyalties which arise in whistleblowing. The English language literature on 
whistleblowing focuses to a large extent on, business (Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran 
2005, Chiu 2003, Uys 2000, Miceli & Near 2002), legal (Vickers 2001, Burrows 2001), 
and healthcare (McDonald & Ahern 2000, Ray 2006, Vinten & Gavin 2005, Hunt 1995, 
Hunt 1997, Paul 2000, Davis & Konishi 2007, White 2006, Hannigan 2006, Peternelj-
Taylor 2003, Faugier & Woolnough 2002, Rennie & Crosby 2002,) with two well-
developed streams within this research which are; (1) identifying the antecedents to a 
whistleblowing event, and (2)the retaliation which occurs. 
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Professional Codes of Conduct 
The General Medical Council (2006, 2009a, 2009b), Health Professions Council (2008), 
and the Nursing and Midwifery Council (2004) all provide guidance on 
Whistleblowing within their respective professional codes of conduct. All of the 
professional codes are written from a deontological philosophical framework. 
Professionals are informed they have a duty towards patients, and the specific duty is a 
‘duty of care’. This duty to put patients’ interests first and act to protect them must 
override personal and professional loyalties. In the GMCs core guidance for doctors 
Good Medical Practice (2009a) it states ‘You must protect patients from risk of harm 
posed by another colleagues’ conduct, performance or health’. Regarding 
whistleblowing, the GMC advises that matters should be resolved internally, and if this 
is not possible ‘independent advice’ should be sought;  
 
If you have good reason to think that patient safety is or may be seriously compromised by 
inadequate premises, equipment, or other resources, policies or systems, you should put the matter 
right if that is possible. In all other cases you should draw the matter to the attention of your 
employing or contracting body. If they do not take adequate action, you should take independent 
advice on how to take the matter further. You must record your concerns and the steps you have 
taken to try to resolve them (GMC 2009a).  
 
The guidance to doctors with a management role is that they should, ‘ensure that 
reporting procedures are in place and that staff are aware of them’, and that they should 
‘respond promptly and professionally to incidents and complaints (GMC 2006)’. The 
NHS complaints system is a failing system. Last year it received more than one million 
complaints, with an increasing proportion going to independent panels because of 
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dissatisfaction with the responses (Revill 2007). Although the government has 
promised to overhaul the complaints system, there are no plans to introduce the new 
reforms until 2009. The HPC offers similar advice to the 13 professions it regulates; 
 
You must protect patients if you believe that they are threatened by a colleague’s conduct, 
performance or health. The safety of patients, clients and users must come before any personal and 
professional loyalties at all times. As soon as you become aware of any situation that puts a patient, 
client or user at risk, you should discuss the matter with a senior professional colleague. If you feel 
that you cannot raise the matter with a senior colleague, you can contact our Registrar (HPC.2008). 
 
The guidance to nurses, midwives and specialist community public health nurses is 
more similar to that provided by the HPC than the GMC, in that it is more about 
‘Internal’ whistleblowing: 
 
Where you cannot remedy circumstances in the environment of care that could jeopardise standards 
of practice, you must report them to a senior person with sufficient authority to manage them and 
also, in the case of midwifery, to the supervisor of midwives. This must be supported by a written 
record (NMC 2008: paragraph.8.3). 
 
The only reference to ‘external’ whistleblowing is ‘…you should be aware of the terms 
of legislation that offer protection for people who raise concerns about health and 
safety issues’ (NMC 2008: paragraph 8.2). The International Council (ICN) Code of 
ethics for nursing does not provide any clear guidance on whistleblowing other than: 
‘develop mechanisms to safeguard the individual, family or community when their care 
is endangered by health care personnel’ (ICN.2006:3). The striking fact within nursing 
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is that nurses are unfamiliar with their own ethical codes. Esterhuizen found in 1996 
that nurses were unfamiliar with professional codes (Esterhuizen 1996). These finding 
were supported by other quantitative studies at the time (Tabak & Reches 1996, Whyte 
& Gajos 1996). Some ten years later the situation is unchanged.  An international 
research project aiming at harmonising ethical standards for nursing practice and the 
nursing professions in Europe called Ethical Codes in Nursing (ECN 2005), has found 
that nurses are not familiar with the content of their codes, and that they make only 
limited use of them in clinical situations. Heymans (2007) study similarly found that 
Dutch nurses were unfamiliar with their codes, and that there was limited dissemination, 
implementation and functioning of codes of ethics. A similar study of Finnish, Greek 
and Italian nurses found that their knowledge of the codes was poor, and that healthcare 
managers were not sufficiently committed to the values of codes (Heikkinen et al. 
2006). Some would argue (Meulenbergs et al.2004) that due to the modernizing 
National Health Service codes are of limited use, and that we need to move to a more 
‘relational ethics’ (Thompson 2002, Tschudin 2006, Ray 2006, MacDonald 2002). 
Nurses are unfamiliar with the guidance within their own professional codes on 
whistleblowing. Despite this unfamiliarity the Bristol Royal Infirmary Inquiry 
(Kennedy 2001) recommended that the relevant codes of practices for nurses, doctors, 
allied health professions, and for managers should be incorporated into their contracts 
of employment. When Paitison (2001) appraised the NMC Code of Professional 
Conduct he concluded …because of terminological inexactitudes and confusions, lack 
of helpful ethical guidance’…the code was ‘ethically inadequate’. 
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Silence or Whistleblowing 
Within healthcare and corporate life there is a body of literature which comprises of 
both disasters where nothing was said by employees until after the event, and very 
public whistleblowers. Within healthcare the public psyche can readily recall such 
cases as Graham Pink ( Brindle 1990, Pink 1994 ),Beverly Allitt (Clothier 1994), the 
Personality Disorder Unit at Ashworth Special Hospital (Fallon et at. 1999), Rodney 
Ledward (Ritchie 2000), the consultant anaesthetist, Dr Stephen Bolsin at Bristol Royal 
Infirmary (Kennedy 2001), Alder Hay (Redfern 2001), and Dr Harold Shipman (Smith 
2004). There is a similar history within business, and it is profitable to follow the 
reports. In the Oil industry the Piper alpha disaster was the first (Cullen 1990), and 
more recently the Brent Bravo (Harris 2006, Macalister 2006). In the rail industry, 
Clapham Junction (Hidden 1989), Paddington (Cullen 2000, Clark 2004), Potters Bar 
(HSE 2003), and most recently Grayrigg in Cumbia (Jowitt and Smith 2007). If there is 
any commonality in reviewing these distressing reports, it is the difficulty in raising 
concerns within an organisation. Fuller (1999) found that much of the evidence in 
accident causation suggests that managers have to balance the competing [italics in the 
original] requirements of safety with their other responsibilities. In their review of the 
empirical literature on leadership and safety outcomes O’Dea and Fin (2003) state 
‘numerous studies have found that pressure to achieve high production targets is 
implicated in accident causation’. A regular finding of these studies is that dangerous 
practices are tacitly encouraged by management even though they contradict formal 
safety policies. When injuries occur such actions can be labelled human error since 
they are contrary to company safety policy. Graham Pink (1994) spent two years 
raising his concerns in 43 letters, some of which are printed in The Guardian 
. 
 
162 
newspaper (Brindle 1990). Along with the ‘tacit encouragement of dangerous 
practices’ seems to be the insidious nature of it becoming common practice. When the 
Ward manager (Mr Moran) was questioned about how a child could be allowed to visit 
two convicted paedophiles on his ward he replied ‘…you aspired to go to Lawrence 
ward, you earned the right to go on Lawrence ward, because it was operated on low 
staffing. They have wine and cheese parties. It was a slow insidious process that the 
invasiveness of such things as searching ceased’ (Fallon et al 1999: 3.12.1). Some may 
argue that these are just isolated cases, and that with the passing of the Public Interest 
Disclosure Act in 1998 (1998, DTI 2006), and the launch of the charity Public Concern 
at Work (PCaW 1993) that whistle blowing would be far more effective. Vinten and 
Gavin appear more accurate when they surmise, 
 
 ‘…It would almost be possible to write a common core report that would readily apply to every type 
of disaster; the findings of previous reports concealed or not actioned; lack of independence or 
effectiveness of inspectorates; failure to adopt a participative management style and, worst the ‘not 
required back’ stamp for those employees who dare complain of health and safety abuses’ (Vinten & 
Gavin 2005). 
 
 Writing in 2003 Associate Professor Bolsin outlines the heartache and agonizing time 
he and his family went through once he had exposed the problems with paediatric 
cardiac surgery at the United Bristol Healthcare Trust (Bolsin 2003). Far from 
welcoming his concerns, the new Chief Executive of the Trust wrote to him stating; 
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…I must make it clear that I am deeply disappointed at the information about your previous 
activities that has come to my attention since your departure, and I know that my concern is shared 
by the Trust Board (Bolsin  2003:294). 
 
In the oil industry a senior consultant to Shell is going through a similar process. He 
brought his concerns to the attention of the directors of Shell as far back as 1999, and 
then again in 2004, but he still feels safety is compromised. Interviewed in the 
Guardian (Macalister 2006) Campell states “I am sorry to have to go public on this but 
if the current safety regime demonstrated by the Brent Bravo (fatal accidents) case 
study has failed and if improvements are not undertaken another major accident is 
inevitable”.  Vinten and Gavins (2005) comment on ‘the findings of previous reports 
not actioned’ can be found within the Paddington Inquiry where it states, 
 
There was a lamentable failure on the part of Railtrack to respond to recommendations of inquiries 
into two serious incidents, namely the accident at Royal Oak on 10 Nov.1995 and the serious SPAD 
(Signal Passed at Danger) at SN109 on 4 Feb 1998 (Cullen 2000:3).  
 
Perhaps one of the best examples of all of the old negative aspects of whistleblowing 
still being very much alive is that of Dr Nancy Olivieri who has insisted on publishing 
her adverse data on the drug Deferiprone which is for treating thalassemia. The drug 
company Apotex threatened her and the university, and the hospital put coercive 
pressures on her not to publish the data. Olivieri has been dismissed from her post 
within the hospital, and the drug company has been criticized for ‘placing profits ahead 
of patient safety (Schafer 2007). As the case continues, all interested parties try to 
discredit each other in four books that have been written upon this case (Naimark et al 
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1998, Thompson et al 2001, Le Carre 2001, Schuchman 2005). In reviewing all of 
these cases, one gets a haunting perspective of the employee working within an 
organisation prior to a major incident. Some of the employees knew of dangers but kept 
silent, for example the Piper alpha disaster (Cullen 1990), the Clapham Junction rail 
disaster (Hidden 1989), and most recently in the case of Susan Hodges and Richard 
Murphy who are awaiting the outcome of an enquiry into the death of their baby son 
(Revill 2007). Some knew of dangers but kept quite for fear of retaliation. Others raised 
concerns which were dismissed or ignored, for example Paddington (Cullen 2000:3). A 
final group raised, and continues to raise their concerns regardless of the hostility and 
the prolonged nature of the whistleblowing, for example Graham Pink (Pink 1994), Dr 
Stephen Bolsin (Kennedy 2001), Bill Campell (Macalister 2006), Dr Nancy Olivieri 
(Schafer 2007). This raises the question ‘What causes staff to function along this 
continuum of silence, to (prolonged) whistleblowing?’, especially when they know to 
not speak out could have disastrous consequences.  
 
Moral Framework 
In attempting to analyse the answer to this complex situation, it would be useful to have 
a theoretical framework in order to develop a systematic response. Van Es and Smit 
(2003) provide one such theoretical framework which has three different domains for 
practical ethics. These are public, organisational, and personal ethics, with 
organisational containing the three roles of ‘employee’, ‘manager’ and ‘professional’ 
(Figure 10.) 
 
 
 
. 
 
165 
Figure 10. Moral domains and perspectives. Adapted from Van Es and Smit (2003) 
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There is much debate regarding theories on moral reasoning, especially between 
Kohlberg (1975) and Gilligan (1998). Kohlberg (1975) defined six stages which were 
divided into three levels of preconventional, conventional, and postconventional moral 
reasoning, and thought that the majority of professional people responded to ethical 
dilemmas at the second level, which is characterized by conformity to majority 
behaviour. Most theorists agree that ethical behaviour follows a continuum of cognitive 
thought that progresses from narrow, self-serving view to a broader, more reflective 
view (McAlpine et al. 1997). On developing the ‘Ethical Reasoning Tool’ (McAlpine 
1997) developed the responses into three levels. Level 1, Traditional response, is where 
responses focused on obedience to others; Level 2, Traditional/reflective response is 
where responses remained within traditional boundaries, but demonstrated an 
awareness of relevant ethical issues, and Level 3, Reflective response, where the 
responses were client centred, supported by an ethical framework, and demonstrated a 
willingness to challenge unethical practices. 
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Themes in the Literature 
With the use of the combined frameworks of Van Es and Smit (2001) and McAlpine 
(1997), a number of themes can be identified in the literature on what influences 
individuals decision to remain silent, or to blow the whistle (Please see Appendix 2). 
 
Personal Ethics 
There is a lack of research in this area, and empirical studies that take a questionnaire 
survey approach can have a low response rate. For example Ahern and McDonalds’ 
(2002) study achieved a 20% return rate. The other studies are individual case studies, 
or offer legal advice.  
 
One of the major themes in the literature, disaster reports, and the press, is the negative 
consequences of whistleblowing to the individual. This is not just an historical 
perspective, but continues today as whistle blowers such as Bolsin and Olivieri write in 
the press. Whistleblowers are described, and describe themselves as ‘fearing reprisals 
(Gobert and Punch 2000, Firth-Cozens et al. 2003), fearing retaliation (Yamey 2000), 
being demoted (Baty 2006), having their mental stability questioned (Schafer 2007), 
and losing their employment (Vickers 1999). This history would become known to any 
would-be whistleblower as it is in the culture of organisations, and well documented. It 
is worth noting that it is the same fear which causes an under-reporting of error (Leape 
et al 1991, Vincent 1999, 2001), and makes the role of Patient advocate so challenging 
(Chafey et al 1998, Watt 1997). A tension exists here regarding loyalty to self 
(integrity), patient, colleagues, and employer. The tension also goes against the 
powerful processes of socialisation and enculturation. Most of these cases will present 
. 
 
167 
as a moral dilemma, where ‘there must be at the very least two courses of action which 
each have a claim to be obligatory, yet which cannot both be taken in the circumstances 
(McConnell 2006). Here the individual has to consider the cost of whistleblowing to all 
involved, with particular attention to the fact that it goes against the organizational 
cultures, professional codes of conduct which have an emphasis on team working and 
collegiality, and the dynamics of institutional loyalty. Rennie and Crosby found that the 
number of medical students prepared to whistle blow declined in the later year groups 
of the course, and goes on to propose ‘this may be on account of a strengthening of 
collective identity’ (Rennie and Crosby 2002:177).  
 
In the health professions and in teaching, where the therapeutic-self is used in the 
caring act, this moral cost is significant and should be considered along with the 
literature on Emotional Intelligence (McQueen 2004, Schutte et al 2001). The 
professional codes conflict on where your duty lies, and they tend to ignore the duty to 
self as outlined in Kants Categorical Imperative upon which the codes are founded. 
With a consequentialist approach such as Utilitarianism often the interests of a single 
person is traded-off against common good. In both situations the individual can 
experience what Greenspan (1995) terms ‘moral cost’ or ‘moral remainder’. Greenspan 
also emphasis the role of emotion in decision making where he explains that dilemmas 
are a consequence of a set of social rules, when they prohibit action either way, 
emotion is ‘a second-best substitute for action’.  
 
This psychological impact of whistle blowing is clearly evident in the literature where 
individuals report distress, isolation, economic and emotional deprivation, stress related 
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emotional problems, and being ostracized (Hunt and Shailer 1995, Vinten 1994, Dyer 
1999a, 1999b, McDonald and Ahern 2000, CHI 2000). McDonald and Ahern (2000) 
make a clear distinction between ‘isolation’ where individuals are moved away from an 
area, that is away from known supporters’ and ‘Social ostracism’ where the supporters 
are (emotionally) removed. Chiu found whistleblowers, 
 
…believe in the importance of protecting wider interests, are less concerned with self-interest, have 
a strong sense of self-efficacy and locus of control, and a higher than average need to control their 
environment (Chiu 2003:585). 
 
 This widening gap between personal values and the employing institutions values will 
be discussed below under ‘Organisational Ethics’. 
 
Organisational Ethics 
There are a number of factors which have influenced the ethics of the National Health 
Service, probably the greatest being the introduction of competitive tendering when 
NHS Trusts became exposed to global market forces (Chaston 1994, Brereton 2010). 
Specifically, the three principles of Neoliberalism has had a great impact upon the 
organizational ethics of the Health Service in, principally the United Kingdom, but also 
in Canada, Unites States of America, Australia, and New Zealand.  
 
Where previously Keynesian economics has encouraged cooperative working within 
the Health service, Neoliberalism emphasised Individualism, the Free Market, and 
Decentralisation. There are a number of (ethical) internal conflicts with Neoliberalism 
. 
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when applied to the Health Service: 1. The greatest user group within the Health 
Service are those from poorer socioeconomic backgrounds. The ethos of Health 
promotion / prevention is to target this group as it has an economic impact upon the 
country and world. Advocates of neoliberalism believe in pressuring the poorest people 
in a society to find their own solutions to their lack of health care. This does not 
consider the greater or collective good, and this is a significant point as A.I.D.S., T.B., 
and many other diseases are not respecters of class or creed; 2. The pursuit of narrow 
self-interest rather than mutual interest is in stark contrast to the higher level required in 
Moral Theory as espoused by, for example Levinas, which puts the other first.. In other 
words, most theorists agree that ethical behaviour follows a continuum of cognitive 
thought that progresses from narrow, self-serving view to a broader, more reflective 
view (McAlpine et al. 1997);3. Finally, the starting point for any ethical behaviour is 
that the individual actually cares about the other and has a sensitivity to the most 
vulnerable, and yet according to McGregor a 
 
…basic assumption of neoliberalism is that human beings will always try to favour themselves. As 
they do this, they need have no concern for others or the environment. This absence of concern can 
exist because each person is assumed to act independently of others and is assumed to be restricted 
only by his/her natural surroundings and NOT by any other human being (McGregor 2001: 84).  
 
Another major theme within the literature is that whistleblowers feel that they are not 
listened to within their own organizations (Treasure 1998, Irving et al 1998, Moore et 
al. 2010). Graham Pink (1994) spent two years raising his concerns in 43 letters. Dr 
Bolsin raised his concerns on eight critical occasions (Dehn 2001). Along with this 
. 
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feeling was the thought that nothing would be done even if they did raise concerns 
(Hunt and Shailer 1995, Davidson 1998, CHI 2000). These features of organisational 
ethics are useful as indicators of espoused values. Even once investigations into 
negligence had commenced there was a culture of secrecy within the health service. 
Ritchie (2000) found ‘considerable reluctance’ amongst nursing staff to cooperate with 
her Inquiry into Rodney Ledward. Some nurses refused to attend to it at all, and one 
who did was told by another nurse ‘more the fool you’. Vickers (2001) argues that the 
Public Interest Disclosure Act (1998) may be limited in helping staff to speak out. The 
reason for this is that any disclosure must be made in ‘good faith’, where it would be 
very easy to attribute mixed motives to any potential whistleblower, which would 
prevent protection under this section.  
 
Public Ethics 
Globally, the approach and attitude towards ethics is changing. There is also greater 
access to quality research in a timelier manner. In his book on a moral history of the 
twentieth century Glover (2001) brings out this point where he states ‘…I was struck 
by the range of experience that he and other Polish philosophers could bring to thinking 
about ethics, and also by the way much English-language writing on ethics is limited 
by relative insulation from some of the twentieth century’s man-made disasters’. Many 
of these changes are due to the result of major political reform. Of special interest are 
the social anthropology studies on the demise of socialist power in Eastern Europe and 
the Soviet Union. An example of this would be those carried out by the Max Plank 
institute for social anthropology (Hann 2005). This changing socio-political spectrum 
offers an opportunity to study this emerging situation and to consider the moral effects 
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of different regimes. Morality and economic success do seem to be related in the 
current literature on the removal of socialist power in the Soviet Union (Hann 2005). 
Pokrouvskii (2001) focuses this point further in her question ‘Does moral progress 
parallel economic growth? Alternatively, is there perhaps a reverse relation?’. 
Neuberger (2005) takes a similar analysis from the British situation in her book The 
Moral State We’re In. The ideologies of Socialism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet 
Union, and Communism in China provide a model for research, especially now that 
these political systems have been replaced. Chiu (2003) outlines some of the 
behavioural changes in the transition from planned to market economies, from a 
situation of high external control, to one based upon Market forces. The literature on 
whistle blowing, and the government inquiries on disasters undermined the Publics’ 
confidence in the ability of corporations and professions being able to regulate 
themselves. With this lack of trust came the introduction of a whole raft of new 
legislation including the re-writing of professional codes, the introduction of the charity 
Public Concern at Work, the passing of the Public Interest Disclosure Act. Some 
detailed examples of this external regulation are the GMC introduced a clause into the 
‘Duties of a Doctor’ which places a professional responsibility on doctors to report a 
colleague suspected of being unfit to practice (GMC 2009a), One of the 
recommendations in the Bristol Inquiry was for hospitals to publish mortality league 
tables (Blumenthal (1996), the Commission for Health Improvement (CHI) was 
introduced to inspect hospitals, and the UK Consensus Statement on undergraduate 
teaching of medical ethics and law, recommends whistle blowing as a core curricular 
topic (Consensus Statement 1998). 
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Conclusion 
Undermining the quality control mechanisms within organisations seems to be a 
consequentialist calculation of costs and benefits. As already discussed, a number of 
organisations chose to ignore the recommendations made in reports which had serious 
safety implications. While a number of processes have been put in place to encourage 
and support whistle blowers, the most recent research demonstrates it still has all of the 
high cost implications to the individual. Even the introduction of whistle blowing into 
the curriculum appears to have the opposite effect to that intended in that medical 
students are less inclined to whistle blow the longer they remain a student (Rennie & 
Crosby 2002). The overall conclusion would be that there is a power relationship 
between the individual, the individual as part of a team, the organisation, and the 
process of enculturation which suggests relational ethics plays a more functional role 
than external legislation. 
. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: FREE TO BE CONDEMNED?
64
 
 
Thus ethics is no longer a simple moralism of rules which decree what is virtuous. It is the original 
awakening of an I responsible for the other: the accession of my person to the uniqueness of the I 
called and elected to responsibly, which is the true beginning of the human and of spirituality. In the 
call which the face of the other addresses to me, I grasp in an immediate fashion the graces of love: 
spirituality, the lived experience of authentic humanity (Levinas 2001:182). 
 
Introduction 
Chapter Four (Ethical Decision Making) traced moral behaviour through the process of 
decision making. It explored the complex processes of decision making within the 
multidisciplinary healthcare team, from how it is taught within the healthcare curricula, 
how health professionals make decisions, through to the contextual dynamics situated 
within the health care system. Chapter Four (Whistleblowing) explored how 
professionals raise concerns regarding poor clinical practice, and finally discussed the 
role of the National Health Service Litigation Authority (NHSLA) in addressing issues 
of an ethical nature.  
 
Chapter Four concluded by identifying Deontology as the main philosophy 
underpinning regulatory codes of practice, and the concept of a ‘duty of care’ owed to 
patients. It discussed virtue ethics in relation to the process of enculturation through 
clinical practice, and also considered the undermining dynamic of a utilitarian, 
consequentialist calculation of cost and benefit. The overall conclusion was that there is 
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. 
 
174 
a power relationship between the individual, the individual as part of a team, the 
organisation, and the process of enculturation which seems to suggest relational ethics 
plays a more functional role than external legislation in providing sensitive, ethical care 
to patients. 
 
The theoretical analysis performed in the previous two chapters has identified the two 
concepts of freedom and movement. The latter only in passing-this has yet to be 
explained, but will be here as crucial in providing ethical care to patients. This chapter 
and the following are an invitation to consider these two concepts from a range of 
philosophical perspectives. Where Chapter Five focuses on critically analysing these 
concepts within the legal and political processes, Chapter Six follows the same 
analytical discourse in questioning whether ethics is prior to ontology. 
 
The main goal of this chapter is to move the discussion into the legal framework 
influencing clinical practice, and the wider political context of health care. In order to 
achieve this goal, this chapter is divided into the following sections: 
 
1. Hermeneutics and the decision making process in law 
2. Hermeneutics and the political context of health care 
3. Caring as Commerce 
4. Defining responsibility in law-the ‘Duty of Care’ concept 
5. Conclusion 
 
. 
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Section One outlines the legal procedure in cases of clinical negligence, and discusses 
the specific method taken in Case law termed the Black Letter approach. The 
discussion develops to include jurist’s decision making and Kants’ work on judgment. 
With the legal process established in section one, section two then expands the analysis 
to consider the political context of health care. Section three explores responsibility to 
others from a legal perspective and from Levinas’ concept of Face.  
 
The overarching analytical framework being applied to this chapter and Chapter Six is 
the philosophical category of movement which is based upon the work of Aristotle and 
Kierkegaard. Additionally, theories of justice will be considered principally to 
distinguish the extent of the connection between law and morals in the five selected 
legal cases of clinical negligence. The concept of movement will be introduced first, 
before providing an overview of the main theories of justice. 
 
Aristotle defines the kinesis-energeia dichotomy in the Metaphysics (1924), and then 
develops this in the Physics (1936). Where Aristotle was focusing on this dynamic 
structure of being within the universe, Kierkegaard applied these concepts to human 
actions (Stack 1974). Carlisle provides a helpful distinction between the concepts 
dunamis (potentiality) and energeia (actuality) by providing the example that a seed is 
‘‘potentially’ what the mature plant is ‘actually’ (Carlisle 2005:12)’.She then concludes 
‘Kinesis is, then, a category of transition, and it signifies a process of actualization 
(Carlisle 2005:12)’. It is then, this category of kinesis which will be explored in this 
chapter and Chapter Six. 
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One of the sustained debates within jurisprudence which is relevant to this study, 
concerns the extent to which morality pervades law. Legal theorists have debated three 
main views on the relationship between legal and moral theory (Wacks 2005).Legal 
positivism which has been developed from Bentham and Hume, considers law as 
consisting of ‘Posited’ rules, and as such is morally neutral (Wacks 2006). Hart is one 
of the most influential writers within legal positivism. His conception of law was as a 
social phenomenon that could only be understood by describing the actual social 
practices of a community (Hart 1997). The second main legal theory views legal 
reasoning as identical with moral reasoning, and is termed Natural law. The essence of 
natural law is that there are objective moral principles which depend upon the nature of 
the universe and which can be discovered by reason (Freeman 2001). While Legal 
positivism and Natural law provide a contrasting view, they both however subscribe to 
the view that ‘there is no prima facie moral obligation to obey an unjust law (Wacks 
2005:151)’. The dominant pervading theory of positivism has been greatly challenged 
over the past thirty years by Ronald Dworkin (Wacks 2005). Dworkin views law as 
‘Interpretive’, where legal reasoning aims to reformulate past legal decisions in the 
most coherent and morally attractive way. In order to keep the discussion focussed 
upon kinesis it appears significant that Dworkin includes in his explanation of 
interpretation; 
 
Each judge’s interpretive theories are grounded in his own convictions about the “point”-the 
justifying purpose or goal or principle-of legal practice as a whole, and these convictions will 
inevitably be different, at least in detail, from those of other judges (Dworkin 2006:88). 
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From this it seems crucial that the judge has chosen the ethical way of being, especially 
when reflective judgement plays such a significant role as opposed to determinant 
judgement. If, in contrast to Dworkin’s proposal, judges took more of a positive 
approach, which would be akin to Kant’s ‘determinant judgement’ there would be less 
reliance upon the individual judge’s thoughts, values and opinions. This will be 
discussed later in relation to Kant’s work on determinant judgement (where the case is 
brought under a pre-existing rule) and reflective judgement (searching for a 
rule/concept that fits the particular case). Reflective judgement thereby has a reliance 
upon the individual choosing the ethical way of being, that is not necessary in the same 
degree in determinant judgement. 
 
This is a kinesis from non-being to being. For Levinas ‘…the original awakening of an 
I responsible for the other (Levinas 2001:182)’. Kierkegaard emphasises the 
importance of freedom and action in the ethical stage as opposed to the distracted way 
of being in the aesthetic sphere: 
 
…ethics, which does not have the medium of being but of becoming and therefore denounces every 
explanation of becoming that deceitfully wants to explain becoming within being, whereby the 
absolute decision of becoming is essentially revoked and all talk about it is essentially a false alarm
65
 
(Kierkegaard 1992a:421) 
Kinesis then sets up a dialectic of movement and change that occurs within the 
individual. It provides a conceptual framework from which to explore this tension 
between non-being and being of the individual in a totalising system. The concept will 
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be considered below in relation to the legal system to consider the extent that 
individuals have made this transition. In Chapter Seven the freedom to act is explored 
as a series of aporiai
 66
. In Chapter Eight it will be applied to the tension between 
movement and knowledge where repetition is considered in contributing to 
epistemology. First, then, kinesis will be reviewed in the judge’s freedom to be ethical. 
 
In this chapter, the concept of justice is examined in relation to the potential duality of 
the ontological and ethical subjectivity. The theoretical analysis on conceptions of 
justice will draw upon a number of philosophers in exploring questions of justice as 
being, and also as an ethical event. Some of the main tensions to be examined appear to 
be set out by Levinas where he said; 
 
We are we because, commanding from identity to identity, we are disengaged from the totality and 
from history. But we are we
67
 in that we command each other to a work through which we recognise 
each other. To be disengaged from the totality while at the same time accomplishing a work in it is 
not to stand against the totality, but for it - that is, in its service. To serve the totality is to fight for 
justice. The totality is constituted by violence and corruption. The work consists in introducing 
equality into a world turned over to the interplay and the mortal strife of freedoms. Justice can have 
no other object than economic equality. It is not born of the playing out of injustice itself - it comes 
from outside. But it is illusion or hypocrisy to assume that, while born outside of economic relations, 
justice can be maintained outside, in the kingdom of pure respect (Levinas 2006a:31). 
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poros denoting ‘path or passage’ (Mautner 1999:32) . Aporia is variously translated as; no passage, or as 
an impasse. Aporia is the singular, with  Aporiai being the plural form.  
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The importance of this disengagement from the totality and history is a theme which 
will be developed throughout the thesis. First, the legal process will be discussed in 
relation to how cases of clinical negligence are considered. 
 
1. Hermeneutics and the Decision Making Process in Law 
One approach to decision making used in law, religion and ethics is hermeneutics. The 
background to this method is important within healthcare ethics and law since 
professionals draw guidance from legal (statutes, precedents, and treaties), religious, 
and classical texts, and yet there is a challenge with how this text is applied. Schmidt 
summarises this challenge where he notes: 
 
Understanding occurs as a fusion of the so-called past horizon of the text with the present horizon of 
the one who understands. The central problem of hermeneutics, the necessary task of application, 
concerns how the text is brought to speak in the interpreter’s now expanded horizon (Schmidt 2006: 
8). 
 
The two words ‘Hermeneutics’ and ‘Exegesis’ both mean to ‘interpret’. Hermeneutics 
from the Greek word hermĕneuein, and ‘Exegesis’ from ex ‘out of’ and hegeisthai ‘to 
guide, or lead’ (Mautner 1999). Inwood, adds richness to this background by stating 
that both of these Greek words are derived from the name Hermes, the messenger of 
the Greek gods, and that hermēneutike (technē) is the ‘art of interpretation’ (Inwood 
1995: 353). Hermeneutics has also developed from a narrow definition as outlined by 
. 
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Schleiermacher (1998) which was applied to texts, to a broader definition as in 
Heidegger (1999) which he applied to Dasein
68
.  
 
Interpreting Common law takes an exact approach termed ‘Black-letter’. The black-
letter approach provides an exact method for understanding law as a practiced system 
and a recognised legal framework for interpreting Case law. Balkan describes the 
black-letter approach as ‘through the lens of a specific interpretative framework 
(Balkan 1996: 956)’. This framework involves seeing each case as if it formed part of a 
system of rules which are internally connected and related to each other in distinct 
clusters and groups (Hofheinz 1997). Such rules are embedded in other legal Cases and 
in Statutes with the internal connections being identified through cross-referencing 
specific rules, and through the identification of legal principles and axioms. A 
philosophically significant point is that within this approach the analysis must 
‘insulate’ the topic from supposedly ‘non-legal factors’ which would include policy, 
political, social and economic issues as though these were somehow ‘external’ to legal 
research (Hofheinz 1997). 
 
This method has been applied in all of the cases researched and an overview of the 
process is best seen in Appendix 2 where the main statue law, and ‘significant cases’ 
are referenced for each transcript. Legal authority is found by paying particular 
attention to the most recent appeal judgments regarding the case in, for example, the 
Court of Appeal, House of Lords, and the European Court of Justice. Twining (1994) 
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helpfully explains that disputed points of law largely dominate the lower level courts, 
and that points of law prioritised by the black-letter tradition are mainly found in 
superior courts. Within legal reasoning ‘Cases’ are located at the base of a hierarchical 
pyramid with legal rules, legal principles and axioms being prioritised in turn above 
this. As a system it would now be worthwhile to explore how the Black-letter approach 
within law articulates with the philosophy of Hermeneutics.  
 
Insulating non-legal factors occurs in two main ways within the legal system. Firstly, 
by the hierarchical structure of the court system. That is, in cases of clinical negligence, 
the main clinical details are gathered in the court of first hearing. This is why so many 
jurists are reluctant to question this process, as they argue that the judge within the 
court of first hearing has had the privilege of seeing the witnesses face to face. Jurists 
in higher courts have to depend upon the clinical evidence gathered in the first court. 
The only additional clinical detail which may be requested at a later date is that 
provided by a clinical expert. 
 
In addition to this process, clinical details are isolated via the Black–letter approach, 
where once gathered, they contribute to the legal argument, and the technical definition 
of the case. For example most of the cases reviewed have been defined as within the 
Tort of negligence. In such cases the Claimant (Plaintiff in Scotland) must prove that 
there was a ‘Duty of care’ owed to the claimant, that this duty was breached, and the 
negligence caused harm. By this process there is a rapid progression from what could 
be termed ‘clinical language’ into the technical language of law. 
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The Black-letter system tries to separate ‘non-legal factors’ and legal factors. In this 
process some of the clinical details have been handled with a lack of due concern and 
not given the significance which they would be given in professional clinical practice. 
At times they have been interpreted incorrectly. This occurs at the court of first hearing, 
but can also be demonstrated as a weakness within the decision making process within 
the House of Lords. 
 
The legal decision making process can clearly be seen in all of the cases where the 
relevant Statute law is applied, relevant Cases identified, and the ratio decidendi 
( reason for deciding) adhered to. The ratio of the case has to be decided from its facts, 
the reasons the court gave for reaching its decision, and the decision itself. Only the 
ratio of a case is binding on inferior courts, by reason of the doctrine of precedent 
(Martin & Law 2006). However, it is confusing to see precedent applied in what seems 
contradictory ways. Some of the most significant cases being in the House of Lords 
where each law lord provides the rationale (including references) for their judgment. In 
these rulings the judgments are sometimes as close as 3; 2 dissenting
69
. From this 
situation the question arises of how such disparate judgments occur when such a 
rigorous legal process is followed. 
 
Although the current discussion relates to law, the same interpretative challenges apply 
in world religions and healthcare ethics. In a recent symposium on ‘Religions and 
Cultures of East and West; Perspectives on Bioethics’ ethicists were invited to discuss 
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the influence of their own religion and culture when considering issues within bioethics 
(Sade 2008). The research papers consider such views from the Jewish (Zoloth 2008), 
Chinese (Kirkland 2008), Christian (Lustig 2008), Hindu (Sarma 2008), Islamic (Athar 
2008), and Japanese perspectives (LaFleur 2008). One of the key features for the 
ethicists is in interpreting classical texts in the current context. For example, Zoloth 
when considering Judaism explains: 
 
Hence, the casuistry that supports ethical response is based on exegetical reasoning that is debated 
over a prolonged temporal period. New developments in the field of molecular biology, however, 
call for innovations within this tradition, and they call for them very rapidly (Zoloth 2008: 14). 
 
In a similar way with the black letter approach within law, it is sometimes difficult to 
find a Case which is a good fit for the legal problem, or a similar relevant 
religious/classical text. Zoloth goes on to identify some of the hermeneutic challenges 
within the Jewish tradition: 
 
Jewish ethics is essentially a complex, reasoned argument about how such Biblical texts, historical 
and contextual judgments, and an interpretive community’s normative values are brought to bear on 
a particular case at hand (Zoloth 2008: 15). 
 
This is strikingly similar to Dworkins view of law where he writes: 
 
Law as integrity asks a judge deciding a common-law case like McLoughlin to think of himself as an 
author in the chain of common law. He knows that other judges have decided cases that, although 
not exactly like this case, deal with related problems; he must think of their decisions as part of a 
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long story he must interpret and then continue, according to his own judgment of how to make the 
developing story as good as it can be (Of course the best story for him means best from the 
standpoint of political morality, not aesthetics) (Dworkin 2006: 238 & 239). 
 
In Schleiermacher’s universal hermeneutics, he distinguishes between two parts to the 
art of understanding: the grammatical, and the psychological.
70
 Both are interdependent, 
however, and the interpreter must decide upon which emphasis to give to each, 
depending upon their area of work (for example, law, theology, or classical literature). 
The next challenge for the interpreter is breaking in to the topic, at the textual level it is 
about understanding words within sentences, and sentences within a text. At a more 
general level it concerns the authors work as a part in relation to the whole of his 
culture, and this culture as embedded in the history of an era. There is an 
interdependence of whole and part which is defined as the ‘hermeneutic circle’. At the 
existential level this includes the individual meaning of a person and of their 
particularities in relation to the concept of a human being (Schleiermacher 1998).  
 
In the current analysis of the case transcripts, this is a challenging area for jurists 
because they have to understand clinical language, and the letter of the law. 
Schleiermacher explains: 
 
Everything in a given utterance which requires a more precise determination may only be 
determined from the language area which is common to the author and his original audience 
(Schleiermacher 1998: 30).  
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Heidegger expands upon Schleiermachers’s definition of hermeneutics to apply not just 
to texts, but also to other aspects of human being where he states; ‘Hermeneutics is the 
announcement and making known of the being of a being in its being in relation to me 
(Heidegger 1999: 7)’. This challenging aspect of interpretation can perhaps be best 
seen within law, in the role of the ‘Expert Witness’.  
 
Precisely because the legal system recognizes the inherent problems in trying to 
understand a language area ‘Which is common to the author and his original audience’ 
(Schleiermacher 1998:30), the justice system is dependant upon Expert Witnesses. As a 
consequence of this both defendants and the legal system itself are vulnerable to 
experts who lack integrity and or skill (Dwyer 2008).  
 
 
Following the Bristol Royal Infirmary inquiry Kennedy reported that the current Tort 
based adversarial system of negligence liability supports a culture of blame and fear, 
encourages a code of silence amongst professionals, and results in errors being covered 
up (Kennedy 2001: paragraph 26.). Since then the department of health in England has 
consulted with health professionals regarding the options for the future of clinical 
negligence litigation within the NHS. In 2003 Sir Liam Donaldson (Donaldson 2003) 
authored a report on ‘Making Amends - A Consultation paper setting out proposals for 
reforming the approach to clinical negligence in the NHS’. 
 
The role of the Expert Witness is in assisting the court to ascertain the true facts. In a 
lecture given by Sir Anthony Clarke he explains: 
. 
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My experience of various types of litigation and arbitration over many years has convinced me (as is 
perhaps self-evident) that the expert plays a crucial [role] in the administration of justice, both civil 
and criminal. Without the expert witness it would be almost impossible for judges to decide very 
many types of case (Clarke.2008: 85). 
 
Most of the legal cases analysed, and indeed most of the healthcare cases are classed as 
‘complex’. Bloom-Cooper emphasizes this challenge for jurists where he expounds:  
 
There are times-especially in the world of high technology with society’s growing appetite for 
dispute resolution in the courts-when the ability of judges [and I would add juries] to understand the 
true import of expert evidence and reach an informed and well-reasoned judgment will be taxed to 
the utmost, and even beyond judicial endeavour (Bloom-Cooper 2006:7).  
 
In order for justice to be carried out for the claimant and defendant, the expert must be 
free to give unbiased opinion. For the courts to provide justice it has to carry out the 
two functions of, firstly establishing the true facts, and with this done, it must then 
apply the relevant principles of law to those facts, ‘to provide a judgment, which is 
both correct in fact and law (Clarke 2008: 85)’. From this it can be seen that the ‘facts’ 
and ‘rules’ are separated. That there is what may be called the ‘clinical language’, and 
‘legal language’. That the judge is dependant upon the Expert Witness, and yet once the 
clinical information is gathered it is isolated through the Black-letter approach. It 
appears to be reasoning which involves both a priori and a posteriori, but the legal 
process gives precedent through a priori knowledge. 
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The judiciary go to a great deal of effort in trying to establish the objective truth. As 
discussed in chapter 2 (2.2 Legal Analysis), and in less detail above, the legal process is 
an evolving approach which stringently applies legal axioms, and legal precedent in an 
attempt to try and find the objective truth for all concerned in the case. Yet, the 
experience of the legal process is different from the various perspectives of patient, 
nurse, doctor, manager, and the hospital executive team. One of the main differences is 
that it is usually the patient, or a relative of the patient, who has experienced first-hand 
the alleged clinical negligence. This perspective will now be considered in the light of 
Kant’s transcendental metaphysics, and in his ethical theory. 
 
Kant attempted to show that traditional metaphysics rests upon a fundamental mistake 
when it presupposes that we can make substantive knowledge claims about the world 
independently of experience (Kuehn 1999). It is this discussion on the role of 
experience in establishing objective knowledge which appears to be relevant to the 
cases of clinical negligence. Perhaps the problem is stated best by Ewing where it is 
explained; ‘For the main question always is - what and how much can understanding 
and reason come to know without the help of any experience…?’ (Ewing 1923: xi). 
 
Kant wrote three critiques; The first, Critique Of Pure Reason in 1787, then the 
Critique of practical reason in 1788, and finally the third, Critique Of Judgement in 
1790. While the above question is answered in the first critique, Kants’ third critique 
will be called upon in considering the pleasure aspect of making a judgement. 
Additionally, the Critique Of Practical Reason, Groundwork Of The Metaphysic Of 
Morals 1785, and The Metaphysics Of Morals 1797 will also be consulted on issues of 
. 
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a wider ethical nature. In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant (2007) distinguishes 
between three powers of the mind. These are the abilities to sense, to understand, and to 
reason. Kant’s philosophy develops through the three Critiques. In the Critique of Pure 
Reason, to judge was to apply a concept or rule to particulars (Schaper 2006:369). In the 
third critique (Critique of Judgement) Kant wants to call that kind of judgement 
‘determinant’ judgement and to distinguish it from ‘reflective’ judgement, where the 
particular is given and the rule or concept under which it falls has to be found or 
discovered (Schaper 2006:369).  
 
With this distinction at the forefront, Kants’ critical philosophy tries to show what is 
involved in making a judgment. The structure outlined is that we have the ability to 
register sensory data such as sensations which he termed ‘sensibility’. Next we have 
intellect. This is the ‘understanding’. The final faculty is ‘reasoning’ which is the 
ability to infer logically. In the introduction to the final Critique Kant explains that 
“Judgment” takes the middle position between “understanding” and “reason” (Schaper 
2006). 
 
Within the legal Case transcripts non-legal factors are isolated. The receptivity to such 
sensory information, Kant termed ‘intuitions’, and he categorically denies that we can 
have any knowledge which is purely conceptual. Kant outlined the importance of a 
synthesis between these faculties in the Critique of Pure Reason where he proposes: 
 
Our nature is so constituted that our intuition can never be other than sensible; that is, it contains 
only the mode in which we are affected by objects. The faculty, on the other hand, which enables us 
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to think the object of sensible intuition is the understanding. To neither of these powers may a 
preference be given over the other. Without sensibility no object would be given to us, without 
understanding no object would be thought. Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without 
concepts are blind. It is, therefore, just as necessary to make our concepts sensible, that is, to add the 
object to them in intuition, as to make our intuitions intelligible, that is, to bring them under concepts. 
These two powers or capacities cannot exchange their functions. The understanding can intuit 
nothing, the senses can think nothing. Only through their union can knowledge arise (Kant 2007:93). 
 
Yet as a system the law appears to drive a wedge between ‘intuitions’- as clinical detail 
on the one hand, and understanding and reasoning as legal concepts, on the other. It is 
important to highlight here that the clinical details are only structurally similar to 
intuitions. The reason for this is that clinical details are not just undetermined 
sensations; rather they are already determined by concepts as particular kinds of objects 
such as clinical signs and symptoms
71
. The crucial point is that the judges would need 
to know these concepts in order to recognise the order of importance upon clinical 
information. It does not seem to be the case that the law ignores ‘intuitions’, for in the 
area of the Expert Witness the legal system is in a dependant situation, with bias 
resulting from this. It seems rather that by attempting to bracket and control the 
‘intuitions’ thereby disunion occurs. 
 
Crucial to this discussion is the conceptual structure within which all thought and 
experience is thought to take place. In an eloquent section where Kant is discussing the 
frustration within Metaphysics, he explains; ‘Ever and again we have to retrace our 
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steps[…] (Kant 2007: 21)’, and, ‘[…] the procedure of metaphysics has hitherto been a 
merely random groping, and worst of all, a groping among mere concepts (Kant 2007: 
21)’. In response to this question: 
 
Why, in that case, should nature have visited our reason with the restless endeavor whereby it is ever 
searching for such a path, as if this were one of its most important concerns? (Kant 2007:21). 
 
 Kant proposes what he called his ‘Copernican Revolution’;  
 
Hitherto it has been assumed that all our knowledge must conform to objects. But all attempts to 
extend our knowledge of objects by establishing something in regard to them a priori, by means of 
concepts, have, on this assumption, ended in failure. We must therefore make trail whether we may 
not have more success in the tasks of metaphysics, if we suppose that objects must conform to our 
knowledge. This would agree better with what is desired, namely, that it should be possible to have 
knowledge of objects a priori, determining something in regard to them prior to their being given 
(Kant 2007:22).  
 
It is from this position of objects conforming to our knowledge that difficulties appear 
to arise within the legal system. For Kant, a judgment involves a synthesis of concept 
and intuition. For this transcendental synthesis to occur the understanding must draw 
upon a priori concepts which he termed ‘categories72’. Although the categories are 
applied by principles, the categories relate to all understanding. Kant repeatedly stated 
that this theory of understanding ‘[…] is not to be construed as empirical psychology’ 
                                                 
72 Kant defines twelve ‘categories’. Some of the main ones are; Totality, Unity, Negation, Reality, 
Possibility, Existence and Causality.
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(Scruton 1987: 22). It may be at this stage worthwhile to make a trial of this framework 
contained within the Transcendental Analytic in relation to the legal transcripts. 
 
From Kant’s perspective, any patient (or judge) will be presented with many different 
sensations which he termed a ‘manifold of intuitions’. Crucially, the way in which the 
patient will sift or gather this selection of intuitions together and identify connections 
Kant called ‘synthesis’. According to Kant, it is here that the source of knowledge 
arises; ‘It is to synthesis, therefore, that we must first direct our attention, if we would 
determine the first origin of our knowledge’ (Kant 2007:111&112). This synthesis has 
two aspects to it which has real consequences to the way a patient’s care experience is 
viewed by judges
73
. Firstly, Kant considered self-consciousness as a prerequisite for 
synthesis to occur, and that the ‘I think’ does not always accompany the perceptions for 
every being. Consequently, the patient or judge would not know their own experience. 
Kant explained this relationship where he said ‘All the manifold of intuition has, 
therefore, a necessary relation to the ‘I think’ in the same subject in which this 
manifold is found’ (Kant 2007: 153). The second aspect is where the synthesis involves 
the active application of a concept. Although Kant identified specific ‘categories’, the 
individual still has to recognise the familiar concepts within their sphere of existence. 
Where David Bell (2003) provides the helpful example of the manifold sensations 
which would help him identify his motorbike, the same would apply for the patient 
recognising pain, the nurse recognising a rapid pulse rate, and the judge recognising 
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clinical negligence. Where the potential challenge appears to arise is recognising the 
concepts in an unfamiliar conceptual terrain.  
 
This situation is challenging at all levels of judgement. That is from the patient, health 
care staff, NHS managers, and for jurists. Kant’s distinction between ‘determinant’ and 
‘reflective’ judgement provides some helpful insight into some of the complexity of 
such reasoning. Applying a concept or rule to particulars (‘determinant’ judgement) 
appears to be uncommon for jurists in the ‘hard cases’ reviewed so far. Rather, it 
appears as if the jurists are being presented with the particular and they have to find the 
rule or concept under which it falls (‘reflective’ judgement). Such a view would be 
sympathetic to Dworkins’ view of law as being ‘Interpretive’ where legal reasoning 
aims to reformulate past legal decisions (Dworkin 2006). However, it would still fail to 
explain how such disparate judgements occur when jurists follow such a precise, 
rigorous legal process. 
 
It is precisely at this juncture that Kant’s work in the Critique of Judgement is helpful 
in exploring things where their possibility can be explained neither by the objective 
principles of the pure understanding or by the moral law. 
 
The Moral Law for Kant includes the following practical imperative; 
 
Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of 
any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end (Kant 1997a: 91). 
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The following discussion aims to consider precisely this ‘means-ends’ in relation to 
reflective judgement. Whilst this discussion will focus on the judgements made 
primarily by jurists, this analysis encompasses all judgments, including those made by 
health care staff and managers. 
 
Kant sets out an explanation of reflective judgement in Introduction IV (On Judgement 
as a Power That Legislates A Priori) of the Critique of Judgement (1987). In the 
introduction Kant provides the limits of Determinative judgment which is 
‘subsumptive’ (Kant 1987:19). Following this Kant identifies the precise area where 
determinative judgement runs out: 
 
On the other hand, since the laws that pure understanding gives a priori concern only the possibility 
of a nature as such (as object sense), there are such diverse forms of nature, so many modifications 
as it were of the universal transcendental concepts of nature, which are left undetermined by these 
laws, that surely there must be laws for these forms too (Kant 1987: 19).  
 
As reflective judgement moves from the given particular to the universal, this also 
requires a principle, and Kant postulates that reflective judgement gives this law ‘but 
only to itself (Kant 1987:19)’. This principle is a key which opens up a number of 
teleological vistas; 
 
Now insofar as the concept of an object also contains the basis for the object’s actuality, the concept 
is called the thing’s purpose, and a thing’s harmony with that character of things which is possible 
only through purposes is called the purposiveness of its form (Kant 1987: 20). 
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This teleological and aesthetic view involves considering objects - whether as law 
making or patients - as hypothetically as purposive and as products of intentional 
actions (Shaper 2006). This thesis has great potential in considering the purpose of laws 
or indeed patients as such judgements ‘…are mainly used when there is a relation 
between a cause and effect which a person intends (Fricke 1990:48)’. For example, this 
helps to explain Dworkins view that; 
 
Each judge’s interpretive theories are grounded in his own convictions about the “point”-the 
justifying purpose or goal or principle-of legal practice as a whole, and these convictions will 
inevitably be different, at least in detail, from those of other judges (Dworkin 2006:88). 
 
From Kant’s thesis it can be seen that what sets the judgement of taste apart from other 
kinds of judgement is that the feeling of pleasure alone determines it. Schaper (2006: 
371) confirms this where she emphasises: 
 
The most subjective and private of human capacities, that of feeling, far from being mute and 
inchoate, could, Kant now thought, yield the determining ground of the aesthetic judgement 
(Schaper 2006:371). 
 
This has real consequences for jurists as law makers and in considering the teleological 
perspective of the case, especially when the ratio could potentially influence many 
future cases. It emphasises that the deontological principle is insufficient alone, but 
requires to be coupled with an ability for reflective judgement. Equally, it has real 
potential for the way in which patients are viewed, potentially as holistic individuals or 
more as commodities in a market economy where success is measured in terms of 
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waiting lists, and patient through-puts. These perspectives will be discussed in the next 
section on the political context of health care.  
 
2. Hermeneutics and The Political Context of Health Care. 
Discussion regarding this legal decision making process has to be set within the current 
political system. This is important within the NHS and the area of clinical negligence in 
terms of innovative new treatments and the financial cost of offering such treatments. 
Deakin et al. outlines this change where they state: 
Thus, the politicization of tort law is thus becoming obvious in our system as well as the patchy 
nature of our reforms clearly reflect either the impact that pressure groups have on the generation of 
‘partial’ legislation or even the introduction of legislation which openly admits as its first objective 
the desire to save the NHS money (even if the long term effects of this reform remain openly 
uncertain) (Deakin et al. 2008: 8). 
 
In fact, the legal area of clinical negligence is undergoing major reform. An estimate of 
the size of the problem can be seen in the National Audit Office statistics on the 
financial cost of negligence claims within the NHS. The NHS Litigation Authority, 
which handles out-of-court claims against the NHS in England, spent £530 million 
settling cases in 2004-2005, and has made provision of £7.6 billion for unsettled claims 
in 2004-2005 (Hall 2005). The reforms were set out in the chief medical officers 
consultation document ‘Making Amends’ (Donaldson 2003). The first recommendation 
of the document which was to introduce an NHS Redress Scheme without the need for 
court proceedings has now been introduced in the NHS Redress Bill (House of 
Lords.2005). It is significant to note that one of the principle aims of the reforms as 
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identified to the independent charity, Action Against Medical Accidents ( AvMA), and 
as identified in the research commissioned for ‘Making Amends’ was; ‘preventing the 
same thing happening to someone else (Walsh 2005:267). 
 
The reason for detailing the legal procedure to identify if a duty is owed to the Other, is 
to make this clear before setting it into its political context. The relationship of 
responsibility to the Other will be explored next in a political context. Consideration 
will be given to whether the limits of this relationship are largely dependant upon 
economic ends. 
 
One of the major influences upon the delivery of care within the National Health 
Service was the exposure of the health system to market pressures. For the first time the 
NHS was planned to operate on market values, where previously it was traditionally 
governed by non-market norms (Sandel 2009a). Prior to 1991, the NHS had existed as 
a system for almost fifty years, where professional incomes had ceased to depend upon 
selling clinical process as a commodity (Hart 1995). In 1991, the United Kingdom 
government introduced a quasi market for the delivery of healthcare. This was similar 
in other parts of Europe, America, and in New Zealand (Laugesen 2005). In this quasi 
market paradigm, healthcare was set into an economic analysis. The manufacturers of 
goods –as health- (Hospitals, General Practitioners) were separated from the purchasers 
of goods. This ‘purchaser-provider’ split then inadvertently viewed patients as 
commodities. Part of this reform included a policy to develop an internal market, where 
there was provider competition. Creation of an internal market had an explicit aim of 
encouraging competitive markets. In this system hospitals were converted to Trusts, 
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and General Practitioners transformed into General Practice Fund Holders (GPFH) 
(Propper and Söderlund 1998). Providers then competed for patients not just in their 
regions but also in other regions. The end result was to put pressure on the quality 
adjusted unit costs for the health care required (Melinick et al. 1992). 
 
Crucially, the NHS was (and remains) a ‘quasi’, or modified market. Crucially so in 
fact, because if it was a pure form market, discussions would eventually arise about the 
value (as price) of products. In Europe, the introduction of ‘user fees’ was less than 
what policy makers had proposed (Laugesen 2005). Precisely because the government 
intervenes in ensuring universal access to comprehensive care, determines health care 
need, and the ensuing resource allocation, two major consequences result from this 
regarding moral action. 
Firstly, patients are denied the opportunity to choose within the market where they 
would like to receive their health care. In a pure market this would stimulate price 
reduction, or higher quality care at the same price. Importantly, it would define where 
patients as individuals placed value. Much of the NHS reforms were based upon the 
work of Professor Alain Enthoven who spent one month in the United Kingdom in 
1984 reviewing the NHS. In his report, Professor Enthoven intended that the individual 
patient would be the purchaser, where he proposes: 
 
Moreover, it is possible that such GP practices might become competitors for patients, thereby 
adding an element of consumer choice that has not been present in the NHS (Enthoven 1991:68). 
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In reality, purchasing is performed and regulated en-block by the District Health 
Authority, and subsequently by the Health Boards. In any given geographical area 
monopoly and monopsony
74
 situations are regulated. Dawson (1994) argues that within 
the NHS it is not a simple inverse relationship which exists between the degree of 
competition and the published prices for care. Rather, contracts are negotiated by 
bargaining which is highly context specific and has long term collaborative objectives. 
The level of intervention by the government prevents the market from establishing 
what is of real value to patients. The moral significance of this position is highlighted 
by Sandel where he explains: 
 
Market-mimicking governance is appealing because it seems to offer a way of making political 
choices without making hard and controversial moral choices (Sandel 2009b). 
 
The second consequence of government interventionism concerns the moral agency of 
staff. This is not to provide a wholly negative analysis of the NHS reforms, as much 
was achieved in improving the cost efficiency of the system. However, the argument is 
attempting to highlight the consequences of a quasi market, as being the lack of 
discussion on moral value in public life, and the inability of the market to identify what 
is of moral value within a democratic society. 
 
The 1980s and 1990s NHS reforms introduced a new form of management which 
involved governance of staff by market principles (Clatworthy et al. 2000). With the 
introduction of Trusts, management was devolved to the Board of Directors, who had 
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to compete with other trusts for resources (Cutler 2000). In this new structure terms and 
conditions of staff employment would be determined locally by the trust, where 
previously this was established at a national level (Buchan 2000). Salience was given to 
performance management which translated into clinical targets. Enthoven predicted 
how the Trust strategy would be broken down into annual personal objectives when he 
said; The success of staff would be much more tied to the success of their hospital than 
it has been in the past (Enthoven 1991:66).’ The economic theory presupposes that 
individual health professionals can be directed and ordered to care, in the same manner 
as factory workers manufacturing an inorganic mechanical component. It is significant 
to note that the output of health care production is measured in terms of waiting lists for 
particular departments such as Accident and Emergency, or for specific operations such 
as hip replacement. The importance of performance management can be evidenced in 
the 77.7% increase in NHS managers from 1997-2005 (House of Commons Health 
Committee 2006), and in the volume of targets; 
 
The number of performance indicators multiplied. So did the number of targets, a trend across all 
government departments led by the Treasury. At the peak, NHS managers reckoned they had to meet 
300-plus targets (ministers claimed a somewhat lower figure). And if targets were not met, there 
were sanctions (Klein 2007:41). 
 
Care as merchandise, and the selling of care as commerce is organized and funded by 
the government, mainly through target setting and resource allocation. Trusts then 
develop Health Improvement Plans with the local Health Board. This is then developed 
into a Trust strategy and implemented by the use of annual personal objectives for 
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health professionals. Staff are then appraised on how successful they have been in 
implementing the Trust strategy. 
 
3. Caring as Commerce 
Bernard-Henri Lévy usefully points out that under Voltaire and Diderot commerce had 
a double meaning. In addition to meaning the exchange of merchandise ‘it was a saying 
the relationship between souls and minds (Lévy 2008:15)’. It seems as if it may be in 
this secondary definition that a tension develops for health care professionals. As they 
use their Self in the therapeutic encounter with the Other. Levinas captures this tension 
where money is the medium of interchange between individuals; 
 
In the transaction, the action of one freedom over another is achieved…It keeps individuals outside 
the totality since they dispose of it; and, at the same time, it includes them in the totality, since in 
commerce and transaction the man himself is bought or sold: money is always wages to some extent 
(Levinas 2006a:32). 
 
This point has become important within health care as staff performance is judged by 
the degree it is aligned to the Trust strategy. Sartre is in accord with Levinas regarding 
this tension between the individual and as also part of a community where he explains;  
 
It is the world which makes known to us our belonging to a subject-community, especially the 
existence in the world of manufactured objects (Sartre 2000:423). 
 
The contrast that begins to emerge in caring as commerce is the degree to which 
patients are considered objects or subjects, and this point requires investigation in 
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relation to the potential totalisation of staff within an organization predicated upon a 
quasi market economy. 
 
With staff objectives which are aligned to the Trust strategy, the personal objectives are 
dependant on the line managers’ objectives, in a role of subordination. Sartre develops 
the tension between the I and the We by discussing how through work individuals are 
constantly exposed to the tension between having an individual identity and being part 
of a group identity. He uses two helpful examples to bring out the distinction between 
individuality and the ‘They’ or ‘We’. In Being and Nothingness Sartre uses the 
example of the subway where – as similar to the Trust employment objectives - it is the 
ends that the individual pursues which are defining: 
 
My immediate ends are the ends of the “They,” and I apprehend myself as interchangeable with any 
one of my neighbours. In this sense we lose our real individuality, for the project we are is precisely 
the project which others are (Sartre 2000:424). 
 
In his later work (Notebooks For An Ethics), Sartre compares the artists work and the 
work of a subordinated factory worker who is involved in some ‘collective 
undertaking’ (Sartre 1992:129). The comparison brings to light how the artist can 
distinguish their individuality in the work, where the contribution of the collective 
worker gets lost in the whole. The effect on an ethics is important as the collective 
worker senses a diminished responsibility where he states; 
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At the same time, it also has a density of being that allows me to avoid the anxiety of being 
responsible for my I (Sartre 1992:130). 
 
The next section explores the concept of responsibility in terms of caring for patients 
within the legal framework. 
 
4. Defining Responsibility in Law-the ‘Duty of Care’ Concept 
Ethics and law converge when considering the question of responsibility. In law, the 
‘duty of care’ is set out within the Tort of negligence. Torts are civil wrongs (Vanstone 
1998). ‘Tort’ comes from the Latin word tortus meaning twisted or crooked. It is a 
wrongful act or omission (Martin & Law 2006).  Negligence as a distinct tort began 
with the Scottish case of Donoghue v Stevenson (1932 S.L.T. 317). A brief sketch of 
the background to this case will be given as it provides a stark contrast to Levinas’ 
view of responsibility where: 
 
To be the other's hostage, in Levinas's terminology, is to be obligated to an immemorial debt that I 
do not remember contracting. This obligation, which is not voluntary, holds me to a condition of 
passivity, like that of creation, where I am neither the author of myself nor self-contemporaneous. 
Moreover, I am obligated, in Levinas's frequent phrase, "straightaway" (d'emblee). This is to say that 
the obligation is immediate and does not go by way of the theoretical (Levinas 2001:7). 
 
Levinas views responsibility for the other in a radical way in comparison to the legal 
system. The history of the Donoghue case is that May Donoghue found the remains of 
a decomposed snail within her ginger beer drink which she had ordered. This was in 
Paisley in 1928. Donoghue brought an action in law against the manufacture of the 
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drink; David Stevenson. Twice (April 1929, and in June 1930) the Court of Session 
ruled that there was no legal authority allowing a claim for damages against a 
manufacturer where no contract existed. It was only when the House of Lords 
recognized her claim for status as a pauper, did the appeal proceed (Taylor 2004). In 
examining the legal authorities in Scottish and English law, Lord Atkin commented; 
 
It is remarkable how difficult it is to find in the English authorities statements of general application 
defining the relations between parties that give rise to the duty (1932 S.L.T. 317: 8). 
 
In law, it has been, and remains difficult defining the relations between individuals that 
give rise to a ‘duty of care’. In the Donoghue case, May suffered ‘from shock and 
severe gastro-enteritis (1932 S.L.T. 317:2)’ as a direct result of consuming the 
contaminated drink. She was unable to pursue her case as one of contract law because 
her friend had bought the drink so no direct contract existed between her and the 
manufacturer. It would have been a difficult case for May to sustain because she had to 
retain her legal team who were pursuing her case without a fee. Ms. Donaghue also had 
to gain the status of a pauper because she was unable to put up the security for the cost 
of the case. Further, it should be added that she had to take her complaint to three 
different courts before it was recognised that a relationship existed between the 
manufacturer of the drink and the plaintiff. It is also suggested by Taylor (2004) that 
Ms Donaghue would have had great difficulty in finding a solicitor who would have 
been prepared to take her case. However, her solicitor had three weeks previously acted 
for the unsuccessful pursuers where mice were found in bottles of aerated water. 
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In contrast for Levinas: 
The expression the face introduces into the world does not defy the feebleness of my powers, but my 
ability for power.
75
 The face, still a thing among things, breaks through the form that nevertheless 
delimits it. This means concretely; the face speaks to me and thereby invites me to a relation 
incommensurate with a power exercised, be it enjoyment or knowledge (Levinas 2008b:198). 
 
The contrast found by considering Levinas’ work helps to uncover some of the main 
philosophical discussions within jurisprudence, which can be identified in the speech of 
Lord Atkin in 1932, and evidenced today in the legal transcripts being analysed. Some 
of the relevant questions within legal philosophy are concerning whether law and 
morality are separate, to what extend there should be politicisation of law, and also the 
source of the moral ought. 
 
In stark contrast to the legal system, Levinas places ethics in the form of the relation to 
the Other prior to reason, law, justice, universality, and politics. There is an important 
development in Levinas’ thinking between the writing of Totality and Infinity, and the 
more recent text Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence. In Otherwise than Being or 
Beyond Essence, Levinas abandons the structure of phenomenology in different strata. 
In the translator’s introduction Alphonso Lingis outlines this change:  
 
The ethical relationship with alterity is now described with concepts opposed to those of presence, 
the present, aim or intentionality. These concepts will be used to formulate saying itself, and the 
signifygness of speech founded on an existential structure of being for-the-other, in terms of making-
contact that precedes and supports making signs (Levinas 2008a: xxi & xxii). 
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 Mon pouvoir de pouvoir’-My ability for power. 
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 In a similar fashion Levinas makes 
 
… an attempt to traverse the passage from ethics to politics. In each of his two major works, Totality 
and Infinity and Otherwise than being or Beyond Essence, Levinas endeavours to build a bridge 
from ethics, conceived as the nontotalizable relation with the other human, to politics, understood as 
the relation with the third party (le tiers),that is, to all the others that make up society…(Levinas 
1996:161).  
 
The tension in these relationships can perhaps best be seen where Levinas states: 
 
To be disengaged from the totality while at the same time accomplishing a work in it is not to stand 
against the totality, but for it - that is, in its service. To serve the totality is to fight for justice. The 
totality is constituted by violence and corruption. The work consists in introducing equality into a 
world turned over to the interplay and the mortal strife of freedoms. Justice can have no other object 
than economic equality. It is not born of the playing out of injustice itself-it comes from the outside. 
But it is illusion or hypocrisy to assume that, while born outside of economic relations, justice can be 
maintained outside, in the kingdom of pure respect (Levinas 2006a:31). 
 
Ethical care as the ‘nontotalizable relation with the other human’ is explored in law 
through the concept of negligence. For negligence to be proven four elements have to 
be established. These are that a duty of care was owed to the individual, that that duty 
was breached, causation is established, and damages are identified (Jones M. 2003). 
There are different tests for establishing if the individual was responsible for owing a 
duty of care (Leng 2007). The test for determining whether a duty of care exists where 
there is physical damage - such as in clinical negligence - is a three tier test which was 
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established as legal precedent in the case of Caparo Industries Plc v Dickman ([1990] 2 
AC 605). The first two elements are significant in establishing clinical negligence, in 
that much time and care is spent in exploring if a duty of care was owned to the 
individual, and then if that duty was breached. 
 
To decide if a duty of care is owed to the Other in law, the tripartite Caparo Dickman 
test is applied. This involves considering the following three questions; Was damage 
foreseeable? Is the relationship between the parties proximate? And, Is it fair, just and 
reasonable to impose a duty of care? Establishing a legal relationship is based upon 
Lord Atkins’ legal principle which was expressed in Donoghue v Stevenson; 
 
The rule that you are to love your neighbour becomes in law, you must not injure your neighbour; 
and the lawyer's question, Who is my neighbour? Receives a restricted reply. You must take 
reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonably foresee would be likely to 
injure your neighbour. Who, then, in law is my neighbour? The answer seems to be— persons who 
are so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably to have them in contemplation 
as being so affected when I am directing my mind to the acts or omissions which are called in 
question. (1932 S.L.T. 317:8). 
 
In a lecture to the Personal Injury Bar Association (PIBA) Conference, Norris (2009) 
outlined the potential confusion between legal duties, and what would be better termed 
social obligations. To illustrate the point he uses two scenarios. In the first, an 
individual is flattened by a lorry when the bystander fails to suggest that they might 
look to the right before crossing the busy road. In the second scenario, Norris cites a 
judge who used the example of an absent minded walker who strides along with their 
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head in the air, ‘oblivious to the approaching cliff’s edge (Norris 2009:114)’. The 
reason for his conclusion - ‘the explanation can only be that in all those cases the law 
imposes no duty of care (Norris 2009:114)-is that they fail the Caparo Dickman test. 
The area where the test fails is that of proximity, in that the individual had not assumed 
any responsibility for the unfortunate victim. And also that the victim had not relied 
upon the bystander, and if they did, they had no reasonable basis for doing so. 
 
Before considering the further restrictions law places upon the standard of relationship 
with the other, it may be worth bringing out the contrast in Levinas’ position. In 
responding to a question from Philippe Nemo, regarding the concept of the Other 
having an elevated position Levinas clarifies the concept of The Face; 
 
The first word of the face is the “Thou shalt not kill.” It is an order. There is a commandment in the 
appearance of the face, as if a master spoke to me. However, at the same time, the face of the Other 
is destitute; it is the poor from whom I can do all and to whom I owe all. And me, whoever I may be, 
but as a “first person,” I am he who finds the resources to respond to the call (Levinas 1985:89). 
 
For Levinas, the relationship with the Other is primal. It already has proximity, and 
regarding resources, it is set in the context of the infinite - ‘I am he who finds the 
resources to respond to the call’ (Levinas 1985:89). In stark contrast to this, the history 
of the tort of negligence has been one of narrowing the definition of a legal relationship. 
The case of Donoghue (1932 S.L.T. 317) had overturned the old cases which had 
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limited the scope of duty to ‘privity of contract’76. Two attempts, in 1970 (Home Office 
Dorset v Yaught Co. Ltd [1970] 2 W.L.R. 1140) and 1977 (Anns v Merton London 
Borough Council [1977] 2 W.L.R. 1024) were made to widen the scope of the duty, but 
both were overturned in favour of a narrower definition of responsibility (Leng 2007). 
Deakin et al. confirm this appraisal where they state; 
 
The courts have turned their back on the broad formulations adopted in Anns and Dorset Yaught and 
confined Donoghue v Stevenson to cases of physical damage. Incrementalism, however, has come to 
acquire a much more rigid and narrow form in the English common law than it has in other parts of 
the Commonwealth where it is seen as a means of preserving flexibility and not as a limiting tool 
(Deakin et al. 2008: 128). 
 
In trying to establish if the health professional has a legal duty to the Other, the courts 
have traditionally applied the Bolam test ([1957] 1 W.L.R. 582). The expected standard 
of care of any healthcare professional was defined by Mr Justice McNair where he 
directed the jury; 
 
…that he is not guilty of negligence if he has acted in accordance with a practice accepted as 
proper by a responsible body of medical men skilled in that particular art. ([1957] 1 W.L.R. 582: 
Line 587) (emphasis added). 
 
The Bolam test is significant in analysing the legal transcripts on a number of levels. 
Firstly it roots the moral ought in what others would do, rather in what ought to be done. 
It derives a value from a fact. Samanta et al. (2003) argues that the Bolam test allows 
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 The doctrine of privity in contract law provides that a contract cannot confer rights or impose 
obligations arising under it on any person or agent except the parties to it. 
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health care professionals to set the legal standard for themselves. From this perspective 
it is a powerful tool in deciding if there is a duty of care owed to the patient. Brazier 
(2000) explains how the use of the Bolam test can be used to render claims sufficiently 
incontestable, to prevent them from ever reaching the courts. Secondly, the Bolam test 
and the use of expert opinion have revealed the courts as being susceptible to bias 
(Dwyer 2007, 2008). This point was discussed above. And finally, the Bolam test;  
 
…would appear to have crossed the boundaries of diagnosis and treatment, as well as the limits of 
medicine, thereby enlarging the role of the doctor to that of a moral arbiter (Samanta et al. 2003:444). 
 
The different areas of potential bias within the Bolam test produced further doctrinal 
changes in the ruling of Bolitho v City and Hackney Health Authority ([1997] 3 W.L.R. 
1151). In Bolitho, Lord Browne-Wilkinson stated;  
 
The court has to be satisfied that the exponents of the body of opinion relied upon can demonstrate 
that such opinion has a logical basis ([1997] 3 W.L.R. 1151).  
 
In this House of Lords ruling Lord Browne-Wilkinson had reduced the ability of health 
care professionals to set the legal standard of care for themselves. The professed 
opinion now must stand up to logical analysis by the judge. 
 
It can be established from the above legal doctrine, that in law, the legal relationship is 
defined through the ‘duty of care’ owed to the Other. The moral ought is defined by 
what other professionals would do in a similar situation (‘in accordance with the 
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practice accepted as proper by a responsible body of medical men skilled in that 
particular art’). This reduced view of responsibility then has to be considered within the 
overall purpose of the tort of negligence, which contains elements of both Corrective 
and Distributive justice (Lippke 1999).  
 
Within law the duty of care has expanded from privity of contract to a more inclusive 
duty, however there remains a clear distinction between physical and psychiatric 
harm
77
. While there has been much progress within legal jurisprudence on the topic in 
the past century, there remain severe restrictions on the scope of recovering damages 
within this area of tort law (Deakin et al. 2008). The courts have been slow in accepting 
psychiatric harm as a head of damage within tort law. It was not until 1983 that Lord 
Bridge in the case of McLoughlin v O’Brien expressed the problem facing judges when 
he said; 
 
Moreover, psychiatric medicine is far from being an exact science. The opinions of its practitioners 
may differ widely. Clearly it is desirable in this, as in any other, field that the law should achieve 
such a measure of certainty as is consistent with the demands of justice. It would seem that the 
consensus of informed judicial opinion is probably the best yardstick available to determine whether, 
in any given circumstances, the emotional trauma resulting from the death or injury of third parties, 
or indeed the threat of such death or injury, ex hypothesi attributable to the defendant's negligence, 
was a foreseeable cause in law, as well as the actual cause in fact, of the plaintiff's psychiatric or 
psychosomatic illness ([1983] 1 A.C. 410: Paragraph.433). 
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 Privity of contract is the relationship that exists between the parties to a contract. One of the key 
features is that only the parties to the contract could sue or be sued under the contract. Third parties 
could not derive rights from someone else’s contract. 
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Psychiatric harm is difficult to define in law. There are many limiting devices to restrict 
potential claimants, and there have been many attempts to define the types of 
relationships where it would be reasonable to understand that due to closeness, people 
could suffer psychiatric harm. An example of this would be where Lord Oliver argued 
that the policy of tort law was on the whole to confine any action in negligence to the 
‘primary’ accident victim (Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire [1992] 1 AC 
310). There remains an imbalance in the way that physical and psychiatric harm is 
viewed within tort law. In that harm to the body takes precedence. This discussion can 
be traced through the case of McFarlane v Tayside Health Board ([2000] 2 A.C. 59), 
when George and Helen McFarlane had a healthy baby following the failure of a 
Vasectomy. The House of Lords ruled by majority that the couple should succeed in a 
claim for pain and suffering arising from the birth, but rejected the claim for economic 
losses due to the birth of the child. The concept of psychiatric harm has been introduced in 
this chapter as part of the argument in the challenge of defining responsibility in law. 
However, it will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter within specific legal cases. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Hermeneutics has been applied as a framework to uncover the challenges of 
interpreting text in the ‘interpreter’s now expanded horizon’ (Schmidt 2006:8).This has 
involved following the same legal process that the jurists took which involves 
identifying similar preceding cases, identifying legal precedent, and consulting legal 
axioms. This process is identified at the beginning of each legal transcript. This has 
been found to be particularly relevant in situating the analysis into a historical context, 
which includes a constantly expanding horizon due to the ongoing advances in 
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biomedical technologies. Also recognised was the fact that multiculturalism beings a 
richness to the discourse, but at the same time the many world faiths share the common 
challenge of responding rapidly to the advances in biomedical technology. This 
discussion is developed further in Chapter Six in relation to contemporary ethical issues. 
 
The concept of justice has been introduced in this chapter and has been explored in the 
rich, but challenging, context of interpreting case law in the area of clinical negligence. 
The work of Levinas was also introduced and developed to provide a contrasting view 
of responsibility in caring for patients. Then the politicization of tort law was identified 
through the technical definition applied in the ‘duty of care’ in law. With the 
relationship established between the ‘duty of care’ owed, the consequent boundaries of 
responsibility, and potential liability of a health system, cost containment as an aspect 
of justice was recognised. 
 
Given some of the challenges identified in this chapter regarding enculturation, the next 
chapter aims to consider the philosophical argument that ethics is prior to ontology. 
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CHAPTER SIX: EITHER/OR; THE AUTHENTIC INDIVIDUAL 
 
 
Every man, however modest his talents, however subordinate his position, feels a natural need to 
form a view of life, a conception of life’s meaning and aim (Kierkegaard 1992b:493) 
 
 
Introduction 
Chapter Five attempted to situate the study in its historical context by outlining the 
current approach to the legal process taken in cases of clinical negligence. By exploring 
the concept of responsibility towards the other from a legal and ethical perspective, the 
discussion teased out the constant either/or question staff have to face regarding 
choosing the ethical, and the limits set upon responsibility towards the Other. The 
Other in this context, being predominantly, but not exclusively, patients.  
 
The aim of chapter is an invitation to consider the philosophical argument that ethics is 
prior to ontology. This claim is central in the work of Levinas, where the call of the 
other has priority. This is something which is prior to any theory about being. This 
claim will be further explained as the chapter develops. A portfolio containing five 
cases of clinical negligence will be used as the primary empirical source as the testing 
ground for a philosophical analysis of real cases. A purposive selection criterion has 
been used to imitate the most common cases presenting to the NHS Litigation 
Authority. The selection includes five clinical specialties of: Surgery, Obstetrics & 
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Gynaecology, Medicine, Psychiatry & Mental Health, Community Care, and one 
category ‘Other’. The details of the selection criteria are provided in Chapter Two.  
 
The analysis of the real cases of clinical negligence unravels some of the dynamics 
contributing towards ethical desensitisation. Sartre, Levinas, and Kierkegaard are 
applied as the main theorists to uncover and tease out some of the totalising effects 
within the health care system from the political, professional, and organisational levels. 
The critical point is the influences which lead to lowering the bar on the quality of 
patient care. 
 
Although the clinical incident in some of these cases occurred more than ten years ago, 
they remain current in law as long as the claimant has the right to appeal. Some of the 
cases have exhausted the appellate process, but that in itself contributes to the 
discussion on the concept of justice. 
 
The selected legal transcripts provide insight into what would be otherwise the private 
lives of individual patients, and members of health care staff. The advantage gained by 
the transcripts is that they provide an overview of the whole process which traces the 
clinical situation through to the final legal ruling on the case. 
 
The main approach taken in this chapter is to take a snapshot in the historical time 
frame of health care delivery within the NHS. Then armed with this information to 
focus upon the ethical aspect of this care. Within this chapter the analysis is centred on 
the concept of responsibility towards the patient. It develops the argument set up in the 
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previous chapter, by continuing to explore the philosophical category of kinesis, and 
the concept of responsibility through the legal ‘duty of care’. Likewise, it continues to 
develop a contrasting view of responsibility as presented by Kierkegaard, Sartre and 
Levinas.  
 
In the previous chapter, Levinas presented a view which focuses upon the particular 
individual and resists the mediation of the universal. Similarly, Kant identified the 
consequences of considering patients and law-making as objects. Where such a 
teleological view considers objects as purposive and as products of intentional acts.  
Both of these perspectives will be sustained in the current analysis which will now also 
involve Kierkegaard and Sartre in more detail. 
 
For Kierkegaard, and many existential philosophers, to be a self, to exist as an 
individual is always dynamic and to be under way. Kierkegaard’s perspective is 
particularly useful because of the way it sets the whole scene in relation to other 
philosophers, and also for the dynamic relation between the individual and the 
organisation, or Crowd. It also has a number of unique features within the definition of 
a ‘self’ such as transcendence, and the way the self relates to itself through the absolute. 
For Existentialists, the individual first exists, and then develops an essence. In 
professional life – as in all aspects of life - the individual must first constitute a self, 
before it can care for another in a constructive, therapeutic manner. In the health care 
literature this concept is captured in the research on the socialisation and 
professionalisation processes. Kierkegaard’s work will be discussed below in relation 
to the selected cases. On controversial points it will be discussed in relation to Jean-
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Paul Sartre’s philosophy. Amongst other issues, this coupling allows exploration of 
existentialism along the theistic-atheistic continuum, and a posthumous review of 
Kierkegaard’s philosophy. First it will look at the definition of a self and how this self 
is constituted by others, the organisation, and then how this self relates to the patients. 
 
Kierkegaard is often mistakenly discounted as a ‘religious’ philosopher, and there is a 
lingering myth that he is an irrationalist. Although he challenged the organised religion 
of the established Danish Church, he was interested in a particular ontology that he 
considered the established church of that time to be stultifying. Similarly, Jean-Paul 
Sartre outlined this ‘becoming’, but for him it was becoming as an Atheist. In both 
approaches the importance of the structure is about becoming, and less about the 
particular type. Some philosophers state that what Kierkegaard was doing with his 
particular model of the self was to unsettle people about whether they could have faith - 
in the same way that Socrates did with knowledge. The example given to substantiate 
this claim is from the Attunement within Fear and Trembling. Here Johannes de 
Silentio is considering the story of Abraham going to sacrifice his son Isaac and he says: 
 
There was once a man: he had learned as a child that beautiful tale of how God tried Abraham, how 
he withstood the test, kept his faith and for the second time received a son against every expectation. 
When he became older he read the same story with even greater admiration, for life had divided 
what had been united in the child’s pious simplicity. The older he became the more often his 
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thoughts turned to that tale, his enthusiasm became stronger and stronger, and yet less and less could 
he understand it
78
 (Kierkegaard 1985a:44). 
 
Kierkegaard centres his ontology and ethics in his definition of the self;  
 
The human being is spirit. But what is spirit? Spirit is the self. But what is the self? The self is a 
relation which relates to itself, or that in the relation which is relating to itself. A human being is a 
synthesis of the infinite and the finite, of the temporal and the eternal, of freedom and necessity. In 
short a synthesis. A synthesis is a relation between two terms. Looked at in this way a human is not 
yet a self (Kierkegaard 1989:43). 
 
At the heart of Kierkegaard’s philosophy he seeks to bring together our Greek and 
Judeo-Christian heritage (Dreyfus 2006). In his definition of the self above, he sets out 
the structure as two sets of contradictory factors. The ‘Body’ which is ‘finite’, 
‘temporal’ and ‘necessary’. And then the ‘Soul’ which is ‘infinite’, ‘eternal’, and has 
‘possibility’. Dreyfus points out that prior to Kierkegaard, the Greek philosophers 
viewed these two sets of contradictory factors as combined ‘[…] Where the self would 
be in hopeless self-contradiction (Dreyfus 2006:140) ’, rather than as a synthesis as 
outlined in Kierkegaard’s definition. The detailed structure of Kierkegaard’s self can be 
gleaned from his many books, but the project of becoming an individual is mainly in 
Either/Or (1992b), and Stages on Life’s Way (1983) and concluded in The Sickness 
Unto Death (1989). It is in the latter book, and from the basic premise of synthesis 
above, that he outlines the different ways of being, in the Aesthetic, Ethical, and 
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 The history of this Old Testament story regarding Abraham and Isaac is pre- Ten Commandments and 
Levitical law. This could be of hermeneutical importance as it is in more of a Virtue ethics context than 
one of external regulation. 
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Religious spheres of existence. Kierkegaard provides a rich polemical of these ways via 
a portfolio of characters. However, when the literature is stripped back, it reveals an 
ontology containing three ways of being. 
 
In the existential position of Aandløshed (Spiritlessness) the psyche
79
 has a sense that 
the self is a contradiction but lives in distraction (Hannay and Marino1998:19). 
Alternatively, in the next existential position the self can choose to relate to the two 
opposing factors in a positive, or negative relationship. Kierkegaard explains these 
where he proposes: 
 
In a relation between two things the relation is the third term in the form of a negative unity, and the 
two relate to the relation and in the relation to that relation: this is what it is from the point of view of 
soul for soul and body to be in relation (Kierkegaard 1989:43).
80
 
 
The negative unity of this position is where there is disequilibrium because the 
individual denies one of the sets of factors, and behaves as if only the other aspect of 
the self exists. So, if they choose only the temporal and body, they lose the eternal and 
soul. The positive form of this position is where the individual tries on their own to 
express both sets of factors, but this turns out to be futile. Kierkegaard (1992b) gives 
the example of the individual who tries to make facticity absolute, only to find that they 
lose possibility, and end up paralysed by fatalism. Only by being in an unconditional 
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 Psyche’ was chosen over ‘individual’ because if the person does not choose an ‘unconditional 
commitment’ they do not become an individual. Instead they are part of the crowd or herd. 
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 Hannay (Kierkegaard 1989:167,168) provides two useful points (Note 5) regarding the translation of 
the above sentence. The first relates to the word unity which could also be replaced by ‘unit’, and also 
that ‘from the point of view of’ can also be translated as ‘under the qualification of’. 
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commitment can the self get the two sets of factors into a positive relation. Kierkegaard 
states this only authentic existential position thus: ‘Such a derived, established relation 
is the human self, a relation which relates to itself, and in relating to itself relates to 
something else’ (Kierkegaard 1989:43).  
 
While this reduced synopsis reveals Kierkegaard’s ontology clearly, his prose 
eloquently emphasises the poverty in all but this last existential position
81
. Crucially, 
and uniquely to Kierkegaard, is the third aspect of this relation which involves the 
relation to the infinite. If the individual is unable to successfully bring the opposing 
factors together they are in despair; ‘The imbalance in despair is not a simple 
imbalance but an imbalance in a relation that relates to itself and which is established 
by something else’ (Kierkegaard 1989:44). 
 
Kierkegaard indicates that this ‘something else’ is an unconditional commitment. In 
Fear and Trembling, for the sake of brevity he uses the example of a young lad falling 
in love with a princess, but he concedes that; ‘[…] Any other interest whatever in 
which an individual concentrates the whole of life’s reality can, when it proves 
unrealizable, give rise to the movement of resignation’ (Kierkegaard 1985a:70,71). 
 
Kierkegaard and Sartre share some common ground here. For Kierkegaard the pre-
ethical stage of the Aesthetic is roughly equivalent to a life of immediacy where the 
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 To emphasise the position within the Aesthetic stage -where the individual chooses the finite, temporal, 
facticity, and body, - Kierkegaard uses ‘Don Juan’ in ‘Stages on Life’s Way’ and in ‘Either/Or’. Don 
Juan lives only for the sensual satisfaction of the present moment, portrayed as a tireless seducer of 
women. Kierkegaard also emphasises ‘immediacy’ through humour in ‘Stages on Life’s Way’ where the 
invitations to the banquet are sent out at the last minute, and there is a work crew ready to dismantle the 
gathering place as soon as the banquet is finished (Malantschuk 2005). 
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individual is concerned only with their physical body and socially determined identity. 
This would be the concept of facticity in Sartre’s work. For both, the individual 
standing in an immediate relation to something, is to be unmediated by critical 
reflection. As explained below, this for Sartre would be being-in-itself. 
 
Sartre’s ontology is constructed as an opposition to being-in-itself (ĕtre-en-soi) which is 
a non-conscious mode of being, in favour of being-for-itself (ĕtre-pour-soi), which is a 
conscious desire for Being. All of the factors which contribute to the situation 
individuals find themselves in is termed facticity by Sartre. Where Kierkegaard has 
three stages of development (Aesthetic, Ethical and Religious), Sartre has three 
ekstases
82
 where the being-for-itself is separated from its Self. These three are, 
‘Temporality’, ‘Reflection’, and ‘Being-for-others’. Within the stages there is a 
progressive movement from inwards (enstasis), out to the Other. ‘Temporality’ is 
nihilation of the being-in-itself by being-for-itself, in the three dimensions of past, 
present, and future. This is significant to the cases being discussed as here Sartre is 
reversionary in explaining that individuals are more than the roles they play. With the 
waiter in the café Sartre highlights someone paralyzed by duties and obligations to the 
point that he has become like a robot. In discussing ‘temporality’ Sartre states;  
 
Society demands that he limit himself to his function as a grocer [...] There are indeed many 
precautions to imprison a man in what he is, as if we lived in perpetual fear that he might escape 
from it, that he might break away and suddenly elude his condition (Sartre 2000:59). 
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By transcending their facticity individuals can realize their freedom, and in so doing 
realize that the past is not a reliable predictor of the present or future. The ‘transversal’ 
function of consciousness allows the individual to review the past from the perspective 
of existential freedom.  
 
In ‘Reflection’ the being-for-itself tries to adopt an external view of its Self. This aspect 
has similarities to Kierkegaard’s confinium83 of irony. In Kierkegaard’s work there are 
two areas of confinium. The transitional area of irony is to be found between the 
Aesthetic and the Ethical stages, and the transitional area of humour is between the 
Ethical and Religious. It is the territory of irony which has similarities to Sartre’s 
being-for-itself, for ironists disengage radically from society realising that all cultural 
norms are relatively valid. According to Kierkegaard this insight is gained from 
recognising the ethical infinite requirement (Kierkegaard 2009b).  In Sartre, the final 
ekstasis is where the being-for-itself discovers it has a Self-for-the-other (ĕtre-pour-
autrui). In most of the cases reviewed it will be seen that the individual failed to choose 
their Self. In failing to choose their Self, they then did not have a Self-for-the-other. 
 
In order to consider the main aim of this chapter, which was to explore the claim that 
ethics is prior to ontology, this chapter is going to apply the legal theory discussed in 
the previous chapter to consider clinical negligence in more detail.  
 
In order to achieve this goal, this chapter continues under the following sections: 
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 Confinium is a concept used by Kierkegaard to denote a ‘border territory’ (Kierkegaard 1992a: 501 & 
502). 
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Emotion 
National opinion 
Kinesis 
Moral and legal responsibility 
Potentiality and actuality 
Conclusion 
 
Emotion 
Most of the legal transcripts analysed contain an emotional dimension to the existential 
situations (e.g. Ann Marie Rogers p.229, Harry Coleman P.243, Naazish Khan p.254). 
The first legal case to be introduced (Michelle Anne Brindley v Queen's Medical 
Centre University Hospital NHS Trust [2005] EWHC 2647 (QB)) is predominantly 
concerned with psychiatric harm, and therefore the role of emotion in clinical care.  
 
Sensitive nursing and medical care from a Sartrean and Kierkegaardian perspective is 
dependant upon the degree to which the individual chooses their Self. The question of 
‘What ought I to do?’ in any given situation, is related to what the individual considers 
regarding ‘What can I do?’ (Stack 1973). Kierkegaard uses the method of Either/Or in 
relation to this and emphasises the importance of choice. Sensitive individualised care 
is based upon the patient in their changing dynamic context. Kierkegaard brings out the 
ineptitude in being part of the crowd where he explains; 
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Your activity is designed to keep yourself hidden, and in that you succeed, your own mask is the 
most enigmatic of all; for you are nothing and exist merely in relation to others, and you are what 
you are in this relation (Kierkegaard 1992b:479). 
 
 
One of the key characteristics in this case (Michelle Anne Brindley v Queen's Medical 
Centre University Hospital NHS Trust [2005] EWHC 2647 (QB)) is the role of emotions 
in caring for patients. For Kierkegaard, emotions are perceptual states and thereby 
provide epistemic access to the moral situations they concern (Roberts 1998). Emotions, 
considered as part of consciousness, are constitutive of character. The consequences for 
patient care can be seen in the choice of either/or choosing oneself. Either: 
 
Thus consciousness is the decisive factor. In general, what is decisive with regard to the self is 
consciousness, that is to say, self-consciousness. The more consciousness, the more will; the more 
will, the more self. Someone who has no will at all is no self (Kierkegaard 1989:59). 
 
Or: 
 
Or can you imagine anything more frightful than that it might end with your nature dissolving into a 
multitude, with your really becoming many, becoming, like that unhappy demoniac, a legion, and in 
that way losing the innermost, the most holy thing in a man, the unifying power of personality? 
(Kierkegaard 1992b:479). 
 
This case concerns three main issues, which include the claimant transcending her 
facticity, the role of clinical guidelines, and the influence of a consultant in setting the 
standard of care. 
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The case of Brindley v Queen’s Medical Centre University Hospital NHS Trust ([2005] 
EWHC 2647 (QB)) involves Mrs Michelle Anne Brindley who claims that the NHS Trust 
negligently failed to give her proper advice during the second trimester of her pregnancy. 
At twenty-two weeks gestation Mrs Brindley was attending an ante-natal clinic. At this 
time a Consultant Radiologist (Dr Peter Twining) informed her in clear terms that the 
ultrasound scan revealed the foetus had no kidneys. Mrs Bindley’s witness statement 
concurs with Dr Peter Twinings statement where he said: 
 
I informed the Claimant of my findings on the scan. I explained to her that I could not see any 
kidneys and that termination of pregnancy was an option for her. I did not discuss termination of 
pregnancy at length, instead making arrangements for her to see Professor James to discuss the 
findings. I provided the Claimant with my report (exhibit PT5) and made arrangements for her to see 
Professor James. (Paragraph 103 [2005] EWHC 2647 (QB). 
 
Following this consultation Mrs Brindley was very upset and visited her father along with 
her husband Paul. Mrs Brindleys father arranged for her, her husband, and for himself to 
see Professor James that same afternoon. Professor James was Professor of Fetomaternal 
Medicine, Director of the High Risk Pregnancy Unit which Mrs Brindley was attending, 
and also the consultant in charge of her obstetric care. When Mrs Brindley visited 
Professor James he remembered her being ‘extremely distressed (Paragraph 139 [2005] 
EWHC 2647 (QB)’, he recollects them saying the problem was that the baby ‘had no 
kidneys, was going to die because of that, and there would have to be a termination 
(Paragraph 152 [2005] EWHC 2647 (QB)’. 
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Faced with the facts Mrs Brindley recognised her freedom to choose. Presented with 
the picture of her having a baby which was deformed and would die, she chose to 
transcend these facts (facticity). When the consultant radiologist (Dr Peter Twining) 
explained the situation Mrs Brindley became distressed and sought a second opinion. 
Equally, Professor James was presented with a difficult situation in that he was faced 
with a distressed woman, and his professional opinion differed to the diagnosis 
provided by Dr Twining. For Sartre, existence precedes essence, and Existentialism is 
not as it has been challenged as Quietism. Sartre explains: 
 
The doctrine I am presenting before you is precisely the opposite of this, since it declares that there 
is no reality except in action. It goes further, indeed, and adds, “Man is nothing else but what he 
purposes, he exists only in so far as he realises himself, he is therefore nothing else but the sum of 
his actions, nothing else but what his life is (Sartre 1973:41). 
 
Sartre includes in this the choosing of emotions. That is, he believes individuals choose 
their emotions. Following the consultation with Professor James Mrs Brindley felt 
reassured that all was well, and she changed her mind about the necessity of having a 
termination of her pregnancy. The legal transcript reports the information which helped 
Mrs Brindley to trust Professor James’ opinion; 
 
 
The witness statement of Mr Brindley dealt in paragraph 11 with what was said by Professor James 
on the afternoon of 13 May 1999. They duly met with Professor James who carried out another scan. 
He left them with the impression that he could certainly see something in the area where the kidneys 
should be and Mr Brindley remembered him saying that the fluid must be coming from somewhere 
. 
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and that therefore they must be OK as it could only be the kidneys which could produce it. By that 
stage, they were both very confused at the conflicting stories they had been told and from the 
emotional strain of it all. However, Professor James left them feeling reassured and certainly gave no 
impression there would be any problems with the baby, but he did tell them that the claimant would 
need to go back to the hospital regularly for the fluid to be checked and for the baby's heart to be 
monitored. There was no mention whatsoever of the need for any abortion and, as far as Mr Brindley 
was aware, there was no likely problem with Owen's lungs as this had never been mentioned to him 
([2005] EWHC 2647 (QB) : 50). 
 
The extent of emotion in these situations is however significant as can be seen at 
paragraph 44; 
 
The claimant was asked to explain why, on her version of events, she was still distressed at the end 
of the discussion with Professor James on 13 May 1999. She replied: Because I am a distressful 
person. I don't know if this aspect of my character hinders me taking in complex medical advice 
([2005] EWHC 2647 (QB): 44). 
 
This case highlighted the role of many of the professional guidelines, and one specific 
clinical guideline in everyday practice. Professor James had chaired the working group 
for standards developed by the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists entitled; 
‘Fetal Guidelines for Screening Diagnosis and Management’. In his witness statement and 
in examination he admitted to not following his own guidelines on a number of significant 
areas. 
 
Some examples are Professor James explained that when there had been a discussion of 
termination; ‘…his practice was to document a brief summary of what took place, and 
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he had no idea why he did not do that in this case (Paragraph 201[2005] EWHC 2647 
(QB)’. Under Cross-examination; ‘…Professor James accepted that the records he 
made on 17 May and 3 June were substandard (Paragraph 183 [2005] EWHC 2647 
(QB)’. 
 
Similarly, in considering the guidance from the GMC on the crucial role of clinical 
notes and in the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists document entitled; 
‘Fetal Guidelines for Screening Diagnosis and Management (1997)’ section 3.7. states; 
 
Once fetal abnormalities have been diagnosed, it is helpful to provide a specific written or typed note 
or letter for parents. It is also useful to have this document duplicated for all professionals involved 
in the care of the parents so that everyone knows what has been discussed (Paragraph 8. [2005] 
EWHC 2647 (QB). 
 
In response to Cross-examination of his clinical record keeping Dr Twining said; 
…it was not his practice to outline in the records his discussions with patients. He accepted that this 
was poor practice on his part, but he did not have the time to make entries of this kind in the records 
(Paragraph 111 [2005] EWHC 2647 (QB). 
 
However, in choosing and making decisions, the individual doctor, nurse or patient chooses 
for all humanity. Sartre states that, ‘In fashioning myself I fashion man’ (Sartre 1973:30). 
In such decision making Sartre believes individuals are ‘legislators for the whole of 
mankind (Sartre 1973:30)’. Since we do not know the outcome of our actions, and we 
cannot escape from a sense of profound responsibility, we should act in anguish. It is 
striking at this point to witness how ineffectual the clinical guidance is, and it raises 
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questions as to why the medical staff in this situation, while knowing the content of the 
guideline, chose to ignore it. The previous discussion from Kant on the purposivness of 
patients appears to be relevant here, and indeed Levinas on reducing alterity to Same. In 
discussing ends (telos) in relation to a world-historical view Kierkegaard explains: 
 
In a world-historical perspective there is much wider scope for this confusion, where it often seems 
as if good and evil obey a quantitative dialectic, and as if there is a certain magnitude of crime and 
cunning in relation to millions of individuals and entire peoples, where the ethical becomes as shy as 
a sparrow in a dance of cranes (Kierkegaard 2009b:118). 
 
Such behaviour as documented in the legal transcripts has real consequences for any 
community or society. Kierkegaard’s contribution towards politics aims to avoid the 
state’s self-deification by proposing that each individual’s actions are regulated in 
accordance with a higher ethical criterion (Dooley 2001).  
 
The outcome of this case was that Mrs Brindley gave birth to Owen who has one small 
abnormal kidney, and also suffers from deafness and severe mental disability. While 
Professor James accepted in cross-examination that his reply was substandard practice, 
the judge found that the defendant is not liable to the claimant. Such dialectic with 
society from the state sets up a tension with the other as alterity. Kierkegaard seems to 
capture this dynamic where he outlines the impact the individual can have as part of 
society, and thereby contributing to a political framework; 
 
The ethical lays hold of the individual and requires of him that he refrain from all observation, 
especially of the world and of humankind; for the ethical as the internal cannot be observed by 
. 
 
229 
someone outside; it can be realized only by the individual subject, who is then able to know what 
lives within him, the only actuality that does not become a possibility by being known and that 
cannot be known just by being thought, since it is his own actuality, which before it became actual 
he knew as a thought-about actuality, i.e., as a possibility; whereas in respect of another’s actuality, 
he knew nothing about it before, by coming to know it, he thought it, i.e., changed it into possibility 
(Kierkegaard 2009: 268).    
 
Patients and staff who have made the difficult decision to present their complaint to the 
legal system do so primarily because their individual clinical care, (or staff have 
witnessed clinical care that), is considered to be substandard. For these individuals the 
clinical context is crucial, and what could be called their ‘existential situation’ at the 
time of the incident. Consideration will be given to the societal level in the next section, 
and also to the political implications of Kierkegaard’s work in the next chapter 
(Chapter 7). 
 
National opinion 
In R. (Ann Marie Rogers) v. Swindon Primary Care Trust ([2006] EWHC 171 (Admin), 
[2006] EWCA Civ 392.), the applicant, who was a fifty four year old woman,  had 
undergone a Mastectomy, breast reconstruction and auxiliary surgery for stage 1, 
HER2-positive breast cancer. During the course of her chemotherapy her son 
discovered on the internet that there was a type of breast cancer known as HER2 
positive which could be treated with Herceptin. Accordingly, Ms Rogers asked her 
Consultant to test her for HER2, to which she tested positive. 
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At the time of the hearing
84
 Herceptin was licensed for the treatment of stage 2 breast 
cancer, but it had not received a Product License from the Department of Health, and 
the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) had not appraised its 
effectiveness
85
. However, Mrs Rogers consultant wrote to the medical director of the 
Swindon and Marlbourgh NHS trust informing him of the ‘exciting’ results of the 
Herceptin trials
86
 (Piccart-Gebhart et al. 2005, Romond et al. 2005, Hortobagyi 2005) 
which had been presented to the American Society of Oncology in May 2005 
(paragraph 6 [2006] EWHC 171 (Admin)), and asked if Ms Rogers could pay for 
Herceptin whilst remaining an NHS patient. The Primary Care Trust refused on the 
grounds that it did not fund the unlicensed use of Herceptin for stage 1 breast cancer. 
Dr Cole (consultant) agreed to treat the Claimant with Herceptin on a private basis, 
with Ms Rogers paying for the drug, but not for the medical care as Dr Cole waived his 
fees. Ms Rogers paid for the first two treatments, but when she was unable to afford the 
third treatment she sought legal advice. On the 21
st
 of December 2005 Judge Charles 
granted permission to apply for judicial review and ordered the Trust to fund, and 
provide Herceptin until the determination of this order. 
While Ms Rogers was coping with the news that she had breast cancer and attempting 
to receive the best medical care, there was a high profile debate being carried out in the 
national press. In September, Boseley (2005a) wrote an editorial on the leading cancer 
charity ‘Cancer Bacup’ launching a "dossier of delay", claiming that patients were 
                                                 
84
 15
th
 of February 2006. 
85
 Herceptin obtained approval from NICE soon afterwards. 
86
 The rationale for such a level of detail on the clinical evidence is to develop a discussion on the role of 
evidence, the development and use of Clinical Guidelines, and the way this can contribute to the 
patients’ anxiety. 
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dying unnecessarily because 23 new drugs had not been given approval for use in the 
NHS by the National Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE). In October the same 
health editor (Boseley 2005b) reported on a similar case to Ms Rogers, where Barbara 
Clark, a 49-year-old nurse with an aggressive breast cancer had won her battle to obtain 
NHS treatment with Herceptin, after she threatened to take her case to the European 
Court of Human Rights. It was only when another patient (Elaine Barber) was planning 
to take her primary care trust to the high court over its refusal to fund her Herceptin 
treatment that the then health secretary, Patricia Hewitt intervened in the debate 
(Asthana 2005). Hewitt bypassed the decisions of NHS regulators and NICE and 
informed NHS Trusts that they could not refuse to fund the drug on grounds of cost 
alone (Meikle 2005a, Meikle 2005b). 
The personal anxiety in this Case can be seen in all of those closely supporting Ms 
Rogers. With her son researching the topic on the internet, by her consultant writing to 
the medical director of the trust and finally agreeing to treat her as a private patient. Ms 
Rogers’s individual perspective on the situation can be gleamed from a statement to the 
press at the time;  
I have endured grueling chemotherapy and radiotherapy, and I am angry with my PCT refusing to 
fund the health treatment I need. I will continue to fight for Herceptin as it is vital in preventing the 
cancer recurring and allowing me to get my life back (Press Association 2005),  
And also from her witness statement; ‘It is only now with the Herceptin that I feel that I 
have been given a small part of my life back and I have been able to start thinking 
about the future’ (Paragraph 9. [2006] EWHC 171 (Admin)). 
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Levinas develops this relation with the Other much further
87
, and he would refer to this 
form of impersonal being as “Il y a”88. Levinas explains its meaning as: 
 
“Il y a” in the sense of “Il pleut,” “il fait beau” (“it” is raining, “it” is nice outside). This “it” marks 
the impersonal character of this stage in which impersonal consciousness experiences something 
without objects, with-out substance- a nothing that is not a nothing, for this nothing is full of 
murmuring, a murmuring which is unnamed. In this horrifying experience of annihilation, the 
thematic of the “there is” roots the construction of a subject who, from out of the neuter, will affirm 
and posit himself (Levinas 2001:212). 
 
Between normative ethics and western rationality both Kierkegaard and Levinas 
propose an alternative ethical theory. Levinas sets out some themes common to both 
philosophers when he states; 
 
Responsibility in fact is not a simple attribute of subjectivity, as if the latter already existed in itself, 
before the ethical relationship. Subjectivity is not for itself; it is, once again, initially for another 
(Levinas 1985:96). 
  
Both share a critique of philosophy which argues that in the name of autonomy, 
philosophy subordinates the individual to the impersonal (Weston 1994). Kierkegaard 
was responding to Hegel’s philosophical system. In the Concluding Unscientific 
                                                 
87
 For Levinas the relation with the other is not symmetrical; ‘[…] in the relation to the face, it is 
asymmetry that is affirmed; […] (Levinas 2001:166)’. 
88
 In his preface to ‘Emmanuel Levinas; Basic Philosophical Writings’ Peperzak writes; ‘The expression 
il y a translates the German es gibt (there is), but receives a very different interpretation from 
Heidegger’s: rather than the generosity of a radical Giving, il y a is the name of a dark and chaotic 
indeterminacy that precedes all creativity and goodness (Levinas 1996: ix)’. 
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Postscript Kierkegaard writes with a great sense of humour regarding Hegel where he 
proposes; 
 
If a dancer could leap very high, we would admire him, but if he wanted to give the impression that 
he could fly - even though he could leap higher than any dancer had ever leapt before - let laughter 
overtake him. Leaping means to belong essentially to the earth and to respect the law of gravity so 
that the leap is merely momentary, but flying means to be set free from telluric conditions
 89
, 
something that is reserved exclusively for winged creatures, perhaps also for inhabitants of the moon, 
perhaps-and perhaps that is also where the system will at long last find its true readers (Kierkegaard 
1992a: 124). 
 
Although Kierkegaard was specifically responding to Hegel, Levinas was also 
responding to a philosophy which was totalising. It is perhaps useful here to quote a 
précis of Hegel’s thought before considering the alternative proposed by Levinas and 
Kierkegaard. In the preface to Phenomenology of Spirit Hegel wrote as one of the aims 
of his work;  
 
5. The true shape in which truth exists can only be the scientific system of such truth. To help bring 
philosophy closer to the form of Science, to the goal where it can lay aside the title ‘love of 
knowing’ and to be actual knowing - that is what I have set myself to do […] To show that now is 
the time for philosophy to be raised to the status of a Science would therefore be the only true 
justification of any effort that has this aim, would indeed at the same time be accomplishing it 
(Hegel 1977: 3, 4). 
 
                                                 
89
 ‘of the earth as a planet’  
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Levinas challenges this view of truth and he challenges the previous concepts of ethics. 
For Levinas, Western philosophy and civilisation has an approach which reduces 
everything to be rationally ordered and manipulated. This analysis is performed in the 
framework of the term the ‘ontology of power’. In centring the theory on the primacy 
of the inter-human relation, Levinas reverses the power relation in social and political 
systems since Plato. The next section is going to explore the extent to which 
individuals perceive freedom to act ethically in the concept of Kinesis as outlined in the 
introduction to the previous chapter. 
 
Kinesis 
It will be recalled that Kierkegaard applied the concepts of potentiality, and actuality, 
with kinesis as category of transition. It is then this process of actualization that will be 
considered in this section. 
 
The legal cases selected so far have explored the jurists’ decision making; the next 
Case (Denise Lynn Merelie v. Newcastle Primary Care Trust and Denise Lynn Merelie 
v. Newcastle Primary Care Trust & Others’(2006 WL 1732530, 2006 1732530 (QBD) 
[2006] EWHC 1433) discusses the dynamics of relationships in witnessing poor 
clinical care. 
 
This Case was brought to court by the Claimant (Denise Lynn Merelie), who was 
employed by Newcastle Primary Care National Health Service Trust as a senior dentist, 
until her dismissal in May 2001. Although the pre-court history is complex (Please see 
Appendix 3.), it was her dismissal which triggered the Claimant to take the case to 
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court. Where, commonly it would be the patient who would directly bring a case of 
negligence to court, in this Case the Claimant has brought two actions against 
Newcastle Primary Care NHS Trust and a large number of employees and managers 
within the Trust.  
 
The first action is a claim that the Trust broke its contractual obligations to the claimant. 
Specifically, this argument alleges a breach of the contractual duty of trust and 
confidence laid out in the ‘Malik duty’ (Malik [1998] AC20). The breeches refer to the 
Trust not following its own grievance procedure when the claimant lodged a complaint 
about her immediate manager, Mr Ferguson in October 1999. Also, it refers to the 
Trust not investigating the allegations made about the claimant. 
 
 The second action is a claim in negligence where the Trust owed the Claimant a duty 
of care as an employee, and had ‘[…] breached that duty by unreasonably exposing her 
to a foreseeable risk of injury (Paragraph 9, Page 5 [2006] EWHC 1433)’. This refers 
to the Trust knowing that the Claimant was vulnerable to stress due to her sickness 
record in 1999, and therefore should have foreseen that any allegations which were 
made against her would cause her injury. 
 
Where at first sight it may seem the essence of this case is the negligence on behalf of 
the Trust to discharge its ‘duty of care’ to the Claimant, in actual fact the case begins 
when staff raise their concerns about the Claimants behaviour towards patients and 
other members of staff. For in November 1999, two dental colleagues (Ms Nagaj and 
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Mrs Welbury) wrote to Mr Ferguson as manager about the Claimants unprofessional 
conduct. Mrs Welbury explains in her letter: 
 
All the incidents reported about this dentist since August 1999 have involved members of staff 
within several departments of the Trust, except for the complaint I have received from South 
Benwell [Primary] School (Paragraph 105, P.33 [2006]EWHC 1433).  
 
Equally Ms Nagaj raises her concerns for the patients’ safety where she writes;  
 
As the problem has involved Trust staff outside our department and indeed people outside the Trust I 
would like to be assured this is being addressed by a suitable person, to safeguard our patients 
(Paragraph 106, P.34 [2006] EWHC 1433). 
 
 Then in March 2000, four Dental nurses lodged a complaint under the formal 
Grievance procedure against the Claimant. The substance of these complaints was 
about the way the Claimant related (or rather failed to relate) to the patients and their 
Carers. Insight can be gained form the evidence provided by Mrs Fawcett (Dental nurse) 
who explains the Claimant; ‘[…] did not come across as overly sensitive’ with patients. 
She; ‘[…] had no emotional involvement with them, she simply did the job” (Paragraph 
39, p.13 [2006] EWHC 1433)’. Another dental nurse (Mrs Falkous), observed that the 
Claimant; ‘[…] never spoke to patients and was not warm towards them; patients 
sometimes commented that she was miserable (Paragraph 39 p.14. [2006] EWHC 
1433)’. The written concerns from the dentists and the evidence from the nurses are all 
the more significant when it is realised that the patients consist of principally, 
schoolchildren, the elderly, mentally ill, and patients with a dental phobia. 
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One of the main features in this Case is the way in which the Claimant related to other 
members of staff, and to patients. In the caring professions, such as nursing, medicine, 
social work, Allied Health Professions (predominantly Physiotherapy), and dentistry, 
the ‘use of the self’ is crucial in providing sensitive, individualised care. The research 
relevant to this area includes the group of concepts; Therapeutic Self (Peplau 1988), 
Emotional labour (Hochschild 1983, Strauss et al. 1982, Fineman 1993), Social 
intelligence Thorndyke (1937), Emotional intelligence (Thorndyke 1920, Salovey and 
Mayer 1990, Goleman 1995, Cartwright & Pappas 2008) and Moral distress (Within 
Nursing; Jameton 1984, Wilkinson 1989, Corley 2002, Hanna 2004, Hardingham 2004. 
Within medicine; Hillard 2007. In Psychiatry; Austin 2008. And Social Work; 
O’Donnell 2008). Some researchers are working in more than one area, and it is worth 
noting that the work by Mayer et al. (2000, 2001, and 2002) is attempting to measure 
Emotional intelligence from two differing aspects, which is contributing to conceptual 
confusion. 
 
Strauss et al. (1982) was the first to report that there was more to medical work than the 
physiological core and posited the idea of ‘sentimental work’. Fineman (1993) also 
identified that medical work contains emotional zones. This work has been further 
developed into the first definition of Emotional intelligence provided by Salovey and 
Mayer (1990:189) as being; ‘[…] The ability to monitor one’s own and others’ feelings 
and emotions, to discriminate among them and to use this information to guide one’s 
thinking and actions’. 
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In the legal case the evidence indicates that the claimant was in what Kierkegaard 
would consider despair. Due to her inability to bring the two opposing factors together, 
her Self was in an imbalance by choosing one factor more than the other. In this 
existential position, she was not yet a self. This will be discussed using a number of 
examples from the case. This will be performed by moving from the overall, macro 
issues, towards the way this was manifested in caring for individual patients, at the 
micro level. 
 
One of the most arresting features of this case is the case history (Please see Appendix 
3). On numerous occasions the claimant has been informed of the facts being held 
against her from multiple perspectives, and she remains indifferent to these facts. This 
is a common feature which can be traced from her colleagues, through the NHS 
organisation and into the legal system, culminating in the claimant ignoring the judges 
ruling on refusing an appeal. In concluding the case on the 11
th
 of April 2006, Mr 
Justice Underhill stated;  
 
The Claimant has applied for permission to appeal. I refuse that application. My decision on her 
claims has been based essentially on findings of fact and I do not believe that there is a reasonable 
prospect of those findings being overturned on appeal (Paragraph 202. p.61EWHC 1433). 
 
Yet, on the 2
nd
 of March 2007, the claimant appealed to the Supreme Court of 
Judicature Court of Appeal, where nine claims were set out as grounds of appeal 
against the previous judge ([2007] EWA. Civ 171). 
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Both Kierkegaard and Sartre would see the claimant as transcending her facticity, in 
favour of possibility and freedom (transcendence). Kierkegaard would consider the 
claimant’s (Denise Merelie) despair as due to her negative unity in choosing the 
infinite over the finite, and that Denise had not discovered this unconditional 
commitment which would help her bring the two opposing factors together. This point 
is important to the philosophy of both Kierkegaard and Sartre as without some 
requirement for equilibrium the criticisms of existentialism providing a radical freedom 
would be difficult to answer. Sartre responds to the same challenge by explaining that 
when the individual chooses, they are choosing for the whole of humanity. 
 
King clarifies Kierkegaard’s position on this way of relating, but also adds to it by 
presenting Nietzsches’ view where he states: 
 
For Kierkegaard the existing individual does not, as with Nietzsche, unfold solely within immanence, 
within the closed limits of the finite, but is from the beginning grounded in transcendence, and only 
in relation to this higher Being can he be understood in his self-hood. It is the individuals’ way of 
relating to these two poles of reference, the finite and the infinite, and within them to himself, that 
form the basis of his particular mode of existence. It is the observation, not only as a thinker but 
equally as a poet, of the various forms this relating may take that characterize the originality of 
Kierkegaard’s re-examination (King 2005:30). 
 
This point of departure for Kierkegaard from Nietzsche, and indeed, Kierkegaard from 
Sartre is not only important for this claimant, but also for any ethical theory. All of the 
existential writers emphasize facticity, which becomes crucial when individuals start to 
consider what they ought to do in any given ethical situation. For this question is 
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fundamentally tied by how the individual views their transcendence in deciding what 
they can do. That is, how they perceive their freedom.  
 
In the Case summarised here a number of working relationships had deteriorated. The 
first involved the Claimants line manager. This can be seen in the case transcript where 
the claimant claimed; ‘[…] An unparticularised allegation of sexual harassment; and 
allegation that Mr F. hounded the Claimant relentlessly, constantly complaining and 
criticising everything she did (Paragraph 10, p. 6 [2006] EWHL 1433.)’.  
 
Crucially, the Claimants relationship with her patients had deteriorated. There are 
witness accounts which state the claimant: 
 
[…] Did not come across as overly sensitive with patients; “had no emotional involvement with 
them” and “never spoke to patients and was not warm towards them: patients sometimes commented 
that she was miserable” (Paragraph 39. pp.13 & 14 [2006] EWHL 1433.).  
 
The dental nurses had observed the behaviour towards patients, had experienced it first 
hand, and had refused to work with the dentist. Finally, the Claimants relationship with 
the organisation (Newcastle Primary Care Trust) deteriorated as she escalated her 
complaints through line management, culminating in a letter to the Chief Executive of 
the Trust. 
 
The fact that the relationships had been deteriorating over a significant period of time is 
useful in observing how individuals and the organisation – as embodied in management 
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- responded. A philosophical analysis of these relationships from a Kierkegardian 
perspective would provide an overarching framework which leads to the consequences 
of poor relationships. Kierkegaard will also help in drawing out some of the problems 
in adopting Existentialism in its entirety.  
 
Kant’s moral philosophy states; ‘Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, 
whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but 
always at the same time as an end (Kant.1997a: 91)’.Where Kant was concerned with 
universal laws, and Existentialism concerned with the particular, there are similarities 
here in that both demonstrate a concern in caring for the self , and Kant attached value 
to ends in themselves (persons) and; ‘[…] Only a relative value as means and are 
consequently called things’ (Kant 1997a: 90, 91). In the court transcripts it appears as if 
the dentist had become ethically desensitised and was predominantly existing in the 
Aesthetic sphere of existence, which –as a dynamic process-puts a distance between the 
self and the patients. For Kierkegaard this can happen so subtly the it may occur 
without the individual self noticing; ‘The biggest danger, that of losing oneself, can 
pass off in the world as quietly as if it were nothing: every other loss, an arm, a leg, five 
dollars, a wife, etc. is bound to be noticed’ (Kierkegaard 1989:62,63). 
 
So far this analysis of the court transcript has explored the dentist’s relationships with 
other people, but Kierkegaard’s analysis would also include the organisation. Sartre 
departs from Kierkegaard in the crucial aspect in that he believes that freedom is an 
absolute end in itself. For Sartre, authenticity becomes the fundamental ethical category 
as individuals appreciate their status as radically free. Kierkegaard’s overall structure of 
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being is outlined in three stages of the Aesthetic, Ethical and finally Religious. It is in 
the Ethical stage that the individual discovers the bankruptcy of ethical codes. In fact it 
is; […] Dangerous precisely because it is the category of the crowd, the community 
(Vardy 1996:52)’.  Unlike Sartre, Kierkegaards’ fundamental ethical stage is the 
Religious where the individual comes to an end of self-reliance and discovers selfhood 
in an ethical model. Rather than a leap into oblivion this model is based upon one 
major law; non-preferential love
90
 (Care). 
 
Any retrospective analysis has the privilege of being able to isolate rigorously the 
written law (law ‘as ought’) from the law as practiced (laid down, ‘as is’), and any 
moral judgment can similarly be suspended until the legal facts are elucidated.  When 
such a suspension of judgment is applied to the clinical decision making (of nurses, 
doctors, dentists, and Allied Health Professionals) similar ethical issues are uncovered 
when the process is applied to the legal system (of expert witnesses, and jurist’s 
decision making), the foundational one being freedom. That is freedom within the two 
predominant ethical frameworks of a consequentialist and non-consequentialist 
approach. This premise will be explored by building upon the previous cases with the 
introduction of another patient, Mr Harry Coleman. 
 
 
                                                 
90
 Love is an important aspect in Kierkegaard’s work , along with suffering. It is linked to the existential 
spheres where in the esthetic the individual has a self love, but as the individual moves to the ethical and 
the religious they develop a self for the other. There is a detachment from the world as external objects, 
and a move inward to values which transcend the immediate. Kierkegaard also contributes to 
epistemology by distinguishing between the differing forms of truth; the truth as knowledge, and the 
truth as love. Kierkegaard is able to consider philosophical problems related to existence and ideas, 
through the concept of love. He brings together love (philo) and wisdom (sophia) (Carlisle 2006:156). 
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Moral and legal responsibility 
The Case of Mr Harry Coleman ([2004] EWHC 2931 (Admin), 2005] EWCA Civ 1172) 
raises questions regarding the integration of ethics and law, and indeed if they are 
separate, independent, frameworks. Perhaps with the main question being; ‘Is moral 
responsibility divorced from notions of legal responsibility?’ 
 
Mr Coleman, who was an eighty-three year old gentleman, was admitted to Luton & 
Dunstable Hospital in 2003, for the removal of gall stones. During the procedure for 
removing the stones (Endoscopic Retrograde Cholangio-Pancreatography, 
sphincterotomy and stone extraction (ERCP)), it was found at post-mortem that the 
consultant surgeon had caused; ‘[…] An oval full thickness tear of 0.9 cm maximum 
dimension on the anterior surface of the duodenum (Line 16 [2004] EWHC 2931 
(Admin))’. It was this traumatic perforation of the duodenum which caused peritonitis 
and ultimately Mr Coleman’s death. 
 
Other relevant clinical details include the fact that the nurses allowed Mr Coleman to 
suffer pain for three and a half hours while they waited for the house officer to respond 
to his bleep;  
 
At 18.30 the nurses noted that he was complaining of abdominal pain. The surgical house officer 
was bleeped, but did not see him until 22.00. At that time Mr Coleman was noted to have been 
complaining of abdominal pain since his ERCP ([2004] EWHC 2931 (Admin): Line 7). 
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Again, during the night Mr Coleman’s clinical observations documented his 
deteriorating condition, and when the nurse informed the house officer at 5.20 am, the 
doctor did not attend;  
 
At 05.20 there is an entry in the nursing notes that he was complaining of pain and had a distended 
abdomen. His oxygen saturations were dropping. The house officer was informed but did not attend 
at that time ([2004] EWHC 2931 (Admin): Line 10). 
 
More than three hours later, at 08.30am the doctors were informed that Mr Coleman’s 
blood pressure had fallen to 90/60 mmHg., his pulse had increased to 110/min and his 
oxygen saturations were 88%. At 9am the doctors visited Mr Coleman and discussed 
the possibility of surgery for a perforated bowel. Since 1830 hours the previous night 
Mr Coleman’s pulse had been increasing, his blood pressure falling, respiratory rate 
increasing, and urinary output decreasing to less than 20mls per hour. These are all the 
cardinal signs of a patient’s clinical condition deteriorating. In this situation the nursing 
and medical staff have a duty of care to the patient, which includes a duty to implement 
prompt care. 
 
It is surprising to read in detail of how, especially the nurses in this case, documented 
their lack of action in the sight of objective knowledge. For both Kierkegaard and 
Sartre this would be non-reflective being. In Kierkegaard the pre-ethical stage of the 
Aesthetic corresponds to a life of immediacy where the individual is concerned only 
with their socially determined identity. As outlined in the introduction this would be in 
Sartre’s ontology being-in-itself. 
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The scenario from a Levinasian perspective reveals the nurses as not hearing the call of 
the other. Not experiencing being the others hostage, of the asymmetrical height in the 
face of the other, and therefore not being moved to act. 
 
This is why for Kierkegaard: 
 
Viewed ethically, the actual is higher than the possible. It is the very disinterestedness of possibility 
that the ethical wants to annihilate by making existing the infinite interest (Kierkegaard 2009c:268). 
 
Following his death one of the doctors informed the coroner, who in turn ordered a post 
mortem. Mr Coleman’s daughter (Mrs.Rita Goodson) thought that her father’s death 
may have been caused by clinical negligence and requested that the Coroner should 
conduct an enquiry in accordance with the requirements of Article 2 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR
91
), which requires an independent medical expert 
to assess the treatment given to her father. The legal essence of the case is that Mrs Rita 
Goodson (claimant) sought judicial review when the coroner (defendant) refused two 
applications concerning the inquest which were that; firstly to conduct the inquest as an 
investigation for the purposes of the Human Rights Act 1998, Schedule.1 Part I 
Article.2
92
 (Human Rights Act 1998), and secondly to appoint an independent medical 
expert to be involved in the inquiry.  
                                                 
91
 The content of the ECHR Article 2 and the Human Rights Act 1998 Schedule.1 Part I Article.2, are the 
same. The 1950 ECHR was incorporated into the HRA. 
92
 ‘1. Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally 
save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty 
is provided by law’. 
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The decision to engage article 2 of the ECHR is at the discretion of the coroner. One of 
the areas of practical guidance is from Lindsay and Astill (Lindsay and Astill 2004: 4) 
where they explain: 
 
He [the coroner] should consider where the death in question is likely to appear on the spectrum of 
possible Article.2 violations: from murder at one end to plain negligence at the other. 
 
At this juncture in the transcript it is worth noting two levels of argument. At the 
superficial level there is a discussion about how just the coroner’s decision making was. 
More significantly is the larger discussion regarding constitutionalism. The claims 
against the coroner will be considered before exploring the more fundamental questions 
regarding constitutional law. 
 
The notable points about the trustworthiness of the coroner’s investigative approach are 
the following; The coroner had no medical qualifications but chose not to involve any 
expert witnesses other than the Consultant surgeon (Miss Chesly-Curtis) and Senior 
Registrar, who were both involved in the surgical operation performed on Mr Goodson. 
These facts can be evidenced from Paragraph 29 in the court transcript: 
 
29. In relation to each basis it is submitted that the coroner, who is not medically qualified, was 
wrong to refuse to seek independent medical evidence in reliance solely upon his own uninformed 
view that there was no ground for considering that the medical personnel involved might have been 
negligent and that he trusted them to give an objective opinion on their area of expertise as to the 
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adequacy of their own treatment which led to Mr Coleman's death ([2004] EWHC 2931 
(Admin):paragraph 29). 
 
Additionally, the Consultant surgeon provided a report which included statistics on the 
morbidity and mortality associated with the surgical procedure, but there were no 
references to support these figures. During the court case the coroner’s legal team 
submitted the above two aspects as crucial evidence: 
 
However, in this case, the statistical evidence coupled with the clinical judgment of more than one 
Specialist, the facts of the case, the medical text-books and common sense, do not in any way lead 
towards negligence…([2004] EWHC 2931 (Admin):paragraph 25.2). 
 
In other words, the two individuals involved in performing the operation provided 
expert evidence in the case against them. 
 
Another area of potential bias is where the coroner relied upon the forensic pathologist. 
In the court transcript the inconsistencies in the coroner’s evidence is highlighted where 
it states: 
 
In his written reasons he acknowledged that he could not rely on the pathologist, Dr Calder, to give 
evidence "beyond his remit" (though in his witness statement he refers, inconsistently, to Dr Calder 
as "very experienced in carrying out autopsies in relation to hospital deaths and recognising signs of 
negligence). He was otherwise relying on the evidence of the very witnesses whose conduct was in 
question. He denied himself the independent evidence which could have enabled him to decide 
whether or not there was any sign of clinical negligence. … ([2004] EWHC 2931 (Admin): 
paragraph 29). 
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The final, but perhaps the most fundamental error in the coroners approach relates to 
whether article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) would be 
engaged by Mr Goodson as a patient within an NHS Trust hospital. The coroner 
thought that the case should not be considered for investigation because article 2 was 
not engaged. The rational he provided for this was; ‘In this case I am firstly not 
convinced that the Luton & Dunstable NHS Hospital Trust is a State Body or an Agent 
of it ([2004] EWHC 2931 (Admin): paragraph 25.1)’. Effectively, the coroner had 
denied the deceased’s family the right to have their fathers death investigated as 
recognised within the ECHR. This contradiction and lacuna was later explicitly 
accepted where it records in the legal transcript: 
 
i) The Luton and Dunstable Hospital NHS Trust is a public authority within s.6 of the Human Rights 
Act 1998. This is now accepted on the coroner's behalf, although he expressed a different view in his 
written reasons ([2004] EWHC 2931 (Admin): paragraph 33.1). 
 
The dialectic above is in many respects a veil over a more significant argument which 
can be uncovered in the defence provided by Mr Burnett on behalf of the coroner. 
Almost buried in the totality of the transcript is this one sentence, which said en passant 
could be readily missed, and yet it changes the whole legal framework through which 
the coroner is viewed: 
 
36. Mr Burnett QC emphasised that the coroner was represented before this court for the purpose of 
providing assistance to the court rather than to defend the particular decision([2004] EWHC 2931 
(Admin): paragraph 36). 
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As a consequence of this perspective the coroner became protected in his status as 
‘providing assistance to the court’. So far the analysis has uncovered a number of 
weaknesses in the investigative approach taken by the coroner, and a legal manoeuvre 
executed to limit cross examination of the coroner’s investigative rationale. The 
previous discussion from Kant on the purposiveness again seems to be relevant here in 
considering how the patient, coroner, and law are viewed in relation to the desired telos. 
Of equal importance are the grand themes from Kierkegaard, Sartre, and Levinas 
regarding kinesis where the individual lawyers and jurists are deciding upon the ethical 
by the decisions they make. These themes will now be considered in the main argument 
put forward by Mr Burnett when advocating on behalf of the coroner. 
 
The argument set out by Mr Burnett is of great importance to this thesis due to the way 
it makes explicit the link between law and morality. The same line of argument was 
also used in Rogers previously, and Khan in the next section. 
 
This argument could look deceptively reasonable prima facie. However, it gathers 
authority when it is discovered that this argument is linked through legal principles laid 
down in a famous case simply referred to as Wednesbury. From the transcript it can be 
established that the coroner made his judgement - that there was no negligence - based 
upon Wednesbury: 
 
43. In keeping with the coroner's general stance before the court, Mr Burnett did not address detailed 
submissions in defence of the particular decision. He pointed out, however, that the coroner took the 
view, for the reasons given by him in writing, that there was no reason to believe that there was or 
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might have been negligence. Mr Burnett submitted that whether the coroner was entitled to reach 
that view on the particular facts was to be determined on Wednesbury principles. The mere fact that 
the possibility of negligence had been raised by the family was not enough to require the coroner to 
retain an independent medical expert. It was a matter for his judgment ([2004] EWHC 2931 (Admin): 
paragraph 43). 
 
Wednesbury is a shorthand term used by lawyers to refer to a prominent legal case 
(Associated Provincial Picture Houses, Limited v Wednesbury Corporation. [1948] 1 
K.B. 223.) that set out the standard for unreasonableness in administrative law. It is 
also know as Wednesbury principles, Wednesbury unreasonableness, and Wednesbury 
grounds. While the content of the case was about a local authority allowing a cinema to 
open on a Sunday - on the condition that no children under the age of fifteen years of 
age were admitted - the judges ruling developed the doctrine of ‘reasonableness’. In his 
judgement Lord Greene explained: 
 
Once that question is answered in favour of the local authority, it may be still possible to say that, 
although the local authority have kept within the four corners of the matters which they ought to 
consider, they have nevertheless come to a conclusion so unreasonable that no reasonable authority 
could ever have come to it. In such a case, again, I think the court can interfere. The power of the 
court to interfere in each case is not as an appellate authority to override a decision of the local 
authority, but as a judicial authority which is concerned, and concerned only, to see whether the 
local authority have contravened the law by acting in excess of the powers which Parliament has 
confided in them ([1948] 1 K.B. 223: Line 234). 
 
This doctrine clearly has real implications for the current case being discussed, but 
more importantly as contributing to a philosophy of law. With contemporary modern 
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management there is a focus upon efficiency and effectiveness in financial terms. So 
resourcing dilemmas have become commonplace as adjudication problems within law. 
First the actual defence set out on behalf of the coroner will be discussed, and then 
attention will be given to the doctrine as part of legal theory. 
 
Although the argument set out by Mr Burnett QC is lengthy it succinctly draws 
together a number of areas of diverse legal theory: 
 
The court should be aware of the implications of the position for which the claimant is contending. 
At present, independent experts are retained in a very small proportion of inquests into deaths in 
hospital (some 5-6% of the total in the coroner's own experience, though practice varies across the 
country). The Report of the Fundamental Review in June 2003 estimated the total cost of the whole 
coroner service at about £71.4 million per annum. If independent experts had to be retained in all 
inquests involving hospital deaths, that cost would rise very substantially. Decisions have yet to be 
taken on the Report of the Fundamental Review and, as was recognised in Middleton (para 34), 
those decisions will take into account the relevant policy, administrative and financial considerations; 
and, pending those decisions, the existing scheme must be respected save to the extent that a change 
is required in order to achieve compatibility with the Convention. The court should not be seduced 
into achieving by judicial activism a change that is properly a matter for legislation. Moreover, if the 
claimant's arguments in relation to deaths in hospital were accepted, the same might apply e.g. to 
deaths in care homes and to other areas of state regulation ([2004] EWHC 2931 (Admin): paragraph 
36). 
 
With the four aspects of Mr Burnett’s argument culminating in this ‘Flood-gate 
argument’, warning to the court, it is easy to lose sight of what it is in response to. 
Simply put, it was Mr Coleman’s daughter requesting on behalf of the family, that the 
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inquest should be conducted for the purposes of article 2 of the ECHR. She had also 
requested an independent medical expert to review the treatment given to her father. 
When the coroner had refused these requests, Mrs Goodson wanted to challenge the 
lawfulness of the coroner’s decision to refuse these applications. It is worth restating 
the focus of the family’s concern before considering Mr Burnetts defence statement and 
the wider political, economic and philosophical context of this legal argument. 
 
The line of argument set out by Mr Burnett has an established authority. Certainly in 
Wednesbury, but also in the Diceyan model of sovereignty (1914), and in the work of 
Michael Polanyi (1999) who in turn influenced Lon Fuller (1978). In the next chapter 
this legal theory will be discussed in relation to Kierkegaard’s view of community and 
politics. Dooley expresses this where he argues: 
 
…the one abiding concern throughout is how to release the ethical from the sclerosis of dogma so as 
to keep it focused on what is essential and primary in all ethical considerations, that is, the single 
individual (Dooley 2001:xix).  
 
At present the focus shall remain on the legal discussion, and in tracing the 
development of adjudication will perhaps identify the temporal flux which is 
unavoidably part of kinesis.  
 
Interestingly, Dicey (1914) expressed the classical definition of sovereignty which 
would be similar to Kierkegaard’s view of polity. That is in the Diceyan model of 
sovereignty there is a belief in limited government and minimum state intervention. 
. 
 
253 
Similarly, Michael Polanyi has influenced economic and political theory especially 
through his book Logic of Liberty: Reflections and Rejoinders (Polanyi 1999). It is 
within this book that Polanyi explains the concept of Polycentricity. In considering the 
relationships between producers and purchasers Polanyi develops a regular polygon 
framework, which when stretched along its vertical axis reveals how all of the 
interlocking angles are affected. From this mathematical model Polanyi went on to 
propose that polycentric problems comprise of a large and complicated web of 
interdependent relationships. When change occurs to one relationship, it produces an 
incalculable series of changes to other relationships (King 2008). Polanyi influenced 
the work of Lon Fuller who was a philosopher of law. Fuller developed the concept of 
polycentricity as discussed by Polanyi and applied it to the process of adjudication 
(Fuller 1978). Crucially, Fuller thought that polycentric disputes were non-justiciable 
(Fuller 1978, Allison 1994, King 2008). 
 
Analysis of the legal theory so far suggests a non-interventionist approach would be 
taken in polycentric cases on resource allocation issues. Syrett (2000) found that in 
reviewing recent cases involving resource allocation within the NHS, there was near 
universal refusal to intervene by the courts. The Goodson case had polycentricity due to 
the interested relationships involving the coroner’s office, and the National Health 
Service. Mr Burnett appears to appreciate this in emphasising the impact this decision 
could have if it were to also include the Independent sector with care homes. A full 
blown discussion of the relationship between the individual and the state will be carried 
out in the next chapter. In the meantime the discussion will continue with another two 
cases. 
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Potentiality And Actuality 
The two further cases which have influenced coronial law are that of Middleton ([2004] 
WL 343872) and Khan ([2003] EWCA Civ 1129). In Middleton the Court of Appeal 
rejected the distinction between individual and systemic neglect in relation to his death 
while in custody. However it did extend the role of the coroner in an inquest from only 
exploring the ‘by what means?’ did the death occur, to ‘by what means and in what 
circumstances?’  
 
The exploratory legal framework applied in the Goodson case was also influenced by 
Khan. This case provides a useful comparison in exploring the legal process in 
operation as the clinical negligence is similar, but the legal outcome is different. In the 
case of Khan a three your old girl (Naazish) was being cared for by a nurse providing 
haemodialysis. The nurse omitted to take regular blood gas analysis of potassium, and 
also omitted to shake the dialysate bag of fluid to ensure thorough mixing of the 
potassium. The outcome was that Naazish received a fatal dose of potassium which 
caused cardiac arrest and death. In this case the court found that the coroner’s 
investigations had not been sufficiently detailed to enable the procedural (adjectival 
law) obligation under article 2, to be fulfilled.   
 
In the two cases of Goodson and Khan the role of the coroner is to implement the 
Human Rights Act which incorporates the ECHR. As outlined above it is Article 2 
(The right to life) which is the relevant statute. In law the obligation upon the state is to 
protect life, to put in place effective legal systems to prevent offences against 
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individuals. Within healthcare the requirement to protect life is supported by 
professional standards via the General Medical Council (GMC), Health Professions 
Council (HPC), and the Nursing and Midwifery Council (NMC). The House of Lords 
emphasised the coroner’s role in Middleton where they stated; 
 
In the absence of full criminal proceedings, and unless otherwise notified, a coroner should assume 
that his inquest is the means by which the State will discharge its procedural investigative obligation 
under Article 2. (Line 4 [2004] WL 343872). 
 
The crucial point is that in Goodson the coroner refused to carry out an independent 
inquiry citing the fact that it was a case of ‘simple negligence’. In comparison, the 
Khan case was one of ‘Gross negligence’. For the purpose of justice the coroner has a 
primary role in starting the legal process. It is also worth noting that the coroner in the 
Goodson case was not medically qualified which may contribute to how effectively 
clinical details can be validated. The only staff to be interviewed were those involved 
in the operation, and no Expert witness was called for an independent opinion. 
 
One of the intentions of the HRA was: 
 
To enable individuals to use the UK courts to prevent and remedy the misuse of public power which 
is the primary purpose of incorporating the ECHR (Klug and Stramer 2005:1). 
 
There have been, however, problems where the convention conflicts with existing law, 
or where changes in society have challenged the implementation of the ECHR. An 
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example here would be on aspects of liberty and laws regarding terrorism. Klug and 
Starmer explain some of the detail where they state: 
 
Confounding early assumptions that declarations of incompatibility would be infrequent, the higher 
courts have issued 17 in five years, of which 10 are still standing (Klug and Starmer 2005:3).  
 
The history of the introduction and implementation of the HRA outlines the ongoing 
challenges in attempting to protect individuals’ rights (Klug and Starmer 1997, 2005, 
Sparks 2008). 
 
The legal responsibility to protect individual rights is problematic as outlined above, 
and continues to be so, especially when jurists and coroners have financial 
consequences to consider. Within a moral framework it is striking to see the behaviour 
of jurists, coroners, medical and nursing staff when considering the rights of a patient. 
When Naazish Khan died the consultant anaesthetist omitted to inform the family of 
the overdose of potassium. 
 
Lord Justice Brooke explained in the introduction to the case that: 
 
A doctor at the hospital discussed the situation with her parents at some length, but it is said that he 
regarded the very high potassium levels [18.9mmol/L
93
] as an artefact and made no reference to 
them at all (Paragraph 8 [2003] EWCA Civ 1129). 
 
                                                 
93
 The potassium level has been added to the quotation. The normal therapeutic level would be 
3.5mmol/L-5mmol/L, and it is common knowledge in clinical practice that anything out with this range 
(Hyperkalaemia and Hypokalaemia) results in cardiac arrhythmias/cardiac arrest. 
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Due to the clinical staff at the hospital omitting to inform the coroner of the high 
potassium level, the cause of death was recorded as one of cardiac arrest and a 
malignant tumour of the lymph nodes. Naazish was buried within 24 hours of her death 
as in accordance with the family’s Muslim faith. At great distress to Mr Khan the 
police investigation required Naazish’s body to be exhumed for post mortem. The 
pathologist carrying out the post mortem (Dr Millroy) found: 
 
Taking the findings of high potassium at collapse, combined with the post-mortem findings and the 
experiments performed on 25th November 1999, described by Professor Forrest, in my opinion 
death is consistent with potassium poisoning (paragraph 11 [2003] EWCA Civ 1129). 
 
 The appeal committee in the House of Lords considering the case of Middleton had a 
discussion regarding ‘system’ negligence and ‘individual’ negligence. Their conclusion 
was: 
 
[…] For the purpose of vindicating the right protected by article 2 it is more important to identify 
defects in the system than individual acts of negligence. The identification of defects in the system 
can result in it being changed so that suicides in the future are avoided. A finding of individual 
negligence is unlikely to lead to that result (paragraph 88[2004] WL 343872). 
 
This is an important feature which occurs within all of the professions (nursing, 
medicine, law) and at the differing health and legal hierarchical system levels. 
 
When the nurse is considered in the Goodson case, the nurse, nursing Sister, and 
consultant anaesthetist in the Khan case, they all live in this tension between the 
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‘individual’ and the ‘system’. Each had to decide what to do, given the facts of their 
situation.  
 
In the Denise Lynn Merelie case above the potential of losing oneself can be 
recognised as Kierkegaard proposed: 
  
Once the will begins to have half an eye for the outcome, the individual begins being immoral-the 
will’s energy slackens, or is developed abnormally into an unwholesome, unethical, mercenary 
hankering that, however great its accomplishment, does not accomplish the ethical: the individual 
insists on something other than the ethical itself (Kierkegaard 2009c:112) 
 
Yet this point has great significance as Sartre considers the role of consciousness in 
relation to the I. In tracing the role of consciousness from Descartes’ ‘I think, therefore 
I exist’ Sartre crucially parts company with Kant where he explains; ‘The problem of 
the critique is a de jure problem; thus Kant affirms nothing about the de facto existence 
of the ‘I think’ (Sartre 2004:2)’. The Self is out there in the world, like the self of 
another. It is more than the self-consciousness as outlined by Descartes; it is an 
ongoing project in the world. Sartre is in accord with Kierkegaard in considering 
consciousness as unifying itself;  
 
It is consciousness that unifies itself, concretely, by an interplay of ‘transversal’ consciousnesses that 
are real, concrete retentions of past consciousnesses. In this way, consciousness continually refers 
back to itself: to speak of ‘a consciousness’ is to speak of the whole consciousness, and this singular 
property belongs to consciousness itself, whatever its relations with the I may in other respects be 
(Sartre 2004:7). 
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This constituting aspect of consciousness has important implications for the way in 
which professionals view their ‘facticity’. The nurse in the Goodson case diligently 
documented the clinical picture of a patient dying in front of her eyes while patiently 
waiting for the doctor to respond to his bleep. In a similar fashion, the nurse, nursing 
sister and consultant anaesthetist in Khan withheld vital information about the 
Hyperkalaemia as causative in the death of Naazish. This concept is discussed by Sartre 
(2000) in Being and Nothingness when he considers the concept of bad faith with the 
use of vignettes.  
 
Conclusion 
The legal system, and Case law in particular, have a number of vying pressures to 
contend with, as law as distributive and corrective justice. Jurists’ decisions regarding 
claimants of clinical negligence invariably include distributive justice. This has been 
and remains a significant factor in considering the ends of justice. It has not been 
possible to obtain an overall accurate financial costing in terms of clinical negligence 
litigation. The devolved parliaments, creation of NHS Litigation Authority in England, 
and the fact that many cases remain live or open, make it difficult to calculate an 
overall accurate sum. However, the statistics already discussed give an insight into the 
cost factor. The case of Denise Merelie is a good example of some of the costs involved. 
Not just financial, but also in staff time attending legal proceedings, and the cost to the 
Trusts corporate image, or impact upon its branding strategy. What originally started 
out as a staff grievance within Newcastle Primary Care Trust, in October 1999, has 
now been discussed in various courts on four different occasions, the most recent being 
in April of 2009. The continual evolution of the legal system and the relevant area of 
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tort law ensure distributive justice will remain an end pressure upon the jurists’ 
decision making process. One of the current challenges within current legal reform, -as 
expressed through the NHS Redress Bill (House of Lords 2005), and the transition 
from the House of Lords to the Supreme Court- will be encouraging health 
professionals and NHS Trusts to admit to clinical negligence as soon as it occurs. This 
will be challenging as it is counter to the philosophy of the quasi-market economy 
within which the NHS operates. As the cases have demonstrated the Trusts are 
reluctant to accept charges of negligence, and will challenge costs even once they have 
been found negligent in law. An example of this would be where the NHS Trust was 
found negligent in causing the death of baby Elliot, but after the hearing the NHS Trust 
appealed against the judges decision regarding the costs (Brindley V Queen's Medical 
Centre University Hospital NHS Trust [2005] EWHC 2647 (QB)). The appeal was 
dismissed but even at the end of the legal process, there seemed to be no acceptance of 
responsibility by the Trust for caring for Elliot and his mother. Legal procedure 
requires non legal factors to be bracketed out of the discussion. The NHS Trust as 
Defendants must also comply with this approach, and also continue to compete within 
the health market. Both factors have an overall dynamic of de-robing the human of 
their subjectivity. 
 
 The ‘duty of care’ concept within tort law defines relationships. Through various tests 
it can establish if a relationship exists, and if it does exist, the resultant standard of care 
owed. Queens Council, William Norris (2009) provided the memorable examples of 
where no duty exists when the bystander observes the nonchalant walker heading 
towards the cliff, or where the pedestrian is flattened by a lorry after failing to look 
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right. This necessary defining, limiting, and quantifying of the duty sets the threshold 
for measuring what is considered negligent, or what is legal and illegal. Such a 
quantified threshold however, can be used to decide standards of care within health 
care, and also as a benchmark in defence litigation. At the professional level and the 
strategic NHS Trust level an optimal level of conduct can then be calculated and 
translated into professional regulation and clinical standards of care. The economic cost 
is calculated on the minimal cost of care balanced against any potential litigation. 
Young (Young et al.2006) explains that in a range of potential defences in negligence, 
the lack of a breach of care is the most cost effective defence. While potential litigation 
can have a normative influence upon relationships of care, it remains at a minimal 
standard, and the challenge is in forcing a duty to care. Perhaps this is best seen in the 
case of Michelle Anne Brindley ([2005] EWHC 2647 (QB)) where Professor James was 
chair of the working group for standards developed by the Royal College of Obstetricians 
and Gynaecologists entitled Fetal Guidelines for Screening Diagnosis and Management. 
During the case it was established that he had failed to implement his own standards. In the 
same case Dr Twining said it was not his practice to make records of his discussions with 
patients. He accepted that this was poor practice, but he did not have time to make entries 
of this kind in the patients’ records. 
 
Definitions of ethical health care require sensitivity to the historical context. Most of 
the cases considered have been post-NHS reforms, in the context of the quasi market 
economy. Yet it had been striking to note that both Lord Atkins’ legal principle of 
neighbour and Levinas’s philosophy is founded upon the example of the Good 
Samaritan. Organised care is historical, but care of the Other is transhistorical and 
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therefore infinite. The definition is based upon the telos. One is calculated on finance, 
the other stands outside of time and resource considerations. The subtle difference is 
seen in Levinas where the Other is a primal relationship, prior to ontology. Such a view 
engages with the Other first, as a hostage to the call, and then considers resources. 
There is a potential problem within health care as part of the quasi market, and this is 
one regarding emphasis. With an economic telos and the use of personal employment 
objectives aligned to the Trust strategy, more emphasis could be placed upon the finite 
and necessary, rather than infinite and possibility. The consequent lack of synthesis 
results in the individual professional not being a Self–for-others. For sensitive ethical 
care an original awakening of an I responsible for the Other, is required. 
 
The foregoing discussion has demonstrated the work of Kierkegaard, Levinas, and 
Sartre, as being suffused with a concern for the authentic individual. All three 
philosophers argue against a philosophy which reduces all things to a total synthesis of 
existence. 
 
 One of the main themes of this chapter was identified by Levinas at the outset; that 
ethics is prior to ontology. This proposal was considered during the discussion of some 
of the legal cases, where rationality involves a metaphysical reductionism that strives to 
eradicate difference, in order to secure knowledge. 
 
In critiquing the legal case transcripts some of the positive contributions from the 
existential philosophers have been identified. For Kierkegaard, the individual is faced 
with a choice between the aesthetic which is a life of immediacy, or the task of 
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becoming a self in the ethical stage. Crucially for Kierkegaard, this existential 
movement involves freedom, from the potentiality of becoming a self, to actualisation. 
The aesthete explores countless possibilities, but does not choose any of them. A 
similar dynamic was encountered in Sartre, where he emphasised authenticity as social 
and other regarding. From this Sartre contributes to an understanding of the self as 
intersubjectively constituted. Some of the features identified from the cases discussed 
involved having a self-awareness in a social situation (clinical context), which involves 
developing a lucid awareness of all clinical interventions. Kierkegaard, Levinas and 
Sartre all emphasise the importance of the authentic self, with its freedom and 
responsibility, as contrasted with the totalised self which is ‘existing merely in relation 
to others’. Levinas has highlighted the significance of this reductive rationalism not 
only at the level of the individual, but also at the organisational and political levels. 
Levinas insists that political totalitarianism is founded upon an ontological 
totalitarianism. That is, rationalism encourages individuals to think in an abstract way, 
which results in a detached approach to reality. The rationalised self is in an existential 
vacuum, distant from its surrounding reality. For Levinas, ontology reduces difference 
to sameness and in the process a rich pre-philosophical (ethics is prior to ontology) 
personal identity is lost. 
 
The following chapter will analyse justice in ‘Contemporary ethical problems in 
healthcare’, before evaluating existentialism (Chapter Eight) as a potential way of 
ethical being in caring for patients. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: CONTEMPORARY ETHICAL ISSUES: A SURVEY OF 
APORIAI                   
 
Metaphysics, or the relation with the other, is accomplished as service and as hospitality. In the 
measure that the face of the Other relates us with the third party, the metaphysical relation of the I 
with the Other moves into the form of the We, aspires to a State, institutions, laws, which are the 
source of universality. But politics left to itself bears a tyranny within itself; it deforms the I and the 
other who have given rise to it, for it judges them according to universal rules, and thus as in 
absentia (Levinas 2008b:300). 
 
 
Introduction 
The previous two chapters have raised a number of generative questions. In considering 
the legal transcripts, discussion arose around how individual patients were cared for by 
the individual nurse, doctor or dentist. Some of the main arguments led into the 
political context in which health care staff work, and indeed where judges make legal 
rulings. In particular, the cases of Harry Coleman ([2004] EWHC 2931 (Admin), 2005] 
EWCA Civ 1172), and Naazish Khan ([2003] EWCA Civ 1129) point to a more radical 
analysis being required on the relationship between the citizen and the state, with 
particular attention being paid to concepts such as sovereignty, constitutionalism, and 
polycentricity. The legal process as explored previously will now be considered from 
the political perspective suggested by Allison: 
 
More fundamentally, however, adjudication should be viewed as a form of social ordering, as a way 
in which the relations of men to one another are governed and regulated (Allison 1994:357). 
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It is from this view of adjudication as a potential ‘form of social ordering’ that theories 
of polity, economy, and political economy will be considered in relation to the delivery 
of health care. The case of Ann Marie Rogers ([2006] EWHC 171 (Admin), [2006] 
EWCA Civ 392.) will be called upon again especially on considering political economy. 
 
The aim therefore of this chapter is to continue with the threads of argument from the 
previous two chapters, but to now gather them into a small number of major themes 
around the relationship between the individual and the state. As previously done, the 
analysis will draw from Levinas, Sartre, and Kierkegaard. However, the discussion will 
now focus on the political level. On difficult points discussion between these 
philosophers will be brought out. 
 
The overall approach taken in this chapter has been influenced by a number of 
philosophers. The structure was developed and influenced in reading a number of key 
philosophers. This provided a model framework to tackle such an analysis which 
considered the connection between philosophy and history, and philosophy and 
theology.  MacIntyre’s Riddell Memorial Lectures (published as Secularization and 
Moral Change) were helpful in tracing the historical background to the process of 
secularization (MacIntyre 1967). Following this line of enquiry led to a more 
contemporary but complex perspective on the topic of secularization, which also 
includes the reverse process termed ‘sacralization’ where something secular, becomes 
sacred. This was uncovered by Charles Taylor in his book A Secular Age (Taylor 2007). 
This theme has been important as already discussed in conjunction with hermeneutics, 
but it also seems likely to be a perennial issue, even as it goes through many hues to 
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include other concepts such as multiculturalism. Due to this, this diachronic theme will 
be sustained in this chapter and appraised against some of the major challenges facing 
mainstream world religions - as influences in ethical decision making.  
 
The legal theory will be discussed in relation to Kierkegaard’s view of community and 
politics. Dooley expresses this where he argues: 
 
…the one abiding concern throughout is how to release the ethical from the sclerosis of dogma so as 
to keep it focused on what is essential and primary in all ethical considerations, that is, the single 
individual (Dooley 2001:xix).  
 
 
In order to achieve the above aim, this chapter is an aporia-based inquiry, consisting of 
a survey of a small number of aporiai in health care ethics. The concept of aporia is 
founded upon the Greek language, with the prefix a meaning ‘without’, and poros 
denoting ‘path or passage’ (Mautner 1999:32). Aporia is variously translated as; no 
passage, an impasse, a puzzle or paradox, and as a lack of resources.  The English 
words pore and porous share this common Greek root in the word poros (Soanes and 
Stevenson 2003).   
 
Arriving at a state of aporia is part of a larger framework within ancient Greek 
conceptions of analysis, which were said to be of two kinds; one theoretical, and the 
other problematical (Geometry) (Woodruff 2010). Central to both of these 
methodologies is the regressive conception of analysis (Woodruff 2010). Of relevance 
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to the legal approach of cross-examination, and to the approach taken in this thesis, is 
the theoretical approach taken by Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. In the early dialogues 
of Plato, Socrates demonstrates the elenctic method. Such an approach is derived from 
the Greek word elenchein which means to cross-examine, or refute (Vlastos 1982). 
Socrates used this approach in attempting to find a definition through dialogue with his 
interlocutors. Examples of such cross-examination can be found in Charmides (What is 
temperance?), Laches (What is courage?), Euthyphro (What is piety?), and in the Meno 
(What is virtue?). 
 
The Socratic method, or method of elenchus is related to the concept of maieutics. This 
link is important in drawing out the various stages of elenchus, and also the different 
characterisations of aporia which will be discussed below. 
 
The term maieutics derives from the Greek word maieusthai which will be recalled as 
meaning midwifery (Westfall 2009). As a midwife assisting the birth of ideas Sedley 
(2004) explains that there are three outcomes of Socrates’ midwifery. These effects of 
midwifery appear to be linked to the different characterisations of aporia. The first 
outcome according to Sedley is where the individual is not pregnant and Socrates sends 
such on to other teachers who ‘…profess to supply information rather than extract it 
(2004; 35)’. In the next stage the individual is pregnant but they do not nurture their 
offspring (Sedley 2004). And the final outcome is where some ‘…give birth to many 
fine offspring (Sedley 2004; 36)’. 
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The term aporia (ἀπορία) has evolved in the writings of Aristotle and especially Plato, 
with a number of resultant functions which will now be briefly outlined in order to 
establish the meaning being used in this chapter. 
 
In the early writing of Plato, the traditional use of aporia is where a search for a 
Socratic-type definition (What is F?) ultimately fails (Politis 2008a). In the Meno 
Socrates’ induces a state of aporia in a slave boy precisely to demonstrate the maieutic 
role of the teacher, which is to test whether people really know what they think they 
know. This cathartic function of aporia cleanses the interlocutor
94
 of any pretence at 
knowledge and assists them in identifying what they do not know. It signifies the end 
of a search to solve a problem and consequently renders the interlocutor speechless as 
they remain within a puzzled state. At an impasse. Such an aporia can be termed 
‘purgative’ or ‘cathartic’ (Politis 2008a). This is relevant to the cases of clinical 
negligence where reflexive knowledge contributes in helping individuals to identify the 
limits of their knowledge as part of ethical responsibility. In legal cross-examination it 
is used to try and establish the facts of the case. It is worth noting the various ways in 
which the characters in Plato’s writings respond to being in a state of aporia. This 
ranges from aporia as something passive that happens to a helpless victim, through to it 
being a stimulus to search for an answer (Politis 2008a). 
 
The aim and functions of aporia seem to be tied to the concept of movement as 
previously discussed in chapter 5, in that the individual must decide what to do in this 
                                                 
94
 Interlocutor is deliberately used here because this individual can only be called a learner if they take up 
the challenge and attempt to search fro a way out of the impasse. 
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situation of aporia.  It will be recalled that Carlisle explained that ‘Kinesis is, then, a 
category of transition, and it signifies a process of actualization (Carlisle 2005:12)’. 
This process is now considered in the other characterisations of aporia. 
 
Significantly, the next characterisation of aporia is less well known. Politis explains 
where he states: 
 
The traditional view assumes that aporia in the early dialogues has only one aim and that Plato uses 
the term ἀπορία and its cognates in only the one way for just one kind of aporia. On this assumption 
it is natural that only the cathartic aim of aporia should stand out since it is indeed prominent and 
conspicuous. But this assumption is I think mistaken, and we will see that Plato, through the 
different characters in these dialogues, characterizes aporia in different ways. There are two very 
different characterizations, and rightly understood this means that Plato distinguishes two kinds of 
aporia: in addition to the cathartic aporia, there is a kind of aporia that is properly a part of 
searching (zêtêsis) –zetetic aporia (Politis 2008a:89).   
 
This zetetic aporia can also be found in Aristotle. Aristotle outlines the usefulness of 
identifying and setting out aporia at the beginning of a philosophical argument. In the 
Metaphysics Aristotle proposes that: 
 
We must first enumerate the questions that should be first discussed (aporêsai). A preliminary discussion 
of problems is useful. A problem is like a bond which we cannot unloose until we understand its nature. 
A student who has not discussed the difficulties does not know the direction in which he should move, 
nor even whether he has found what he is looking for. The man who has heard the contending arguments 
is best able to judge between them (Aristotle .1924:221). 
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Plato provides a model of zetetic aporia in a number of his early dialogues. A kinesis 
can be witnessed in the individual who moves from being in a state of paralysis due to 
perplexity, to recognising the problem as a stimulus, to searching for an answer, and 
then in defining and discussing the problem. Crucially, the zetetic aporia does not 
indicate the end of an inquiry –as in cathartic aporia-rather, it is the beginning and 
starting point. In discussing reflexive knowledge in the Charmides, Plato provides a 
detailed example of a zetetic aporia. Some of the features of this dialogue are that 
Socrates ‘…will argue on both sides (whether or not…) of both parts of this question 
(whether or not it is, first possible and, second, beneficial’ (Politis 2008b:7) to have 
reflexive knowledge. Further, such a zetetic aporia also recognises that there may be 
good reasons on both of the opposed sides of a question.                    
 
In a footnote Politis (2008b) explains that in a previous article (Politis 2008a) he 
considered the two characterisations of aporia as separate. Now he is of the opinion 
that they are closely related. In this chapter both the cathartic and the zetetic 
characterisations of aporia are being used. 
 
The cathartic aporia is being used in the sense that the previous two chapters analysing 
the legal transcripts has led to an ethical impasse in that the law as posited is not 
followed, but rather Case law is regularly reinterpreted. From this perspective law and 
justice is always in the future. Current posited (codified) law is not followed, and 
therefore this practice is not legal-judges do not follow codified law. 
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The zetetic aporia is being used to define an extended inquiry into a problem with 
reasonable arguments on both sides of the opposed sides of the question. The main 
question is whether or not the current political structure supports the ethical care of 
patients. Since it is an open question definitions of legal justice will be used to evaluate 
the dialogue on both sides of the question regarding whether or not it is beneficial to 
patients (claimants). 
 
This chapter is looking for a way in which the individual is free to act, free from 
external binding influences. The philosophical term aporia has been used in 
recognising the complexity and difficulty of the path. From a position of doubt the 
analysis plans to consider arguments from a number of perspectives (paths) in order to 
demonstrate they are in fact ethical impasses. This then leaves the way clear for a 
consideration of Kierkegaard’s political philosophy. The discussion and argument 
within this chapter has been divided into the following sections; 
 
Locating Ultimate Authority in Justice. 
Aporia 1. Sovereignty and the nation-state. 
Aporia 2. Sovereignty at the supranational level. 
Aporia 3. Constituent and Constituted power. 
Aporia 4. Citizenship. 
Aporia 5. Secularisation as an Influence upon Ethical Decision Making. 
Kierkegaard’s view of Civil Society. 
Conclusion. 
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Locating Ultimate Authority in Justice. 
There were two striking statements made in chapter 6 which have highlighted an 
important area for further investigation. The first was in the Wednesbury case 
(Associated Provincial Picture Houses, Limited v Wednesbury Corporation. [1948] 1 
K.B. 223.), where Lord Greene ruled: 
 
In such a case, again, I think the court can interfere. The power of the court to interfere in each case 
is not as an appellate authority to override a decision of the local authority, but as a judicial authority 
which is concerned, and concerned only, to see whether the local authority have contravened the law 
by acting in excess of the powers which Parliament has confided in them ([1948] 1 K.B. 223: Line 
234). 
 
The second statement was from Mr Burnett QC where he warned; ‘The court should 
not be seduced into achieving by judicial activism a change that is properly a matter for 
legislation. ([2004] EWHC 2931 (Admin): paragraph 36)’. 
 
Both of these statements seem to be important in the case involving Harry Coleman 
([2004] EWHC 2931 (Admin), 2005] EWCA Civ 1172), but they also appear to lead to 
some fundamental questions about justice, and in turn the consequences for ethical 
behaviour. In the previous chapter it was established that when Mr Coleman’s’ 
daughter presented with some questions about her father’s clinical care, the legal 
system responded with some surprising legal manoeuvres. Some of the key points to be 
recalled are that; the coroner decided that article 2 of the ECHR was not engaged due to 
the NHS Trust not being a State body. This was later revoked; The Coroner was 
. 
 
273 
presented before the court in a protected status, and was as such not open to 
questioning on his decision making; The Coroner made his judgement of finding no 
clinical negligence based upon Wednebury; And finally, Mr Burnett QC presented a 
cost argument for why the coroner did not use an independent expert, and also as a 
warning to the court if they should rule in favour of the claimant. It is these facts which 
are now going to be explored in some detail. 
 
Rawls (1999) states that justice as fairness begins with the choice of the first principles 
of a conception of justice. The work of Rawls is helpful in providing one conceptual 
framework, from which discussion can take place in a systematic manner. Being a 
hypothetical framework it provides a contrast to Existential philosophy. Rawls model 
of fair choice involves two important aspects. These are that the individual must place 
themselves in the original position, which entails the veil of ignorance. Rawls proposes 
that by placing ourselves into this thought experiment we will be able to establish the 
rights and duties of justice that we owe to the other. 
 
Firstly the structure of the political status quo will be outlined before considering this in 
relation to Kierkegaard’s view of genuine community life. In the process some of the 
tensions envisioned by Kierkegaard will be considered, especially where he thought; 
 
The longer life goes on and the longer the existing person through his action is woven into existence, 
the more difficult it is to separate the ethical from the external, and the easier it seems to corroborate 
the metaphysical tenet that the outer is the inner, the inner the outer, the one wholly commensurate 
with the other. Exactly this is the temptation, and for this reason the ethical becomes day by day 
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more difficult, consisting as it does in that true hypertension of the infinite which is the beginning, 
and where it is therefore most clearly apparent (Kierkegaard 1992a:138). 
 
Viewing the status quo will first be considered through the concept of sovereignty. 
 
Aporia 1. Sovereignty and the Nation-State 
The analysis in the previous two chapters leads to the question of why the judges made 
the decisions they did. When all of the legal process is followed, the ratio of the Case 
cross-referenced, and the final legal opinions considered, it seems that the judicial 
process exhibits a high degree of indeterminacy. Some of the cases raised the question 
of the power of the court to interfere, or indeed the limits placed upon judicial power, 
due to, for example, such mechanisms as the ‘separation of powers’, devolution 
legislation, and European law. 
 
How power is viewed has consequences for any theory of being (ontology), normative 
theory, and in turn the way patients are cared for. Sovereignty is the modern concept 
which originally expressed the idea that there must be a final and absolute authority in 
the political community (Hinsley 1966). The idea of sovereignty leads to perhaps the 
most fundamental debate within the philosophy of law which concerns the extent to 
which law should be kept separate from morals. The two main opposing schools of 
thought (Natural Law and Legal positivism) have had a long historical debate which 
continues today. The most succinct description of natural law is provided by 
D’Entrèves where he explains ‘…that it provides a name for the point of intersection 
between law and morals (D’Entrèves 1994:116)’. In contrast, legal positivists believe 
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there is no necessary connection between law and morals, laws are commands of 
human beings, and that a legal system is a closed logical system (Hart 1997). The term 
‘positivism’ comes from the Latin positum, which describes the law as it is laid down 
or posited (Wacks 2006).  
 
That the concept of sovereignty has a fluid meaning is undisputed. As a concept it is ill 
defined (Walker 2003, Ilgen 2003). The traditional view of sovereignty is that based 
upon the Westphalian model (Berg & Kuusk 2010). In this model sovereignty is the 
very relational interface between law and politics and: 
 
‘comes into existence through a process in which a group of people within a defined territory is 
moulded into an orderly cohesion through the establishment of a governing authority that can be 
differentiated from society and which is able to exercise an absolute political power (Loughlin 
2003:56). 
 
Unlike Levinas’s view of responsibility to the other, sovereignty is a concept defining 
limits to responsibility through boundaries. It is recognised that political power is not 
the sole influence upon social behaviour. Hinsley (1966:3) explains this where he states: 
 
At no time, in no society, has the political system been the only agency or institution in the 
community. In the most advanced societies, as in the most primitive, the law it lays down is never 
the sole code regulating social behaviour, and the role of citizen is but one of several roles which 
each man plays as a member of society. 
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This is partly why secularisation will also be explored later. However, in the meantime, 
the limiting effect on political power in the concept of sovereignty will be uncovered. 
 
Defining the territory to be ruled has been a significant historical aspect within 
sovereignty. Given the fact that sovereignty in its modern definition has developed 
from the theological concept (Schmitt 1985, Buijs 2003), it is useful for the purpose of 
analysis to recognise the tensions within the framework between absolute sovereignty 
as conferred upon a deity, and that which is more of a geographical nature.  
 
Significantly, limits to resources is also implicit within the definition which is not 
surprising in an economic calculation of responsibility, but the subtlety of limiting the 
potential for thinking what could be done, may well go unnoticed. For Levinas the 
responsibility is prior to the economic calculations, which would follow later. 
Regarding such risk calculations Kierkegaard proposed; 
 
But the ethical never raises questions of worldly wisdom; it merely demands understanding enough 
to discover the danger-in order then to go boldly into it, which indeed seems very stupid. Oh, strange 
power that is in the ethical! (Kierkegaard 2009b:117). 
 
Later in the same paragraph Kierkegaard proposes the approach to be taken; ‘and the 
trick simply to be enthusiastic, as another author has said: to be joyful out on the 
70,000 fathoms deep’ (Kierkegaard 2009b:117). 
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Physically, the state is the political institution in which sovereignty is embodied. 
Within western constitutionalism sovereignty is categorised into three areas of public 
power through the concept of ‘separation of powers’ (Morrow 2005). The separation of 
legislative, executive and judicial functions proposes a system of checks and balances 
of power. In reviewing the separation of powers within the Commonwealth 
constitutional tradition Saunders (2006:4) finds: 
 
By contrast, the constitutional arrangements in the United Kingdom are quite different, in key 
respects. Unlike the United States, this country has a parliamentary system with at best a weak 
institutional separation of the legislative and executive branches. 
 
The purpose of tracing and uncovering the concept of sovereignty here is to establish 
where ultimate political power lies, prior to considering what actually happened in the 
selected cases of alleged clinical negligence. For the rationale of constructing a 
philosophical argument the key milestones will be set out, where the high detail is to be 
found in the work by Walker (2003) and Bogdanor (2009). 
 
To bring together the key features above on British constitutionalism, it can be 
established that this consists of the sovereignty of Parliament. The relevant path of 
power is expressed through ‘unitary legal authority premised upon centralised political 
authority expressed through the will of Parliament (Armstrong 2003:328)’. Armstrong 
(2003) outlines some relevant consequences from the above to the current discussion 
on the validity, priority and continuity of parliamentary sovereignty. This adds to the 
previous discussion on the doctrine of legal precedent in chapters 2.2, and 5. Now it 
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can be seen that the sovereignty of Parliament is above legal precedent and Case law 
because; laws enacted by Parliament are legally valid; the courts have a duty to apply 
the latest will of Parliament above other law which includes Case law; and finally, 
sovereignty cannot be legally limited (Armstrong 2003). Here, at source, is the ultimate 
legal principle-Parliamentary legal power could not detract from its own continuing 
sovereignty (Craig 2000). Ultimately, ‘…the source of its authority being historical 
rather than legal (Craig 2000:223)’. While viewing the source of legal authority and 
Parliamentary omnipotence it is worth identifying some final relevant points. That is, 
that Parliament cannot come under legally binding rules that would limit its legislative 
powers. Equally evident is the way the particular political theory by the ensconced 
government of the day is enshrined in the legislation adopted by Parliament. And the 
final point will be discussed later in relation to Kierkegaard’s view of community 
which considers the sovereignty of the polity. This seems a moot point as Craig 
explains: 
 
The constitutional discourse of previous generations reveals an awareness of the need for principled 
justifications for the existence of sovereign power, in a way which has been largely forgotten (Craig 
2000:224). 
 
Before focussing the discussion down to the level of the individual, and considering 
Kierkegaard’s perspective on community, some of the wider challenges within the legal 
and political systems will be considered. 
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Aporia 2. Sovereignty at the Supranational Level 
The legal cases of Harry Coleman ([2004] EWHC 2931 (Admin), 2005) EWCA Civ 
1172), and Naazish Khan ([2003] EWCA Civ 1129) drew upon the statute law within 
the Human Rights Act. Central to both cases was the belief –as expressed in the Human 
Rights Act-to a fair legal trial. It is however now worthwhile re-examining the legal 
process under the concept of sovereignty. Clearly in both cases there was clinical 
negligence. In Mr Coleman’s case, the consultant surgeon had accidentally perforated 
his bowel during the laparoscopic procedure. Whilst this was the source of the problem, 
the more concerning issue was the nurses and doctors lack of clinical intervention. In 
fact the nurse diligently documented the deterioration of Mr Coleman as if it were in a 
novel (Kierkegaard’s aesthetic stage), rather than in the real ethical or religious spheres. 
For Kierkegaard the different spheres are to assist the individual to see where they are 
in their own ethical development. Some of the relevant features are that there is a 
movement, from a less to a more truthful form of life, becoming increasingly inward 
and increasingly passionate. Kierkegaard also explains the spheres of existence as 
distinguishing between two ways of relating to the world. That is through knowledge 
(aesthetic) and through a subjective passionate concern with meaning in life. The 
problem of regarding the truth solely in terms of knowledge, is that it identifies a 
valueless and meaningless world. 
 
Just as prominent is the clinical negligence in the case of Naazish Khan where the 
nurse administered a fatal overdose of potassium to the three year old girl. At the 
clinical level any registered health care professional would readily identify the 
behaviour in the cases above as clinical negligence. To make it more objective, if this 
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care was measured against clinical protocols developed from text books; it would 
deviate significantly from the expected minimal norm. Yet in law these cases are 
classed as ‘hard’ cases. 
 
In contrast to ‘clear’ cases, ‘hard’ cases are where established rules or laws are unable 
to provide conclusive answers, and therefore cause indeterminacy in law (Bunnin and 
Yu 2004). It is at this juncture where a number of considerable philosophical issues 
arise which together bind towards the main argument at this stage. Each will be 
considered in turn before reintegrating them into the overall whole. 
 
The ‘hard’ cases – which according to Freeman (2001:1392) are ‘nearly all cases that 
reach the stage of argument in court’ - uncover the extent to which the judges have 
discretion. Hart outlines this open texture of law where he writes; 
 
In every legal system a large and important field is left open for the exercise of discretion by courts 
and other officials in rendering initially vague standards determinate, in resolving the uncertainties 
of statutes, or in developing and qualifying rules only broadly communicated by authoritative 
precedents (Hart 1997:136), Emphasis added. 
 
Yet in previous chapters it was established that due to the technological advances 
within healthcare precisely how challenging this was for both jurists and juries. In the 
cases being discussed, laparoscopic surgery, and the use of renal dialysis as part of 
chemotherapy are relevant examples. Previously the work of Dwyer (2007, 2008) also 
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identified both the dependency and therefore the vulnerability of judges when 
requesting Expert Witnesses. 
 
Where this bears relevance within the philosophy of law is in the historical movement 
away from natural law, towards law as posited (legal positivism). Freeman (2001:199) 
provides a helpful overview of this development where: 
 
The new approach was essentially secular and positivist, and though lip-service continued to be paid 
to a notional subjection to overriding natural law, the supporters of legal sovereignty tended 
increasingly to whittle down natural law from a system of norms to a mere statement of human 
impulses explaining the need for a sovereign power in human society, as with Hobbes, or to a mere 
formal category to justify a belief in inalienable sovereignty, as in Rousseau’s theory of the general 
will. But as became apparent in the writings of Hume, true empiricism really involved the rejection 
of natural law as a system of norms, as Hume argued, the validity of normative rules cannot logically 
be treated as an objective fact, but depends on the relative viewpoint of those who apply them. 
 
 
The present argument is concerned with uncovering where ultimate authority lies 
within the polity and has been using the concept of sovereignty to structure this enquiry. 
Before continuing this line of exploration into the influence of European law, it is 
worth identifying a linkage at this stage, of parallel change within law and theology. 
This is where, through the process of secularisation, theology has also undergone a 
transversion towards being more homocentric.
95
 While this will be discussed at a later 
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 Transversion is a term used within genetics to refer to the changes within the structure of DNA and its 
ongoing consequences to the health of the system (human). A ‘Transition’ is a straight exchange with a 
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point in more detail, binding the two together here identifies the hermeneutical 
challenges within law and theology from this revised homocentric stance. This 
foundational change has thrown up a wide range of ‘ethical’ debate within theology 
regarding reinterpretation of canonical text from this new horizon. Although there is a 
long list of topics, the following provides a short synopsis of some of the current 
debates; abuse of children and vulnerable young people (Pope Benedict XV1. 2010); 
that in Messianic Judaism believers must fully observe the Mosaic Law (Law of Moses) 
(Smith 2010); same sex relationships, and also the ordination and induction of 
ministers who are in same sex relationships (The Church of Scotland 2007, 2009);and 
the final example; whether there should be women bishops in the Church of England 
(The Archbishops Council (2004). The significance to the current argument is that 
theology when popularised loses both its theoretical structure and authority. Robertson 
(2010) captures the consequence of this where he explains that as traditional 
institutions of moral authority have lost power, constitutional judges have stepped into 
the breach, and radically altered traditional views of what courts can and should do. 
The relevance of Kierkegaard in reviewing these changes within theology can be seen 
where he outlined the consequences of popularism: 
 
In our age the principle of association (which at best can have validity with respect to material 
interest) is not affirmative but negative; it is an evasion, a dissipation, an illusion, whose dialectic is 
as follows: as it strengthens individuals, it vitiates them; it strengthens by numbers, by sticking 
together, but from the ethical point of view this is a weakening. Not until the single individual has 
established an ethical stance despite the whole world, not until then can there be any question of 
                                                                                                                                              
similar protein, whereas a ‘Transversion’, while less common, is an exchange on a different level and has 
ongoing significant changes to the system as the DNA continues to knit the new pattern. 
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genuinely uniting; otherwise it gets to be a union of people who separately are weak, a union as 
unbeautiful and depraved as a child-marriage (Kierkegaard 2009c:106). 
   
With the link to theology established, the argument can now continue to explore how 
association with Europe through the Human Rights Act (European Convention on 
Human Rights), potentially vitiates individuals. The aim of this section in the 
discussion is to uncover some of the outcomes in moving away from the traditional 
Diceyan model of sovereignty, to a rights based system. Such dialectic will uncover 
through cross-examination that at the heart of a rights based system lies a metaphysic 
of the self, as a theoretical construct of an unembodied being. It will continue with 
Kant and Sartre’s perspective - as previously outlined - where people are a ‘means to 
an end’, rather than as ‘ends in themselves’, where their roles and ends are defined by 
the political system. Sartre confirms this when he said; 
 
There are indeed many precautions to imprison a man in what he is, as if we lived in perpetual fear 
that he might escape from it, that he might break away and suddenly elude his condition (Sartre 
2000:59). 
 
This perspective from Kant and Sartre will be set off-stage (waiting in the wings) while 
the rights based system is weighed up against Kierkegaard’s view of civil society. The 
issues raised in the Harry Coleman and Naazish Khan cases will continue to inform the 
exploration. For Mr Coleman his family wanted to engage article 2 of the ECHR to 
thoroughly investigate his death in hospital. The Khan family wanted the death of 
Naazish investigated under the same European legislation. At the first court hearing the 
presiding judge in the Khan case, The Honourable Mr Justice Silber concluded;  
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In common with everybody who has heard about the tragic death of Naazish, I have the greatest 
sympathy for the claimant and his family but my task is to apply the law which I have sought to 
do…Third, in any event as Naazish died before the 1998 Act came into force, the state did not have 
any adjectival duties under Article 2 ([2003] EWHC 1414 (Admin) paragraph 99). 
 
It is this delimitation of responsibility which will continue to be reviewed through the 
association with European jurisprudence. To be detailed in the timing of events, 
Naazish Khan died on the 8
th
 of October 1998, with the HRA 1998 being given Royal 
Assent on 9
th
 of November 1998, and it came into force on the 2
nd
 of October 2000. 
This raises questions about which concept of justice is being rendered in this case. 
Zook captures some of this essence in Kierkegaard’s work where he comments: 
 
Kierkegaard’s opposition to closed, institutionalized frameworks of civic interaction stems from 
their tendency to relieve civic actors of their ethical burdens and responsibilities, thereby weakening 
the bonds that hold civil society (Zook 2008:399). 
 
First, a brief outline of the Human Rights Act will be given, before considering the 
political and economic consequences. 
 
One of the key features of sovereignty is in defining the boundary within which to have 
authority and to rule. Commonly the theoretical construct includes both Internal and 
External elements. The doctrine of rex est imperator in regno suo
96
 remains helpful in 
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 The king is emperor in his own realm. 
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identifying where ultimate authority lies, and from this what laws and values are 
important within this kingdom. 
 
Adoption of The European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(ECHR) through the Human Rights Act 1998 in October 2000, set in motion a revision 
to existing ideas of traditional Dicean sovereignty within the United Kingdom. The 
theoretical change underpinning the legal system was prescient in the Tom Sargent 
Lecture in 1997 where Lord Irvine said: 
 
As we move away from the traditional Diceyan model of the common law to a rights based system, 
the effects will be felt throughout the common law and in the very process of our judicial decision 
making (Lord Irvine 1997:9 &10). 
 
Importantly, this change would affect all law, including the Tort law of negligence 
(Arden 2010). At this stage it is worth recalling the historical aim imbedded within the 
HRA, and ECHR as being tied back to the post-war Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR 1948) (Arden 2010). The broad ethical values contained within all three 
documents are aimed at establishing fair and tolerant societies (HRA 1998, ECHR 
1950, UDHR 1948).  Contained within these statutes is a search for the balance 
between the rights of the individual and the wider rights of society (Millet 2005: 
paragraph 11).
97
 Consequently, at the theoretical level a search for the equilibrium 
between freedom and constraint. 
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 Klug (2007:4) states that ‘The exception to this search for ‘balance’ are the rights to be free from 
torture and slavery which are neither qualified nor limited under the ECHR’. 
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In considering the source of ultimate authority within the polity the following 
influences will be considered; The European Court of Justice (ECJ) in Luxembourg as 
the Court of last resort; When British courts are considering a Convention right, they 
are required to take into account the jurisprudence from the European Court of Human 
Rights (EctHR) in Strasbourg, France (Arden 2010); The European Union (EU) is an 
economic and political union which has a single economic market. As the largest 
economy in the world, consideration will now be given to the integration of these 
factors on the concept of justice. Where justice was previously considered at the 
Domestic level in chapter 5 (section 2), analysis will be carried out at the European 
level of law. Once again Deakins proposition will be explored; 
 
Thus, the politicization of tort law is thus becoming obvious in our system as well as the patchy 
nature of our reforms clearly reflect either the impact that pressure groups have on the generation of 
‘partial’ legislation or even the introduction of legislation which openly admits as its first objective 
the desire to save the NHS money (even if the long term effects of this reform remain openly 
uncertain) (Deakin et al. 2008: 8). 
 
 
One final aspect for consideration will be brought in at this point, with one final 
contribution of additional theory. Deakin et al. (2008: 8) proposition above alludes to 
the influence of pressure groups upon legislation, and the setting of boundaries. In the 
legal transcripts reviewed, the case of Ann Marie Rogers is a paradigm example 
(Chapter 6.2). It will be recalled that in this case, the Health Secretary (Patricia Hewitt) 
bypassed the decisions of NHS regulators and NICE and informed NHS Trusts that 
they could not refuse to fund Herceptin on grounds of cost alone. This seemed to be a 
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case which challenged the concept of sovereignty and the boundaries of law, through 
the collective power of the people played out in the national press. At this juncture the 
theoretical construct of Carl Schmitt regarding Sovereignty is helpful in clarifying 
boundaries within politics and theology. 
 
Schmitt commences his definition of sovereignty with the opening declaration: 
‘Sovereign is he who decides on the exception (Schmitt 1985: 5)’. This idea has 
similarities in the work of Taylor – to be discussed later - where consideration is given 
to secularisation as a move from an enchanted, ‘porous’ state of being, to a ‘buffered’ 
state which admits no exceptions. Taylor summarises the state where he explains: 
 
As a bounded self I can see the boundary as a buffer, such that the things beyond don’t need to “get 
to me”, to use the contemporary expression. That’s the sense to my use of the term “buffered” here. 
This self can see itself as invulnerable, as a master of the meanings of things for it (Taylor 2007:38). 
 
Within healthcare, the Evidence Based Practice (EBP) ideology has greatly contributed 
to this construct of the ‘buffered’ self, and also a scientific research process which 
eradicates exceptions. Relevant to the current discussion is the end point of such a 
belief system (EBP), where there is considered to be no such thing as an accident 
within clinical practice. A supportive example would be where Davis and Pless (2001) 
wrote in the British Medical Journal explaining that the journal had decided to ban the 
word accident from its pages. This was premised upon the claim that ‘most injuries and 
their precipitating events are predictable and preventable (Davis and Pless (2001:1320)’. 
This was one of the striking features of the news when Hewitt bypassed The National 
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Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence, in performing their role of appraising 
evidence for clinical practice. 
 
For Schmitt the exception is a useful tool to undercover fundamental questions about 
sovereignty. In cases such as the Herceptin example, Schmitt analyses the situation as 
‘Although he stands outside the normally valid legal system, he nevertheless belongs to 
it, for it is he who must decide whether the constitution needs to be suspended in its 
entirety (Schmitt 2005:7)’. In the Herceptin situation the support gathering to 
individuals suffering from breast cancer which would be suitable for treatment with 
Herceptin, threatened to undermine the authority of the government. Schmitt explains: 
 
From a practical or a theoretical perspective, it really does not matter whether an abstract scheme 
advanced to define sovereignty (namely, that sovereignty is the highest power, not a derived power) 
is acceptable. About an abstract concept there will in general be no argument, least of all in the 
history of sovereignty. What is argued about is the concrete application, and that means who decides 
in a situation of conflict what constitutes the public interest or interest of the state, public safety and 
order, le salut public, and so on. The exception, which is not codified in the existing legal order, can 
at best be characterized as a case of extreme peril, a danger to the existence of the state, or the like. 
But it cannot be circumscribed factually and made to conform to a preformed law (Schmitt 2005:6). 
 
Previously, ontology has been thought about at the individual level in relation to ethics. 
In this next section ontology is going to be applied to the institutional level of the 
European Union. Schmitt’s incisive analysis will be followed by the concrete 
application of the concept of sovereignty to the discussion. It will continue to focus on 
the notion of justice within the human rights framework. As in the foregoing chapters, 
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the analysis will proceed from the micro to the macro, at this level the individual 
professional will be substituted for discussion at the state level, with the same structure 
followed in thinking about the dynamics of a member state within the European Union 
in relation to authentic being. 
 
Within Europe
98
, the European Union has made a claim to ultimate authority in relation 
to the member states through the doctrine of supremacy of European law. This was set 
out by the ECJ in some seminal decisions such as that expressed in the Costa case: 
 
By creating a Community of unlimited duration, having its own institutions, its own personality, its 
own legal capacity and capacity of representation on the international plane and, more particularly, 
real powers stemming from a limitation of sovereignty or a transfer of powers from the states to the 
Community, the Member States have limited their sovereign rights and have thus created a body of 
law which binds both their nationals and themselves (Flaminio Costa v E.N.E.L. [1964] ECR 
1141:3). 
 
From the above ruling it can be seen that that there is a direct link between the ECJ as a 
political unit, and individual citizens, where previously this was exclusively with their 
own nation-sates (Olsen 2008). In relation to a theory which influences the behaviour 
of citizens and in setting out norms this is an influential development. This is made 
explicit in the following statement in Costa: 
 
                                                 
98
 The current discussion is focussed upon Europe. One the structure is set out, the discussion will 
consider a global view. 
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The transfer by the states from their domestic legal system to the Community legal system of the 
rights and obligations arising under the Treaty carries with it a permanent limitation of their 
sovereign rights (Flaminio Costa v E.N.E.L. [1964] ECR 1141:3). 
 
Such a transfer of legal rights would affect the individual citizen within both a legal 
(ECJ) and economic framework (European Economic Community (EEC)). This new 
milieu would cut across the borders of previously insulated legal-political systems in 
terms of membership and rights (Olsen 2008). These changes would not just affect the 
individual on the horizontal dimension across national boundaries (transnational), but 
also on the vertical plane through the creation of a hierarchical, direct link with the 
European community (supranational). Dual membership then as a citizen of the nation-
state and European community constitutes the individual citizens identity, provides the 
notion of inclusion and exclusion criteria of membership, and importantly, contributes 
to the definition of other. 
 
Further, as a citizen within the EEC, the economic framework involving a common 
market was, -and continues to- contribute to the identity of an individual as worker. 
Oliver captures some of these changes: 
 
These developments in the practical and political conditions in which parliamentary sovereignty is 
exercised in the UK represent radical departures from earlier practice. They affect our understanding 
of Parliament’s position in the Constitution. It is no longer at the apex of a simple hierarchy of 
strictly legal norms. Instead a more subtle and varied network of relationships between laws or rules 
of different kinds and from different sources is developing. At the highest, Parliament is at the centre 
of a web rather than at the apex of a pyramid (Oliver 2003:357).  
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From these changes the question arises of who authorises the European community to 
take such freedom to act. Under the previous Westphalia system, this could be viewed 
as a threat to external sovereignty. This question will be considered in the next section 
on how the constitution is instituted. 
 
Aporia 3. Constituent and Constituted Power 
In continuing to consider the ultimate authority of the European Convention on Human 
Rights as applied in the Khan and Goodson cases, the European Community is a useful 
exploratory model on a number of levels. The discussion will continue to unravel the 
legal structure down to the level of the individual citizen in the hope of discovering the 
main influences upon a normative theory. What appears to be new will be referenced to 
what appears to be prescient in Kierkegaard’s work. For Kierkegaard foresaw: 
 
System and conclusiveness correspond to each other, but existence is the very opposite. Abstractly 
viewed, system and existence cannot be thought conjointly, because in order to think existence, 
systematic thought must think it as annulled and consequently not as existing. Existence is the 
spacing that holds apart; the systematic is the conclusiveness that combines (Kierkegaard 1992a:118). 
 
Regarding authentic existence, sovereign constituent power is a founding power, 
creating force, and as such defines boundaries. The boundaries define the identity of 
those given membership and those declined as other.  
 
It has been established above that the European constitution preceded the European 
constituting power, in that the legal framework was drawn up prior to a European 
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people being in place. The European constitution was developed upon the national-state 
constituting power. Such an approach raises problems regarding the legitimacy of this 
framework. Lindahl (2007a) explains the opposing views of constituting power, where 
Carl Schmitt gives primacy of place to constituent power over constitutional power and 
democracy over the rule of law. Whereas, Hans Kelson by contrast, proposes that the 
people in a democracy has no prior political existence until it is recognised by legal 
rule. According to Lindahls’ (2007a) analysis, in Schmitt’s eyes, Kelsen collapses 
constituent into constituted power, and politics into law, by denying the prior existence 
of the people as a political unity. However, Kelsen’s legal framework recognises a 
paradox at the heart of the law (Lindahl 2007b). If the logic of the Costa ruling (above) 
is taken as an example in creating the European community, it can be established that 
there was no norm of pre-existing positive law. The problem then arising for Kelsen is 
recognising this power that creates the first constitution without being legally 
empowered to do so. The constituent sovereign appears external and prior to any 
established system of positive laws (Kalyvas 2005). 
 
Constituting power is ambivalent in its relation to the constituted power. The 
constituting power, while founding the constitutional order remains irreducible to and 
heterogeneous from that order. The importance, according to Kierkegaard of each 
single individual basing their actions upon a higher ethical criterion will be discussed in 
the next section. For how individuals view their freedom will influence both as a 
constituting power, and the constitution. As individuals group together to make a polity, 
this very act demonstrates the inextricable relation between autonomy and heteronomy. 
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Kierkegaard warned of the danger of the state’s self deification, and a legal system that 
had no external criterion upon which to judge itself. 
 
At the domestic, nation-state level, sovereignty can be seen to operate, with a 
geographical area defined, a people to protect (and as part of a covenant the same give 
up self- rule) and rule, and also the freedom to define the Common good. The advent of 
the supra-nation has however given birth to a complex system with boundaries which 
define members and others. It appears notable here that the citizens give-up a degree of 
self-rule both at the domestic and supra-national level in return for ‘protection’ it its 
broadest definition. 
 
Tied to the notion of sovereignty within the European Union was the development of 
the Common market. For the past thirty years the governing philosophy of the United 
States of America and the United Kingdom has involved the belief that Markets are the 
vehicle to achieve the public good (Sandel 2009a). For any normative theory, it can 
then be seen that both the legal and economic frameworks are aligned towards market-
orientated ways of conceiving citizenship. Importantly, this includes calculations of 
economic cost in determining justice within claims of clinical negligence. However, the 
self-interest identified by Adam Smith (1904) as a dynamic to a competitive market can 
create problems in deciding how to value the goods. This seems to be relevant when in 
healthcare, caring is the commodity. 
 
Sovereignty at the domestic level was a hostile and competitive structure, rather similar 
to Smiths view of self-interest, only transposed to the national level. Such a view is 
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continually challenged by globalisation. Korten et al. (2002) provide a useful 
comparative analysis of the two opposing world views of empire and community. In 
the worldview of empire the only positions life offers is to rule or be ruled, to be a 
winner or a loser. Whereas the world view of community allows for creativity, and the 
equitable sharing of power and control of resources. In discussing the role of market 
economies Sandel proposes that careful consideration should be given to when to use 
markets as some things are corrupted or degraded when turned into commodities. 
Regarding this question Sandel explains; 
 
To decide them democratically, we have to debate case by case the moral meaning of these goods in 
the proper way of valuing. This is the debate we didn’t have during the age of market triumphalism. 
As a result, without quite realising it, without ever deciding to do so, we drifted from having a 
market economy to being a market society. The hope for moral and civic renewal depends on having 
that debate now. It is not a debate that is likely to produce quick or easy agreement. To argue about 
the right way of valuing goods is to bring moral and even spiritual questions into public discourse 
(Sandel 2009b:9). 
 
The dynamics of a market society further define alterity. Given that there has been a 
move away from sovereignty towards universal human rights, this section will consider 
such rights in light of a market economy. 
 
At the domestic level there is a perception by the public that too many asylum seekers 
and immigrants take advantage of the Human Rights Act. In one poll conducted for the 
Ministry of Justice, 43 per cent of the public took this view (Ministry of Justice 2008). 
The same research found that - in keeping with Sandel’s view - the general public 
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perceive a general lack of respect, what they termed  a ‘values vacuum’ (Ministry of 
Justice 2008). Sandel (Sandel 2009b) believes there is now a widespread sense that 
markets have become detached from fundamental values. In continuing with the 
question of legitimacy of the European community, when Lady Justice Arden reviewed 
the ECHR with regard to tort law she concluded; 
 
The result is that there is a great deal of discretion in the hands of the judges to decide whether or not 
the common law will be developed in accordance with Convention rights…(Arden 2010:149). 
 
Correspondingly, Shah and Poole (2009) found when evaluating the impact of the HRA 
on the House of Lords that the court is busier, but there is a low win rate for human 
rights cases. Post-HRA, 42 pre cent of the courts caseload is composed of human rights 
related cases. This compares with 17 per cent pre-HRA (Shah and Poole 2009). As a 
system endorsing universal human rights, Shah and Poole interpret the statistics thus; 
‘A more likely explanation is that while the Lords may be keen on hearing human 
rights cases, they are not particularly sympathetic in general to human rights 
claims
99
(Shah and Poole 2009:13)’. 
 
If the route is followed in trying to raise issues with universal human rights-as in the 
clinical cases under consideration-further stumbling blocks (skandalon) will be 
discovered in attempting to make a claim. In completing the discussion at the domestic 
level, the final point to make is that it is only unlawful for public authorities to act in 
                                                 
99
 Italics in the original. 
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conflict with human rights. It does not operate at the private or individual level (Arden 
2010). 
 
At the supra-national level forty-seven European states currently make up the Council 
of Europe, which participates in the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. 
As has been discussed above, claimants must first exhaust the domestic legal system 
before presenting a claim at Strasbourg. Some of these cases from some countries can 
involve extreme human rights abuses (The Guardian 2009). Yet the court is at risk of 
becoming hamstrung due to the sheer volume of claims presented, and the resultant 
backlog of cases. This has been a sustained problem, as in 1999 the court had a backlog 
of 60,000 cases (Verkai 1999). At the beginning of 2010 the court had a backlog of 
over 120,00 cases and a multi-year waiting list (European Court of Human Rights 
2010a).In August, this is now 138,200(European Court of Human Rights 2010b). This 
is even with revision to the structure of the court (Ochsenbein 2010). It is worth noting 
that Russia currently has the largest number of pending applications making up 27.6% 
of the total claims (European Court of Human Rights 2010b). 
 
Attempts to annul existence in all or any of it forms (ethical, legal, economic, political) 
by the system (national or supra-national) provides space for re-activation of the 
constituent power which according to Derrida lies in a dormant and subterranean form. 
‘Existence is the spacing that holds apart (Kierkegaard 1992a:118)’ according to 
Kierkegaard. Such a dynamic exposes the vulnerability and therefore the instability of 
the constituted power. 
. 
 
297 
Andrei Sakharov who won the Nobel Peace Prize for – amongst other major 
contributions - exposing how laws can contribute to hatred wrote in his autobiography; 
 
For me, the moral difficulties lie in the continual pressure brought to bear on my friends 
and immediate family, pressure which is not directed against me personally but which at 
the same time is all around me. I have written about this on many occasions but, sad to 
report, all that I said before applies equally today. I am no professional politician - which is 
perhaps why I am continually obsessed by the question as to the purpose served by the 
work done by my friends and myself, as well as its final result. I tend to believe that only 
moral criteria, coupled with mental objectivity, can serve as a sort of compass in the cross-
currents of these complex problems (Sakharov 1975). 
 
After considering the problem for many years Sakharov identified moral criteria and 
mental objectivity as potential guides. However, some of the concerns he wrote about 
remain contemporary. In writing about the economic crisis in Europe Thornbjørn 
highlighted some of the tensions in living in the nation-state, and supra-nation state 
simultaneously; 
 
To participate fully in multicultural societies we need a well-developed sense of identity, but 
growing unemployment and marginalisation mean people lose that identity and start defining 
themselves in opposition to others – fertile ground for extremists to spread their message of hatred 
(Thornbjørn 2010). 
 
So far the discussion has attempted to outline many of the boundaries required by 
sovereignty from the domestic level up to the supra-nation state of the community. The 
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structure however, continues to define alterity at the supra-national state level. That is 
for example those who are out with the European community as other. Two final 
examples will be discussed in this section before considering how the institutional 
structure influences the individuals’ identity as a citizen. The following two examples 
aim to uncover some of the consequences upon a normative theory when the system so 
far discussed is rolled out to the global picture. 
 
In defining alterity the supra-nation state develops a necessary boundary against third 
world countries. Necessary, in terms of an economic system which requires self-
interest as a force to drive the free market. Turner (2004:175) goes further and suggests 
that the ‘global economic system depends on the continued existence of these 
impoverished societies’. Researchers, bioethicists, and healthcare professionals are 
socialised and embedded within the boundaries (immanence) of their domestic, and at 
most supra-nation state level. The research agenda and scholarship (including ethics) is 
funded towards the common good for that nation. Here there is the potential skewing of 
the research agenda as savvy researchers develop research applications where there are 
grants to be found. In contrast, Rennie and Mupenda (2008) discovered global health 
disparities when they carried out their research on ethical issues in biomedicine and 
public health research in the democratic republic of Congo. In all of the epidemiology 
studies presented by Rennie and Mupenda (2008) there is a stark contrast between the 
richest and poorest countries. Perhaps the most striking is that regarding the maternal 
mortality rate. The lifetime risk of pregnancy-related death in Malawi is 1in 7, as 
compared with 1 in 2800 in industrialized nations (Meguid et al. 2007). It is then from 
this contrasting perspective that Turner (2004) proposes that the long list of 
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contemporary bioethical issues (face transplant, stem cell research) are only intelligible 
in the socialisation of wealthy developed nations. Current issues in bioethics are more 
focussed on issues of personal autonomy, than social justice at the global level (Farmer 
2004). Socialisation at the nation-state level is similar to living in Kierkegaard’s 
Aesthetic sphere as previously discussed, which is a life of immediacy. Regarding the 
Maternal Mortality Ratio (MMR) in Malawi, and the political thinking of sovereignty 
in particular, Kierkegaard explains; 
 
But to exist signifies first and foremost to be a particular individual, and this is why thinking must 
disregard existence, because the particular cannot be thought, but only the universal (Kierkegaard 
1992a:326). 
 
The particular is prior to the constituted power as a dormant and subterranean power. 
Within the supra-national state framework the current world-view as Empire requires 
states to compete with each other for global economic power. Focus currently is upon 
the BRICs, which in economics is the acronym referring to the countries of Brazil, 
Russia, India, and China. In defining the common good, China decided to move from a 
socialist planned economy in the 1980s to a market economy (Keping 2009). 
Economically China’s strategy has been a success. A précis of the statistics show that 
China’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) increased from 359 billion yuan in 1978, to 
8.94 trillion yuan in 2000 (Keping 2009). This economic success requires to be 
considered in evaluating the impact of poverty on individuals, and the consequences of 
environmental and ecological degradation. For example, although there were more than 
one million millionaires in 1997, more than 80 million people were living under the 
. 
 
300 
poverty line of about 200 yuan per year (Keping 2009). With the change from a 
socialist planned market to a market economy a large number of citizens have for the 
first time, no access to any form of social security in China (Keping 2009). 
 
Above, the influence of the context which the individual lives in has been considered. 
The next section aims to explore the influence of such an environment in shaping the 
ethical character of the citizen through the concept of identity. 
 
Aporia 4. Citizenship 
The history of sovereignty has been one defining alterity, originally at the nation-state 
level, and more recently at the supra-national level. The functional unit of a polity is 
the citizen. This status of an individual as tied to a political unit is constitutive of a self-
identity. Lindahl explains that this identity is reflexive in the way in which the 
individual constitutes the constituted power and vice versa:  
 
Whereas the identity of a thing can only be established in terms of what it is, the identity 
of a human being is also reflexive in that this being relates to itself as the one who acts and who is 
ultimately at stake in such acts (Lindahl 2007a:6). 
 
In terms of citizenship, the reflexive aspect is developed through the potentially 
interrelated dimensions of Membership, Identity, Rights, and Participation, which all 
have a bearing upon each other (Olsen 2008). Such dynamic relations are defining for 
the citizen, state, and for the formation of groups. Isin (2002) clarifies that these 
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relationships are not simply polar between inclusory and exclusory, but rather that they 
are dialogical. Crucially Isin goes on to explain; 
 
Ways of becoming political, such as being citizens, strangers, outsiders, and aliens, do not exist in 
themselves, but only in relation to each other (Isin 2002:29).  
 
This basic structure has not changed with the transposition of citizenship to the supra-
national level, only the complexity of choice has increased for the citizen as they have 
to consider an array of multiple identities (Verhoeven 2002). Only the individual can 
decide the value and emotional significance attached to membership of social groups, 
which thereby construct their self-image (Tajfel 1981). However, all of these processes 
tie the individual through membership as a citizen to some collective organisation, or 
organisations (Olsen 2008). 
 
Where nationalism was a powerful concept in helping individuals conceive of their 
identity in a social, religious, and political space, European legislation is now putting 
into question the master identity imposed by the nation-state. The challenge now from 
globalisation, and advanced capitalism is how to develop a new order. The digital 
exchange of information as communication and commerce is a useful model to 
problematize the issues of previous conceptions of sovereignty as governance. 
Consideration would then need to be given to notions of Membership, Identity, Rights, 
and Participation across virtual boundaries. 
 
. 
 
302 
Regardless of the changing structure, it can be seen that citizenship and the dialogical 
relationships involved are powerful in developing identity. In relation to healthcare in 
general, and health care and legal professions particularly, Isin believes that the 
professions purposefully deploy alterity: 
 
It may also enable us to see “globalization” and “postmodernization” not as given and immutable 
phenomena, but as strategies deployed by the professions as dominant groups to constitute their 
strangers, outsiders, and aliens, who while being implicated in these strategies, also attempt to 
capture and transverse them (Isin 2002: 283). 
 
As previously discussed under the concept of ‘Polycentricity’, this complex network of 
relations has real consequences for ethics as human action. Polyanyi’s theory seems to 
tie in well here, for although he was writing about business as an interrelated system, 
his theory also functions at the individual level: 
 
Where large numbers are involved, such mutual adjustments must be indirect; each individual 
adjusts himself to a state of affairs resulting from the foregoing actions of the rest (Polyanyi 
1999:170)
100
 
 
Citizenship then creates a specific type of actor, and defines the limits of their role in 
terms of freedom to act. Isin captures this poetically where he explains that: 
 
The city is a difference machine because these “characters” are not formed outside the machine and 
encounter each within the city, but the city assembles, generates, distributes, and differentiates these 
                                                 
100
 Polanyi proposes that for “individuals” we may read “corporations acting as individuals” (Polyanyi 
1999). 
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differences, incorporates them within strategies and technologies, and elicits, interpellates, adjures, 
and incites them (Isin 2002:283). 
 
With regard to the legal process, it was established earlier that polycentricity  
influenced the judges ability to make a judgement, in that when a case was said to have 
polycentricity the many interrelated consequences were unknown-the spiders-web 
effect. Equally, the city (or hospital, or state) has been uncovered in its role as 
determining relationships, and casting the role of actors. In discussing human action 
Hannah Arendt seems to capture the significance of this network; 
 
It is in accordance with the great tradition of Western thought to think along these lines: to accuse 
freedom of luring man into necessity, to condemn action, the spontaneous beginning of something 
new, because its results fall into a predetermined net of relationships, invariably dragging the agent 
with them, who seems to forfeit his freedom the very moment he makes use of it. The only salvation 
from this kind of freedom seems to lie in non-acting, in abstention from the whole realm of human 
affairs as the only means to safeguard one’s sovereignty and integrity as a person (Arendt 1998:234) 
 
Under such negative analysis, citizenship appears to be an aporia as far as ethical action 
is concerned. Lindahl (2007) found that Kelsen and Schmitt both interpret the ‘self’ of 
the self-rule as meaning the rulers and the ruled are the same. These two forms of 
identity lead to two distinct kinds of questions which both operate at the individual, and 
collective levels.  
 
In the final section consideration will be given to Kierkegaard’s view of identity as 
selfhood in developing a civil society. Before exploring Kierkegaard’s proposal, one 
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final aporia influencing decision making will discussed; that concerning the affect of a 
secularizing society upon ethical debate within health care. 
 
 
Aporia 5. Secularisation as an Influence upon Ethical Decision Making 
 
It was established in chapter 5 that major world belief systems continue to influence 
ethicists in the process of ethical decision making. In Chapter Five, the review of major 
world religions and cultures upon bioethics focussed upon hermeneutical challenges. 
Added to this factor are that patients and their families bring their own individual belief 
systems, and notions of value when making decisions about health care. The aim of this 
section is to consider current challenges to some of the major world belief systems, and 
the potential consequences of this to ethical decision making. 
 
Taylor in analysing ‘Latin Christendom’ (2007:29) provides an in-depth analysis of 
Secularization. Similarly, MacIntryre (1967) traces the changing social relations due to 
laisser-faire ideology, and utilitarianism as part of market forces which dominated 
secular thought. In questioning the move from having a religious belief to not having 
one, Taylor sets out three main areas of change (Taylor 2007). Some of these features 
have been seen in the discussion of Natural law above. According to Taylor, previously 
the natural world which individuals inhabited had its place in the cosmos and the great 
natural events were attributed to the Absolute. Secondly, sovereignty – as already 
discussed - was founded upon the Absolute. Finally, in accord with Weber’s expression 
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of “disenchantment” (Weber 2004), Taylor proposes that the pre-modern condition was 
to live in this terms negation; an ‘enchanted’ world (Taylor 2007:26 27). 
 
While it is recognised that the analysis provided by MacIntyre and Taylor are 
predominantly focussed upon the Christian tradition, the current analysis aims to 
continue with a global view, where the topic is considered from Kierkegaard’s 
perspective of becoming, which includes becoming an atheist. So it is not so much 
about any one religion, but rather, about authentic being. Gorski and Altinordu (2008) 
argue that an approach which incorporates non-Christian religions and non-Western 
religions is needed to fill in gaps in empirical knowledge, and also to respond to 
practical and political challenges facing societies which no longer consist of just one or 
two main religions.    However, the approach taken by both MacIntyre and Taylor, their 
respective findings, and the framework by Taylor are foundational in being able to 
move on to a more abstract discussion. 
 
Taylor (2007) summarises secularization theory into having three explanatory facets. 
Gorski and Altinordu (2008) also provide a helpful overview, and add to the 
complexity of secularization theory by explaining some theories are also concerned 
about the way the different facets interact. Taylor explains the main structure: 
 
This has been mainly concerned with explaining various facets of secularity 1 (the retreat of religion 
in public life) and 2 (the decline in belief and practice), but obviously, there is going to be a lot of 
overlap between these and secularity 3 (the change in the conditions of belief) (Taylor 2007:423). 
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Much of the foregoing discussion has considered facets 1 and 2 of secularization in 
conjunction with sovereignty. In summary they were that the Post-Westphalian 
structure caused a substantial change in the discourse on the legitimacy of authority. 
Prior to this sovereignty had a strong theological character (Mac Amhlaigh 2007). The 
contractualist account from Thomas Hobbes onwards then provided a framework for a 
secularising shift, where sovereignty was implemented through a social contract. 
 
Secularization has been evaluated in terms of attendance at institutions of religion, and 
in terms of individuals espousing a personal faith. Chaves (1994) proposes that neo-
secularization is most productively conceived of as a decline in religious authority, and 
as a decrease in the influence of religious values. 
 
In terms of attendance at religious institutions Küenzlen (2009) indicates an increase in 
Russia and in Yugoslavia. Currently the interest is focussed upon the increased interest 
in religion in China. Writing in The Guardian Weiss proposes: 
 
The reasons for this boom are twofold. The first is that the Chinese have found Christianity to be a 
stabilising belief system amid a dramatically changing socioeconomic landscape, which had its 
previous religious traditions crushed by Maoism and its values questioned after Tiananmen Square. 
And, secondly, with its obvious western heritage, the rise of Christianity may be linked to a 
subconscious attack on the norms and values espoused by the PRC
101
 – rather like South Korea in 
the 1980s (Weiss 2010). 
 
                                                 
101
 People’s Republic of China. 
. 
 
307 
Such a change in the grounds of belief reveals a complex view of secularization from 
the global perspective. As Taylor suggests there appears to be movement between 
secularization and sacralization: 
 
Thus my own view of “secularization”, which I freely confess has been shaped by my own 
perspective as a believer (but that I would nevertheless hope to be able to defend with arguments), is 
that there has certainly been a “decline” of religion. Religious belief now exists in a field of choices 
which include various forms of demurral other spiritual options. But the interesting story is not 
simply one of decline, but also of a new placement of the sacred or spiritual in relation to individual 
and social life. This new placement is now the occasion for recompositions of spiritual life in new 
forms, and for new ways of existing both in and out of relation to God (Taylor 2007:437). 
 
This complex global situation regarding world religions is challenging to draw together 
in considering its influence upon ethical decision making. One final comment from 
Marcel Gauchet (1999) points to a discussion prescient in the work of Kierkegaard. 
Gauchet (1999) thought that secularisation was the loss of the constitutive or world-
forming power from religion, and that the hallmark of religion is the postulate of a 
supramundane realm. An attempt will now be made to consider this complex view 
within the confines of Kierkegaard’s concept of Christendom. 
 
In his book Attack Upon Christendom Kierkegaard distinguishes between Christianity 
and Christendom (Vardy 1996). Most of the secondary literature on Kierkegaard 
provides lengthy detail on Kierkegaard’s criticism of the Lutheran Church of Denmark 
(Pattison 1997, Hannay & Marino 1998, Carlisle 2006). Kierkegaard’s view of 
Christendom links to his concept of the crowd which would allow the public to 
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recognise and call themselves Christians en masse. Kierkegaard wanted to ward against 
religion as a system similar to that of Hegel’s philosophy (Carlisle 2006). Kierkegaard 
wanted individuals to think for themselves and not to just adopt the whole theological 
framework in an unthinking (Repetition as discussed next) fashion: 
 
To lack infinitude is despairing confinement, narrowness. It is, of course, a question here only of 
ethical narrowness and limitation. The world really only interests itself in intellectual or aesthetic 
limitations, or in the indifferent, which is always what the world talks about most. For worldliness
102
 
is precisely to ascribe infinite value to the indifferent. The worldly point of view always clings 
closely to the difference between man and man, and has naturally no understanding (since to have it 
is spirituality) of the one thing needful, and therefore no understanding of that limitation and 
narrowness which is to have lost oneself, not by being volatilized in the infinite, but by being 
altogether finitized, by instead of being a self, having become a cipher
103
, one more person, one 
more repetition of this perpetual Einerlei [one-and-the-same] (Kierkegaard 1989:63). 
 
Globalisation, Cosmopolitanism, Multiculturalism, is not a challenge for Kierkegaard’s 
ethical framework because it is an Open system. Many of the aspects about 
secularization are in accord with Kierkegaard’s thinking. Kierkegaard would enjoy 
Gauchet’s (1999) thought that secularisation was the loss of the constitutive or world-
forming power from religion, and that the hallmark of religion is the postulate of a 
supramundane realm. That is, when secularisation is defined as Christendom. Although 
Kierkegaard was specifically writing about the Christian faith, his main focus was on 
that singular individual; The authentic self. In relation to ethical decision making, many 
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challenges arise from individuals who are entrapped within their religious system, but 
who have failed to chose themselves. This will be considered in the next section. 
 
Kierkegaard’s View of Civil Society 
Kierkegaard was concerned with the way individuals related to each other, and in turn 
how they related to the political structures that ruled their defined territory. This section 
aims to discuss some of the challenges set out above as aporiai, in presenting 
Kierkegaard’s view of civil society. 
 
Certainly the sketch above of the legal, political, economic and religious landscape has 
some parallels with the foundational crisis of the times that Kierkegaard was writing 
from (Garff 2005). In many respects Kierkegaard’s very writing style demonstrates a 
contributing aspect to his theory of being. With the use of irony and maieutics,
104
 
Kierkegaard is able to create space in his role of author with his readers (Westfall 
2009). Through the use of pseudonyms, differing opinions in different books being 
published on the same day, and indirect communication, Kierkegaard states that he 
deliberately used these techniques in order to assist individuals to think for themselves 
(Kierkegaard 2009a). The purpose of this was to break away from the crowd and to 
speak to that single individual (Kierkegaard 2009a). Westfall summarises this by 
explaining that Kierkegaard lets his students ‘discover the truth for themselves’ 
(Westfall 2009:640). 
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At the heart of Kierkegaard’s view of civil society is the authentic individual. Chapter 
Six was prefaced with Kierkegaard’s central premise on ontology; that 
 
Every human being, no matter how slightly gifted he is, however subordinate his position in life may 
be, has a natural need to formulate a life-view (Kierkegaard 1992b:493). 
 
However, the preceding discussion above has highlighted a range of obstacles in 
achieving this selfhood, not least the circular economy of exchange, which defines 
alterity through the difference machine. Such an economy has been seen to be feeble in 
helping those most vulnerable individuals in time of most need, whether this is 
vulnerable patients or countries. As introduced in the previous chapter, and emphasised 
in the discussion above, it seems as if in global economic terms a certain magnitude of 
injustice to millions of individuals is acceptable in a system ‘where the ethical becomes 
as shy as a sparrow in a dance of cranes’ (Kierkegaard 2009b:118). 
 
In contradistinction both Levinas and Kierkegaard place the ethical relation with the 
other ‘prior to any thematization or any concrete relation’ (Weston 1994:170). Time 
and again the discussion appears to fall back to the parable of the Good Samaritan. If 
presented today with such a case-whether a vulnerable individual or country-both the 
legal and political systems would demonstrate the limits of responsibility. If the cases 
from Chapter Five are recalled (where Norris considered the legal responsibility to the 
pedestrian about to walk in front of a lorry, and the absent minded cliff walker) Norris 
(2009) explained there was no duty of care because the individual has not assumed any 
responsibility for the unfortunate victim. Similarly, from a political perspective the 
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individual would be evaluated from the individual-as-worker status as a function of the 
market. It is against this backdrop that Kierkegaard’s view of civil society will now be 
explicitly appraised.  
 
The spheres of subjective existence are not hierarchical, and experience gained in one 
sphere can be helpful in another sphere. However, Kierkegaard did propose that there 
was progression from the aesthetic to the religious, with a deepening of inwardness, 
truthfulness and passion as the individual moves towards the ethical and religious 
spheres (Carlisle 2006). Each sphere of existence also has an increasing appreciation 
for the actualisation of possibilities (Carlisle 2006). Crucially, both Levinas and 
Kierkegaard believe that existence occurs, not within immanence, but rather in 
transcendence. This is crucial due to the consequences of such a view, which was 
discussed above in relation to Aquinas and the subsequent removal of Natural law. 
Transcendence is important to the current discussion on at least two levels. Firstly, it 
provides a unique view as an existing individual from which to consider existence. In 
discussing how philosophy interprets the I as a particular case of generality, Weston 
explains the importance of transcendence for Kierkegaard and Levinas where he states: 
 
But the very structure of this thought for both Kierkegaard and Levinas ignores the first-person 
position from which the philosopher must himself speak. The essential character of this ‘position’ is 
that I am not for myself a particular case of a generality: and it is this which requires for both 
thinkers a reference to a ‘transcendence’ which itself precludes conceptuality and which therefore 
involves us in a paradoxicality when we try to speak about it (Weston 1994:167). 
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As a consequence of the above then, secondly, transcendence removes boundaries 
which communities and political systems rely upon, but produce closure towards the 
other. Thus it is the authentic individual which is at the centre of Kierkegaard’s view of 
civil society. 
 
The authentic individual is the one who has decided to make a project of becoming of 
his or her self. For those who do not make this choice are said to be in Despair because 
they realise that the actual self is not the true self. According to Kierkegaard the 
majority of individuals would be in this category of misrelation to their self, in despair. 
This theory has been critically applied previously to individuals, at this stage in the 
discussion it will be applied to society. In recalling the collective as a difference 
machine the struggle to become the authentic self can be envisioned where Kierkegaard 
proposed: 
 
A person in despair wants despairingly to be himself. But surely if he wants despairingly to be 
himself, he cannot want to be rid of himself. Yes, or so it seems. But closer observation reveals the 
contradiction to be still the same. The self which, in his despair, he wants to be is a self he is not 
(indeed, to want to be the self he truly is, is the very opposite of despair); that is, he wants to tear his 
self away from the power which established it. But despite all his despair, this he is incapable of 
doing. Despite all his despairing efforts, that power is the stronger, and it compels him to be the self 
he does not want to be (Kierkegaard.1989:50). 
 
In the aesthetic sphere, the difference machine overwhelms the individual and they are 
unable to be the authentic individual. At the political level the traits of the aesthetic 
sphere include having a weak sense of self, social conformity, planning for the moment, 
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and being self interested. There are lots of ideas and possibilities - but like the seducer 
in Either/Or - there is no commitment. The common good and strategic telos is in 
valuing pleasure, and there is institutionalisation of the construction of the self. The 
processes of socialisation and institutionalisation remain for Kierkegaard a choice for 
the individual: 
 
If you imagine a helmsman in his ship when it is just about to tack, then he may be able to say, ‘I can 
either do this or that’, but unless he is a pretty poor helmsman he will also be aware that the ship is 
still maintaining its normal headway, and so there is only an instant when it is immaterial whether he 
does this or that. Similarly with a human being; if he forgets to take the headway into account, the 
moment eventually comes when there is no longer any question of an either/or, not because he has 
chosen but because he has refrained from choice, which can also be expressed in another way: 
because others have chosen for him, because he has lost himself (Kierkegaard 1992b:483). 
 
There are two manoeuvres which awaken the individual from the sickness unto death 
and contribute to Kierkegaard’s vision of a civil society. These involve Irony and 
Repetition. Each will now be discussed in turn regarding their contribution to selfhood, 
before the final discussion on the ethical sphere.  
 
Genuine community life is predicated upon the authentic individual. Irony is a 
transition area located within the aesthetic sphere which assists the individual to move 
into the ethical sphere (Carlisle 2006). It helps the individual by providing a standpoint 
from which to put into question the prevailing lego-political structures as discussed 
above. Irony allows the single individual a space from which to teleologically suspend 
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their absolute attachment to the established order (Dooley 2001). To put into question 
the deification of the state, and the legitimacy of the difference machine: 
 
The immediacy of the age of revolution is a restoring of natural relationships in contrast to a 
fossilized formalism which, by having lost the originality of the ethical, has become a dessicated 
ruin, a narrow-hearted custom and practice ( Kierkegaard 2009c:65). 
 
Through irony the individual can disengage from the state of immediacy. This process 
can be facilitated by the use of maieutics as an educational tool where the individual is 
set off balance and is being placed into a position to having to think about what the 
truth may be. 
 
Kierkegaard responds to Socrates and Plato’s proposal that truth can be found in 
recollection, and to Hegel’s through mediation; that truth can only be found through 
Repetition. This concept is important in becoming an authentic individual within 
society, so some of the complex relevant aspects will be unpacked below. 
 
In order for the individual to gain a new, fresh perspective, which is able to stand back 
from immanence, this requires transcendence. The transforming aspect here is that the 
individual no longer relates itself to itself, but now relates itself to the Absolute as an 
ethical model and ideal (Kierkegaard 1989). From this new standpoint the individual is 
able to evaluate the world, and re-evaluate past experiences. This in passing has a 
poetic relevance to the idea of maieutics because in discussing Repetition Kierkegaard 
states the person becomes ‘a new person (Kierkegaard 1985:18)’, and the process as a 
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‘rebirth (Kierkegaard 1985:19)’. One relevant further term is worth mentioning here, 
and that is that Kierkegaard calls the transformation of perspective ‘the moment’ 
(Kierkegaard 1985:19).
105
 To summarise this transfer from relating to themselves, to 
now relating to the Absolute, Kierkegaard explains: 
 
Inasmuch as he was in untruth and now along with the condition receives the truth, a change takes place 
in him like the change from “not to be” to “to be” is indeed the transition of birth (Kierkegaard 1985:19). 
 
From ‘the moment’ the individual gains this new perspective, truth can be evaluated 
against this act of transcendence, rather than the previous position of immanence. A 
gulf then opens up here between two ways of knowing. One way is as described above 
which could be called subjective knowing, and the other which is human or secular 
knowledge which refers to simply upholding the law-without critical reflection. For 
Kierkegaard individuals do not have a predetermined identity. Rather, identity is 
always something yet to be established.  
 
Transcendence allows the individual to chose their self, rather than as being in terms of 
social roles. By being able to evaluate the legal and political status quo against the 
Absolute, the individual is able to develop a more responsible perspective, in 
opposition to the crowd of herd-like status against which Kierkegaard constantly warns; 
 
But while one kind of despair steers blindly in the infinite and loses itself, another kind of despair 
allows itself to be, so to speak, cheated of its self by ‘the others’. By seeing the multitude of people 
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around it, by being busied with all sorts of worldly affairs, by being wise to the ways of the world, 
such a person forgets himself, in a divine sense forgets his own name, dares not believe in himself, 
finds being himself too risky, finds it much easier and safer to be like the others, to become a copy, a 
number, along with the crowd (Kierkegaard 1989: 63, 64). 
 
As has been discussed previously in the clinical cases, only in a synthesis of the finite 
and infinite, can the authentic individual emerge. The legal cases of Khan, Coleman, 
and Merelie, have each in their own way demonstrated the consequences of becoming 
entangled in being as social roles. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has been concerned with elucidating the dynamics between the ethical 
individual in relation to the ultimate authority located within the concept of sovereignty. 
Five different paths were explored as potential frameworks to support ethical action, 
but each resulted in a fossilisation of the individual into the universalising system. 
 
The structure of the chapter allowed a movement from exploring the ethical issues 
within the legal cases, out to the same issues at the level of countries. To the recurring 
themes Kierkegaard provided a recurring singular response which was focused on the 
authentic self. Although many issues were identified regarding the legal system, it has 
to be stressed: 
 
However, neither Kierkegaard nor Derrida considers it possible to dissolve the law. What they do 
call for is a “reinvention” or a “repetition” of the law, with the aim of making it more responsive to 
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the idiosyncratic demands of each particular event. Kierkegaard considers this the way to bring the 
law to life anew (repetition) (Dooley 2001:235). 
 
Indeed, Repetition seems to be a key concept in helping the individual health care 
professional gain a key advantage point from which to evaluate ethical dilemmas. Real, 
practical, teaching strategies were considered, where, for example, Irony can be used to 
assist the individual to drive a wedge between unreflective social roles, and Repetition.  
Maieutics was also considered as a facilitative educational process in this connection. 
 
Where in previous periods religion and the topic of theology contributed as a guiding 
force on ethical issues, areas of acute debate within some key world religions appear to 
render them silent on key current ethical debates. In some of the examples discussed, 
delay appears a purposeful strategy within church governance in order to keep disparate 
opinion from causing fissures within the institutions. Although as Kierkegaard has 
highlighted with the Helmsman, indecision is a decision. 
 
Finally, one of the recurring themes has been the way in which institutional 
frameworks have relieved their actors of responsibility, regardless of whether that 
system is the healthcare, legal, political, or theological system. 
 
Chapters Five, Six, and Seven have all engaged with a critical analysis which has 
reviewed ethical action and has tried to uncover the normative framework. Chapter 
Eight will consider Existentialism as a potential framework to guide ethical action. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: EXISTENTIALISM AT THE IM/PASSE 
 
For example, it is said that one rues ten times having spoken, for the one time one rues one’s silence. 
And why? Because the external fact of having spoken can involve one in disagreeable consequences, 
since it is something actual. But to have kept silent! Yet this is the most dangerous of all…The world 
thinks it is dangerous to venture in this way, and why? Because one might lose; the prudent thing is 
not to venture. And yet by not venturing it is so dreadfully easy to lose what would be hard to lose 
by venturing and which, whatever you lost, you will in any case never lose in this way, so easily, so 
completely, as though it were nothing-oneself. For if I have ventured wrongly, very well, life then 
helps me with its penalty
106. But if I haven’t ventured at all, who helps me then? (Kierkegaard 1989: 
64, 65). 
 
 
Introduction 
The previous Chapters, Five, Six, and Seven have explored the philosophical 
relationship between ethics and law. In order to do this, the thesis has set up a number 
of main arguments following a sustained analysis of ethical experience as viewed in the 
legal transcripts of clinical negligence. Ethical experience has been evaluated against 
the philosophical writings of, primarily, Kierkegaard, Levinas, and Sartre. 
 
One of the central arguments concluded that there are three contending positions 
regarding the influence of morals in law. These philosophical views were outlined in 
the discussion regarding Natural law (Aristotle, Hobbes), Legal positivism (Hart, 
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Kelson), and in the Law as interpretation (Dworkin). Of relevance to this chapter is the 
complex summary; that this is best seen as a continuum, with the various theorists 
located somewhere on the spectrum between law as an intersection of law and morals, 
and the pole position of law as a closed logical system which is separate from morals. 
The point to highlight seems to be when the moral analysis is performed, rather than 
thinking that legal positivists exclude this aspect. Legal positivists are concerned with 
the influence of morality on law. However, they 
 
… do share the view that the most effective method of analysing and understanding107 law and the 
legal system involves suspending moral judgement until it is established what it is we are seeking to 
explain (Wacks 2005:44). 
 
Placing the analysis at the end of the process as an ethical cleansing of law, has 
however, a significant effect on the outcome, in comparison to, for example Dworkin 
who sees the moral and political aspects as intertwined in law. 
 
Another central argument which commenced in Chapter Five, first having provided the 
central features of an existential approach to responsibility, has explored the constant 
Either/Or regarding the choice of the ethical and the limits set upon responsibility 
towards the other. This argument has developed through Chapters Six and Seven, and 
expanded to explore the relationships between law, ethics, and politics, in locating 
ultimate authority in justice. Crucially, Chapter Seven concluded that the current 
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political structure provides a teleological suspension of the ethical and legal in 
preference for the political. 
 
The cases of clinical negligence reviewed, have allowed a tracing of the whole legal 
process from the clinical setting to final legal judgements, including the appeal process. 
This systematic investigation of the legal process is critical to the current discussion 
regarding the ethical care of patients, due to the way in which clinical care is regulated 
by such a legal framework. At the same time, the investigation has achieved some 
clarification of questions raised in previous chapters. These insights shall be set out 
first in summary form, before moving on to consider existentialism per se. 
 
By observing the end of the legal system, and accounting for the structures of human 
interaction it has been possible to see the conditions for the realisation of the political-
legal system. During the discussion it has been established that Civil law is based upon 
Case law which involves the authority of legal precedent and legal axioms. The first 
insight gained from the legal cases concerns law as a closed system of norms. As a 
normative theory of justice the procedure was followed both in the court system, and in 
detail during the hearing of a particular legal case. The court system of normative law 
involves evaluating the facts of the case against the legal framework through the court 
of first hearing through to the final appeal stage. Within a case hearing, once the facts 
in issue have been heard, the legal hierarchy of authority is followed. It can be recalled 
that this involves reviewing previous legal cases in an attempt to find the best fitting 
(similar) case, adhering to the doctrine of legal precedent, applying statute law, 
following the relevant legal axioms, and subjecting all of these stages to hermeneutics. 
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Yet, in all of the cases reviewed there was no exact fitting previous case. This poses a 
challenge to legal positivism such as that previously proposed by Hans Kelsen. That is, 
in the cases reviewed the law as posited was not followed. While the focus will remain 
upon the point under consideration, the concept of freedom in the decision making 
process will be discussed fully at a later juncture. 
 
When the law as posited was not followed, it was observed that often a decision was 
put off (delayed), referred to another higher court, or a decision was made which had a 
political ratio decidendi such as the case which was said to involve polycentricity. In 
all of the cases, the law as posited was suspended. It appears that in following the legal 
process that these particular cases, precisely because they are aporia, have captured 
something significant. This is in the sense discussed previously regarding aporia, that 
rather than being a dead end to the enquiry, this boundary area in law (inside and 
outside, nomos and anomie) has become the point about where the whole question 
turns. That is, how the legal system behaves when presented with a question which 
does not readily fit the previous legal authority, especially those of a political nature. 
 
What posited law appears to capture in these aporia is precisely its inability to respond 
to the particular case. Each case is other, requiring an absolutely unique interpretation 
and a decision based upon totalized rules. With the question of justice therefore not 
answered, it repeats rather like an echo.
108
 Such injustice resulting from indecision, 
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Kierkegaard would term the teleological suspension of the legal, in preference for the 
political. 
 
With some of the main challenges identified to an ethical way of being, this chapter 
aims to respond to some of the problems identified in the current ethico-legal and 
political structures. It will then consider Existentialism as a potential way of being 
which will ensure the ethical care of patients. This chapter continues with a critical 
revisiting of the main themes of existentialism; Freedom/time/repetition/ 
Selfhood/the moment. 
 
Main Themes of Existentialism: Freedom/time/repetition/selfhood/the moment 
Kierkegaard’s analysis of the nature of truth is a response to speculative thinking, 
particularly of Hegel’s philosophy. While Kierkegaard critiqued a number of areas 
within Hegel’s philosophy he did respect him, and the truth which Kierkegaard is 
interested in is ethical or religious truth (Evans 1998). This is a point to clarify as his 
critique does not apply to other types of knowledge. 
 
Kierkegaard considers scientific methodology as an inappropriate research approach 
for investigating the human spirit (Kierkegaard 1992b). With regard to ethical and 
religious knowledge Kierkegaard thinks that people forget that they really exist. In The 
Sickness Unto Death Kierkegaard explores some of the subtleties of losing oneself in 
relation to existing ethically (Kierkegaard 1989). Deductive reasoning, with its method 
of moving from an idea out to reality is not truth qua ethical knowledge. The 
distinction can be seen where he states ‘A human being thinks and exists, and existence 
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[Existents] separates thinking and being, holds them apart from each other in 
succession (Kierkegaard 1992a; 332). For Kierkegaard, truth happens when an idea is 
turned into reality (Dooley 2001). In this way Kierkegaard’s philosophy informs people 
how to live; 
 
All essential knowing pertains to existence, or only the knowing whose relation to existence is 
essential is essential knowing. Essentially viewed, the knowing that does not inwardly in the 
reflection of inwardness pertain to existence is accidental knowing, and its degree and scope, 
essentially viewed, are a matter of indifference (Kierkegaard 1992a: 197) 
 
 
Carlisle clarifies the difference between objective and subjective truth in the following 
way; ‘Kierkegaard says that subjective truth is a matter of how-how one lives-whereas 
objective truth is a matter of what one knows or believes’ (2006: 68).  
 
This appears of relevance to the current analysis of the legal transcripts in that it was 
previously established, that the judges having considered all of the objective truth 
through the legal hierarchy of authority (legal evidence, previous legal cases, precedent, 
and legal axioms), frequently had to make a subjective decision. A similar situation 
arose in the case involving the use of Herceptin where the research based guidelines 
(NICE) were overruled by the Health Ministers subjective decision (Ann Marie Rogers) 
v. Swindon Primary Care Trust ([2006] EWHC 171 (Admin), [2006] EWCA Civ 392.). 
A final example would be in Brindley v Queen’s Medical Centre University Hospital 
NHS Trust ([2005] EWHC 2647 (QB)) where Professor James did not follow the 
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guidelines he developed for the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists 
(chapter six). 
 
Kierkegaard’s main argument in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript to 
Philosophical Fragments (Kierkegaard 1992a) is relevant to the analysis of clinical 
decision making, and the legal transcripts, especially where scientific truth is being 
applied to ethical problems. In ethical matters, Kierkegaard thinks that rather than 
helping, it can remove the energy from the ethical way of life; 
 
But all such scientificalness becomes especially dangerous and corruptive when it wants to enter the 
realm of the spirit…O dreadful sophistry which expands microscopically and telescopically in 
volume after volume and yet, qualitatively understood, yields nothing but does deceive men out of 
the simple, profound, passionate wonder and admiration which gives impetus to the ethical.’ 
Kierkegaard 1975: 243, 244,245. (2809)). 
 
Levinas is in accord with Kierkegaard’s important argument here, and so both will be 
considered in now bringing together some of the main themes from the previous 
chapters, and by drawing out some of the specific consequences for ethics in caring for 
patients. 
 
Both Kierkegaard and Levinas consider Western rationality as reductive, which when 
worked out in ontology, epistemology, and metaphysics, is detrimental to ethical 
behaviour. Levinas explains it as ‘Western philosophy has most often been an ontology: 
a reduction of the other to the same…’ (Levinas 2008b: 43). However, some of the 
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detail is required to be exposed here, in order to outline the consequences at a later 
point. 
 
The rationalist project, in order to attain objectivity, tries to think of the individual by 
dissolving their subjectivities into a collective group in order to develop a system. 
Kierkegaard explains this claim; 
 
But for the speculating thinker…his task consists in going away from himself more and more and 
becoming objective and in that way disappearing from himself and becoming the gazing power of 
speculative thought (Kierkegaard 1992a:56). 
 
At this point it is worth highlighting the overall effect of totalisation, especially in the 
care of vulnerable patients. This has been a leitmotif throughout the thesis, however the 
accumulative discussion identifies a human being who is being dissolved, desensitised, 
and who eventually has no-self-to-care for patients. 
 
Existentialism proposes an alternative way to exist as a human being. One which has 
the concern for the most vulnerable in society as one of the irrefusable demands. Where 
ethics is prior to ontology. From such a perspective, existentialism will now be 
evaluated as a potential way to care for patients, and how this would contribute to 
ontology, epistemology, and metaphysics.  
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The distinction provided by Kierkegaard regarding subjectivity and objectivity will be 
sustained in the current discussion, but also with a view later, to use this distinction in 
the chapter to reconsider aporia in an ethical dilemma.   
 
Kierkegaard proposed that; 
 
Ethically-religiously, the emphasis is again on: how…but it is to be understood as the relation of the 
existing person, in his very existence, to what is said. Objectively, the question is only about 
categories of thought; subjectively, about inwardness. At its maximum, this “how” is the passion of 
the infinite, and the passion of the infinite is the very truth (Kierkegaard 1992a:202, 203). 
 
There are a number of key features within this proposal which transpire to be a radical 
departure from the norm. When Kierkegaard was writing this he was responding to the 
ancient Greek approach to truth which was seen as recollection, and Hegel’s logic of 
mediation (Carlisle 2006). In the place of recollection and mediation Kierkegaard 
placed his key category of repetition. Before considering how repetition would help an 
individual free themselves from the totalising system, Levinas’ ‘ethics of 
responsibility’ will be brought alongside so that both can be considered in tandem.  
 
The how, of how one should live, for Levinas is as introduced in Chapter Five, through 
the call in the face of the other. Levinas believes the rationalistic system wants to 
understand everything, and fears the things which cannot be grasped by this approach. 
For this reason Levinas is interested in these things which cannot be subsumed, such as 
culture, religion, and foreign traditions. For Levinas, the how is through alterity, the 
call of the other; 
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A calling into question of the same-which cannot occur within the egoist spontaneity of the same-is 
brought about by the other
109
. We name this calling into question of my spontaneity by the presence 
of the Other ethics. The strangeness of the Other, his irreducibility to the I, to my thoughts and my 
possessions, is precisely accomplished as a calling into question of my spontaneity, as ethics 
(Levinas 2008b: 43). 
 
 
At this point, it is worth recalling the health professionals and managers in the Khan 
case where Naazish was administered the fatal overdose of potassium, and the Coleman 
case where the patient’s demise was accurately charted, but little action taken. In 
addition to this it may be worthwhile to recall from chapter four (Whisteleblowing) that 
one of the main themes arising in the literature was a ‘fear of reprisals’ when raising 
concerns. In all of these examples there seems to be a concrete dynamic between the 
individual and the system. For quite some time now this has been recognised in 
inquires, and the concept of ‘Systems Failure’ is used to define such systemic failure 
(Walshe and Offen 2001, Walshe 2003, National Quality Board 2010). It is valuable to 
notice the power of totalisation as discussed above. In the Bristol inquiry a consultant 
anaesthetist (Dr Bolsin) tried on number of occasions-unsuccessfully-to bring to 
attention the seemingly high morbidity and mortality rate with a certain surgical 
procedure. In the Report of the Public Enquiry, Kennedy found; 
 
                                                 
109
 This non-capitalised other is in the original. 
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The difficulties he (Dr Bolsin) encountered reveal both the territorial loyalties and boundaries within 
the culture of medicine and the NHS and also the realties of power and influence (Kennedy 2001: 
161). 
 
From this discussion it can perhaps be seen that even the enquires into clinical 
negligence-precisely because they take an objectivist, rationalistic approach, - look at 
the system, the what rather than the how. Within the legal system the concept of 
responsibility is given a reduced scope of influence, specifically through Tort law, and 
duty of care which involves consideration of legal proximity. At the political level, 
responsibility is also demarked geographically, and even within these boundaries in 
terms of sameness and difference. For Levinas the responsibility is not set out in 
positive law as obligations, rather the obligation chooses us precisely because of our 
ability to make a difference. In contrast to the notion of advocacy, with Levinas the 
face of the other calls to me, and holds me hostage. Responsibility is then, prior, to any 
laws, language, and ontology. Levinas explains this; 
 
The relationship of proximity cannot be reduced to any modality of distance or 
geometrical contiguity, or to the simple ‘representation’ of a neighbour; it is already an assignation, 
an extremely urgent assignation – an obligation, anachronously prior to any commitment (Levinas 
2008a:100&101). 
 
As a responsibility which is prior to theory, it escapes conceptualisation, or overflows 
the finite. It does not negate the need for law and knowledge, but rather the height of 
the other gives purpose for both in this primordial obligation. In existentialism the other 
puts my being in question and by so doing challenges totalisation. 
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Existentialism encourages the individual, not to stand against the system, but to 
critically evaluate it from the perspective of the infinite self. A being in the system, but 
not part of it. This is then a particular way of being where the individual may have to 
sacrifice their own personal security within the tradition in order to respond to the call 
of the other. 
 
One of the challenges to an ethical way of being is in responding to an ever changing 
horizon. When this question is addressed within speculative thought it is difficult to 
recollect a response to a novel problem. That is, looking for a future problem in the past. 
Because repetition has an openness on the future, it is more responsive to the novel. 
Previously the incongruence of exploring a how to live question, with a what is the 
concept, was explored and found to be fruitless. Despite Socrates best efforts as a 
Gadfly the cathartic-aporia failed to stimulate anyone to take up the search for 
knowledge. 
 
Kierkegaard and Levinas develop a concrete way of being a community, based upon 
the idea of neighbour. Unlike the powerful processes of socialisation and 
professionalization, existentialism is able to critically review the current situation 
through the infinite. In this way each patient is unique.  
 
Conclusion 
Chapter Seven aimed at locating the ultimate authority in justice. From at ethical 
perspective, all of the various investigations ended in an impasse where the ethical 
question was never addressed. This chapter is a continuation from the previous one but 
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has developed to consider if existentialism could be a potential way through the 
problem (aporia). 
 
When the law was investigated as a system to provide justice, it was found to suspend 
ethical and legal matters to give priority to the political discourse. It was then proposed 
that when justice is not being done by the legal system, the ethical question keeps on 
calling out-it repeats because it cannot settle. The consequences of this were considered 
in relation to patients where they never receive a clear answer to the clinical negligence 
they experienced. This can then result in further investigations and appeals at further 
cost to the NHS and both the legal and political systems. The wider implications are 
that the legal decisions made have far reaching implications into the future because of 
legal mechanisms such as the doctrine of binding precedent. 
 
The work of Kierkegaard assisted in distinguishing between Western rationality and 
ethics, and also between subjective and objective knowledge. This distinction was then 
applied to how one lives, and what one knows, in relation to clinical and legal practice. 
The argument developed from the previous chapter to highlight the sophistry within 
law and the extent to which judges make decisions based upon the subjective truth. 
 
One of the results from the discussion in this chapter was the recognition of inadequacy 
of scientific methodology in addressing ethical problems. The case of the judge 
overriding evidence based guidelines was used as an exemplar. 
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The sustained theme of Western rationality as reductive was supported with the 
somewhat surprising consideration, that evidence based practice has the potential to 
stultify critical ethical thought, and can in fact remove the passionate wonder of clinical 
practice. 
 
Kierkegaard uncovers a critical point when he discusses passion, as this is what gives 
purpose and motivation to work and care for patients. In contrast, the objective truth-on 
its own- considers categories of thought and as such can create ethical ennui. 
 
Existentialisms contribution to epistemology concluded this chapter in highlighting 
how repetition, rather than recollection or medication could contribute to the increasing 
number of novel ethical dilemmas presenting in the future. 
 
The final chapter will draw together the many fragments of existentialism discussed in 
the thesis in an attempt to propose a coherent way to care for patients. 
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CHAPTER NINE. CONCLUSION: EXISTENTIAL ETHICS    
The Central Claim  
The central claim of this thesis is that Existentialism is the missing dimension in  
providing the most cost efficient ethical health care to patients. This claim has been   
argued following a critical review of ethical theory which has included; deontology,  
consequentialism, and virtue ethics, where all were found to be lacking something  
essential.   
 
A significant point was argued regarding both ethics and epistemology in Chapter  
Four where the work of Greco and Turri (2011) revealed that in Virtue ethics, and  
Virtue epistemology, the analysis is reversed in relation to that taken by the other two  
normative theories of ethics. At the heart of healthcare ethics then, there appears to be a  
conflict of approaches, or at least, a lack of explanation on how these two main  
approaches can work together in harmony.  
  
This thesis has therefore aimed to uncover the incongruence of such an approach, and  
to destabilise the current convention within law, philosophy, and ethics, which is  
unable to sufficiently acknowledge the experiential dimension of the individual in a  
particular community or organisation. Moreover, this work has attempted to identify  
how de facto the current philosophical framework actually contributes towards care  
which falls below a minimum safe –and ethical- level.   
   
This concluding chapter aims to provide a rehearsal of all of the preceding eight  
chapters by now highlighting some of the key arguments stemming from the research,  
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which would support the central claim for an existential ethics to be included within the  
mainstream. Such an ethics would call for a vibrant form of the existent self. However,  
it is not advocating a radical existentialism. Rather, one which incorporates the key  
features as outlined by the existentialist writers which includes freedom, authenticity,  
and responsibility. When applied to health care, the detail has revealed that these  
concepts involve a pre-philosophical responsibility for the patient (other).  
   
Enfolded within the discussions are two strands of the thesis qua thesis. The first has  
explored the existential dimension of teaching ethics within health care. A sub-strand  
within this has given consideration to how existentialism could contribute to  
epistemology, especially an epistemology of ontology. The second strand focussed  
upon the clinical practice situation, which included the regulating professional bodies.  
It was here that the experiential dimension was most noticeably minimalized.   
 
Sartre, Levinas, and Kierkegaard all consider three elements in their consideration of  
existence, namely, the subject, freedom, and the ethical. The central claim of this thesis  
will now be made explicit, using this triadic structure.    
 
The Subject.  
Firstly, the subject. Chapter Six introduced the concept first outlined by Aristotle, and  
then developed by Kierkegaard, to denote movement (kinesis). This is a feature    
common to all three of the main existential philosophers discussed. For Kierkegaard  
this involved the individual making the transition from possibility to actuality, and the  
existential spheres assisted in identifying the movement from the aesthetic to the  
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religious. Existence for Sartre, involves movement from evading the human condition  
which he termed bad faith, towards being authentic. Similar to Kierkegaard, Sartrean  
ethics requires a clear conception of the self. In the continuum between the aesthetic  
and ethical, irony provided this starting point for self-awareness, which provided a  
rupture between the self and the world. The central role of Kinesis in the work of  
Levinas was introduced in Chapter Two as part of the method, key to this thesis.  
Levinas’s central claim was that the ethical relation is prior to ontology. In other words  
kinesis, involves realising ethics has priority over ontology.  
 
The implications to the individual health professionals-and also to legal practice would 
be to propose a radical change to current practice. This would include the way in which 
ethics is taught; health care is led, and most importantly, the way in which patients are 
cared for.   
 
Crucially, Levinas has argued that Western philosophy has usually been an ontology  
(Levinas 2008). With the emphasis placed upon an epistemology of ontology, no prior  
consideration is given to existence per se. That is, the existing individual. Throughout  
this thesis, the principle concept of the unpresentable trace, in Levinas’ 
phenomenology has been highlighted in relation to patient care. Visibility according to  
Levinas, involves a reduction of the other to my conceptual understanding. This  
conceptual reduction was considered in relation to the totalising power of an 
organisation in Chapter Five. Here, Levinas demonstrated that the Other is always  
irreducible to any category, theme, or concept. Consequently, ethical care is prior to  
ontology, due to the other having height. Such a view appears to contribute towards a  
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consideration of the emphasis upon teaching concepts, in relation to appreciating the  
rich pre-ontological (ethical) world.   
 
For Levinas, the ethical relation with the Other is asymmetrical. In professional health  
care it could be anticipated that the relationship with the patient is asymmetrical due to  
the nurse or doctor having the superior knowledge and skill in comparison to the 
patient. However, with Levinas, it is the patient who has height. Levinas wants to 
protect the invisibility of the Other, and the visibility of the Subject. This position only  
changes when there is the introduction of a third person, as discussed in Chapter Seven  
in relation to political theory. It is then that both are required to become visible, in 
order to decide whom to serve first.  
  
The implications for the individual in clinical practice, is the requirement to take on the  
project of developing an individual self. Existentialism, with its emphasis on existence,  
has a fundamental concern for the lived experience and subjectivity of those immersed  
in a practice such as health care and law. For Kierkegaard the individual must make the  
dialectical move from the aesthetic, to the ethical. The aesthetic stage of existence is 
characterised by immersion in sensuous experience, giving value to possibility over 
actuality, it is a distracted stage, and is a despairing means of avoiding commitment and  
responsibility. In clinical practice it involves being immersed in the current culture, and  
negating the ability to reflect. Sartre’s being-in-itself and bad faith.  
  
Some key aspects then fall from this insight concerning the teaching of ethics, and the  
Continual Professional Development (CPD) of health care professionals. According to  
. 
 
336 
existentialism, existence precedes essence. So there is no such thing as human nature 
which would pre-define that some individuals would be more caring or courageous 
than others. There is only a human condition which is the lived tension between 
freedom and fact. All individuals therefore have the ability to choose to become more 
caring, and to become more courageous. 
   
Sartre importantly identified that at the centre of consciousness there is no-thing such 
as the ego as proposed in psychological and analytical theory. Existentialism then 
proposes a completely different approach to many other traditional theories which 
commence with a conception of human nature, and then derive ethical norms from this 
nature. Consequently the individual’s responsibility is not to duty, obligation, nor 
obedience to some authority. Rather it is in developing a self-for-the other.   
 
The thesis also identified the powerful dynamic that the Other brings to limit freedom- 
in this case in clinical or legal practice. This finding in the research contributes 
positively to improving patient care. It could influence education, management, 
leadership, the psychology of the workplace, and indeed in defining clinical 
competence. The role of the other in conferring meaning upon the subject requires to be  
recognised in the way this can limit the Other. At the organisational and societal levels  
this was highlighted in Chapter Seven by considering the work of Isin on the idea of the  
city as a difference machine that defined insiders and outsiders. Such a system however,  
has a serious impact upon patient care, if individual health professionals attempt to be 
purely what others see in the subject. Previously this was discussed as the sickness unto  
death, where the individual nurse or doctor was totalised by the system, and where  
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Sartre proposed that individuals are more than the roles they adopt. Existentialism  
contributes to the discussion here by highlighting the need for a self-lucidity that is 
both, self-aware, and also aware of the self in a social (clinical) context. Kierkegaard 
made this point regarding groups memorable where he proposed that the individual 
health professional is at risk of existing ‘merely in relation to others’. The final 
outcome of such a quantitative (group, organisational) dialectic is, according to 
Kierkegaard, ‘where the ethical becomes as shy as a sparrow in a dance of cranes’ 
(Kierkegaard 2009b:118). Consequentially, the clinical team has a powerful role in 
shaping the individual. Equally, the individual health professional has to have a bench 
mark which transcends the immediate team, and is located in a wider ethical 
community.   
 
Kierkegaard has emphasised the role of subjectivity over objectivity in ethics, and the 
importance of the emotions. As outlined above, Kierkegaard’s central concern is that 
the subject should choose to develop a self, in opposition to the crowd which is the 
untruth. The movement in the existential stages is one of inwardness, towards the 
ethico-religious stage. Kierkegaard has emphasised the importance of passion in 
bringing together in synthesis the infinite (freedom) and the finite (necessity). 
Kierkegaard strongly criticised any abstract theory - but especially Hegel - that does 
not concern itself with concrete existence, which includes the role of the emotions.   
 
Sartre considered the emotions as having defining power upon objects (patients). The 
structure for this aspect of his work is to be found where he ties acts and intention 
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together. Sartre explained that it is through our acts that values spring up, that we 
discover ourselves in a world – clinical practice - full of demands, in the realisation of  
our projects.   
 
Equally for patient care, the emotional dimension assists in capturing the rich 
experience of existence which includes thinking, perception and imagination. Patient 
care certainly includes providing good arguments, based upon sound evidence, but it 
also involves motivation (intentionality), where imagination can assist in altering an 
individual’s behaviour. The role of emotion and imagination was discussed in Chapter 
Four as part of the moral paradigm of virtue ethics, and also in Chapter Eight in 
relation to repetition which was shown to have openness to the future. The application 
of this proposal in health care would be principally twofold: In decision making about 
individual patients, and also as contributing to political theory and an epistemology 
which views challenges as zetetic-aporia as opposed to cathartic-aporia.  
  
Firstly, imagination is an extended part of perception, of which, emotion is a part. 
Empathy is important to sensitive patient care. However, empathy involves trying to 
imagine the patient’s situation, or even in trying to envisage the outcomes of various 
care interventions in the future. Existentialism-as previously discussed can assist 
considering real or potentially real situations in the future, precisely because it has this 
openness to the future, and new situations. Deliberation as recall reduces the options 
open to the patient. Imagination-which includes the emotive aspect can help correct this  
imbalance but only if it is sufficiently rich and sufficiently inventive (able to transcend  
the immanent context). For Levinas, this is the call of the other that holds us hostage.  
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Kierkegaard contributed to facilitating learning in this area through his rich oeuvre 
which provided examples of deliberative simulation. This pedagogy could be applied to  
developing health professionals by providing hypothetical scenarios which would help 
them inhabit the real world.   
 
Creativity and imagination are hallmarks of existentialism because the subject 
recognises that values are freely created, rather than being discovered. The authentic 
individual realises that they are not the product of social, hereditary, or institutional 
demands, so they are open to new meaning. Sartre explains that this includes promoting  
the freedom of Others (other members of the health care team). The second point 
regarding emotion, is that decision making without this aspect can also reduce the 
possibilities to be considered. This was discussed in Chapter Seven where 
responsibility for the other was proposed as prior to economic calculations.  
 
This rich experience which included perception, imagination, and the role of emotions 
was also identified in virtue ethics. However, the discussion in Chapter Four concluded 
that virtue ethics does not discuss how the individual should first choose the virtuous 
life.  
   
Freedom  
While Kierkegaard’s work contributes both towards philosophy and theology, he was 
against organised religion. Overall Kierkegaard was interested in the individual 
becoming that single individual. By this he meant someone who thought for themselves 
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and made their own decisions. For this reason he distinguished between Christendom 
and Christianity, where the latter was where the single individual had a relationship 
based on faith, and where Christendom was concerned with theoretical proofs about 
religion, and involved a crowd mentality. Therefore, Kierkegaard cannot be called a 
religious writer. In fact Kierkegaard set his theology and philosophy free from religious 
influence. For example, he strongly rejected both Predestination
110
 and Determinism, 
and instead emphasised the freedom that individuals had in choosing their mode of 
existence. Kierkegaard specifically deployed the different spheres of existence to 
challenge people who thought they knew what it means to be ethical or religious. 
However, whether in theology or in philosophy, the main thrust of his argument was 
regarding becoming that single individual who takes up a stance in relation to their life  
and world. This is in contrast to being part of the crowd.  
  
The freedom proposed is not a radical existential freedom, nor indeed solipsism. Rather 
it is a freedom which promotes the freedom of other health professionals’, 
responsibility, and it is held hostage by the patient.      
 
The Ethical  
The ethics being proposed refers to a relationship between oneself and the Other. The  
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 ‘It was only when the conception of human freedom developed and was then brought into relation 
with the conception of divine providence that the doctrine of predestination arose, and had to arise, as an 
attempt to solve the problem…’ (Kierkegaard 1938: 1). ‘From every point of view the concept 
predestination may be considered as an abortion, for having unquestionably arisen in order to relate 
freedom and God’s omnipotence it solves the riddle by denying one of the concepts and consequently 
explains nothing ‘ (Kierkegaard 1938: 1)    
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call of the patient takes priority over ontology. From this primary position the 
relationship is then characterised by my responsibility for the patient. The critical  
aspect in delivering this care is through the development of a self-for-the-other. A self  
which is conscious of all the necrosing potential of the system:  
   
We name this calling into question of my spontaneity by the presence of the Other ethics. The 
strangeness of the Other, his irreducibility to the I, to my thought and my possessions, is precisely 
accomplished as a calling into question of my spontaneity, as ethics. Metaphysics, transcendence, 
the welcoming of the other by the same, of the Other by me, is concretely produced as the calling 
into question of the same by the other, that is, as the ethics that accomplishes the critical essence of 
knowledge (Levinas 2008b: 43).    
  
Levinas repositions the focus back onto the individual patient. By doing this there is a 
reconnection with the meaning of an individual’s life and their relations to other people.  
What is critical here is the engagement with the patient (other) which includes the role 
of emotion, perception, and imagination. Without this engagement, and without first 
choosing the ethical-religious, moral theory lies as a sophisticated, paralysed skeleton:  
   
In relation to their systems most systematisers are like a man who builds an enormous castle and 
lives in a shack close by; they do not live in their own enormous systematic buildings. But spiritually 
that is a decisive objection. Spiritually speaking a man’s thought must be the building in which he 
lives —otherwise every-thing is topsy-turvy (Kierkegaard 1938:  156) 
    
The ethics proposed inhabits the real world of patients, and assists health professionals  
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to engage in this world, as opposed to imaginary examples. However, this thesis has 
also considered the legal and political influences upon the National Health Service as a  
system. The next three sections will review some of these influences shaping normative  
ethics within health care.  
   
The Law as a Means to an End  
The legal system influences the way in which health professionals behave. Principally, 
this is through regulatory legal frameworks, but also through the public consciousness 
of some paradigm clinical cases discussed in the media. Some of the high profile cases 
which have been highlighted in the media act as test cases for all involved in health 
care. In Chapter Four, Dr Stephen Bolsin was considered in regard to whistle blowing.  
In Chapter Six, Ann Marie Rogers was an exemplar of both a patient-and her 
Consultant- challenging legal and political limits.  While the focus of this thesis has 
been on health professionals in the clinical context, the thorough investigation of the 
legal court transcripts led the questioning out into the wider legal and political setting  
of clinical practice.   
 
Attention was then turned to the freedom of solicitors and the judiciary working in an  
adversarial system, with the same set of existential philosophical concerns being 
explored, but this time in relation to notions of justice. The organising question of this 
part of the thesis was the extent to which morality pervades the legal and political 
systems. A number of features were identified within the legal system which aimed to 
provide objectivity and justice. However, once discussion had ceased on the major 
theoretical approaches towards law (Legal Positivism, Natural law, and law as being 
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Interpretive), the objectivity of Expert Witnesses was brought into question, the role of 
Kant’s Reflective judgement was highlighted, and the overall legal system was found 
to have a telos beyond the individual patient-as-claimant. From an existential 
perspective then, law becomes an instrument of economics -as was uncovered through 
the concept of polycentricity, and politics by way of a constant global redefining of 
sovereignty. Law, as a means to providing justice to patients is subsumed by the 
priority of economics and global politics. In Satrean and Kierkegaardian terms, the 
legal system does not have autonomy or authenticity to itself. For Levinas, law and 
politics would be evaluated as being prior to ethics in the current convention.  
  
Solicitors as a Means to an End  
Within the legal system tensions were identified between the individual solicitor 
working within a team representing the client. For example, in the Naazish Khan case 
the individual solicitor and the legal team would have had to defend the NHS Trust, 
even when it knew the Trust was guilty of clinical negligence. In this situation, the 
solicitor must deploy all of his legal expertise in defending a guilty client. The final 
example on this theme would be the questionable investigative approach of the Coroner 
in the Goodson case (Chapter Six). These examples raise further questions about the 
administration of justice. In particular, regarding the individual solicitor being able to 
develop an authentic self in the complex set of duties owed to the client, court, the legal 
system, and to the public interest, and the extent to which solicitors are also instruments 
(means to an end, as opposed to ends in themselves) within the system. In existential 
terms, levelled.  
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It was within the context of the adversarial nature of Tort law that the concept of 
advocacy was first discussed. Solicitors then are in a challenging situation regarding 
their ethical behaviour. That is, it is sometimes necessary of the role as solicitor to be 
partisan. While some of the main arguments for this adversarial role were considered, 
concern remained when there was the possibility that successful partisanship could 
subvert justice. The potential for health care is that solicitors could discredit truthful 
patients, health professionals, and expert witnesses. As a consequence this perverts the 
possibility to learn from the clinical mistake, to rectify system failures, and for the law 
to provide norms which could influence ethical behaviour. In other words, it would be 
difficult to understand the rationale (obiter dictum) of the case, and even more 
significantly, the consequences of any legal precedent (ratio decendi) set out in such  
cases.   
    
However, advocacy (partisanship) is not something an individual solicitor can choose. 
It is part of the structure of the legal system itself. It can potentially have major 
repercussions for justice precisely because of the important role solicitor’s play. This 
includes from the outset in the court of first hearing, when the facts are presented from  
both parties. Since higher courts are reluctant to question this evidence, it is this 
information which structures the later legal arguments.   
 
It seems then as if advocacy requests individual solicitors to suppress their own 
concepts of truth and justice through loyalty to the client, and by so doing serving the  
wider ends of justice, and the public good. Such an approach allows the solicitor to 
support individuals who otherwise would not be able to present their case in legal terms.   
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Kierkegaard would view such a position as the aesthetic stage. This is because the 
individual solicitor is subsumed by the legal system. In Sartrean terms they have 
defined themselves by their role, so they are in bad faith. They are unable to choose to 
develop an authentic self for the other. This discussion concluded with Sartre’s 
distinction that our individuality becomes subsumed in plurality, and along with it the  
dissolution of being responsible for my I.   
 
The Judiciary and the Changing Constitution  
Since the legal system influences the ethical behaviour of health professionals, the 
thesis also identified some of the main changes to the role performed by judges.  One 
of the main reasons for doing this was to review what had happened in the past, in the 
hope of viewing how the judiciary may function in the future. With the explicit 
realisation that the laws the judiciary make, precedent set, and the rulings announced, 
will all affect the way health care is delivered for some considerable time into the 
future. At this juncture some of these findings will be summarised.   
 
Judges have moved from the rule of law (posited) to a role which now has a greater 
moral and political aspect, and therefore law as being more interpretive. This was 
argued through the investigation of sovereignty, where Dicey outlined the doctrine of  
the supremacy of Parliament. Two main themes were discovered here, the first being 
that the judges had expanded their role to include politics. An example of this was 
given in the Wednesbury principle where judges had reduced the role of the executive,  
and at the same time had increased their own involvement into the political sphere. It 
will also be recalled that in the Ann Marie Rogers case, the judge granted permission to  
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apply for judicial review and ordered the NHS Trust to fund and provide the Herceptin.  
Secondly, the doctrine of the supremacy of Parliament was also discovered to be 
undermined by European jurisprudence. Both of these changes were seen to increase 
the judge’s role in morals and politics, in a way not previously involved. This point was  
confirmed as accurate by Deakin et al (2008:8).   
 
With the fact confirmed that the judiciary is now more involved in the moral and 
political aspect of law, the closed nature of the legal system can then be seen in how it 
makes decision making very difficult for judges. That is, the legal system qua system 
suffers from a significant time lag, and an epistemological incoherence. Each of these 
summary points will now be outlined. First the system lag.   
  
Legal authority is derived from reference to legal axioms, statutes, legislation, 
precedent, and previous similar court cases. Judges are promoted from solicitors 
serving as instrumental to the system as discussed above. Statute law, legal precedent, 
and indeed the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) are all historical-
relative to the novel questions facing judges. Some of the main examples were 
Donoghue v. Stevenson (1932), Wednesbury (1948), ECHR (1950), and Bolam (1957).  
Additionally, it was recognised that the values fossilised in such legal authority would  
differ from current values. From a hermeneutical perspective, it is a challenge to apply  
the texts to the judges’ now expanded horizon.  
  
Secondly, posited law is based upon an epistemology of recall. However, with judges 
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being asked more frequently for answers to complex moral and political questions 
which are debated in the media and wider society, there will be a greater requirement 
for Kant’s Reflective judgement, and creativity and imagination in judicial decision 
making. The current convention leads to indeterminate decisions. Lord Rawlinson who 
was a former Attorney General explained that in his previous fifty years of experience,  
he has never known such antagonism as there is currently, between the judiciary and 
the executive (King 2009:143).  
  
Overall, the argument concluded that in the new landscape of Rights, the judiciary were  
now more involved in moral philosophising. The traditional legal approach of applying  
statute and categorising judgements as correct or incorrect, is less appropriate for a 
moral and political discourse concerning value laden questions.   
   
The Ethical Community  
With some of the main challenges identified in ethical decision making –in health care, 
law and politics- the focus then turned to considering existentialism as a potential way 
to resolve some of the incoherence currently seen in ethics, ontology, jurisprudence,  
politics and philosophy.   
 
The closing chapters of the thesis presented the existential view of civil society, or 
envisioned how such an ethical community would exist. Nicol’s definition of politics  
can help to draw these arguments together where he proposed:  
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For our purposes, politics can be viewed as a way of handling conflicting choices between a 
multiplicity of moral maps, struggling with fundamental questions of how life should be lived. It is 
an ongoing struggle between competing visions of the common good, in which different ideological 
groups engage in a quest for competitive advantage (Nicol 2006:722).   
 
Levinas and Kierkegaard have provided a critique of politics which is not to reject 
political rationality, rather it is to emphasise the authentic being, which is foundational 
to politics, and a just polity. Ethics is prior to ontology.  
  
The concluding argument identified the main dynamic of scientific method –whether in  
health, law or politics-as one of levelling. The end of this method is conclusiveness 
where everything must be defined by its terms. This can then mean that the system-
whether political, legal, or educational-can define morality relative to the historical   
situation (epoch) it happens to be in. This was discussed in relation to the NHS as a  
quasi-market economy.   
 
With the main legal and political influences upon the National Health Service identified, 
the final section below aims to bring the discussion to a conclusion in the form of a 
proposal for existentialism within health care.  
   
Existential Ethics-The proposal for Health Care.  
Existential ethics emphasises the pre-theoretical aspect in caring for patients. That is, it 
appreciates the individual and their difference prior to any conceptualization which has 
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the potential to reduce individual difference to sameness. Also completely intertwined 
is the foundational belief that the relationship between the health professional and 
patient is asymmetrical. We are already captivated by their presence in a non-
preferential care towards them.   
 
This view has parallels with virtue ethics in the way both recognise the pre-theoretical.  
Virtue ethics has much to offer in appreciating this pre-theoretical engagement with the 
patient with its rich evaluation which includes a role for the emotions and perception. 
Both existentialism and virtue ethics contribute towards an argument for more of a 
balanced approach to establishing the truth about patients. As previously argued in this 
thesis, virtue epistemologists place virtue as foundational. This manoeuvre assists in  
bringing the real, lived world of the patient and morality closer together. Unlike 
formulae or rules, the virtues do facilitate health professionals on how to act and feel  
when confronted with the everyday questions of clinical practice. For Kant there is an  
unbridgeable gulf between our human perspective and objective reality. Virtue ethics  
and existentialism in contrast, place an emphasis on the subjective truth for the patient  
and as part of the lived world of the health professional. As such they both engage with  
moral practice. The challenge for the other two normative theories is in providing an  
account which is causally adequate if it is unable to capture the lived experience of  
patients or the subjectivity of those involved in the moral practice of caring.  
  
The practical proposal established within existentialism is that consideration should 
then be given to the way in which ethics is taught, and an epistemology which gives 
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primacy to concepts. With the pre-theoretical world of the patient being such a rich 
milieu to learn from rather than to impose theoretical frameworks upon. This could be a  
particularly helpful pedagogy in the health professions to facilitate professionals to 
inhabit the real world of patients. Part of this approach would be to firstly emphasise 
the pre-theoretical in caring for patients, and also how this approach would contribute  
towards epistemology, particularly, health care research.    
  
Levinas provides a structure, to simplify and systematize the pre-theoretical in an  
approach to caring for patients. That is, that we are already obligated to the patient.  
Additionally, Kierkegaard identifies the type of (clinical) existence health professionals  
would have in the aesthetic sphere of being. Helpfully, this provides detailed 
descriptors of beliefs, behaviours, attitudes, and examples of clinical practice 
(ritualized). Kierkegaard also details how irony can be used as a teaching strategy to  
assist the individual health professional to develop an authentic way of caring for 
patients.   
 
Kierkegaard uses a number of literary techniques which could be used to facilitate 
learning to develop an authentic self. With the use of pseudonyms, the reader does not 
know the opinion of the author, so they are encouraged to think for themselves. 
Kierkegaard developed this technique by publishing two books at the same time, each 
with differing arguments on the same topic. This could be applied in a practical way 
with the use of autobiographies such as ‘The Diving-Bell and the Butterfly111’ which 
                                                 
111
 Bauby Jean-Dominique (2008) The Diving-Bell and the Butterfly. (Translated by Jeremy Leggatt). 
Harper. London. 
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allows students to witness a patient’s world after suffering a massive stroke, and being 
left completely paralysed. 
 
Deontology and consequentialism evaluate morality against the acts and beliefs carried  
out by a health professional. Foundational to Kantian deontology is reason, and 
utilitarianism is based upon what everyone desires. These respective bases are contrary  
to capturing and appreciating the pre-theoretical world of the patient. However, virtue  
ethics does capture the pre-theoretical in ethics and virtue epistemology because it 
places virtue as foundational. From the foregoing discussion in the thesis it appears that  
Existentialism has the ability to bring all three normative theories together. Firstly by 
emphasising the pre-theoretical, and secondly by foregrounding the need of the 
individual health professional to choose an authentic way of being. It is this existential  
dimension that existentialism contributes to the proposal.  
   
This thesis has run a double narrative consisting of exploring ethical decision making  
in the NHS, and also on the legal concept of clinical negligence. The explicit purpose  
of this was to ensure that the theory was explored and developed, grounded upon 
everyday clinical NHS practice, which includes legal and political influences.  
 
The existential theory has identified the process of totalisation at the individual and  
organisational level within healthcare. Levinas explained how this reductive 
rationalism was founded upon a reduction of difference within health professionals, to 
sameness. Similarly, virtue ethics identified the importance of exemplars in providing   
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good examples of ethical care. Both theories then supported the discussion on the 
power of the group in influencing the quality of care. Kierkegaard however breaks the 
circuitous argument of constituting and constituted by placing the single individual at 
the heart of an ethical community. The focus is then upon developing authentic 
individuals who have chosen the ethical. The power of this process has been witnessed  
in the legal transcripts where exemplars can influence the quality of care in a negative  
or positive way.   
 
Managers and leaders within the NHS have a crucial role in deciding how rationalism  
can be prevented from being deified in the delivery of ethical health care. There is an  
important role for economics and politics, but left on their own, Levinas has identified,  
they bear a tyranny. In contrast, existentialism deduces an ethical structure which is 
irreducible to totality. That is, in the irreducible ethical responsibility to the other.  
Existentialism does not want to reject the order of political rationality, but rather to do a  
work for it. The proposal is that ethics is ethical for the sake of a transformed 
conception of society, law, and politics.    
 
Unlike the normative theories discussed, existentialism encourages the individual to 
think and decide for themselves as opposed to basing their actions upon duties. When 
the concept of sovereignty as ultimate authority was explored, it was discovered to be 
in a state of flux. Equally, when the legal system was considered as a reference for 
norms, many of the decisions and rulings were indeterminate. In such a political 
climate it seems as advantageous if health professionals can make decisions which are  
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open to the future developments (repetition), but can, importantly, also justify their 
moral practices on an individual basis.   
  
This thesis has highlighted many of the features in deontology, consequentialism and 
virtue ethics, as applied in the NHS. From this strong links have been made with the 
existing moral domain of health care practice. This thesis has sought to argue that what 
is missing from these approaches to ethical decision making in the NHS, is the 
existential dimension. This is not to say that existentialism seeks to oust normative 
ethics from healthcare education, staff development and practice. Rather it seeks to 
strengthen it. It seeks to do this by placing the individual at the centre, as the ethical 
progenitor rather than the obedient servant to systemic and often incongruent forces.  
An existentialist ethics is not a solo player. It seeks to bind normativity with a sense of  
the Other to which normativity is obligated. That said, it has to be acknowledged that 
there are certain challenges to this approach. The first of these would be that it is a 
tough call to invite the individual to be elevated above the collective. Moreover there is  
perhaps a danger that ethical decision making from an existentialist perspective can be 
reduced to individual predilection, or even worse, solipsism, and not always with the 
best of results. But that is not the argument. Rather, the argument is at once both 
modest and strong. It is that without an ethical sense of self for the Other, we are lost to  
our own subjectivity, our own freedom, our own ethics. Further research is needed in 
this existentialist area, probably qualitative and with import. I have sought here to 
introduce existentialism back into the family of ethical decision making in the NHS. 
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APPENDIX 1. 
 
KIERKEGAARD’S 
STAGES OF 
EXISTENCE. 
 
  
     
Aesthetic Sphere: Boundary Ethical Sphere: Boundary Religious Sphere: 
 
zone 
 
zone 
 
Characterised by;   Characterised by;   Characterised by; 
 
  
 
  
 
self-interested 
 
world of social 
responsibility. 
 
only understandable within 
the individual’s relationship 
with the Absolute. 
  
 
  
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
  
 
serious engagement with 
the Either/Or of our selves. 
 
  
  
   
  
very weak sense of self. 
 
strong sense of self. 
 
surrenders strong self of self. 
uninterested in 'the ethical'. Irony 
takes the ethical sphere 
seriously  Humour   
  
   
faith replaces the ethical or 
the universal. 
standing apart from 'the 
universal'. 
 
 'the universal'. 
  lacks freedom-no power to act 
or become something. 
Taking 
oneself 
serious engagement with 
choice. 
Taking 
oneself 
involves understanding that 
one is not self-sufficient. 
 
more 
seriously chooses good and evil/or 
less 
seriously 
 
  
 
excludes them. 
 
  
immersed in the world of 
immediacy. 
 
duty is to 'exteriority'- 
external, 
 
faith is unique to each 
individual. 
life of man in his 'natural' state. 
 
social world. 
 
paradox, inaccessible to 
thought. 
immersed in the world of 
pleasure. 
 
world of human morality. 
 
not communicable with 
others. 
psychically disjointed. 
 
duty & obligation. 
 
individual 'excluded' from the 
personality is fragmented. 
 
  
 
normal' social world. 
intellectual reflection-
indifferent to the thinkers 
reality 
 
  
 
individual sets himself apart 
as the particular above the 
universal 
  
  
 
 
only value is pleasure. 
 
  
 
 'interiority'. 
seeks novelty. 
 
  
 
  
avoids commitment. 
 
  
 
  
rejects social conventions. 
 
  
 
  
 'The Seducer' 
 
Marriage. 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
  
 
  
 
Table 9. Kierkegaard's Stages of Existence. Developed from Carilise (2006) and Earnshaw (2006). 
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APPENDIX 2. WHISTLE BLOWING-SEVEN MAIN THEMES IN THE 
RESEARCH LITERATURE. 
 
  Major theme identified in the Whistleblowing literature; Reference 
1 REPRISALS, RETALIATION, CONSEQUENCES &   
  CENSURE.   
  Fear of reprisals' Gobert & Punch (2000) 
  Retaliation' Yamey (2000) 
  Made to suffer consequences of making concerns known'. Hunt (1995) 
  P.I.D.A. 1998-Conclusion that a doctor acting today as   
  Dr Bolsin did would not be protected by PIDA. Dehn (2001) 
  "There is a real fear among junior staff (particularly    
  amongst junior doctors and nurses that to comment on p.273 paras 28-29 
  colleagues, particularly consultants, is to endanger their Learning from Bristol  
  future work prospects" (2001). 
  Dr Koos Stiekema-huge damages against him for   
  whistleblowing on pharmaceutical company-£550.000. Sheldon (2002) 
  Significant damage to their careers' Dr Peter Dawson-after   
  raising concerns about the safety of patients. Dyer (1999b) 
  Graham Pink & Helen Zeitlin-both lost their jobs after    
  raising their concerns. Vickers (1999) 
  What is particularly alarming about this case is that,   
  even after it became apparent that many children had   
  possibly died unnecessarily as a result of the alleged   
  incompetence of the two surgeons, there was still an    
  abundance of censure for Stephen Bolsin. Klein (1998) 
  Fear of reprimand may be a factor in preventing nurses   
  reporting incidents which were a potential risk to   
  patients, whether or not they themselves were responsible. Walker & Lowe (1998) 
  Research with whistleblowing professionals point to their   
  feelings of fear & vulnerability, together with a conviction   
  that nothing would change anyway. Hunt & Shailer (1995) 
  the courage, persistence, and career sacrifice required of   
  a person who is prepared to step out of line in the interests   
  of patients have been clearly shown Dyer (1998) 
  Main reason for nurses not whistleblowing 'fear of    
  retribution'. Firth-Cozens et al (2003) 
  Dr Nancy Olivieri-professional competence, personal   
  lifestyle and mental stability all brought into question   
  for whistleblowing on adverse data on a drug. Schafer (2007) 
  Dr Aubrey Blumsohn (Sheffield university) punished with   
  demotion, suspension &/or dismissal. Baty (2005) 
 
 
 
 
 
   
. 
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  Major theme identified in the Whistleblowing literature. Reference 
2 
PERSONAL EXPERIENCES/PSYCHOLOGICAL 
IMPACT   
      
  Experiences of distress, isolation' Hunt & Shailer (1995) 
  Economic & emotional deprivation' Hewison & Sim (1998) 
  Victimisation'   
  Personal abuse' Leannane (1993) 
  Ostracised by Co-workers' Vinten (1994) 
  Stephen Bolsin-he emigrated to Australia in 1996    
  because he felt so ostracised by the British Medical   
  establishment. Dyer (1999a) 
  94% of whistleblowers & 92% of non-whistleblowers   
  suffered stress-related emotional problems-anger, anxiety,   
  disillusionment.   
  Non-whistleblowers suffered a higher percentage of   
  emotional health problems, especially feelings of guilt, McDonald & Ahern 
  shame, and unworthiness. (2000). 
  Trust, experiencing intimidation and ostracism by other   
  members of staff. CHI (2000) 
   
   
  Major theme identified in the Whistleblowing literature. Reference 
3 CLOSED DOORS, SECRECY & SILENCE   
  things best dealt with in private & behind closed doors'   
  culture of openness discouraged' Smith (1994) 
  Public Interest Disclosure Act (1998)- disclosure must be   
  made in 'good faith'. (May prevent cases being disclosed). PIDA (1998) 
  Good faith'-"mixed motives may be very easy to attribute P.141 para 194. 
  to any potential whistleblower and would prevent protection Learning from Bristol 
  under this section" (2001). 
  free speech has probably never existed within the NHS'. p.1644 (1994) 
  Ritchie found 'considerable reluctance' amongst    
  nursing staff to cooperate with her Inquiry into Rodney   
  Ledward. Some nurses refused to attend it at all, and one D.O.H. (2000) 
  who did was told by another nurse 'more the fool you'. Wakefield et al. (1999) 
  It is known that considerable under-reporting of error takes 
Firth-Cozens & 
Greenhalgh 
  place. (1997). 
  There is a tension between 'Confidentiality' and 'Public   
  Interest'. Gobert & Punch (2000) 
  Duty of confidentiality vs. Duty of care. White (2006) 
   
   
   
   
   
   
. 
 
427 
  Major theme identified in the Whistleblowing literature. Reference 
4 NOT LISTENED TO   
  Unheard warnings are particularly worrying'. Treasure (1998) 
  Consultant anaesthetist in Bristol "blew the whistle" but Irving,Berwick,Treasure 
  was disregarded. (1998). 
  Reviewing the eight critical occasions when Dr Bolsin    
  raised his concerns'. Dehn (2001) P1. 
  Research with whistleblowing professionals point to their   
  feelings of fear and vulnerability, together with a conviction   
  that nothing would change anyway. Hunt & Shailer (1995) 
  endemic feeling' among nurses that 'nothing could be   
  done'. Davidson (1998) 
  Twenty years of oral and written expressions of concern   
  by Dr McIndoe. Cartwright (1988) 
  Failure among management to listen to the concerns   
  of student nurses led to the sustained abuse of patients. CHI (2000) 
  Whistle blowers had an extremely difficult time within the   
  Trust, experiencing intimidation and ostracism by other   
  members of staff. CHI (2000) 
   
   
  Major theme identified in the Whistleblowing literature. Reference 
5 DYNAMICS OF POWER   
  The difficulties he (Dr Bolsin) encountered reveal both the   
  territorial loyalties and boundaries within the culture of P.161. para18. 
  medicine and the NHS and also the realities of power and Learning from Bristol 
  influence. (2001). 
  He was also concerned that both Organons' arbiters had   
  links with the company and, he felt, could not be guaranteed p.1240 
  to give an entirely independent view'. Shelson (2002) 
  Sir Donald Irvine acknowledges there is still a long way to   
  go in tackling the issues of poor medical performance head Medicopolitical Digest 
  on'. (1999) P.1505 
  Wrongdoing is more likely to be terminated when whistle   
  blowers have greater power-reflected in legitimacy of their Miceli & Near (2002) 
  roles and the support of others.   
  Cultural differences. Chinese are more likely to report Zhuang, Thomas & 
  unethical acts of peers than Canadians. Miller (2005) 
  Organisations are deeply threatened by what Kant
 
called    
  ethical autonomy (Mündigkeit). Alford (1999) 
  Civilian status demonstrates significant negative  Rothwell & Baldwin  
  relationships with whistle-blowing. (2006). 
  Both the patients and nurses stated that for reasons Vaartio & Suominen 
  of personality, not all nurses wanted to advocate. (2006). 
   
   
   
   
   
. 
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  Major theme identified in the Whistleblowing literature. Reference 
6 EXTERNAL CONTROL/EXTERNAL MORALITY   
  The General Medical Council 'Duties of a Doctor' now   
  places a professional responsibility on doctors to report a   
  colleague suspected of being unfit to practice. GMC (1998) 
  Following Bristol, plans to publish hospital mortality   
  league tables. Introducing Commission for Health   
  Improvement (CHI) to inspect hospitals. Blumenthal (1996) 
  UK Consensus Statement on undergraduate teaching of   
  medical ethics and law, recommends whistle blowing as a  Consensus Statement 
  core curricular topic. (1998). 
  Kohlberg (1975) defined six stages, claims the majority of   
  professional people respond to ethical dilemmas at Second    
  level-Conformity to majority behaviour. Kohlberg (1975) 
  McAalpine Level 1. Traditional response, in which response   
  focussed on obedience to others. Only Level 3 challenges McAlpine et al. 
  unethical practices. (1997). 
  Current health care systems continue to promote and  Erlen & Frost (1991). 
  reward 'traditional' behaviours in nurses, and that nurses  McDonald (1994). 
  feel powerless to alter the status quo. Mohr (1996) 
    Corley & Goren (1998) 
  Whistleblowers agreed more strongly with the advocacy    
  statements and non-whistleblowers agreed more strongly Aahern & McDonald 
  with the traditional statements-deference to the doctor. (2002). 
  More first-year students felt that they should report another   
  students misconduct to faculty, this proportion declines over  Rennie & Crosby 
  the years. (2002). 
  Nurses who blew the whistle on misconduct tended   
  to support the beliefs inherent in patient advocacy, while   
  non-whistleblowers retained a belief in the traditional role  
Ahern & McDonald 
(2002) 
  of nursing   
   
   
  Major theme identified in the Whistleblowing literature. Reference 
7 INTERNAL CONTROL/INTERNAL MORALITY   
  ability to self regulate is integral to the definition of a Calman (1994) 
  profession. Boland (1995) 
  little improvement in students performance as they    
  progressed through the medical curriculum, in terms of   
  their proposed behaviour on meeting the whistle blowing   
  scenario. Reason for this was thought to be student's   
  own personal values/morality. Goldie et al. (2003) 
  In the undergraduate setting there is a responsibility for   
  training in health care professionalism, which involves   
  self-regulation. Jennings (1991). 
. 
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APPENDIX 3. Overview of the Legal Process. 
 
Case; Chester v Afshar 
    
    
Appellate  Queen's Bench Division 
History; Chester v Afshar 
    
  Affirmed by 
  Court of Appeal (Civil Division) 
  Chester v Afshar 
  [2002] EWCA Civ 724; [2003] Q.B. 356 
  Affirmed by 
  House of Lords 
  Chester v Afshar 
  [2004] UKHL 41 
Legislation   
Cited;   
    
    
    
    
    
Significant  Chappel v Hart 
Cases Cited; [1999] Lloyd's Rep. Med. 223 
  Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd 
  [2002] UKHL 22 
  Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee 
  [1957] 1 W.L.R. 
    
Judgement; [2002] Court of Appeal (Civil Division) 
  His Honour Judge Robert Taylor 
  Lady Justice Hale 
  Sir Christopher Slade 
  Sir Denis Henry 
Final  Appeal dismissed 
Decision; Application for appeal to the House of Lords- 
  refused. 
Judgement; [2004] House of Lords. 
  Lord Bingham of Cornhill-Allow 
  Lord Steyn-Dismiss 
  Lord Hoffman -Allow appeal-dismiss action 
  Lord Hope of Craighead-Dismiss 
  Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe-Dismiss 
Final    
Decision; 3; 2 Dismiss the Appeal. 
 
 
Table 1. Chester v Afshar. 
 
. 
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APPENDIX 3. Overview of the Legal Process. 
 
 
 
Case; Gregg v Scott 
Appellate  Court of Appeal (Civil Division) 
History; Gregg v Scott 
  [2002] EWCA Civ 1471 
  Affirmed by 
  House of Lords 
  Gregg v Scott 
  [2005] UKHL 2 
Legislation Administration of Justice Act 1982 (C.53) S.4. 
Cited; Fatal Accidents Act 1976 (C 30) S.1. 
  Fatal Accidents Act 1976 S.1. (1). 
  Supreme Court Act 1981 (C.54) S.32A. 
Significant  Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd. 
Cases Cited; [2002] UKHL 22 
  Hotson v East Berkshire HA 
  [1987] A.C. 750 
Judgement; Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead - Allow 
  Lord Hoffman - Dismiss 
  Lord Hope of Craighead - Allow 
  Lord Philips of Worth Matravers - Dismiss 
  Baroness Hale of Richmond - Dismiss. 
Final  3; 2 Dismiss the Appeal. 
Decision;   
 
 
 
Table 2. Gregg v Scott. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
. 
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APPENDIX 3. Overview of the Legal Process. 
 
 
Case; Hotson v Fitzgerald and Others 
  Queen's Bench Division 
  [1985] 1 W.L.R. 1036 
Appellate  Queen's Bench Division 
History; Hotson v East Berkshire HA 
  [1985] 1 W.L.R. 1036 
  Affirmed by 
  Court of Appeal (Civil Division) 
  Hotson v East Berkshire HA 
  [1987] 2 W.L.R. 287 
  Reversed by 
  Hotson v East Berkshire HA 
Legislation Administration of Justice Act 1982 (c.53) s.3 
Cited; Administration of Justice Act 1982 (c.53) s.3(1) 
Significant  Barnett v Chelsea and Kensington Hospital Management Committee 
Cases Cited; [1969] 1 Q.B. 428 
  Clark v MacLennan 
  [1983] 1 All E.R. 416; (QBD) 
  Davies v Taylor 
  [1974] A.C. 207 
  Kenyon v Bell 
  1953 S.C. 125 
  Latchford v Spedeworth International 
   (1984) 134 N.L.J. 36; (QBD) 
  McGhee v National Coal Board 
  Robinson v Post Office 
  [1974] 1 W.L.R. 1176 
  Swanson v Hanneson 
  (1972) 26 D.L.R. (3d) 201; (0) 
  Sykes v Midland Bank Executor & Trustee Co Ltd 
  [1971] 1 Q.B. 113; [1970] 3 W.L.R. 273; [1970] 2 All E.R. 471; (1970) 114 S.J. 225; (CA (Civ Div)) 
  Sykes v Midland Bank Executor & Trustee Co Ltd 
  [1971] 1 Q.B. 113 
 
 
Table 3. Hotson v Fitzgerald. 
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APPENDIX 3. Overview of the Legal Process. 
Case; Denise Lynn Merelie v Newcastle Primary Care Trust 
  Denise Lynn Merelie v Newcastle Primary Care Trust & Others 
Appellate  [2004] EWHL 2554 (QB) Justice Eady-Dismiss the claims in both actions led by Merelie 
History; [2006] EWHL 150 (QB) High Court of Justice Queens Bench Division. Mr Justice Tugendhat 
  [2006] EWHC 1433 (QB) Mr Justice Underhill-Application for permission to appeal - refused. 
  [2007] EWCA Civ.171. Supreme Court of Judicature. Court of Appeal (Civil Division), on appeal from  
  the High Court of Justice Queen's Bench Division- Lord Justice Pill- Application to appeal -refused. 
Legislation Employment Rights Act 1996 Part iv. 
Cited; Management of Health & Safety at Work Regulations 1999 (S.1. 1999 3242) reg.3 
  Protection from Harassment Act 1977 S.1. 
  Protection from Harassment Act 1977 (c.40) S.1. 
  Protection from Harassment Act 1977 (c.40) S.7. 
  Human Rights Act 1998 ( C 42) 
Significant  Malik v Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA 
Cases Cited; [1998] A.C. 20 
  Horrocks v Lowe 
  [1975] A.C. 135 
  Bolitho and Others v City and Hackney Health Authority 
Appellate  Court of Appeal (Civil Division) 
History; [1993] P.I.Q.R. P334 
  Affirmed by 
  House of Lords 
Legislation   
Cited;   
Significant  Bolitho (Deceased) v City and Hackney HA 
Cases Cited; [1998] A.C. 232 
  Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee 
  [1957] 1 W.L.R. 582 
  Hunter v. Hanley [1955] S.L.T. 23. 
Judgement; [1993] P.I.Q.R. P334 Court of Appeal. 
  Lord Dillon-Dismiss 
  Lord Farquharson-Dismiss 
  Lord Simon-Brown-Allow 
Final  2;1 Dismiss the Appeal 
Decision; Leave granted to appeal to the House of Lords 
Judgement; [1997] 3 W.L.R. 1151. House of Lords. 
  Lord Browne-Wilkinson-Dismiss 
  Lord Slynn-Dismiss 
  Lord Nolan-Dismiss 
  Lord Hoffmann-Dismiss 
  Lord Clyde-Dismiss 
Final    
Decision; Unanimous-Dismiss the Appeal 
Judgement; Supreme Court of Judicature Court of Appeal. 
Final    
Decision; Appeal refused. 
 
Table 4. Merelie v Newcastle Primary Care Trust. 
 
. 
 
433 
APPENDIX 3. Overview of the Legal Process. 
 
 
Case; R.( on the application of Rogers)  
  v Swindon NHS Primary Care Trust 
Appellate  [2006] EWHC 171 (Admin)High Court of Justice Queen's Bench Division  
History; Administrative Court 
  Reversed by; 
  [2006] EWCA Civ 392 R.(on the application of Rogers v Swindon NHS  
  Primary Care Trust 
  Court of Appeal (Civil Division) 
Legislation National Health Service Act 1977 (C.49) 
Cited; National Health Service (Functions of Strategic Health Authorities and 
  Primary Care Trusts and Administration Arrangements) (England)  
  Regulations 2002 (S1 2002 2375) 
Significant  R. v North Derbyshire HA Ex p. Fisher 
Cases Cited; (1998) 10 Admin. L.R. 27 
  R. v North West Lancashire HA Ex p. A 
  [2000] 1 W.L.R. 977 
Judgement; [2006] EWHC 171 (Admin)High Court of Justice Queen's Bench Division  
  Administrative Court 
  The Hon. Mr Justice Bean; 
Final  Sir Anthony Clarke MR; Lord Justice Brooke Vice President; Lord Justice Buxton; 
Decision; Policy adopted by the PCT was irrational and unlawful 
 
 
 
Table 5. R. (Rogers) v Swindon NHS Primary Care Trust. 
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APPENDIX 4. Denise Lynn Merelie. Complex Legal Case History. 
  Merelie v. Newcastle Primary Care Trust-Summary of events.  
         
(Claimant has a history of poor conduct to both patients and staff prior to 1999.)       
      February -August 1999.  
October 1999.     Claimant 6 months sickness due to Mr Fergusons 
Claimant lodges a grievance against Mr Ferguson.       conduct.    
           
22 November 1999. (1).           
Tracey Welbury (dentist) letter to Mr F.re Claimants        
'unprofessional conduct at Benwell primary school'.       
          
25 November 1999. (2).           
Helen Nagaj (dentist) letter to Mr F. re Claimants    January 2000.   
'fitness to practice'.     Grievance dismissed by Jill Prendergast (Manager). 
          
14  March 2000.(3)           
4 Dental nurses lodged complaint under formal       
Grievance procedure against the Claimant.       
          
March 2000. (3).       21 June 2000.   
Written statements from nurses supporting   Jill Prendergast meets Claimant & gives copies of 
Grievance.      the nurse’s statements. No action taken-letter. 
      (Nurses reassured-no longer have to work with  
Claimant obtains statements from other nurses   Claimant).    
to vindicate herself.           
      3 July 2000.   
      Jill Prendergast meets Claimant and tells her to 
August 2000.       stop canvassing for statements.  
Claimant continue to solicit for supportive        
statements.      1 September 2000.   
      Formal disciplinary procedure-Claimant Suspended. 
September & October 2000.        
Disciplinary investigation.           
          
30 January 2001.           
Claimant writes to Trust making formal complaint    8 March 2001.   
against 4 nurses & 2 dentists.(Counter-claim to 1,2,   Disciplinary Investigation Report.  
3, above)      Recommends-referral to a Disciplinary Hearing. 
          
      2 & 3 May 2001.   
      Disciplinary Hearing decision-Claimant should be  
      Dismissed.    
          
      4 & 5 September 2001.   
      Appeal of above decision & Full re-hearing. 
          
      7 September 2001.   
      Letter informs Claimant-the dismissal decision  
      was upheld.   
. 
 
435 
          
      October 2002.   
      Claimant has a campaign for an Investigation; 
      Writes to the Press, MP. General Dental Council, 
      Chief Executives' of Trusts.  
      January 2003.   
       Final letter from the Chief Executive of the Strategic  
      Health Authority   
12 June 2003.         
First Action-Newcastle County Court.        
Defendant is Newcastle Primary C.NHS Trust.      
          
10 November 2003.          
Second Action-First Defendant is Newcastle PC.  7 June 2005.   
NHS T. & large number of individual employees or    The two Actions have been ordered to be tried  
officers of the Trust are also Defendants.  together.    
          
      20 June - 11 April 2006.   
      High Court (QBD).Claims in both actions-Dismissed. 
      Permission to Appeal-Refused.  
      (The analysis covers the details of this Hearing)  
          
      2 March 2007.   
      Supreme Court of Judicature Court of Appeal. 
     Appeal refused.   
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 APPENDIX 5. GENEALOGY OF EXISTENTIALISM.     
       
   Forerunners;    
       
   Biblical Text (St Paul c3-c66)    
   St.Augustine (354-386)    
   St Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274)    
   Socrates (469-399BC)    
   Michel Eyquem de Montaigne (1533-1592)    
 
 
 
 
 Blaise Pascal (1623-1662)    
       
       
Time-frame Philosophy;      
  Theology; Literature; Psychology; Art;  
1800 Søren Kierkegaard (1813-1855)  Fyodor Dostoyevsky (1821-1881)    
 Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche (1844-1900) Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche (1844-1900)  Paul Cezanne 
          (1839-1906) 
1850 Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) 
Nikolay Berdyayev (1874-1948) 
(P) Franz Kafka (1883- 1924) Carl Jung (1875-1961) Alberto Giacomette 
 Karl Jaspers (1883-1969) (T) Martin Buber (1878-1965)  Jacob Moreno (1889-1974) Henri Michaux 
 Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) Rudolf Bultmann (1884-1976)   Francis Gruber 
  Paul Tillich (1886-1965)     
    Gabriel Marcel (1889-1973)         
1900 Jean Paul Sartre (1905-1980)  André Malraux (1901-1976) Erich Fromm (1900-1980)   
 Simone De Beauvoir (1908-1986)  Jean Paul Sartre (1905-1980) Carl Rogers (1902-1987)   
 Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961)  Samuel Beckett (1906-1989) Victor Frankl (1905-1997) (E)   
 Albert Camus (1913-1960)  Eugène Ionesco (1909-1994) George Kelly (1905-1967) (Phn)  
   Albert Camus (1913-1960) Abraham Maslow (1908-1970)   
T=Philosophy of Transcendence influenced Theology Arthur Miller(1915-2005) Rollo May (1909-1994) (E)    
P= Philosopher  Walker Percy (1916-1990) (K) Ronald Laing (1927-1989)   
K= Kierkegaard. Traces of his thought.  Norman Mailer (1923- )    
E=Existentialist Psychology  John Updike (1932- ) (K)    
Phn=Phenomenology  John Barth (1930 -)    
 
   
. 
 
437 
 
